LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[Forest Green]

You do not retaliate to 50 warheads with everything you got, as bad as a "limited" nuclear strike is, it is still preferable to a mass nuclear strike, and a massed retaliation will lead to a mass retaliation.

DF-31, DF-41 and RS-24 are all in the sub 50 ton "small" ICBM same as MM3. Are they more capable than MM3? Sure, at least DF-41 and RS-24 (partially because they are mobile). But they are nowhere near the 100 ton class like Peacekeeper or Trident II or the 150-200 ton ICBMs like DF-5, Satan, or Sarmat. Yes, the US is outclassed in ICBMs but at the same time it completely outclasses both Russia and China in SLBMs (different focus). The question should be, should the US even try to outclass Russia and China in ICBMs? The MM3 force is currently a enemy warhead sink, requiring at least a third of the allowed Russian warheads to take out. GBSD does not need to be better than the Russian ICBMs it just needs to be as big if not bigger of a warhead sink, the goal being to increase the cost of an enemy strike beyond that which they are willing to pay. A Peacekeeper II while being more capable could have the opposite effect in reducing the cost of an enemy strike.

Don't fall for Russian and Chinese hyperbole and propaganda. Physics is still physics. For DF-41 to carry 10 warheads to that range it would have to be at least Peacekeeper size, which it clearly is not. Sarmat with 24 HGVs is simply ludicrous. Assuming, their claims of 10 ton payload are accurate and assuming the payload is nothing but HGVs (no structure to hold them, not post-boost vehicle, no guidance, no shroud), you end up with 400kg for each HGV which is very small. Not to say anything of the deployment issues and volumetric issues.

What purpose would it serve not to respond with 'almost everything' as I stated? If someone considered it reasonable to fire 50 strategic warheads against your mainland in a pre-emptive strike, naturally their response to a limited response will be further escalation, so there's no point beating about the bush.

The DF-41 is Peacekeeper-sized and the warheads are smaller/lower yield. It is stated at 80t approx., which is very similar to the LGM-118 (88t) again. And that is an approx. weight. DF-31 is aimed at only 8,000km, so could easily carry a similar payload to Trident II across that shorter range.

On Sarmat I heard 1 avantguard takes the place of 3 regular warheads, which would still be 8, or 24 regular warheads, or 4+12 etc.

 

[sferrin]

RS-28 (Sarmat) will, apparently, be able to carry up to 24 boost gliding RVs. That's just a smidgen more than a "modern SICBM". DF-41 ill be a 10-warhead missile, the longest range ICBM on the planet, and will be mobile. Their "small" ICBMs (RS-24 & DF-31) will each be able to carry twice the number of warheads of a fully loaded MM3.

SICBM? Is that the same as AICBM?

I don't know. Probably. Midgetman

The other thing about Sarmat is that, at that size, but carrying only 4 warheads (as specified in START II), it could be a FOBS.

Or boost gliders with multiple warheads on each or four LARGE warheads. (Before somebody declares large warheads are "useless" let me just stop you right there.)

 

[Desertfox]

Im sure you have all heard of "measured response", "escalation control", "escalation off-ramps", and "escalate to de-escalate". Responding to a limited strike with a limited strike gives you some ability to de-escalate and the chance to limit damage, it gives you options and flexibility. The minute you launch everything, that's it, there are no more options. As bad as they are, limited mutual strikes on ICBM silos are much preferable to both sides than massed strikes on cities.

I will keep dragging in SLBMs because they are most certainly a critical component of deterrence strategy, the triad, and are accountable under New START. Any future ICBM system which GBSD is, must take into account what the Navy is doing with its SLBM force, just as the Russians do as well. The US has chosen its survivable retaliatory force to be its SLBMs just as Russia has chosen it to be its road-mobile ICBM force. You can't talk about one without talking about the other. These decisions are not made in a vacuum.

I will believe DF-41 is Peacekeeper size with 10 warheads when I see it. Foreign news sources are notoriously unreliable and hyperbolic. That estimate for DF-41 is from a 2014 report, more current ones show significantly shorter (~15m vs ~21m) missile, which would not be Peacekeeper sized any more. Is it better than MM3? Probably, its mobile at least, but its no super, boogyman, do-it-all ICBM. And again, the question should be, do we need better or more survivable missiles? Which will be better for detterance Sarmat or Midgetman?

 

[bobbymike]

RS-28 (Sarmat) will, apparently, be able to carry up to 24 boost gliding RVs. That's just a smidgen more than a "modern SICBM". DF-41 ill be a 10-warhead missile, the longest range ICBM on the planet, and will be mobile. Their "small" ICBMs (RS-24 & DF-31) will each be able to carry twice the number of warheads of a fully loaded MM3.

SICBM? Is that the same as AICBM?

I don't know. Probably. Midgetman

The other thing about Sarmat is that, at that size, but carrying only 4 warheads (as specified in START II), it could be a FOBS.

Or boost gliders with multiple warheads on each or four LARGE warheads. (Before somebody declares large warheads are "useless" let me just stop you right there.)

Thought AICBM was the precursor to the WS-120A Super Heavy (never built) ICBM? Although no specific dimensions that I’ve seen, all solid 200t plus with 20+ warheads.

 

[sferrin]

Im sure you have all heard of "measured response", "escalation control", "escalation off-ramps", and "escalate to de-escalate". Responding to a limited strike with a limited strike gives you some ability to de-escalate and the chance to limit damage, it gives you options and flexibility.

Which is why you need as much flexibility as possible. Arbitrarily hamstringing oneself does not make for a credible deterrence. For example, you don't WANT the other guy to think he can "escalate to de-escalate" without an in-kind response.

 

[DrRansom]

The whole dream of the US building an advanced ICBM force flies in the face of American fiscal reality. The US public is in no way going to vote in higher defense spending anytime in the near future. Any nuclear posture and development needs to take into account the fact that there will not be more money for a larger nuclear deterrence.

With that in mind, pulling out of START II is a ridiculous idea. The US should want to keep the nuclear arms race as small as possible to free up cash for conventional forces. Russia, which doesn't care as much about a large conventional military and has the political will, is happy to entangle the US in a nuclear arms race.

 

[bobbymike]

The whole dream of the US building an advanced ICBM force flies in the face of American fiscal reality. The US public is in no way going to vote in higher defense spending anytime in the near future. Any nuclear posture and development needs to take into account the fact that there will not be more money for a larger nuclear deterrence.

With that in mind, pulling out of START II is a ridiculous idea. The US should want to keep the nuclear arms race as small as possible to free up cash for conventional forces. Russia, which doesn't care as much about a large conventional military and has the political will, is happy to entangle the US in a nuclear arms race.

I would guess the last election where even a few percentage of people voted for candidates with defense spending as their MAIN policy was in the 1980s.

I can’t name a single politician who was elected, not just defense being a small piece of their overall agenda, but actually elected on the issue of defense spending.

In the 1980s I would spend hours some Sunday’s watching nuclear modernization debates on network TV. Does this ever happen anymore?

 

[DrRansom]

I would guess the last election where even a few percentage of people voted for candidates with defense spending as their MAIN policy was in the 1980s.

I can’t name a single politician who was elected, not just defense being a small piece of their overall agenda, but actually elected on the issue of defense spending.

In the 1980s I would spend hours some Sunday’s watching nuclear modernization debates on network TV. Does this ever happen anymore?

Exactly - the public isn't engaged in defense. Defense policy-makers should factor that into their planning. If the public isn't engaged, then limit US defense policy to a commensurate level. Don't accelerate a nuclear arms race when the public is not on your side. This is deterrence credibility 101...

 

[kaiserd]

You do not retaliate to 50 warheads with everything you got, as bad as a "limited" nuclear strike is,

You honestly believe if we nuked 50 targets in either Russia or China they'd restrain themselves to 50 targets in the US? Good luck with that.

DF-31, DF-41 and RS-24 are all in the sub 50 ton "small" ICBM same as MM3.

DF-41 is closer to Peacekeeper in capability. And mobile. Both DF-31 and RS-24 are significantly more capable than MM3. And also mobile. Also, we're not talking about SLBMs so stop trying to drag them into the conversation.

The points made above about US Tridents II’s as they relate to the relative role of US land based ICBMs (versus the roles of Russian equivalents of both) appear highly relevant to this topic.

 

[Forest Green]

Thought AICBM was the precursor to the WS-120A Super Heavy (never built) ICBM? Although no specific dimensions that I’ve seen, all solid 200t plus with 20+ warheads.

It was, I was confused. Too many acronyms.

 

[Forest Green]

The whole dream of the US building an advanced ICBM force flies in the face of American fiscal reality. The US public is in no way going to vote in higher defense spending anytime in the near future. Any nuclear posture and development needs to take into account the fact that there will not be more money for a larger nuclear deterrence.

With that in mind, pulling out of START II is a ridiculous idea. The US should want to keep the nuclear arms race as small as possible to free up cash for conventional forces. Russia, which doesn't care as much about a large conventional military and has the political will, is happy to entangle the US in a nuclear arms race.

Really? Have you seen Russia's ground forces?

 

[Forest Green]

I would guess the last election where even a few percentage of people voted for candidates with defense spending as their MAIN policy was in the 1980s.

I can’t name a single politician who was elected, not just defense being a small piece of their overall agenda, but actually elected on the issue of defense spending.

In the 1980s I would spend hours some Sunday’s watching nuclear modernization debates on network TV. Does this ever happen anymore?

In the Cold War people overestimated Soviet and Chinese capabilities, now they underestimate them. In fact many people are happy to blindly assume they don't work, or are vastly exaggerated.

 

[Forest Green]

The points made above about US Tridents II’s as they relate to the relative role of US land based ICBMs (versus the roles of Russian equivalents of both) appear highly relevant to this topic.

Subs can (theoretically) be destroyed without attacking the mainland though.

 

[Forest Green]

Im sure you have all heard of "measured response", "escalation control", "escalation off-ramps", and "escalate to de-escalate". Responding to a limited strike with a limited strike gives you some ability to de-escalate and the chance to limit damage, it gives you options and flexibility. The minute you launch everything, that's it, there are no more options. As bad as they are, limited mutual strikes on ICBM silos are much preferable to both sides than massed strikes on cities.

I will keep dragging in SLBMs because they are most certainly a critical component of deterrence strategy, the triad, and are accountable under New START. Any future ICBM system which GBSD is, must take into account what the Navy is doing with its SLBM force, just as the Russians do as well. The US has chosen its survivable retaliatory force to be its SLBMs just as Russia has chosen it to be its road-mobile ICBM force. You can't talk about one without talking about the other. These decisions are not made in a vacuum.

I will believe DF-41 is Peacekeeper size with 10 warheads when I see it. Foreign news sources are notoriously unreliable and hyperbolic. That estimate for DF-41 is from a 2014 report, more current ones show significantly shorter (~15m vs ~21m) missile, which would not be Peacekeeper sized any more. Is it better than MM3? Probably, its mobile at least, but its no super, boogyman, do-it-all ICBM. And again, the question should be, do we need better or more survivable missiles? Which will be better for detterance Sarmat or Midgetman?

In what bizarre reality would Russia or China just decide to fire 50 warheads at US missile silos and leave it at that though? A typo on the Russian nuclear football?

You're confusing the DF-41 with DF-31.

 

[kaiserd]

I would guess the last election where even a few percentage of people voted for candidates with defense spending as their MAIN policy was in the 1980s.

I can’t name a single politician who was elected, not just defense being a small piece of their overall agenda, but actually elected on the issue of defense spending.

In the 1980s I would spend hours some Sunday’s watching nuclear modernization debates on network TV. Does this ever happen anymore?

Exactly - the public isn't engaged in defense. Defense policy-makers should factor that into their planning. If the public isn't engaged, then limit US defense policy to a commensurate level. Don't accelerate a nuclear arms race when the public is not on your side. This is deterrence credibility 101...

As a non-American born at the very start of the 80’s I can just add that (at a remove) as a child I got the very end of that Cold War existentialist dread associated with the nuclear arms race and when new systems, treaties etc. were still considered major news (even in sleepy old Ireland).
Re: comments above and as relating to this topic I don’t think a lack of US public interest in defense holds true in general (a major issue post 9/11 for example). I think it was more the case that as soon as the imperative to race the Soviet Union died then a more realistic view was taken by both major US parties as nuclear weapons systems were no longer a battle ground for winning or loosing that many votes.
Irrespective of the actual rights and wrongs of specific system (including US land based ICBMs) it does speak to the degree to which the the Cold War nuclear arms race was driven by the desire not to look weak in front of your own constituencies.

 

[DrRansom]

Really? Have you seen Russia's ground forces?

Yes, the force which may get the Armata tank and SU-57 someday? The Russians talk big on spending lots on their conventional military but, apart from key areas (SAMs and some rocket artillery), shy away from wholescale replacement.

 

[sferrin]

The points made above about US Tridents II’s as they relate to the relative role of US land based ICBMs (versus the roles of Russian equivalents of both) appear highly relevant to this topic.

Not at all. The topic is Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. Unless they've started launching D-5s from silos they're completely irrelevant. If you insist on trying to derail the topic you'll be reported.

 

[bobbymike]

Sen. Hoeven: Fully Fund GBSD & Nuke Warhead Modernization - Breaking Defense

You don’t see lots of op-eds from members of the House or Senate appropriations committees. Why? The so-called cardinals — whose influence has slipped with the demise of regular budget order in the two chambers — remain among the most powerful figures on Capitol Hill because they have a greater...

breakingdefense.com

 

[DrRansom]

Not at all. The topic is Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. Unless they've started launching D-5s from silos they're completely irrelevant. If you insist on trying to derail the topic you'll be reported.

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

 

[Forest Green]

Yes, the force which may get the Armata tank and SU-57 someday? The Russians talk big on spending lots on their conventional military but, apart from key areas (SAMs and some rocket artillery), shy away from wholescale replacement.

SAMs and rocket artillery are a huge part of ground forces.

2024 Russia Military Strength

Detailing the current military strength of Russia including air force, army, navy, financials and manpower.

www.globalfirepower.com

2024 United States Military Strength

Detailing the current military strength of United States including air force, army, navy, financials and manpower.

www.globalfirepower.com

 

[sferrin]

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

If you don't like the discussion, feel free to go start another one.

 

[Forest Green]

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

If you don't like the discussion, feel free to go start another one.

Dr. Ransom said that not me.

 

[fredymac]

GBSD is a program of record and factored into the Program Objective Memorandum that allocates budget in the existing defense spending plan. The same holds for the B-21 and Columbia class submarine. They are already costed into the existing projections for defense spending.

Describing replacement of a missile designed 50 years ago and introduced into service in 1970 as an acceleration in the nuclear arms race is a bit much given the multiple generations of ICBMs deployed by Russia since the 90’s. Even with patchwork updates, they are still physically old and technically obsolescent.

Political will without commensurate economic means naturally limits your options as Russia learned in the early 90’s. Oil and gas revenue still determines their economic well being. With net US oil import demand essentially eliminated, the supply/demand pricing for oil exports is not likely to provide the necessary finances. Also factor in the reduced economic base with the loss of former republics.

 

[sferrin]

Describing replacement of a missile designed 50 years ago and introduced into service in 1970 as an acceleration in the nuclear arms race is a bit much given the multiple generations of ICBMs deployed by Russia since the 90’s. Even with patchwork updates, they are still physically old and technically obsolescent.

Russia's oldest ICBM is about a decade newer than the NEWEST MM3.

 

[sferrin]

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

If you don't like the discussion, feel free to go start another one.

Dr. Ransom said that not me.

I know, I fixed it. Mistake in editing first time around. Apologies.

 

[bobbymike]

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

I find myself wondering how many sock puppets Kman has. If you don't like the discussion, feel free to go start another one.

Dr. Ransom said that not me.

I know, I fixed it. Mistake in editing first time around. Apologies.

This is a ridiculous limitation to the discussion. The GBSD exists in a universe with the Trident D-5. The design and purpose of the GBSD will reflect the existing design and purpose of the D-5. Thinking otherwise is disingenuous.

If you don't like the discussion, feel free to go start another one.

Well early in my economic’s studies I learned the Latin ceteris paribus.

Because one could endlessly speculate on the make-up of the future Triad let’s limit this thread to the GBSD program development and expected attributes and/or desired attributes.

Just my humble suggestion

 

[DrRansom]

Describing replacement of a missile designed 50 years ago and introduced into service in 1970 as an acceleration in the nuclear arms race is a bit much given the multiple generations of ICBMs deployed by Russia since the 90’s. Even with patchwork updates, they are still physically old and technically obsolescent.

If the GBSD is basically a like-for-like replacement of the MM3 with the attendant accuracy improvements then it is hardly an acceleration of the arms race. The question is should the GBSD be something different from the MM3? Should it incorporate a road-mobile element or be a Peacekeeper sized launcher. Even those by themselves aren't an accelerating arms race. The arms race acceleration has to do with the future of START II.

If the US wants to keep to the START II framework, then a MM3-like warhead sink is a good option. I contend that is the best approach because the US lacks the political will to do anything more than a like-to-like replacement.

bobbymike - the desired attributes of the GBSD depend upon the future make-up of the triad.

In my opinion, the GBSD should be a like to like replacement for the MM3 and deterrent R&D should go into tactical systems.

 

[bobbymike]

Describing replacement of a missile designed 50 years ago and introduced into service in 1970 as an acceleration in the nuclear arms race is a bit much given the multiple generations of ICBMs deployed by Russia since the 90’s. Even with patchwork updates, they are still physically old and technically obsolescent.

If the GBSD is basically a like-for-like replacement of the MM3 with the attendant accuracy improvements then it is hardly an acceleration of the arms race. The question is should the GBSD be something different from the MM3? Should it incorporate a road-mobile element or be a Peacekeeper sized launcher. Even those by themselves aren't an accelerating arms race. The arms race acceleration has to do with the future of START II.

If the US wants to keep to the START II framework, then a MM3-like warhead sink is a good option. I contend that is the best approach because the US lacks the political will to do anything more than a like-to-like replacement.

bobbymike - the desired attributes of the GBSD depend upon the future make-up of the triad.

In my opinion, the GBSD should be a like to like replacement for the MM3 and deterrent R&D should go into tactical systems.

I think you can discuss desired attributes outside other programs. Like ability to carry BGVs or upload to 10 MARVs absent NST range etc.

I can appreciate Aaron Judge outside of discussions of Giancarlo Stanton.

 

[bobbymike]

Boeing drops from next-generation ICBM competition

This move leaves Northrop Grumman as the sole bidder in the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Desertfox]

What does an HGV give you that the current system does not? I would argue that 1 current RV with 2 full-size decoys (which MM3 can carry) is more survivable than 1 HGV, especially against Russia's current nuclear-tipped point-defense missile defense. Whats the point in being able to carry 10 RVs, when adding that capability will needlessly increase the cost of the system (probably reducing overall numbers) and will create problems down the road for future nuclear reduction treaties? Remember that we already have upload capability with Trident II which can be uploaded to up to 14 RVs.

 

[Forest Green]

If the GBSD is basically a like-for-like replacement of the MM3 with the attendant accuracy improvements then it is hardly an acceleration of the arms race. The question is should the GBSD be something different from the MM3? Should it incorporate a road-mobile element or be a Peacekeeper sized launcher. Even those by themselves aren't an accelerating arms race. The arms race acceleration has to do with the future of START II.

If the US wants to keep to the START II framework, then a MM3-like warhead sink is a good option. I contend that is the best approach because the US lacks the political will to do anything more than a like-to-like replacement.

bobbymike - the desired attributes of the GBSD depend upon the future make-up of the triad.

In my opinion, the GBSD should be a like to like replacement for the MM3 and deterrent R&D should go into tactical systems.

The truth is that very little new R&D is needed for a far better GBSD. Peacekeeper and Midgetman were both pretty much done deals, and AMARV was also at a highly developed state. 200 of each would give you both capacity and mobility, plus counter-ABM capabilities with AMARV.

Strange and scary when going backwards is actually going forwards.

 

[Forest Green]

In related news.

Boeing Backs Out of Nuclear Missile Competition, Prompting USAF Choices | Air & Space Forces Magazine

An unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during an operational test conducted from Vandenberg AFB, Calif., on April 26, 2017. Air Force photo by SrA. Ian Dudley. Story updated on July 26, 2019 at 11:56 a.m. EST. Boeing is...

www.airforcemag.com

 

[sferrin]

What does an HGV give you that the current system does not?

An HGV is much more difficult to shoot down than a ballistic RV. (Flies lower, more maneuverability, much less predictable, etc.) That's why everybody is racing to get them in service.

 

[sferrin]

In my opinion, the GBSD should be a like to like replacement for the MM3 and deterrent R&D should go into tactical systems.

The problem with that is it SEVERLEY limits your options. Why would you want to do that?

 

[Desertfox]

The lack of predictability is useless against a point-defense system. HGVs are also designed to defeat exo-athmospheric missile defense systems like GBI, SM-3, and THAAD. Russia's A-135 is an endo-athmospheric intercepter, so has the capability to go after HGVs. But let's assume you still need two interceptors for every HGV and only one interceptor per RV. I would still take 1 RV + 2 decoys (3 interceptors) over 1 HGV (2 interceptors).

 

[sferrin]

The lack of predictability is useless against a point-defense system. HGVs are also designed to defeat exo-athmospheric missile defense systems like GBI, SM-3, and THAAD. Russia's A-135 is an endo-athmospheric intercepter, so has the capability to go after HGVs. But let's assume you still need two interceptors for every HGV and only one interceptor per RV. I would still take 1 RV + 2 decoys (3 interceptors) over 1 HGV (2 interceptors).

Not every target is surrounded by nuclear-armed point defense systems, nor would they be fooled by decoys. So you have the vulnerability of the HGV and none of the advantages.

 

[marauder2048]

The cross-range from HGVs would let you avoid overflight of neutral nuclear powers which you only otherwise get from a
mobile missile that was repositioned or a big missile that could do plane changes (or round-the-world trajectories).

 

[Desertfox]

Why do you need an HGV then to go after an undefended target? Just needlessly adding cost and complexity. And its impossible to distinguish a full-size decoy (RV with ballast instead of warhead) from a real RV. MM3 can carry two full-size decoys without a problem.

There are no neutral nuclear powers between the US and Russia.

 

[Forest Green]

The lack of predictability is useless against a point-defense system. HGVs are also designed to defeat exo-athmospheric missile defense systems like GBI, SM-3, and THAAD. Russia's A-135 is an endo-athmospheric intercepter, so has the capability to go after HGVs. But let's assume you still need two interceptors for every HGV and only one interceptor per RV. I would still take 1 RV + 2 decoys (3 interceptors) over 1 HGV (2 interceptors).

The A-135 nuclear-tipped Gazelle is very difficult to evade due to blast radius but the S-500 promises conventional intercept speeds up to 7km/s and manoeuvrability in the terminal phase is therefore very relevant. The new A-235 also states intercepts out to 800km altitude and 1,500km range. Unpredictability could still pose problems even for the A-135 given the radio command guidance and intercept timescales though.

 

[sferrin]

Why do you need an HGV then to go after an undefended target? Just needlessly adding cost and complexity. And its impossible to distinguish a full-size decoy (RV with ballast instead of warhead) from a real RV. MM3 can carry two full-size decoys without a problem.

Nobody ever suggested an all-HGV fleet. And hauling dead-weight RVs is a huge waste of capability.