JMR (Joint Multi-Role) & FVL (Future Vertical Lift) Programs

red admiral said:
I think its much more about the adoption of open systems architecture which was viewed as an essential requirement by government for through life, cost effective support. Sikorsky didn't seem to want to offer this - its a different business model that potentially has less down stream income.
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I recall senior executives stating the explicit point of LM buying sikorsky was to get the helicopter systems integration business, and not the helicopter sales business
 
zevets said:
red admiral said:
I think its much more about the adoption of open systems architecture which was viewed as an essential requirement by government for through life, cost effective support. Sikorsky didn't seem to want to offer this - its a different business model that potentially has less down stream income.
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I recall senior executives stating the explicit point of LM buying sikorsky was to get the helicopter systems integration business, and not the helicopter sales business
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Sad, if true. Ironically LMCO did not loose as they are part of the Bell team. Since they are not part of the air vehicle development team ... one wonders at what part of the program they are working? Interesting things going on behind corporate doors to be sure.
 
There's a distinct trend already with the general media focusing on Sikorsky bid pricing and presenting the selection of Valor as a more expensive and anti-taxpayer move - likely playing right into the hands of the CT congressional gang.

Of course my favorite excerpt from the report, which none of the stories I have read seem to think is relevant enough to quote, gives the context as to why those pricing numbers are complete hokum

While Sikorsky’s proposed price is lower, the offer is based on an unacceptable engineering design. Additionally, Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk. In contrast, Bell’s proposed price, in comparison to the design’s independent government estimate, is reasonable and provides the best value to the government.
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"...Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk. "

I wish there was more plain speak in the document. As in: "The Army felt that the incomplete documentation made Sikorsky's cost value numbers suspect." I also think there is more to the unacceptable approach of the technical assessment that was not brought up in the GAO document due to other competitive efforts ongoing.
 
yasotay said:
Enough said. Engineering Design and Development for the Sikorsky/Boeing SB>1 was found to be unacceptable. The redacted portion of the document lays out in detail just how unacceptable the proposal was.
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yasotay said:
"...Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk. "

I wish there was more plain speak in the document. As in: "The Army felt that the incomplete documentation made Sikorsky's cost value numbers suspect." I also think there is more to the unacceptable approach of the technical assessment that was not brought up in the GAO document due to other competitive efforts ongoing.
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From only reading the report you posted, it looks like it was pretty straight forward, honestly. It's not really technical speak, but I suppose it helps to be familiar with it.

From the section right below the scoring graphic you posted:
[i[The SSEB found that Sikorsky “did not provide allocation of functions below the system level of the logical architecture representing an incomplete functional decomposition, allocation, and traceability for the definition, application, and use of system functions.”
The SSEB noted that “it is unclear to the evaluators how the subsystems and components and their boundaries were determined,” and further concluded:
Overall, the functional architecture provided by Sikorsky did not demonstrate an adequate approach to meet the requirements of the solicitation and deferred the work scope to the Weapon System Development Program where the functional architecture would be more fully defined. These significant weaknesses and weaknesses [sic] resulted from insufficient evidence and inadequately defined scope to determine how Sikorsky’s proposed architecture would meet the government’s MOSA and architecture requirements and presents a cost and schedule impact resulting in an unacceptable risk during the Weapon System Development Program. [/i]

I've been part of teams that have won based on our documentation, even when the other team may have had a better product and competitive offer. I've also been on the other side where whoever was writing and reviewing the documentation did a piss poor job despite of the strength of our bid.

They might have been able to survive the delays in the demonstration program or subpar bid-writing, but you cannot expect to survive both. Really, there's zero excuse for two Primes the size of LM and Sikorski to fumble bid-writing this badly. They should have literal teams of people writing these bids and going over them with fine-tooth combs. I've been in a company so small that it would literally have an engineer write their own bid paper work and have it reviewed and edited by a small number of competent people before submission to massage it. I don't remember ever seeing something quite as stark as the bolded above coming back in scoring.

Shortest summary ever came shortly afterward:
"While Sikorsky’s proposed price is lower, the offer is based on an unacceptable engineering design. Additionally, Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk"


Still think the design approach was the right fork to turn down (compared to tilt-rotor), but the design has to work and be affordable, and when you don't acceptably demonstrate and document either of those things, there is no way to win a competition, and little argument to be made for overturning the result.
 
_Del_ said:
yasotay said:
Enough said. Engineering Design and Development for the Sikorsky/Boeing SB>1 was found to be unacceptable. The redacted portion of the document lays out in detail just how unacceptable the proposal was.
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yasotay said:
"...Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk. "

I wish there was more plain speak in the document. As in: "The Army felt that the incomplete documentation made Sikorsky's cost value numbers suspect." I also think there is more to the unacceptable approach of the technical assessment that was not brought up in the GAO document due to other competitive efforts ongoing.
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From only reading the report you posted, it looks like it was pretty straight forward, honestly. It's not really technical speak, but I suppose it helps to be familiar with it.

From the section right below the scoring graphic you posted:
[i[The SSEB found that Sikorsky “did not provide allocation of functions below the system level of the logical architecture representing an incomplete functional decomposition, allocation, and traceability for the definition, application, and use of system functions.”
The SSEB noted that “it is unclear to the evaluators how the subsystems and components and their boundaries were determined,” and further concluded:
Overall, the functional architecture provided by Sikorsky did not demonstrate an adequate approach to meet the requirements of the solicitation and deferred the work scope to the Weapon System Development Program where the functional architecture would be more fully defined. These significant weaknesses and weaknesses [sic] resulted from insufficient evidence and inadequately defined scope to determine how Sikorsky’s proposed architecture would meet the government’s MOSA and architecture requirements and presents a cost and schedule impact resulting in an unacceptable risk during the Weapon System Development Program. [/i]

I've been part of teams that have won based on our documentation, even when the other team may have had a better product and competitive offer. I've also been on the other side where whoever was writing and reviewing the documentation did a piss poor job despite of the strength of our bid.

They might have been able to survive the delays in the demonstration program or subpar bid-writing, but you cannot expect to survive both. Really, there's zero excuse for two Primes the size of LM and Sikorski to fumble bid-writing this badly. They should have literal teams of people writing these bids and going over them with fine-tooth combs. I've been in a company so small that it would literally have an engineer write their own bid paper work and have it reviewed and edited by a small number of competent people before submission to massage it. I don't remember ever seeing something quite as stark as the bolded above coming back in scoring.

Shortest summary ever came shortly afterward:
"While Sikorsky’s proposed price is lower, the offer is based on an unacceptable engineering design. Additionally, Sikorsky’s cost realism could not be fully assessed due to their unacceptable approach, which is therefore indicative of cost and performance risk"


Still think the design approach was the right fork to turn down (compared to tilt-rotor), but the design has to work and be affordable, and when you don't acceptably demonstrate and document either of those things, there is no way to win a competition, and little argument to be made for overturning the result.
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@_Del_ - Thank you for these great insights. Your comments make me go back to my question regarding the disperity between two corporate methodologies for proposal writing as they merge. As with many I suspect there were significant differences in philosophy.
 
The reviewing that goes on doesn't indicate that this was somehow a mistake by Sikorsky. Much rather an attempt to get round the Open System Architecture requirement - you're in a much stronger position to bend the architecture to suit your company as the sole vendor.
 
1681852420645
 
Has there ever been a mention of expected unit cost for both teams? I’ve only ever seen a YouTube video that mentioned the Valour will be half or two thirds the price of the V-22 Osprey.
 
Half or two thirds the price of the Osprey? That will be good going if Bell can get the Valor delivered to the end users on time and within budget, considering what happened during the Osprey's flight test program.
 
Searches for unit cost are a bit vague but I’ve seen $70 - $80 million for a Osprey and $10 - $20 million for a Blackhawk. Sound reasonable?
 
SteveO said:
Has there ever been a mention of expected unit cost for both teams? I’ve only ever seen a YouTube video that mentioned the Valour will be half or two thirds the price of the V-22 Osprey.
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FVL CS3 / FLRAA had requirements morph over time, but the desired unit cost settled somewhere around $40 million
 
FighterJock said:
Half or two thirds the price of the Osprey? That will be good going if Bell can get the Valor delivered to the end users on time and within budget, considering what happened during the Osprey's flight test program.
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The Osprey was the first of its kind entirely for tiltrotors and experienced a myriad of unknown unknowns with respect to technology development, first generation FBW flight controls, vertical engine operation (with 5000psi hydraulics), and flight testing the corners of the envelope on tiltrotors.

V-280 was designed from the ground up to leverage all those lessons learned. There's good reason to be cautiously optimistic, especially in light of the absolutely stellar performance of the AVCD demo program at Bell.
 
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Control laws (CLAWS) will likely be the new "challenge" with FBW aircraft vice aerodynamics.
 
Very frustrating news.

Bush: FARA eight months behind schedule due to delays with engine deliveries, AOA
(Inside Defense, Apr. 19, Dan Schere)

The Army’s top acquisition official told Congress during a Wednesday afternoon hearing that the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft is about eight months behind schedule, stemming from delays with engine deliveries and an uncompleted analysis of alternatives.
Doug Bush told the House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee that FARA is now scheduled to enter milestone B in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026, referring to the point at which the program enters the engineering and manufacturing development stage.
Bell, owned by Textron, and Sikorsky, owned by Lockheed Martin, are competing for the FARA contract. Both companies have said their respective prototypes are nearly complete. But the Improved Turbine Engine Program, which will power the aircraft, continues to experience delays and deliveries are now scheduled for early 2024, Bush has said.
On Wednesday, Bush told subcommittee Chairman Rob Wittman (R-VA) the delays are quality-control-related. Subvendors of General Electric have had trouble making new components with new methods, such as 3D printing, in a way that ensures the engines are up to par for being used in test aircraft.
Also contributing to the FARA delay is the fact that an AOA, an evaluation of characteristics of multiple systems under consideration for procurement, has not been completed for the program, Bush said.
A Government Accountability Office report released earlier this week noted that FARA officials had given a briefing on the AOA, including potential aircraft designs, and risks to cost and schedule, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Advisory Group in November 2021. The Army later requested permission to withdraw the analysis due to delays with the engine deliveries.
In his opening statement Wednesday, Wittman said he found the GAO report particularly concerning, since the Army will have spent $2 billion on FARA by the end of FY-23.
“As the Army considers alternatives and a projected timeframe that would deliver in the 2030s, it is hard for me to conceptualize a manned rotary wing reconnaissance aircraft when we are, even today, proliferating commercial unmanned rotary wing capabilities that could better support, at a more effective price point, [the] Army’s reconnaissance mission,” he said.
When Wittman asked Bush why an AOA had not been completed sooner for FARA, Bush said initially the Army and Defense Department had not decided on an acquisition pathway for the program.
Eventually it was decided FARA would use a traditional pathway that utilized milestone B, the engineering and manufacturing development phase.
“To be fair to my predecessors, I believe there was hope at the time to be able to go, perhaps earlier, to a milestone C-type [production] approach, or even perhaps rapid fielding. But based on where the program is, and the technology, we decided the more responsible approach would be to go to a traditional milestone B, which requires the AOA,” he said.
The AOA is considered “advisory,” Bush added, meaning the decision to move forward with milestone B ultimately rests with Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante, with input from the Army and others.
 
yasotay said:
On Wednesday, Bush told subcommittee Chairman Rob Wittman (R-VA) the delays are quality-control-related. Subvendors of General Electric have had trouble making new components with new methods, such as 3D printing, in a way that ensures the engines are up to par for being used in test aircraft.
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This tracks with the word on the street. GE's design geometry requires additive manufacturing and the tolerancing was not up to snuff on some of these critical spool components, literally preventing assembly. They should rightfully be embarrassed.
 
www.lockheedmartin.com

Sikorsky X2 Technology Propels Army Readiness in the Indo-Pacific

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) covers more of the globe than any Department of Defense geographic combatant commands, making it vital for the military to operate at range.
www.lockheedmartin.com www.lockheedmartin.com

Sikorsky immediately shifting to all out FARA mode.

The verbiage referencing long range INDOPACOM mission capability is more than ironic considering the past 10 years of FLRAA messaging downplaying the same thing.

And the last 2 paragraphs hammering on MOSA have just got to have the Bell folks chuckling with the timing
 
yasotay said:
bobbymike said:
www.defensenews.com

Army evaluating future of heavy-lift helicopters

The US Army is taking a look at possible avenues to pursue a future heavy-lift aircraft.
www.defensenews.com www.defensenews.com
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*Sigh* here we go again. Almost as popular as scout helicopter programs.
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FVL-Heavy is going to be painful, no way around it. There's going to be sticker shock to spare and the Army's going to have a big uphill battle getting it over the line. So coming to the table with as many "No, seriously, we NEED this" studies as they can makes some sense.
 
sferrin said:
yasotay said:
I am not sure Bell has the bandwidth to do both FLRAA and FARA. Honestly I would really like to see Sikorsky get the nod for FARA as the smaller coaxial compound hopefully will scale better. Mostly I really would like to retain three prime OEM (with MD and others) in the wings.

See my cynicism here: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/sikorsky-s-97-raider.22916/page-9#post-593725
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IMO Sikorsky would REALLY have to screw the pooch to lose FARA.
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Personally I think AVX/L3 should have been kept in the competition. L3 is a proven contractor with deep pockets, AVX's designs seem more evolutionary than revolutionary in spite of it's looks, and it would help another potential competitor get off the ground.
 
yasotay said:
The Blackhawk is dead! Long live the Blackhawk!
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I honestly don’t know why the US Army doesn’t just start buying S-92s to replace their older Blackhawks… run it as a parallel fleet to FLRAA.
 
H_K said:
yasotay said:
The Blackhawk is dead! Long live the Blackhawk!
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I honestly don’t know why the US Army doesn’t just start buying S-92s to replace their older Blackhawks… run it as a parallel fleet to FLRAA.
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The production line is no more. The S-92 was not built to military standards. It was designed to assume a military role, but none of the military elected to pursue it. A great "what if" conversation with cigars and scotch whiskey could be had.
 
H_K said:
yasotay said:
The Blackhawk is dead! Long live the Blackhawk!
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I honestly don’t know why the US Army doesn’t just start buying S-92s to replace their older Blackhawks… run it as a parallel fleet to FLRAA.
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It's just too big. I don't think the S-92 fits in a C-17 without taking the rotor head completely off.


yasotay said:
The production line is no more.
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Sort of. They shut down the final assembly site but reserved the possibility of restarting if there was interest. As of a couple of months ago, they were taking orders for new build S-92A+ deliveries in 2025-6, so they do seem serious about restarting the line somewhere. Right now, they actually are building some airframes at West Palm.
 
yasotay said:
The production line is no more. The S-92 was not built to military standards. It was designed to assume a military role, but none of the military elected to pursue it. A great "what if" conversation with cigars and scotch whiskey could be had.
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Canada's attempt has not been smoothest sailing.
 
jsport said:
breakingdefense.com

RAIVEN: Sensing at the edge and beyond the pixel with embedded hyperspectral imaging and artificial intelligence - Breaking Defense

For Future Vertical Lift, the Army wants new and innovative technology that transforms their platforms into advanced weapons systems. One such technology is Raytheon Technologies’ revolutionary RAIVEN Turret 1000, first in a new family of EO/IR systems.
breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com

sponsored and doesnt mention proximity warnings
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Lidar and Hyperspectral sensing. Cool. Can anyone guess the range.
 
yasotay said:
H_K said:
yasotay said:
The Blackhawk is dead! Long live the Blackhawk!
Click to expand...
I honestly don’t know why the US Army doesn’t just start buying S-92s to replace their older Blackhawks… run it as a parallel fleet to FLRAA.
Click to expand...
The production line is no more. The S-92 was not built to military standards. It was designed to assume a military role, but none of the military elected to pursue it. A great "what if" conversation with cigars and scotch whiskey could be had.
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The S-92 devolved into a bloated mess and has thoroughly outgrown its rotor system. Its a compromised design that tried too hard to alternately leverage "proven Blackhawk heritage" vs "new advanced technology" depending on the audience.

Between the falsified run-dry testing on the MGB to obtain part 29 certification, other basic lube system design flaws, gearbox foot cracking issues, tail rotor elastomeric chucking...there's not a lot of promise that the platform would make a good military workhorse.

As mentioned elsewhere above CH-148 has been one of the most protracted and problematic programs in history. I am still amazed VXX went VH-92.
 
In case you were worried about Sikorsky post FLRAA.

U.S. Army, Sikorsky Plan Black Hawk’s Long-Term Future
(Aviation Week, May 1, Brian Everstine)

NASHVILLE, Tennessee—The U.S. Army wants its Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk fleet flying for the next 40 to 60 years, with the follow-on Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) not planned to be a one-for-one replacement for the helicopter.
To get there, the Army and Sikorsky are planning upgrades and sustainment to keep the fleet healthy. This starts with a now-delayed engine replacement that has been affecting other rotorcraft fleets, including the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA).
The Army announced in late April that a production decision for the GE Aerospace T901 engine on the Black Hawk has been pushed to 2026, a two-year delay. The Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) powerplant has seen supply chain disruptions that have pushed back installation into the Army’s first priority for it, Bell and Sikorsky competitive prototypes for FARA, Maj. Gen. Robert Barrie, the Army’s program executive officer for aviation, told reporters at the recent Army Aviation Association of America summit here.
The T901 will replace the existing T700 engines on the Black Hawk and will also be installed on the FARA winner and the Boeing AH-64 Apache for ease of maintenance and cost savings.
Sikorsky last year signed what is expected to be the final multiyear contract for Black Hawk production, totaling $2.3 billion for 120 aircraft. Sikorsky President Paul Lemmo says the company has begun delivering on that contract, with initial deliveries having started in the fourth quarter of 2022 and planned to continue through 2027. The company also received a contract modernization of just less than $100 million for seven additional aircraft added by Congress in fiscal 2022, he says. The production slots under the multiyear program are filling up with orders, such as Australia’s January contract for 40 aircraft, Lemmo says.
Beyond the multiyear, the Army recently released a sources-sought notice for five more years of Black Hawk production for 2028-2033, and Lemmo says the company has responded with interest.
Barrie says this would set up a contractual means to potentially buy aircraft for foreign military sales. It follows a similar model for CH-47 Chinooks that set up an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for international partners. A corresponding model is expected for Apache as well, he says.
Lemmo says he is “optimistic that there will be additional production and modernization of the [Black Hawk] and we’re preparing on all fronts for that.”
This includes additional new-build aircraft or retrofits for modernization. Beyond ITEP, this would also include the Army’s push for a Modular Open Systems Approach allowing third-party systems to be installed on the aircraft.
“We are working on that type of a solution based on our [Future Vertical Lift] solutions, and so we’re looking forward to continuing that discussion and providing that,” he says.
Lemmo also points to the company’s Matrix technology developed with DARPA to fly the Black Hawk without a pilot in the cockpit. This technology has been demonstrated at two major Army exercises—Project Convergence 2021 and 2022. Lemmo says the future of this technology can be as a pilot aid, allowing a pilot to focus on a mission and less so on “mundane flying tasks.”
In the shorter term, the Army has delayed its full-rate production decision for the UH-60V cockpit redesign from Northrop Grumman. The decision was expected in March, but the service needs to ensure that the funding is aligned “just right” before a decision is made, Barrie says. Testing has been completed to show it is effective, suitable and survivable, Barrie says.
Northrop Grumman says it is supporting the Army through low-rate initial production of the UH-60V redesign, with the hardware and software complete and approved for operations.
 
In other FLRAA news. Aggressive schedule by Army standards.

Army Targeting Q3 FY ‘24 For FLRAA Milestone B Decision
(Defense Daily, May 1, Matt Beinart)

NASHVILLE, Tenn.—The Army is targeting the third quarter of fiscal year 2024 for a Milestone B decision to move the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) into a program of record, a senior official confirmed last week.
Maj. Gen. Robert Barrie, the Army’s program executive officer for aviation, said the service at that time would have a firm idea of the acquisition strategy and procurement objective for FLRAA, after having selected Bell’s V-280 Valor tiltrotor design for the major modernization effort.
“We have initiated work with Bell on the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. We’re very excited about this capability for the Army,” Barrie told reporters at the Army Aviation Mission Solutions Summit in Nashville. “We’re laser focused on execution. That’s what both the government team and Bell are executing today. It’s baselining the program, move out, approach Milestone B for the government, bring the program to record and continue with development.”
Bell’s V-280 Valor was named the winner of the FLRAA competition on Dec. 5, beating out Sikorsky and Boeing team’s Defiant X coaxial rigid rotor helicopter offering for the program to find an eventual UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter replacement (Defense Daily, Dec. 5).
Maj. Gen. Water Rugen, director of the Army’s Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional Team, told reporters the Army Requirements Oversight Council is set to meet this July to approve the capabilities development document for FLRAA, which will be followed by a Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval process later in 2023.
The Army’s initial FLRAA deal to Bell is worth up to $1.3 billion but could total $7 billion if all options are picked up.
Army officials have previously said the plan is to have Bell deliver the first physical prototypes for FLRAA in 2025, with continued digital design and work on the virtual prototype in the near-term as the program moves toward a Milestone B decision (Defense Daily, Dec. 6).
“From a milestone perspective…we’re looking at kicking off this program in a disciplined manner. From a programmatic standpoint, which is probably not super exciting to everyone but to us, our bread and butter is an integrated baseline review. [That’s] an understanding of, ‘Here’s the contract that was awarded. Here are exact, in infinite detail, milestones that are going to be understood at the earned value management level and here’s how they’re going to be tracked and here’s how cost account managers are going to report to program managers.’ So it’s things that we do inside program management,” Barrie said during the media briefing.
Gen. James McConville, the Army chief of staff, told reporters during the conference in Nashville last week he feels “very good” about FLRAA and specifically cited the speed and range offered by Bell’s V-280 tiltrotor design.
“The company is ready to go, and they have invested in manufacturing. And, again, we’re going to have that discussion about the importance of performance, cost and schedule. That does matter,” McConville said. “I think there’s tremendous potential when you look at an aircraft that can go over 300 knots and what that’s going to be able to do. We’re just excited about having that capability, especially as we look out into the Indo-Pacific where the ranges are much longer.”
Sikorsky unsuccessfully protested the FLRAA award decision, with a Government Accountability Office report released in April noting the Army deemed its bid with Boeing “unacceptable” in the “architecture” subfactor for engineering and design (Defense Daily, April 14).
 

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