Late 70s RN fleet carrier design?

A continuous build of one new medium to large carrier and one new commando carrier per decade would be ideal.

I don't know if a continuous build of carriers and commando ships is possible, but if you throw the big complex LPDs in that mix you might be onto something. Indeed, anything big and complex with Command facilities, such as Type 82s, might be considered part of a continuous build programme.
 
Boom and bust is the killer, it costs more to ramp up after a bust period than it takes to keep work going (although at a reduced rate) through the design and build cycle.

There is too much focus on value for money achieved through building large batches over a short period of time. Over the long term, it is much more efficient to build what you need to a staggered schedule and replace rather than life extending older platforms.
 
It gets to a point where the aim is to maintain the skills and keep the facilities running.

I think that CVA01 & 02 could/should have been laid down quickly after Fearless and Intrepid were launched to keep those workers and facilities going.
 
For what it's worth, I don't think CVA-01 could realistically operate more than ~36 fighters without locking the deck. (Plus 8-10 Sea King helos or Gannets for ASW/AEW). Anything more than that would significantly impact aircraft turnaround times and sortie rates.

Here's CVA-01 (bottom) with 40x F-4 Phantoms and 8 Sea Kings. The bow catapult and Alaskan taxiway are locked, making aircraft movements difficult until after the first launch. You really don't get the benefit of simultaneous launch & recovery until you launch a half dozen aircraft (at least) and clear both sides of the island. Moreover, the bow deck park is very tight - barely suitable if you need to launch a Gannet (56' span), let alone an E-2 Hawkeye (80' span)... these would have to use the port catapult on the angled deck.

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My arrangements are based on standard USN spotting patterns, with also a look at Royal Navy practice and French spotting on Clemenceau & CdG. They are as close as I can make to the real world.

This involves making sure as many aircraft as possible can be moved around without having to shift others, eg. leaving 1-2 empty spots in each hangar bay, leaving clear taxi lanes on the flight deck to spot the aircraft for launch, space for mobile cranes, tractors, munitions etc. If anything I’m being generous as often parts of the hangar are taken up by maintenance gear, ships boats and other things that take up space and reduce the achievable density.

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Deck spotting from Hobbs, Br A C.

Apols for joining in late.

RE: the USN pre-launch spotting pattern diagram:
I've seen it before too, but I've also seen this picture of USS Nimitz with all four cats operating (below). There are half-dozen others of similar spotting that can be found with some persistent googling too.

Any idea why they're different? The diagram you've shared sacrifices a cat. Do you have a date/reference for it? I wondered if it was spotting for cyclical ops, but the landing area is fouled by spotted aircraft (not actively launching) and it has almost the same number of fighters on deck.

I've read from your other comments that you have some good info on US carrier deck ops - do you have any sources you can share? Thanks in advance!

RE: Total air wing size:
My understanding aligns the Hobb's diagram. The total airwing = as many aircraft as can fitted without fouling the landing area (to allow the last aircraft to land-on or emergency recoveries).

Afaik, the penalties to sortie rate from deck congestion are outweighed by the additional aircraft because the deck is only that crowded when there are near-zero aircraft in the air, or no losses have been taken.


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One reason for those massive air wing numbers was the unreliability of the aircraft prior to the F/A18 Hornet.

For example, if the flying programme required a pair of Tomcats the sqn would prepare 3, so a spare was available if one of the allocated planes became unserviceable early in the mission. This is at least in part the result of the Ault Report, which found the during Rolling Thunder Phantoms were flying air to air missions without serviceable weapons systems and not doing well in air-to-air combat. As a result, just like in the A6 sqns, an unserviceable weapons system in an F4 (and presumably in the following F14) meant an unserviceable aircraft.

The reliability of the Hornet meant the USN didn't need 50+ planes to support a flying programme of 40 planes, their electronics didn't crap themselves between the hangar and the form-up in the air.
 
Pardon me, somehow didn't see this thread earlier. (how did that happen?)
On Buccaneers built.
Forty-six built between 1973 and 1977, plus three for weapons trials work.
Had RN carrier remained in operational planning beyond the early 70's. Then we can envision a new S.3 variant put into production from the mid-to-late 70's. Likely using a lot of Tornado avionics.
Production line could have remained open for much longer.
Temptation there to either move to uprated Spey development or replace with a RB.199 variant.


It all would depend on the bigger picture.
I'm honestly leaning more towards Tornadoes being built as carrier-compatible than a third round of Buccs. Not that an RB199-powered Bucc wouldn't be fun.


There's also the issue of refuelling. The US Navy has enough nuclear carriers that it can refuel and overhaul them on a rolling basis to take full advantage of the lifespan of the ship and spread its building costs. With the Royal Navy taking a carrier out of service for four or five years is going to create a large hole in the fleet.
Yes, the UK would be hurting to refuel a carrier. May have to talk to the French about how they designed their carriers for quick turnarounds, even though the UK uses HEU.

Also, there's little to no chance that the PWR1 could scale up to a carrier-sized unit, it's more or less an S5W. You'd be looking at something more like an Enterprise layout with 8 reactors, and the horrible number of personnel needed to run them. Which is honestly very unfortunate for UK reactor design. Making a ~600MWth reactor fit into a ~130ft wide box is not easy.



Speaking of technology, IIUC the 250' BS6 cats were F111B compatible, which was the looming USN interceptor in 1966. By 1978 the F14 was in service and F/A18 in development, would the new carrier need more powerful cats? Given the consensus seems to think the 78 carrier would be closely related to CVA01 would there be room for longer cats? Perhaps the RN might like what the RAN did lengthening the Melbourne's xat from 103' to 112' with the same power in order to reduce the stress of each launch by about 8%, and give the 78 carrier's cats a few extra feet.
There may be room for longer cats but I don't think they'd need to be more powerful.

F-14s are lighter than F-111Bs. Not a lot lighter, but ~6000lbs is still lighter.



I go back to the Falklands as the key mission (and not only in hindsight)... the basic requirements were to put up a 24/7 CAP, ensure sea control, and send some limited strikes against enemy airfields, naval task forces, or strategic ground targets. Even if the Falklands hadn't happened, other potential Cold War conflicts existed in the Middle East (Yemen, Lebanon), Africa, South East Asia. Not to mention the Soviet threat. There has to be some room to replace Ark Royal in the late 70s with something better than the RN's small VSTOL carriers that doesn't cost as much as a full size 50,000+ ton carrier... let's call it the "minimum size Phantom carrier".
Agreed.


The key to this is sortie rates... in the Falklands the Harriers' peak sortie rate was 60-70 sorties/day x 6 days, i.e. about 2-2.5 sorties/day per aircraft. (The CAP-focused Sea Harriers on Invincible flew 2.5-3 sorties/day per aircraft, while the slightly more strike focused Sea Harriers and GR3s on Hermes flew ~2 sorties day). An air wing of 30 Phantoms & Buccaneers should be sufficient to deliver a similar sortie volume, but to much greater effect in terms of weapons load, range, and combat capabilities (relative to Sea Harrier).

So let's set the requirement at 30 aircraft.
- 14 F-4 Phantoms x 2.5 CAP sorties/day = 35 sorties/day
- 16 Buccaneers x 2 strike sorties/day = 32 sorties/day
Total 30 aircraft x 2.25 sorties/day = 67 sorties/day

Ideally add 1-2 attrition replacements for each type, for a total of 32-34 jets onboard.
A Phantom can do a much longer CAP than a SHAR, and that will reduce the needed sorties per day. Buccs as well.

But I still think that ~30 combat aircraft is about the bare minimum. Plus AEW (whichever bird that ended up being) and ASW helos.



An auxiliary steam boiler to power catapults was studied it appears. This document (from 1966) (link https://library.imarest.org/record/9505/files/v16b3p04a.pdf), summarised findings were:

To supply steam catapults independent of ship's boilers, an auxiliary boiler was designed, developed and installed at the Naval Air Department Bedford, It appeared to work successfully supplying steam to experimental land-based catapults.

It was a La Mont, forced circulation boiler of 110,000 lb/hr evaporation rate and variable working pressure up to 1,025 Ib/sq in. saturated steam. It was fully automatic in the pressure range 550-1,000 lb/sq in. and burnt Diesel fuel through eight 'keyhole' type combustors.

Although a reasonably compact self-contained unit, it was not as small as was hoped and the evaporation rate required to meet a cycle time of 30 seconds was about twice that possible from the boiler.

The key point was that a boiler twice the size, sited in its own boiler room complete with full auxiliaries, was considered to be too
great a penalty in space and weight for back fitting into existing carriers.


So would have one been too great a penalty if in a carrier powered by GTs? Interesting question.

The archive of Journal of Naval Engineering articles on the site linked to has all sorts of interesting historical tidbits.
That does say that a single boiler twice the size was too big a penalty.

Two smaller boilers may have been a better option than a single larger boiler. I'd need a lot more information about ship design that I just don't have. I believe it would require more personnel to operate, but less volume.



Boom and bust is the killer, it costs more to ramp up after a bust period than it takes to keep work going (although at a reduced rate) through the design and build cycle.

There is too much focus on value for money achieved through building large batches over a short period of time. Over the long term, it is much more efficient to build what you need to a staggered schedule and replace rather than life extending older platforms.
Exactly. See also the US building a third Seawolf instead of stopping production at 2. Because Clinton was convinced, after much pressure, that losing all those skilled shipbuilders would be far too expensive to rehire or replace and get their replacements trained up.
 
There may be room for longer cats but I don't think they'd need to be more powerful.

F-14s are lighter than F-111Bs. Not a lot lighter, but ~6000lbs is still lighter.

I think if the marginal cost to make the cats a bit longer was low enough then I think they'd do it.
 
I think if the marginal cost to make the cats a bit longer was low enough then I think they'd do it.
Agreed there. It's just that the parallel/near-parallel landing path reduces space for the bow cats. While the Midways (shortest "big" carriers) used pretty extreme angled decks (up to 10.5deg) and that left more room to keep the bow cats out of the landing path.
 
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