M10 Booker Combat Vehicle / Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF)

[Christopher Wang]

If the US Army had adopted a tracked vehicle such as the Bionix or MTVL instead of the wheeled LAV III for its Interim Armored Vehicle or IAV in the early 2000s, the M10 Booker could have found its place as the Mobile Gun System for the Medium (i.e. Stryker) Brigade Combat Teams.

 

[Josh_TN]

Unless you're saying combined arms is out of the game, no the mission is still there. Booker was made to supplement Abrams attachments in leg infantry. The justification was that it would be able to do the same for far less money. Now that has been proven untrue.

IMO, if they wanted a platform for fire support, a breach loading 120mm gun/mortar with a Bradley level of protection (not necessarily based on that hull) was the better option. I do not know why the U.S. has always insisted on high velocity tank guns for this roll; they did not even used make a 105mm HE (did they start for MGS?), just HEAT. A 105mm HeAT round is a poor support weapon and a high velocity gun is an unneeded amount of vehicle weight. A low velocity gun/mortar would be lighter and have the virtue of operating as indirect fire when ever not needed for direct fire support.

 

[Josh_TN]

Not for less money, for less weight.
Which was true, but broken development process ensured that it somehow became insufficiently less, and until last moment everyone pretended that it's something to be proud of.

It became a medium tank adopted for the fire support role, with Abrams being the heavy. People do not want to call it a tank, but it’s doing everything tank, just a bit less so. A fire support vehicle does not need an HV tank gun if it’s role is actually fire support.

 

[Josh_TN]

If the US Army had adopted a tracked vehicle such as the Bionix or MTVL instead of the wheeled LAV III for its Interim Armored Vehicle or IAV in the early 2000s, the M10 Booker could have found its place as the Mobile Gun System for the Medium (i.e. Stryker) Brigade Combat Teams.

The mediums were always going to be wheeled; there were too many maintenance and operational mobility advantages.

 

[Ainen]

It became a medium tank adopted for the fire support role, with Abrams being the heavy. People do not want to call it a tank, but it’s doing everything tank, just a bit less so. A fire support vehicle does not need an HV tank gun if it’s role is actually fire support.

I personally have no problems with medium tank.
As for HV gun...well, yes. But the whole world's armored thinking for 80 years is driven by Fulda fantoms.
One of major selling points of M10 was that through 105mm gun it kept excellent ready ammo storage.

 

[Desertfox]

There's tons of OTS wheeled options out there. Go and buy one. Heck the 9 ton Panhard ERC can do like 90% of the job

 

[isayyo2]

If the US Army had adopted a tracked vehicle such as the Bionix or MTVL instead of the wheeled LAV III for its Interim Armored Vehicle or IAV in the early 2000s, the M10 Booker could have found its place as the Mobile Gun System for the Medium (i.e. Stryker) Brigade Combat Teams.

No, the M8 was coupled with the MTVL as part of United Defense’s initial bid for the IAV program. United Defense latter offered a 90mm and 105mm turret solution on the MTVL to drive up platform commonality.

Interim Armored Vehicle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

If the Army adopted a tracked platform for the IAV, why would they decided to buy a platform 20 years later with zero commonality to the MTVL or Bionix? The IAV and MPF requirements have very little in common - may you please explain your speculation in more detail?

 

[shin_getter]

Here comes a new challenger!

Combat Proven as a infantry support vehicle, well known to crews
Compact design, can fit many within tight volumes however still have good crew space.
Only 32tons, good growth margin
105mm gun with plentiful 66 rounds

*raid your local museum today*

But Javelins are really damn expensive to use to blow up a bunker, while a 105mm HEP or HEAT shell is cheap.

Missiles can be very cheap if one stop goldplating it with even more pen-aids since no bunker is going to have APS + complex armor + Ewar system. Something like Navair spike or laser guided rocket with thermobaric warhead would do most of the job. I mean there is laser guided carl gustav too, and FPV easily cut below 1k and not more than 5k with fiber.

The real problem is that munitions are new and orphaned, while new vehicles seems to drive procurement crazy. Its like how long range precision fires drove FCS while FOGM just gets forgotten.

Unless you're saying combined arms is out of the game, no the mission is still there.

We all know combined arms involves spearman core, flanking cavalry and archer backline like how warfare have worked for thousand of years.... oh wait

It isn't that a single arm can do everything, but which arms are you combining here?

 

[yeetmahboi]

Not for less money, for less weight.
Which was true, but broken development process ensured that it somehow became insufficiently less, and until last moment everyone pretended that it's something to be proud of.

40 tons v 70 tons on paper but there's nothing in between so the 70 tons uses the exact same transporter and ARV as the 70 ton. The weight difference isn't that impactful.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

We all know combined arms involves spearman core, flanking cavalry and archer backline like how warfare have worked for thousand of years.... oh wait

We’ll also conveniently ignore the transportation issues of deploying a meaningful number of M10s. Let’s not get caught up in details when we’re going to deploy armor by air! Yahoooooo!

 

[yeetmahboi]

It isn't that a single arm can do everything, but which arms are you combining here?

Armour and leg infantry, as the precedent.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It seems to me this mission could be met with UAVs/loitering munitions with far more operational/strategic mobility and less cost. 105mm is a lot cheaper that a switchblade 600, but the M10 itself is a pricey object. The new UAV/sniper/ATGW companies the Army is putting together seem like a better match for a light formation.

Also in an era of drop GPS guided kits for 155mm, I question how much added value a much more vulnerable direct fire platform brings to a light formation.

There's a doctrinal and operational need for direct fire HE in support of leg infantry operations.

Remember that the cost of UAVs etc adds up quickly. Let's say that the Booker costs $10mil. If the UAVs are $100k each, that means that only 100 UAV shots equal the cost of one Booker. ~1 day in combat, going by WW2 standards. Not sure how that lines up with Russo-Ukrainian war, I'm going to guess that it's slowed down a little.

That's less than 3 combat loads of ammo in a Booker, 5 loads in the M8.

 

[jsport]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1661003235774320641

View: https://x.com/ronkainen7k15/status/1661003235774320641?s=19


Personally, an M8er but...

 

[shin_getter]

There's a doctrinal and operational need for direct fire HE in support of leg infantry operations.

Remember that the cost of UAVs etc adds up quickly. Let's say that the Booker costs $10mil.

This is a valid form of argument and a good one at 1990, but not with munition costs at 2025.

A PGK 155mm guidance package is like $15k, plus the ammo probably <$18k. A improvised FPV is <$1k (workable if you have anti-radiation or that opponent don't have broadband EW) and a fiber optics guided drone-missile is also <5k. A NAVAIR Spike missile is also in the $5k region and I'm sure you can look up other cheap infantry missiles by other venders.

So for the cost of booker you can get something on the order of 2000 rounds of cheap infantry missiles, or more than 40 tank loads. Now the tank, its ammo, fuel, support and other logistics is not free so it is not like you are gaining if you fired more than 40 full loads.

It is not impossible to imagine a conflict where 40 full loads can be shot, but it is also easy to see that in other conflict the life expectancy is not even one full load, like pushing up the Ukraine-Russian front in 2025. Conversely, in low intensity conflict the average tank might not face enough opponents to shoot a full load for the entire duration of the conflict.

What is extremely unlikely however, is a conflict which rapid air deployment is required and large ammo loads is needed and ammo cost efficiency is important. A 42ton vehicle is itself can translate to a thousand round of infantry missiles and packing that into an airlifter is providing massively more firepower faster. If rapid action is necessary than ammo cost efficiency is not a major issue since the expected duration of conflict is short and thus affordable.

The kind of conflict which I think tanks are "optimal" is against low end threats like Gaza/Syria (both lacking in AT weapons) in urban warfare where entire cities are demolished room by room by direct fire since tanks can indeed fire more than 40 loads in a campaign and tank shells are indeed very cheap and efficient for the role. I do not think these kind of conflict are fast enough for air deployment.

 

[Ainen]

I don't think it's about price. At least not about price of engagement.

Pgk(fpv, whatever) is used against discovered position. Fpv, of course, can search, but hide'n'seek is still quite easy to win (for humans). Especially humans with their own technical means of observation.

In too many cases in ground warfare, position is discovered(and valid) only when it fires.

Engaging it minutes later will only result in casualties and broken pace of attack, and there's no guarantee that enemy will even still be in that window and won't change position.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Exactly.

The MPF needed to fit within the existing IBCT logistics/engineering support. Needed to be recoverable from a HEMTT Wrecker, uses the same bridges as the HEMTT PLS, etc. It can probably be supported off a HEMTT workshop vehicle, or maybe the M113-based wrenchmobile (I guess it'd be an AMPV-based wrenchmobile now).

Fitter vehicles aren't budgeted for, unfortunately.

For some reason it also needed to be "protected," and the chassis they chose was really volume inefficient, which meant high mass. An M8 AGS with reactive armor would have been lighter for the same protection. Could probably have a baseline protection level of 14.5mm or 30mm APCBC, and addon armor of PG-29, without breaching 25 tons. So not much heavier than an -A2 Bradley.

US were involved in counter insurgency wars.
The problem at hand is that deployable infantry brigades are weak against peers. Tank company gives them weight in defense, and at least some field offensive&ground maneuver capability.

Shipment of abrams over via sea to, i don't know, Philippines, should the need for land operations there arise, will already be accepted by a PLA liason officer.

IBCTs would be working fine in Ukraine. ABCTs not so much, because tanks cannot survive in a battlefield saturated with anti-tank weapons, as is consistently hammered home by the only LSCO in the world. Tanks in Ukraine are used as ersatz howitzers or infantry guns, firing from several kilometers, and IFVs similarly. Actual attacks are done dismounted or with light armor vehicles or trucks like MRAPs. Strykers might be a good middle ground, if they were cheap, but they're not.

That is the standard by which America should be thinking about a war with the PRC. It's two near-peer states clobbering each other. Unfortunately America is thinking in terms of Cold War fights, when really it should be thinking more European, and purchasing IMVs built on FMTV and MRAPs for the IBCTs.

It became a medium tank adopted for the fire support role, with Abrams being the heavy. People do not want to call it a tank, but it’s doing everything tank, just a bit less so. A fire support vehicle does not need an HV tank gun if it’s role is actually fire support.

The actual problem is that a 40+ tonner and a 60+ tonner have functionally zero difference in logistics requirements and strategic mobility, which was ostensibly the main reason behind the MPF, because just giving an IBCT an M1 tank company is "silly" or something. You might need an extra fueler or two to support an Abrams company compared to a diesel Booker company I guess? Have fun with the Hercules section, the contact trucks, and the HETs.

At that point you might as well just use an Abrams anyway since you can only bring one Booker by Globemasters anyway.

Meanwhile AGS was already designed exactly for this job, air drops aside, because it was the intended fire support vehicle of the original BCTs from 9th MTZ going back to the 1970s. A nice, compact, relatively mobile vehicle under 25-tons, with protection from 30mm fire and PG-7VL, and you could get PG-29/PG-7VR protection with modern armor schemes for a similar mass. Unfortunately, AGS is cursed to wander the Earth forever.

Whoever let Booker go through instead of XM1302 should be fired.

 

[Josh_TN]

There's a doctrinal and operational need for direct fire HE in support of leg infantry operations.

Remember that the cost of UAVs etc adds up quickly. Let's say that the Booker costs $10mil. If the UAVs are $100k each, that means that only 100 UAV shots equal the cost of one Booker. ~1 day in combat, going by WW2 standards. Not sure how that lines up with Russo-Ukrainian war, I'm going to guess that it's slowed down a little.

That's less than 3 combat loads of ammo in a Booker, 5 loads in the M8.

Now add in all the logistics of an M10 on top of that, and factor in how it all gets there. How many Switchblade 600s can I fit on a C-17? Because we know its only one M10.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

It's two near-peer states clobbering each other. Unfortunately America is thinking in terms of Cold War fights,

Gobbledygook.

What is different in “two near-peer…” vs “Cold War fights?”

 

[Kat Tsun]

Gobbledygook.

What is different in “two near-peer…” vs “Cold War fights?”

A Cold War era formation, or equipment set built around heavy mechanized formations, wouldn't last a year in Ukraine.

This is evidenced by the fact that it did not, in fact, last a year in Ukraine. By March 2023, the Russians were using Chechen War-era assault detachments with about 20-40 dismounts for a company sized formation. This resembles more WW1 than WW2, because the drone problem is essentially unsolvable under combat conditions, and produces lethal reconnaissance-fires complexes at the company level.

The U.S. Army would do better to break apart all but maybe six to eight ABCTs, and distribute their armor among IBCTs, as separate companies and fire support groups. Equip the IBCTs with MRAPs and IMVs that can be protected against light mortar splinter and medium machine guns. Get rid of most of the self-propelled guns in favor of towed pieces, or at least CAESAR-likes, and train the infantry to attack on foot in very small groups.

That's the only way to fight a modern war at present. The lethality and low cost of lightweight drone systems makes anything less impossible. The actual thing that will happen is the U.S. Army either won't do anything in the next war or it will take immense casualties before adopting something similar to what the Ukrainians have: light motorized formations in MRAPs and IMVs backed by the occasional tank platoon per company.

The really funny part is this would look a lot like the U.S. Marines in Fallujah when they were being followed by the Iraqi police.

 

[Ainen]

IBCTs would be working fine in Ukraine. ABCTs not so much, because tanks cannot survive in a battlefield saturated with anti-tank weapons, as is consistently hammered home by the only LSCO in the world. Strykers might be a good middle ground, if they were cheap, but they're not because apparently an armored truck is a wheelbase too far.

IBCT needs counterattack capabilities.
In Ukraine, both sides hold front not with just drones and firepower, but above all with counterattacks which dislodge weakened attacker. This action faces all the same problems as attack, just against softer enemy with somewhat lesser rotary firepower(further away from his initial point). This needs proper armor.
Any offensive capability(which will at least force opponent to pay attention to one) requires the same. Ability to maneuver in terra nulis (say, Philippines after initial redfor ambphbious/airborne landings) requires the same, as initial Kursk operations shown very well. Column of JLTVs can be utterly devastated by as much as an APC with automatic gun.


IBCT without counterattack capability (counterattacking on foot across the field or in JLTVs?) will collapse very soon.

 

[Josh_TN]

A Cold War era formation, or equipment set built around heavy mechanized formations, wouldn't last a year in Ukraine.

This is evidenced by the fact that it did not, in fact, last a year in Ukraine. By March 2023, the Russians were using Chechen War-era assault detachments with about 20-40 dismounts for a company sized formation. This resembles more WW1 than WW2, because the drone problem is essentially unsolvable under combat conditions, and produces lethal reconnaissance-fires complexes at the company level.

The U.S. Army would do better to break apart all but maybe six to eight ABCTs, and distribute their armor among IBCTs, as separate companies and fire support groups. Equip the IBCTs with MRAPs and IMVs that can be protected against light mortar splinter and medium machine guns. Get rid of most of the self-propelled guns in favor of towed pieces, or at least CAESAR-likes, and train the infantry to attack on foot in very small groups.

That's the only way to fight a modern war at present. The lethality and low cost of lightweight drone systems makes anything less impossible. The actual thing that will happen is the U.S. Army either won't do anything in the next war or it will take immense casualties before adopting something similar to what the Ukrainians have: light motorized formations in MRAPs and IMVs backed by the occasional tank platoon per company.

The really funny part is this would look a lot like the U.S. Marines in Fallujah when they were being followed by the Iraqi police.

While UAVs are a new development that will force some changes, I think it is dangerous to assume the current conflict is a template for U.S. operations against a peer, and almost certainly not against a less than peer which is more likely for IBCTs.

It also is not remotely true that Russia BTGs at the beginning of conflict resembled anything like Soviet formations, outside equipment types.

 

[Kat Tsun]

While UAVs are a new development that will force some changes, I think it is dangerous to assume the current conflict is a template for U.S. operations against a peer, and almost certainly not against a less than peer which is more likely for IBCTs.

It also is not remotely true that Russia BTGs at the beginning of conflict resembled anything like Soviet formations, outside equipment types.

The equipment types are the issue, actually. The problems in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kursk were that mechanical mobile forces are too visible and too easily attacked. FPV drones, not "UAVs", are effectively a fiber-optic guided missile for an order of magnitude less cost. They can replicate destructive effects at a company or battalion level that once took a division, or a brigade, coordinating fires with a Joint STARS.

There is no reasonable level of defense suppression that makes an armored company, perhaps even platoon, survive in that kind of environment and the U.S. Army certainly isn't making the improvements necessary in the vehicles to do so either, assuming that's even possible.

The benefit with an MRAP or IMV is the vehicle is cheap enough that you can take losses, because you will take them, and keep attacking regardless. It's a lot better than losing a $8 million main battle tank whose hulls are irreplaceable scarce resources. The U.S. Army may very well find itself in the same situation as Russia and Ukraine: tanks become scarce due to early war losses and IMVs or ISVs dominate the FEBA.

IBCTs are still going to be the dominant form of brigade regardless, along with their Stryker cousins, they just need to be toughed up a bit to not get stopped completely by mortar bombs or land mines. Which is what HMMWV and FMTV have to do. An IMV like the Dingo and a MRAP like the JLTV would be perfect candidates for a light motorized assault unit to replace their LMTVs and HMMWVs respectively..

Chop up half the ABCTs and parcel them out as fire support for the IBCTs, keep half a dozen for 1 AD and 1 CAV to stay armored, and use the armored divisions as a fire brigade to contain enemy penetrations. Attack with IBCTs supported by lots of artillery. Take a trench and keep going. Win, after a few years, of course. That's the face of modern warfare. It's Korea or the Western Front. WW2 and Desert Storm are not happening again unless the enemy doesn't exist.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

The equipment types are the issue, actually. The problems in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kursk were that mechanical mobile forces are too visible and too easily attacked. FPV drones, not "UAVs", are effectively a fiber-optic guided missile for an order of magnitude less cost. They can replicate destructive effects at a company or battalion level that once took a division, or a brigade, coordinating fires with a Joint STARS.

There is no reasonable level of defense suppression that makes an armored company, perhaps even platoon, survive in that kind of environment and the U.S. Army certainly isn't making the improvements necessary in the vehicles to do so either, assuming that's even possible.

The benefit with an MRAP or IMV is the vehicle is cheap enough that you can take losses, because you will take them, and keep attacking regardless. It's a lot better than losing a $8 million main battle tank whose hulls are irreplaceable scarce resources. The U.S. Army may very well find itself in the same situation as Russia and Ukraine: tanks become scarce due to early war losses and IMVs or ISVs dominate the FEBA.

IBCTs are still going to be the dominant form of brigade regardless, along with their Stryker cousins, they just need to be toughed up a bit to not get stopped completely by mortar bombs or land mines. Which is what HMMWV and FMTV have to do. An IMV like the Dingo and a MRAP like the JLTV would be perfect candidates for a light motorized assault unit to replace their LMTVs and HMMWVs respectively..

Chop up half the ABCTs and parcel them out as fire support for the IBCTs, keep half a dozen for 1 AD and 1 CAV to stay armored, and use the armored divisions as a fire brigade to contain enemy penetrations. Attack with IBCTs supported by lots of artillery. Take a trench and keep going. Win, after a few years, of course. That's the face of modern warfare. It's Korea or the Western Front. WW2 and Desert Storm are not happening again unless the enemy doesn't exist.

Active protection systems that can intercept missiles that are of more sturdy construction and far faster than kamikaze drones have existed for years and I'm sure we can make significantly better systems than those. After the dissolution of the USSR nobody in the western world bothered seriously investing in the development and procurement of new short-range air defense systems, that is finally changing based on these new threats.

Main battle tanks may be relatively rare, but irreplaceable? Something is fundamentally wrong if we can't build new ones. "Lightly motorized assault" units sound like a good combination for many failures with horrendous losses of manpower. These days men who are able and willing to fight and competent officers to lead them aren't exactly "disposable" either, if they ever were in the context of history. Trying to wage a war like it's the fighting along the Somme in 1916 but with drones would simply be unacceptable to the general population.

 

[H_K]

There's tons of OTS wheeled options out there. Go and buy one. Heck the 9 ton Panhard ERC can do like 90% of the job

The Panhard Sphinx is what you're looking for...

16-18 tonnes, 3 crew, could take a 3-4t turret with either a 40mm gun + 4x ATGMs or a 105mm low recoil gun. The 6x6 chassis was very compact, measuring only 5.5m long and 1.65m high (13.6 x 5.5ft), excluding turret, and weighed 12-13t. Protection was decent - up to Stanag Level 5 (25mm projectiles) in the front and Level 4 on the sides.

The Panhard SPHINX EBRC Armored Vehicle

The Panhard SPHINX EBRC Armored Vehicle is a new reconnaissance vehicle developed since 2010 for the French Army Project Scorpion. It has a 2 man turret.

tanknutdave.com

https://www.arquus-defense.com/fr/panhard-sphinx

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAQ1MwnbHFc

 

[Bruno Anthony]

A Cold War era formation, or equipment set built around heavy mechanized formations, wouldn't last a year in Ukraine.

This is evidenced by the fact that it did not, in fact, last a year in Ukraine. By March 2023, the Russians were using Chechen War-era assault detachments with about 20-40 dismounts for a company sized formation. This resembles more WW1 than WW2, because the drone problem is essentially unsolvable under combat conditions, and produces lethal reconnaissance-fires complexes at the company level.

The U.S. Army would do better to break apart all but maybe six to eight ABCTs, and distribute their armor among IBCTs, as separate companies and fire support groups. Equip the IBCTs with MRAPs and IMVs that can be protected against light mortar splinter and medium machine guns. Get rid of most of the self-propelled guns in favor of towed pieces, or at least CAESAR-likes, and train the infantry to attack on foot in very small groups.

That's the only way to fight a modern war at present. The lethality and low cost of lightweight drone systems makes anything less impossible. The actual thing that will happen is the U.S. Army either won't do anything in the next war or it will take immense casualties before adopting something similar to what the Ukrainians have: light motorized formations in MRAPs and IMVs backed by the occasional tank platoon per company.

The really funny part is this would look a lot like the U.S. Marines in Fallujah when they were being followed by the Iraqi police.

Let the lessers fight this way. We’ll bring back movement.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Active protection systems that can intercept missiles that are of more sturdy construction and far faster than kamikaze drones

Which aren't in inventory, and won't be in inventory, since DA is moving forward with Trophy and Iron Fist. Check back in 25 years when they decide they need a new APS after losing 5,000 tanks and IFVs to FPV drones or Javelins or whatever. But hey, they'll be safe from Kornets and RPG-29s. At least until someone fires a third round, since most APS are only really good for about two shots before they're disabled, but I'm glad missiles are really hard to make...

...what do you mean the only defense firms consistently getting massive contracts over the past 10 years have been for ammunition?

After the dissolution of the USSR nobody in the western world bothered seriously investing in the development and procurement of new short-range air defense systems, that is finally changing based on these new threats.

Except it hasn't, and the U.S. Army just killed one of their most important air defense platforms for drone defense, obviously.

A missile that barely exists in inventory isn't going to stop a $500 racing drone with a free ICM bomblet or PG-7VL for a nose. A 25mm PABM round for the Bradley would be nice, but that's too sensible. There's no more JLTVs, so say goodbye to 30mm PABM and M230LF, which would have provided SHORAD to mechanized troops if they had stayed in production.

Main battle tanks may be relatively rare, but irreplaceable?

The Abrams hull line was shut down in 1995 and would require about 36 months to restart, assuming the hull production machinery is still in good condition, and the only bottleneck is ballistic welder training. This was discussed by BAE/United Defense back in 2018 as a way to scale orders in response to Crimea and the solution was to cancel DA orders and use those to fill Polish orders instead.

Anyway, by that time the war will be over, so it's a moot point.

"Lightly motorized assault" units sound like a good combination for many failures with horrendous losses of manpower.

Welcome to war, enjoy your stay.

These days men who are able and willing to fight and competent officers to lead them aren't exactly "disposable" either, if they ever were in the context of history. Trying to wage a war like it's the fighting along the Somme in 1916 but with drones would simply be unacceptable to the general population.

Hey, what has Ukraine been most commonly compared to?

Well, the Somme it isn't, besides there being trenches and misery the similarities end, but that's just war. It's more similar to the projected Pentomic battlefield but with hollow charge anti-armor missiles instead of nuclear bombs. If that's the narrative, then America should leave Asia while it still has that choice, because otherwise it's picking a fight it ostensibly doesn't want to win.

Warfare for cunts. Let the lessers fight this way. We’ll bring back movement.

The Russians were saying this as they drove their parade BMDs into Kyiv and Rosguard's riot police led the way.

Thankfully the U.S. Army is quite big, and when the losses of armored forces mount, it will be able to revert rapidly to a sensible force of light motorized infantry backed by heavy armor reserves and small packets of task organized fire support vehicles of M1s or M2s. Ukraine is showing us that even this sort of mechanization isn't a panacea, but it works, unlike the 2014-2022 dynamic of "sending T-72/BMP battalions to their burning deaths with nothing to show for it".

Depending on where the U.S. Army fights in the future, if it's in Mexico, Iran, or the PRC, will shape what sort of losses it'll take. It can probably beat the cartels for a while, maybe smush Iran at least partially, but the PLA would be a hard nut and require several years of tough fighting. MPF wasn't made for that kind of fighting. It isn't actually clear what MPF was made for except to check off incoherent boxes of threshold requirements. AMPV will still have a hot line, at least for a while, but give it another twelve to eighteen months and it will be just as toasted as the M1 after the -A2s finished production.

I suspect we'll end up with a war in the latter half of 2027, maybe push it out to 2030 if there's another global recession, and all those factories we have now just won't be able to do anything due to the current administration's budget cuts. By the time they're fully staffed, and able to make weapons responsively again, we'll be signing the peace treaty. I'm sure GDLS and BAE know this, too.

AM General is smart and continuing apace production of HMMWV and JLTV -A2 until further clarification.

Right now the ball is in Chevy's court and they'll probably start ramping up ISV production for the IBCTs to transition. DOD has paid a ton of attention to how the Russians are fighting, and winning, in Ukraine. They're attacking in fireteam size units against mechanized infantry squad DFPs/trenches and being supported in their attacks by battalion level fire support groups. This is a shift from the last year's (or year before) assault detachments, but not a huge one.

IBCTs replicating this type of "ultra light motorized" formation could see a lot of success in the reconnaissance-fires complex saturated battlefield, but we're probably getting to the point where individual soldiers "attacking" might be noticed at operational-tactical levels anyway, and destroyed by artillery. Eventually, we may see a reversion to marching to objectives several kilometers or miles away, but in multispectral battledress, and stopping every so often to avoid the electric gaze of ground search radar. That's a few decades out still, I think.

Point is that mechanized armor like Bradleys and Abrams are too high profile and easily detected by even third rate armies like Russia. They're still necessary to have but not as an assault force, they're simply too vulnerable at the moment, and it isn't clear if there's any real path forward where they won't be. If there is, it's very far in the future, considering the M1s are just now getting anti-missile systems which existed in the 1990s.

Anyway ask me after the 4th when Hegseth kills M1301, AMPV (for good this time), NGH, XM30, M230LF, FLRAA, and divests the GMVs.

Real leader's army: You only get where you need to go by RUNNING FAST hooah.

 

[Josh_TN]

The danger is not primarily FPV drones, it’s the ISR UAVs that allow FPV drones to focus on large units or worse, call in artillery. For Ukraine these are generally larger copter versions based on civilian designs, and for Russia I think the Orlan10 is still the most prolific. Engaging class 2/3 recon drones is far more important than focusing on every single FPV, though there will need to be some kind of mechanism for both hard and soft kills down to the platoon level as well. The U.S. actually is off to a decent start with its MSHORADS platforms, and hopefully newer types with cheaper hard kill alternatives (time fused 30mm, guided FFRs) is introduced and delivered in larger numbers. There also are a number of counter drone equipment sets being purchased in both static palletized format and as mobile local defense systems with guns, coyote 2s, and EW systems, though I think these are just beginning to field. Ultimately I think we will see the C-UAS mission expand into the “launched effects” portfolio, with versions of the baseline ALTIUS platform developed to detect opposing UAVs and engage them.

The USMC has a number of promising systems it is starting to field in MADIS/LMADIS and MRIC, though again the numbers need to grow much faster.

Would all this be enough against the PLA? Probably not if they are well supplied. It’s hard to imagine that UAVs will not drastically outnumber personnel in the near future, assuming that is not a thing already. But it very well might be enough for almost anyone else, Russia included, and I think the odds of US Army units clashing with PLA units in any major way is pretty remote. The U.S. is not landing in China and if the PLA is landing anywhere in force in a sustainable way, it seems likely the USAF and USN lost the war already.

 

[GruntFox]

Can you elaborate?

From my understanding, the basic gist is that an aircraft's capabilities heavily depend on atmospheric composition*. With climate change, the air composition has changed enough that aircraft capabilities have degraded. In this case, this means ensuring that the C-17 can't fly with two M10s.

Without a new-sheet aircraft (which takes climate change's current and future air composition changes into account), the only way to restore the C-17's capabilities is to install new engines—engines that absolutely don't exist because there is no civilian need for engines far more potent than what the C-17 already has installed.

EDIT:
* Note that this includes what molecules and atoms compose the atmosphere, air temperature, air pressure, and the like. These factors can turn a workable workhorse aircraft into something reduced at best.

 

[Josh_TN]

From my understanding, the basic gist is that an aircraft's capabilities heavily depend on atmospheric composition*. With climate change, the air composition has changed enough that aircraft capabilities have degraded. In this case, this means ensuring that the C-17 can't fly with two M10s.

Without a new-sheet aircraft (which takes climate change's current and future air composition changes into account), the only way to restore the C-17's capabilities is to install new engines—engines that absolutely don't exist because there is no civilian need for engines far more potent than what the C-17 already has installed.

EDIT:
* Note that this includes what molecules and atoms compose the atmosphere, air temperature, air pressure, and the like. These factors can turn a workable workhorse aircraft into something reduced at best.

Lift is weather dependent, with hot and high takeoffs always being more challenging for both helos and fixed wing. But the overall increase in temperature is marginal and the change in composition trivial in terms of density, especially at airlifted altitudes. I would want to see an external source that found the effect to actually be significant.

What global warming will change more significantly is extreme weather patterns that cause temporary, local disruption of operations, be that severe storms or extreme heat in naturally hot regions:

It's So Hot in Phoenix, Planes Can't Take Off | Climate Central

Planes have been grounded in Phoenix as life-threatening heat descends across the Southwest.

www.climatecentral.org

 

[Scott Kenny]

From my understanding, the basic gist is that an aircraft's capabilities heavily depend on atmospheric composition*. With climate change, the air composition has changed enough that aircraft capabilities have degraded. In this case, this means ensuring that the C-17 can't fly with two M10s.

Without a new-sheet aircraft (which takes climate change's current and future air composition changes into account), the only way to restore the C-17's capabilities is to install new engines—engines that absolutely don't exist because there is no civilian need for engines far more potent than what the C-17 already has installed.

EDIT:
* Note that this includes what molecules and atoms compose the atmosphere, air temperature, air pressure, and the like. These factors can turn a workable workhorse aircraft into something reduced at best.

My dude. The atmospheric level of CO2 is measured in Parts Per Million (currently ~425ppm or so). If aircraft are getting screwed over by a 0.425% change in composition, something is very wrong in physics.

I'd believe temperatures causing issues, as well as pressure. Density Altitude has been a known thing in aviation for decades. Probably since WW2, in fact.

But not atmospheric composition changes causing issues.

Fitter vehicles aren't budgeted for, unfortunately.

Good thing there are already some in inventory (M113-based and HEMTT/7-ton based). And yes, AMPV is scheduled to replace the old M113-based ones already as part of the program of record. The change would be buying "a few more" of those, however many are needed by a battalion of MPFs times number of MPF battalions, which yes might be a couple hundred fitter vehicles.

Whoever let Booker go through instead of XM1302 should be fired.

Have you watched the Chieftain's Hatch video of the XM1302 that I linked? There's absolutely zero space inside for crew, with several displays removed from the specific vehicle he was crawling in. And yes, tank crews wear body armor, especially the TC who will be spending most of the time with head and/or torso outside the armor.

United Defense really should have "bumped" the turret size about 4-6" wider in the crew compartment, and balanced that however was required on the left side of the turret. I'm aware that would probably add at least half a ton of weight to the turret.

 

[Scott Kenny]

A Cold War era formation, or equipment set built around heavy mechanized formations, wouldn't last a year in Ukraine.

This is evidenced by the fact that it did not, in fact, last a year in Ukraine. By March 2023, the Russians were using Chechen War-era assault detachments with about 20-40 dismounts for a company sized formation. This resembles more WW1 than WW2, because the drone problem is essentially unsolvable under combat conditions, and produces lethal reconnaissance-fires complexes at the company level.

The U.S. Army would do better to break apart all but maybe six to eight ABCTs, and distribute their armor among IBCTs, as separate companies and fire support groups. Equip the IBCTs with MRAPs and IMVs that can be protected against light mortar splinter and medium machine guns. Get rid of most of the self-propelled guns in favor of towed pieces, or at least CAESAR-likes, and train the infantry to attack on foot in very small groups.

That's the only way to fight a modern war at present. The lethality and low cost of lightweight drone systems makes anything less impossible. The actual thing that will happen is the U.S. Army either won't do anything in the next war or it will take immense casualties before adopting something similar to what the Ukrainians have: light motorized formations in MRAPs and IMVs backed by the occasional tank platoon per company.

The really funny part is this would look a lot like the U.S. Marines in Fallujah when they were being followed by the Iraqi police.

Did you seriously just suggest replacing mobile artillery with effectively-immobile, towed targets?

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Grade A horseshit that the Cold War implied low casualties. They expected massive numbers of losses. So this future peer fighting should expect this not be shocked by it.

 

[shin_getter]

Fpv, of course, can search, but hide'n'seek is still quite easy to win (for humans). Especially humans with their own technical means of observation.

In too many cases in ground warfare, position is discovered(and valid) only when it fires.

Engaging it minutes later will only result in casualties and broken pace of attack, and there's no guarantee that enemy will even still be in that window and won't change position.

And the M10 wouldn't do better. It is too expensive to be used aggressively and take heavy losses, yet it have no effective protection against enemy threats.

The most likely kind of fire support it would be used for is shoot and scoot behind cover, like:

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/ogznts/a_tank_t72_almost_shot_by_atgm_date_and_place

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/ogznts/a_tank_t72_almost_shot_by_atgm_date_and_place/

The targets it can engage and acquire is heavily limited by what cover is available and many parts of the enemy is inaccessible altoghter. In the case of the Syrian civil war in the siege of aleppo, the SAA built kilometers long berms to cover their tank forces and the whole battle lasted years despite so called "armor."

Even for survivable tanks, the defense would counter via reverse slope/pinhole/defilade positions that breaks up the offense into small groups to be attacked. A few tanks can not cover all the advances and you need a lot of tanks, and tanks can not always spot fires from behind cover either.

And of course, no tank helps with indirect fire.
----------------

Aerial Observation and FPVs on the other hand, can very well spot opponents without top cover and destroy them, engaging targets long before they can fire. Wars lasts because top cover exists with forests, cities and constructed tunnels however restricting one's opponent to these terrains is still powerful.

And top cover only works against FPVs due to operator skill issues: it is difficult to fly a copter into tunnels and other obstructions. When the problem gets solved either via training or hardware there is nowhere to hide.

This action faces all the same problems as attack, just against softer enemy with somewhat lesser rotary firepower(further away from his initial point). This needs proper armor.

A light tank that is not protected against pretty much all munitions is not proper armor.

 

[GruntFox]

Lift is weather dependent, with hot and high takeoffs always being more challenging for both helos and fixed wing. But the overall increase in temperature is marginal and the change in composition trivial in terms of density, especially at airlifted altitudes. I would want to see an external source that found the effect to actually be significant.

What global warming will change more significantly is extreme weather patterns that cause temporary, local disruption of operations, be that severe storms or extreme heat in naturally hot regions:

It's So Hot in Phoenix, Planes Can't Take Off | Climate Central

Planes have been grounded in Phoenix as life-threatening heat descends across the Southwest.

www.climatecentral.org

From my understanding, it's already happening, though more akin to a 'slowly boil the frog alive' than 'suddenly aircraft are useless'. All those small changes really add up.

Grade A horseshit that the Cold War implied low casualties. They expected massive numbers of losses. So this future peer fighting should expect this not be shocked by it.

The problem is that you have discovered why the 'West' invested so heavily in body armor, armored vehicles, stealth aircraft, and drones: just one stack of body bags will tank the policy ratings. In essence, the 'West' only needs to get wrong once while their enemies don't have such problems.

... which doesn't include the information and memetic warfare angle of warfare that current and future conflicts are submerged in now.