How was provoking a war against Japan supposed to overcome the resistance of public opinion to to directly fighting Germany?
Distraction by Germany, racism, and just the fact this shit is hard. No conspiracy required.
I think you need to ask yourself why this alarmed the international community, in light of the later parts of your posts.
The Japanese had every choice, but their government was run by the screaming lunatics in the military. The start of the Pacific War is on no one's heads but their own.
Genuinely, I despise this conspiracy theory and the fact that it's gotten traction. Cease, please.
Presumably, they would actually rethink what they were doing. Obviously, in 2025 we know that was never going to happen, but the US government of the time did not have the level of insight into Japanese politics we enjoy.
Make no mistake, the US' actions were obviously coercive, but, well, I've made no secret of the fact that my stance was that Japan had earned coercive measures to stop them by prior actions.
This is a bad argument, since the Japanese needed the intervening months between the embargo and Pearl Harbor to plan the op.
-The American people associated the intervention of American troops in World War I with the flu epidemic of 1919 and the Great Depression of 1929; they did not want more wars.
-Racism?.. Perhaps, but for the military, the archaic appearance of Japanese fighters with fixed landing gear and only two 0.3-in machine guns as an indicator of Japanese technological level was more important.
The Nakajima Ki.27 had been operating in China since March 1938, and several units were captured and tested by Chinese and Soviets. Its performances were known in the West, but the archaic aspect of its airframe, with fixed undercarriage (inspired by that of the Northtrop XFT of 1934), made the Allies think that it was a design technologically surpassed.
Under the protection of the six-hundred Ki.27 fighters, the IJA conquered 90 per cent of the territories occupied during the World War Two. The Ki.27 was not examined by experts of the Allies until the capture of one from the 77th Sentai in Burma, in April 1942.
The
Zero was also unknown to the Allies. In the spring of 1941, the Chinese succeeded in shooting down an A6M2 over Chengdu. They managed to assemble very accurate data sheet and three-view drawings were given to the U.S. Navy Department and the U.S. War Department, but the experts did not consider the data credible and the report was ignored.
The
Zero was designed to meet specification IJN 19 May 1937 that required a fighter capable of flying at more than 500 kph and with an exceptional range, to escort the bombers on the specific conditions of the war in China. Its construction was only made possible by adopting a retractable landing gear (based on that of the prototype Chance Vought V.143 acquired by the Japanese in 1937) and removing the armour and all the auxiliary equipment typical of a naval fighter, until the airplane weighted 25 per cent less than the Grumman F4F, even keeping its powerful armament. Nobody in the Western countries believed that a fighter with these characteristics could exist until the attacks to Pearl Harbour, Philippines and Java.
In July 1942, American experts could examine a
Zero captured in Akutan Island and identified the weak points of its construction, an information that saved the lives of U.S. airmen and that was used to design the Grumman Hellcat. On the other hand, the Nakajima Ki.43 was completely unknown outside of Japan. The success of the Ki.27 had delayed the start of production until April 1941 with only 40 units having entered service in December. That was a complete surprise to the Allies, who at first mistook it for the
Zero. The Japanese Army decided to reveal its existence in April 1942.
Equipped with butterfly combat flaps and weighting 33 per cent less than the P-40B, the Ki.43 was able to out-manoeuvre the Buffaloes, Hurricanes and Tomahawks. The first unit was captured at Chittagong, in the spring of 1942. Tested by the Australians, the Chinese and the Americans, it revealed some shortcomings in combat: lack of pilot armour and self-sealing fuel tanks.
-The international community is alarmed when the press is alarmed, and the press is alarmed when some important economic group begins to lose power. The international community was not alarmed when Kennedy lost Cuba, nor when Carter lost Iran, nor when England and France lost the Canal... that was simply the right thing to do for public opinion.
-The Japanese had no choice, they were ruled by a military dictatorship far worse than Germany's, and the military (riding the tiger) could not afford dishonor or defeat. Speaking of memory, I think that at the end of 1941 the Rengo Kentai only had fuel for six months of training or two months of combat, they had no choice.
