LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

Josh_TN said:
Maybe camouflage can keep up with the ISR threat, maybe it cannot. Not knowing for sure however is an unacceptable situation for a strategic deterrent.

The only way I’d accept a TEL based deterrent is if it has a network of hardened shelters to move through. And at that point you have to wonder if it isn’t cheaper and easier to just build silos instead of shelters and move the missiles around those. And at that point…why not just have hundreds of missiles in hundreds of silos? That is direction the PRC seems to be moving in, away from TELs. The U.S. is already in that position be default. If anything, I’d just build additional silos.
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Fun fact about North Korea TELs: not only they are enormously heavy (d'uh) but the country roads network is so pathetic, in the end the damn things have very few places to go... those missiles (from memory) are nearly as big as freakkin' Titan IIs, and that booster wasn't featherweight by any mean. Even with lots of wheels to drop the weight per wheel, at some point the road has to be *strong*. Bottom line: now North Korea only has to build Ike Eisenhower Interstate Highways network ... good luck to them.
 
Archibald said:
Fun fact about North Korea TELs: not only they are enormously heavy (d'uh) but the country roads network is so pathetic, in the end the damn things have very few places to go... those missiles (from memory) are nearly as big as freakkin' Titan IIs, and that booster wasn't featherweight by any mean. Even with lots of wheels to drop the weight per wheel, at some point the road has to be *strong*. Bottom line: now North Korea only has to build Ike Eisenhower Interstate Highways network ... good luck to them.
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Good point. I think it’s important to note that no one is taking an ICBM cross country. They are at best road mobile.
 
indicisivedivide said:
I am talking about a stopgap measure. Should be something around a hundred to two hundred warhead on TEL. Missile warning is very advanced and a launcher will of course be prepared to launch quickly.
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You realize that is the entire MM3 fleet, right?

Also, Minuteman 3 is a long skinny missile, some 57-60ft long. Trident is a short, fat missile, only about 45ft long. For road mobile, you want a short missile to go around corners.
 
Josh_TN said:
Good point. I think it’s important to note that no one is taking an ICBM cross country. They are at best road mobile.
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The North Korean idea seems to be that TEL could be quickly shifted between several hardened positions, thus making it MUCH harder to hit. Considering how North Korean like to tunnel, we could safely assume that significant part of its mobility is through tunnel network, completely covered from any observation.
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
North Korean TELs are Chinese-built trucks that were sold to them for "logging" (although I'm pretty sure the North Koreans reversed engineered them and started building their own, given there are now more TELs than the original 5 that were sold to them).
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They do produce domestically heavy transport erector launchers.
Compared to original Chinese logging trucks they have more axles.
From 9 used by Hwasong-15 and HS-18 up to 11 with Hwasong-17.

So... 11 axle chassis may be able to have 150 ton payload.
 
www.northropgrumman.com

Rising to the Occasion: Northrop Grumman and the Sentinel (GBSD) Program | Northrop Grumman

The U.S. Air Force’s Sentinel Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the weapon system replacement for the aging LGM-30 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system (ICBM). Sentinel (GBSD) represents the modernization of the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad.
www.northropgrumman.com www.northropgrumman.com

Technology Maturation Will Help Reduce Risk​

Lunny pointed to capabilities demonstrated during the three-year technology maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) phase, which set the stage for the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract award in September of 2020. A digital engineering approach, the integration of electrical engineering and computer science engineering, was key to the successful TMRR of the weapon system; Northrop Grumman was able to show 10s of thousands of iterations.
 
Forest Green said:
I can't help but feel that Lockeed Martin were best placed to take on GBSD, between Lockheed and Martin-Marietta they built the Trident II and Peacekeeper, what did NG last build in terms of SLBMs/ICBMs?
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I would not expect any institutional knowledge to last through the decades since the U.S. designed a major ballistic missile from scratch.
 
Josh_TN said:
I would not expect any institutional knowledge to last through the decades since the U.S. designed a major ballistic missile from scratch.
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Historically in cases like this I've seen retirees given generous remuneration for briefly coming out of retirement. One would also expect documentation to be a guide - the 1980s may have been a while ago now, but it was long after the doodlings on the back of cigarette packets era.
 
kqcke for you said:
https://www.military.com/daily-news...-old-upgrade-anymore-stratcom-chief-says.htmlView attachment 716124
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That's why I say that the ideal quick-fix is to buy Tridents and only load 3-4 warheads on them.

Tridents are in current production, if only in limited numbers, and are relatively new for the D5LE version. Fresh drawlings, modern technology.

Buy maybe 50 Tridents over 4-5 years, drop them into existing MM silos in a cold-launch tube. Can probably get away with 2" thick steel for the cold launch tube.

And at the same time, design a new missile to replace the MM outright.
 
Scott Kenny said:
That's why I say that the ideal quick-fix is to buy Tridents and only load 3-4 warheads on them.

Tridents are in current production, if only in limited numbers, and are relatively new for the D5LE version. Fresh drawlings, modern technology.

Buy maybe 50 Tridents over 4-5 years, drop them into existing MM silos in a cold-launch tube. Can probably get away with 2" thick steel for the cold launch tube.

And at the same time, design a new missile to replace the MM outright.
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Either use Trident, if that is possible, or design a new missile. But it is a waste to attempt both. And at this point, since the Sentinel program is so far along, it is pointless to attempt anything else.

The other thing that people seem to be ignoring a lot in this thread is that a lot of the Sentinel costs are probably for infrastructure upgrades, not the missile itself. The entire land based ICBM infrastructure is vastly outdated and hard to support, and this program is replacing all components from control centers to comms to silos with new electronics, if not brand new infrastructure. The missile itself is probably the easiest part.
 
Northrop Grumman bought ATK and ATK is the one that basically built Tridents.

Also the infrastructure and logistical requirements to properly operate road-mobiles securely is very very expensive. Silo missiles once built are very cheap to operate.
 
Josh_TN said:
Either use Trident, if that is possible, or design a new missile. But it is a waste to attempt both. And at this point, since the Sentinel program is so far along, it is pointless to attempt anything else.

The other thing that people seem to be ignoring a lot in this thread is that a lot of the Sentinel costs are probably for infrastructure upgrades, not the missile itself. The entire land based ICBM infrastructure is vastly outdated and hard to support, and this program is replacing all components from control centers to comms to silos with new electronics, if not brand new infrastructure. The missile itself is probably the easiest part.
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The point is that Trident is in production right now, and it'd be affordable to make an extra 3 subs worth of Tridents to tide us over till Sentinel arrives. Even if we also need to buy 3-5 sets of Trident C&C boxes now, once the Sentinels are in their holes we take those Trident missiles and C&C boxes and stick them into the next Columbia class subs coming off the line. Then the USN can have bigger DASO shoots to exhaust the old missile stocks.

Optionally, use existing stockpile Tridents instead of buying some more, though I'm not sure how many "extra" Tridents we have.
 
Scott Kenny said:
That's why I say that the ideal quick-fix is to buy Tridents and only load 3-4 warheads on them.

Tridents are in current production, if only in limited numbers, and are relatively new for the D5LE version. Fresh drawlings, modern technology.

Buy maybe 50 Tridents over 4-5 years, drop them into existing MM silos in a cold-launch tube. Can probably get away with 2" thick steel for the cold launch tube.

And at the same time, design a new missile to replace the MM outright.
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Wait, what problem are we trying to solve again? We're getting significant exposure to handwavium here.
  1. Does the industrial base exist to provide Tridents over and above the Navy's requirements?
  2. What's required to make USAF RVs work with Trident PBPVs?
  3. How much civil engineering work would be required to configure the silos for such a large missile?
  4. What's the delay needed to rewrite the environmental assessment?
  5. Can the C3I be adapted to work with the rest of the Air Force C&C infrastructure, and if so, at what cost?
  6. How much more will it cost in terms of maintenance? Do we have the infrastructure to routinely transport a 135,000 lb. vehicle from an integration site to East BF, South Dakota?
  7. Since we don't know the actual capabilities of the LGM-35, what newer technologies might we be giving up to get the Tridents?
  8. How much is all of this going to cost and what does the USAF/DoD/Federal Government give up to get it?
 
GeorgeA said:
Wait, what problem are we trying to solve again? We're getting significant exposure to handwavium here.
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  1. Does the industrial base exist to provide Tridents over and above the Navy's requirements? - Yes, the line is currently running making a small number of rocket motors per year, over and above the number of rockets that need to be replaced due to age-out. Those "extra" motors are then fired on test stands. The proposal is for 8-12 additional complete missiles a year for 4-6 years. 50 birds and 5 C&C sets because the USAF does one launch capsule per 10 silos.
  2. What's required to make USAF RVs work with Trident PBPVs? - We're not playing that game. This proposal uses complete Trident D5LE missiles, including the USN Mk4 or Mk5 RVs. The USN/DOE has a pile of extra RVs available due to downloading the Tridents from 14 RVs to 4 RVs per missile.
  3. How much civil engineering work would be required to configure the silos for such a large missile? - None, the inner diameter of the MM hot launch silo is approximately 15 feet. You suspend the Trident launch capsule (same design as a single missile tube) inside the MM silo using existing mounting points. There might be some odd bits fitting the Trident command and control system into the USAF command capsules, but that's not pouring concrete or anything.
  4. What's the delay needed to rewrite the environmental assessment? - minimal rewrite, as far as I know. 90 day comment period, usually 90 days to evaluate, final EIS goes live in ~6months from draft.
  5. Can the C3I be adapted to work with the rest of the Air Force C&C infrastructure, and if so, at what cost? - We're using the complete Trident submarine control package, which natively talks to STRATCOM. No modifications or translator boxes required.
  6. How much more will it cost in terms of maintenance? Do we have the infrastructure to routinely transport a 135,000 lb. vehicle from an integration site to East BF, South Dakota? - No additional maintenance costs, the systems are effectively "wooden rounds" and are left in the capsules. I'm unsure of the total number of bigass trucks used to haul Trident missiles on base that could be available to use for essentially two missile moves. One move from SWFPAC in Washington state on Interstate 90 to the prepped silos in East BF SoDak, and a second move some 10 years later to remove the missiles from USAF service and drop them into Columbia-class boats either in Georgia or Washington state. Advantage of Trident over MM/Sentinel is that Trident is significantly shorter, so is less complicated to move (~55ft long trailer, not ~75-80ft long trailer). Each base is known to have a minimum of two of those trucks/trailers and I assume more like 12. Convoy security during the missile moves is no different than what the USAF already deals with, the missiles would just come from a different location.
  7. Since we don't know the actual capabilities of the LGM-35, what newer technologies might we be giving up to get the Tridents? - None, this is a temporary fix to give Sentinel time to mature. Tridents dropped into MM silos for about a decade.
  8. How much is all of this going to cost and what does the USAF/DoD/Federal Government give up to get it? - I don't have access to cost docs, but this is all either stuff that the US is buying already or is going to have to buy for the Columbia class in a few years. The only extra expense would be the land launch capsule. All other costs are either coming a little earlier or are already budgeted for.
 
sferrin said:
Don't know why they didn't go with a continuous diameter instead of tapering it down. They really seem to have gone as cheap as possible.
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I wonder what the purpose is, the MMIII already had a range of 13,000-14,000km, and the LGM-35A seems to have the same bus diameter, so why all the extra fuel? HGVs?
 
At this point all ya'll are doing is speculating. That graphic is also speculation.

As for stop-gap Tridents... we can simply just re-engine MMIII if we need a stopgap. The problem with solid-fueled missiles is the aging of the solid-fuel, new motors -> problem solved. Trying to fit Tridents into MMIII silos will require a whole new requal process which wont be cheap or quick.
 
Until Sentinels pics or dimensions are published I don’t think we draw any conclusions about the design. It is a hot launch missile, which puts a clear upper diameter limit - so we do know it is closer in diameter to MMIII first stage than Peacekeeper’s continuous diameter. I think that’s all we know for sure.
 
bobbymike said:
L3 Harris Parent Co. of Aerojet Rocketdyne looks as MMIII as one could imagine
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Which exactly?) I remember NG have used MMIII model at various expos for representing _GBSD_ (which in this meaning is more than Sentinel) while official rendering was online for a while.
 

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Scott Kenny said:
  1. Does the industrial base exist to provide Tridents over and above the Navy's requirements? - Yes, the line is currently running making a small number of rocket motors per year, over and above the number of rockets that need to be replaced due to age-out. Those "extra" motors are then fired on test stands. The proposal is for 8-12 additional complete missiles a year for 4-6 years. 50 birds and 5 C&C sets because the USAF does one launch capsule per 10 silos.
  2. What's required to make USAF RVs work with Trident PBPVs? - We're not playing that game. This proposal uses complete Trident D5LE missiles, including the USN Mk4 or Mk5 RVs. The USN/DOE has a pile of extra RVs available due to downloading the Tridents from 14 RVs to 4 RVs per missile.
  3. How much civil engineering work would be required to configure the silos for such a large missile? - None, the inner diameter of the MM hot launch silo is approximately 15 feet. You suspend the Trident launch capsule (same design as a single missile tube) inside the MM silo using existing mounting points. There might be some odd bits fitting the Trident command and control system into the USAF command capsules, but that's not pouring concrete or anything.
  4. What's the delay needed to rewrite the environmental assessment? - minimal rewrite, as far as I know. 90 day comment period, usually 90 days to evaluate, final EIS goes live in ~6months from draft.
  5. Can the C3I be adapted to work with the rest of the Air Force C&C infrastructure, and if so, at what cost? - We're using the complete Trident submarine control package, which natively talks to STRATCOM. No modifications or translator boxes required.
  6. How much more will it cost in terms of maintenance? Do we have the infrastructure to routinely transport a 135,000 lb. vehicle from an integration site to East BF, South Dakota? - No additional maintenance costs, the systems are effectively "wooden rounds" and are left in the capsules. I'm unsure of the total number of bigass trucks used to haul Trident missiles on base that could be available to use for essentially two missile moves. One move from SWFPAC in Washington state on Interstate 90 to the prepped silos in East BF SoDak, and a second move some 10 years later to remove the missiles from USAF service and drop them into Columbia-class boats either in Georgia or Washington state. Advantage of Trident over MM/Sentinel is that Trident is significantly shorter, so is less complicated to move (~55ft long trailer, not ~75-80ft long trailer). Each base is known to have a minimum of two of those trucks/trailers and I assume more like 12. Convoy security during the missile moves is no different than what the USAF already deals with, the missiles would just come from a different location.
  7. Since we don't know the actual capabilities of the LGM-35, what newer technologies might we be giving up to get the Tridents? - None, this is a temporary fix to give Sentinel time to mature. Tridents dropped into MM silos for about a decade.
  8. How much is all of this going to cost and what does the USAF/DoD/Federal Government give up to get it? - I don't have access to cost docs, but this is all either stuff that the US is buying already or is going to have to buy for the Columbia class in a few years. The only extra expense would be the land launch capsule. All other costs are either coming a little earlier or are already budgeted for.
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These arguments are missing some significant factors.

1. The fundamental problem with a land-based Trident is it completely destroys the dissimilar redundancy required of the strategic force. If a major test failure were to occur, or a major manufacturing problem was discovered, or it is discovered that there is a major vulnerability of the weapon that either could or is being actively exploited by an adversary that results in a strategic weapon system being rendered even temporarily ineffective, that is a major problem. When you have two dissimilar weapons, the probability of such an event affecting two weapons simultaneously is extraordinarily unlikely and mitigated by the existence to two independent systems. With a single weapon system, that probability, as low as it is, is totally unacceptable. Both Trident and Minuteman have had test failures in the last decade; while neither have resulted in either system being grounded, the potential there still exists. The presence of a minimal sustainment production capacity for critical components does not change this.

2. Trident was for some time downloaded due to the combination of a reduced threat environment and desire to reduce operational and sustainment costs. The threat environment in the last two decades has radically changed, and so has the Navy's targeting plans. Furthermore, the current force was built to provide reserve warheads for the submarine force, not an additional land-based force. The W76 and W88 also do not meet Air Force safety requirements, as does the missile itself, but we'll get to that in a moment.

3. Significant work would be required. One of the biggest obstacles for the LGM-35 is reconditioning and replacing much of the hardware both in the silo facilities and the infrastructure connecting those silos to their control centers; that work would still have to be done for a land-based Trident. Furthermore, the Trident command and control system was not designed for a land-based application and would require significant rework. The guidance system of the missile in particular has been noted as a significant issue. Trident II's accuracy is predicated on a series of very accurate gravitometric surveys performed in the 1980s that was limited to only a partial (though still expansive) set of potential patrol areas and launch trajectories. Outside of those surveyed areas, D5 accuracy was reduced significantly. Certifying the weapon for land based use would require a new set of surveys for at least a majority of target sets, at significant cost and delay to fielding.

4. An environmental review for a land-based Trident would be extensive. Neither the weapon nor its warheads meet safety requirements for a land-based weapon. Trident uses a higher energy, detonable propellant in order to meet range requirements while remaining within Navy packaging requirements. This is acceptable in a Navy application where the consequences of a detonation either in flight or aboard a vessel would be limited and almost certainly not bring harm to civilians, for an Air Force weapon the potential consequences for a failure of even an unarmed weapon are much greater. Furthermore, neither of the warheads available for Trident possess either a fire-resistant pit or utilize insensitive high explosives, thus the potential consequences of an accident with an armed warhead are much greater. This problem cannot be fixed by simply mounting the weapon with the W78 or W87, since neither reentry vehicle would fit. With these issues, an environmental review of a land-based Trident would likely be prolonged and not guaranteed to be successful.

5. Maintenance costs are a minor consideration on this topic, though transporting a heavier, wider, less safe weapon across the country presents some significant issues.

6. What does this "temporary solution" achieve here? The Minuteman force is aging, but is still capable of meeting Air Force needs into the 2030s. A land-based Trident would take most of a decade to deploy in actuality after all the reviews and modifications required to both the facilities and weapon system. At which point Sentinel is well into flight testing and a number of Minuteman facilities have either been or are in the process of being renovated for it. After which the modifications for a land-based Trident will have to be torn out and replaced with Sentinel equipment.

7. So in actuality you don't know, and are simply guessing. The idea of a common missile were studied in 2015 by DOD, with the findings reported to Congress. Said study, the Report on Strategic Missile Commonality, has never been released publicly, but Congressional testimony by Admiral Benedict alluded to many of these issues. Though maybe you can ask FAS, since they managed to acquire the study, not that they will ever release it since it undermines many of their pro-common missile arguments.
 
totallyaverage said:
These arguments are missing some significant factors.

1. The fundamental problem with a land-based Trident is it completely destroys the dissimilar redundancy required of the strategic force. If a major test failure were to occur, or a major manufacturing problem was discovered, or it is discovered that there is a major vulnerability of the weapon that either could or is being actively exploited by an adversary that results in a strategic weapon system being rendered even temporarily ineffective, that is a major problem. When you have two dissimilar weapons, the probability of such an event affecting two weapons simultaneously is extraordinarily unlikely and mitigated by the existence to two independent systems. With a single weapon system, that probability, as low as it is, is totally unacceptable. Both Trident and Minuteman have had test failures in the last decade; while neither have resulted in either system being grounded, the potential there still exists. The presence of a minimal sustainment production capacity for critical components does not change this.
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Had not considered that point, though with Trident still in production I would have assumed that such a risk was minimal.


totallyaverage said:
2. Trident was for some time downloaded due to the combination of a reduced threat environment and desire to reduce operational and sustainment costs. The threat environment in the last two decades has radically changed, and so has the Navy's targeting plans. Furthermore, the current force was built to provide reserve warheads for the submarine force, not an additional land-based force. The W76 and W88 also do not meet Air Force safety requirements, as does the missile itself, but we'll get to that in a moment.
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Still is downloaded to all public information, so the Navy warheads would still be available.

Point taken about the safety requirements.


totallyaverage said:
3. Significant work would be required. One of the biggest obstacles for the LGM-35 is reconditioning and replacing much of the hardware both in the silo facilities and the infrastructure connecting those silos to their control centers; that work would still have to be done for a land-based Trident.
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So? The Trident command and control systems needed to be purchased for the Columbia class anyway. So that is merely buying some 5 sets of C&C units earlier than originally planned.

Replacing the silo hardware and connecting landlines is a part of LGM-35 anyways, if not building whole new silos. So that is paid for out of LGM-35 funding, unless LGM-35s require new silos instead of new command capsules. Need more info before we can come to an agreement here.

Remember, this is supposed to be a ~10yr temporary replacement, to give the advanced tech in LGM-35 more time to mature.


totallyaverage said:
Furthermore, the Trident command and control system was not designed for a land-based application and would require significant rework. The guidance system of the missile in particular has been noted as a significant issue. Trident II's accuracy is predicated on a series of very accurate gravitometric surveys performed in the 1980s that was limited to only a partial (though still expansive) set of potential patrol areas and launch trajectories. Outside of those surveyed areas, D5 accuracy was reduced significantly. Certifying the weapon for land based use would require a new set of surveys for at least a majority of target sets, at significant cost and delay to fielding.
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I disagree here, because the gravitometric surveys were done to further enhance launcher location. Launching from a fixed known location is the best possible starting fix for your inertial guidance system.


totallyaverage said:
4. An environmental review for a land-based Trident would be extensive. Neither the weapon nor its warheads meet safety requirements for a land-based weapon. Trident uses a higher energy, detonable propellant in order to meet range requirements while remaining within Navy packaging requirements. This is acceptable in a Navy application where the consequences of a detonation either in flight or aboard a vessel would be limited and almost certainly not bring harm to civilians, for an Air Force weapon the potential consequences for a failure of even an unarmed weapon are much greater. Furthermore, neither of the warheads available for Trident possess either a fire-resistant pit or utilize insensitive high explosives, thus the potential consequences of an accident with an armed warhead are much greater. This problem cannot be fixed by simply mounting the weapon with the W78 or W87, since neither reentry vehicle would fit. With these issues, an environmental review of a land-based Trident would likely be prolonged and not guaranteed to be successful.
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I thought Mk4a RBAs were IM certified?

And frankly, the USAF can kiss the USN's ass in regards to nuclear safety. How many incidents have the USAF had, versus how many USN?


totallyaverage said:
5. Maintenance costs are a minor consideration on this topic, though transporting a heavier, wider, less safe weapon across the country presents some significant issues.
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No worse than transporting 135klbs of ANFO or the Shuttle SRBs. And warheads are apparently being transported in unmarked semis with minimal escorts instead of a full armored convoy.


totallyaverage said:
6. What does this "temporary solution" achieve here? The Minuteman force is aging, but is still capable of meeting Air Force needs into the 2030s. A land-based Trident would take most of a decade to deploy in actuality after all the reviews and modifications required to both the facilities and weapon system. At which point Sentinel is well into flight testing and a number of Minuteman facilities have either been or are in the process of being renovated for it. After which the modifications for a land-based Trident will have to be torn out and replaced with Sentinel equipment.
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It buys time for any of the advanced systems in LGM-35 to mature.

Because I don't expect the LGM-35 to be deployed till the 2040s because we haven't designed a new missile for the USAF in over 40 years. The senior engineers from those projects are all dead, the junior engineers have all retired.


totallyaverage said:
7. So in actuality you don't know, and are simply guessing. The idea of a common missile were studied in 2015 by DOD, with the findings reported to Congress. Said study, the Report on Strategic Missile Commonality, has never been released publicly, but Congressional testimony by Admiral Benedict alluded to many of these issues. Though maybe you can ask FAS, since they managed to acquire the study, not that they will ever release it since it undermines many of their pro-common missile arguments.
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I don't particularly need to be right on this point. This is not about a permanent replacement of MM or LGM-35 with Trident. This is a 10yr cover our asses temporary program.

Again, I am expecting a ~10yr delay in LGM-35 deployment because all the engineers involved have never built an ICBM before. And I don't believe MM will be viable into the 2040s.
 
Why do you think the USAF cares so much about safety?

You can cover your ass with re-motored MMIII... And all the NG engineers do have plenty of experience with solid-rocket motors, who do you think builds the Trident motors?
 
Desertfox said:
Why do you think the USAF cares so much about safety?

You can cover your ass with re-motored MMIII... And all the NG engineers do have plenty of experience with solid-rocket motors, who do you think builds the Trident motors?
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How long will the rest of the MM3 stuff last?
 
Its not like the Trident D5 is much newer, it would be 50yo tech by the time it got deployed, and the ground stuff would have to be replaced for D5 and then again for Sentinel... Going with D5 would be much more expensive for very limited benefit.
 
Scott Kenny said:
The designed-in-1950s hardware that can't really be repaired or replaced today because nobody knows how it works or how to fix it.
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Akshully, a lot of the reason why these systems are not easily replaced is because people know how they work. More accurately, people know that they *do* work. The consequence of that is "if we have something that works, why change it? Here, please enjoy fifteen layers of malevolent bureaucracy to change a bolt."
 
My prediction:

1) Continuing delays and problems not necessarily with the missile but with everything else they are replacing/modernizing/upgrading like silos, launch centers, C3, etc. will see a drop in the ICBM force first to 300 eventually to 200.

2) At the time the 200 deployed Sentinels decision is made the US will begin the development, as recommended in the recent Strategic Posture Report, of a single warhead mobile system.

Odds 1) 50/50 2) 10/90
 
bobbymike said:
My prediction:

1) Continuing delays and problems not necessarily with the missile but with everything else they are replacing/modernizing/upgrading like silos, launch centers, C3, etc. will see a drop in the ICBM force first to 300 eventually to 200.

2) At the time the 200 deployed Sentinels decision is made the US will begin the development, as recommended in the recent Strategic Posture Report, of a single warhead mobile system.

Odds 1) 50/50 2) 10/90
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It seems more likely to me legacy systems are simply maintained as best they can while infrastructure is refurbished. There is a full squadron of silos and command centers in reserve that can function is the initial upgrade site or else swing space for MM3s while upgrading occurs squadron by squadron. I would not think any draw down from 400 would be necessary.

I do not think mobile basing will ever be considered; there are too many security issues, both strategic and domestic. It also seems doubtful Sentinels remain single warhead for long.
 
Orionblamblam said:
Akshully, a lot of the reason why these systems are not easily replaced is because people know how they work. More accurately, people know that they *do* work. The consequence of that is "if we have something that works, why change it? Here, please enjoy fifteen layers of malevolent bureaucracy to change a bolt."
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There's a reason I'm cheering on the USAF general who is going to war with his own bureaucracy.

Live in missile compartment 2nd level so you can have a nice sit-up rack, you hear the Missile Techs bitching about the procedures they're dealing with: "Using the following picture, label all bolts. Step 1: Turn bolt 1 39 turns counterclockwise to remove bolt 1. Step 2: Turn bolt 2 39.5 turns counterclockwise to remove bolt 2. ..."
 

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