Infantry Squad Size Studies

What is your ideal number for the dismounts of an infantry squad?

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GruntFox

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So, I've been looking up infantry squad size studies, and so far, they tend to focus on a dismount squad size of 11-15. I've only got an older study as a PDF and an article that references another, so I want to know where I could find more of these studies. This is largely due to working on a few settings (including an Empire Earth 1 and Empire Earth 2 fusion setting alongside a Xenonauts-style setting) of a more MilSciFi bent.

That and someone said that anything more than nine men on the dismount is ludicrous/insane.
 
www.armyupress.army.mil

Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad

The author uses Sir Michael Howard’s dimensions of war (operational, technological, logistical, and social) to analyze how changes in military affairs and human society, as well as projections about future war, warrant reconsideration and change to the makeup of the current infantry squad.
www.armyupress.army.mil

www.armytimes.com

How algorithms and primate research can help decide the best size for your squad

'Ape politics' shows that warfighters may be most effective in groups of 5, 15 and up to a max of about 150.
www.armytimes.com www.armytimes.com

A squad of 15 will be better controlled and more effective than one with seven or even 18 members. A company of 150 would be better ready for a mission than one with 220, at least as far as communicating what the unit needs to do and when.

The effective group numbers start at five, then to 15 and so on, seeing their effectiveness peak at 150 and again at intervals of 50 or so until maxing out at 500, according to decades-old academic anthropology.

And Army mathematicians just proved it.

In some ways, warriors have known this going back to the days of the Roman Legion, which varied somewhat in size but at times featured cohorts of 500 legionnaires for battle.

The Marine Corps recently switched its squad size from 13 to 15, after much debate on whether to shrink or increase the number.

Well, Army science and university research may have validated ages of unit wisdom. And how effective military unit leaders or CEOs (or even the leaders of protests and riots) are depended a lot on what’s called the “Dunbar number.”

That number was arrived at by anthropologist Robin Dunbar in the 1990s. The research hypothesized that 150 was the largest group that humans can maintain “stable social relations.”

Recently, Army Research Office Chief Scientist Bruce West and students at the University of North Texas were able to test the decades-old theory.

“The layering sequence is interesting because each number in the sequence is within a factor of two of the empirical magnitudes of entity sizes in the U.S. Army, ranging from a squad of roughly 15 to a platoon of approximately three times the squad size, next to a company consisting of three platoons and followed by a brigade the size of roughly three companies and so on,” West said.

Understanding how the information flows in a group, then analyzed and either accepted or rejected, is critical both within a single team of any size and how individual teams work with other teams, West said in an Army statement.

West and his team were the first to “computationally capture” the dynamics of how information moved through the group, where it flowed or stalled.

That’s a major factor in unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.

“The military has done this pretty much based on intuition,” West said.

Knowing this, researchers hope that commanders can better structure how they disseminate information and how they get a real feedback for how well their units understand and execute, intent.

“Whether it’s a speech to change morale, whatever your intent is, just knowing that and designing that when you give assignments or break up assignments, all of that can work to make the group much more efficient,” West said.

And starting at the lowest level is a much better route.

Briefing in a large battalion formation, hoping everyone is paying attention, hearing what’s said and understands what to do — that’s not the best mode of communication.

Having fire team or squad leaders schooling their soldiers or Marines on what’s to be done and how it fits into the battalion operation — much better.

“The information will get to everyone bottom-up and it will be very stable,” West said. “If I do the same thing and do it from the top down, it will be very unstable.”

That becomes apparent in problem-solving, and even in how groups will behave if there are “bad actors” in the mix.

West said that evidence in research on protests and riots shows this.

The mathematician noted that 1 to 2 percent of a group that acts as disruptors can shift a demonstration into a violent riot. But that’s most common when the size of the group rests on a Dunbar number, say 50 or 150. But it’s not quite the same when it falls in between.
 
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Top down versus bottom up organisation?

I would start with the role of the section, what do you want each section to be emplyed as, what weapons etc. Take that and work out how many sections are then needed per platoon and, keep going.

The aveage section (We called them 'bricks' back in my day) was four gruntz.

Different units will have different roles andf therefor different requirements for the section.

How many vehicles and what type? This all has an impact on logistice and ability of the unit to sustain operations,

Sorry but you need to sort these areas out before you go for platoon and company sizes.

I cannot see how 15 blokes can be the smallest element of an infantry unit but I suppose we are talking about terminology here rather than any serious communication problems.
 
why are three teams of 4-5 not seen as logically better than two? flanking and reserve/backup tms etc --seem to be always better.

how does one start backwards in planning...first one establishes a squad then one figures out what vehicles and log is needed not the other way around...that is how we ended up in the bastardized position we are in.
 
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TomS said:
Reddit being reddit, someone seems to have done a nice job summarizing the evolution of US Army thinking on this topic, with links (I didn't check whether the links still work).

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/12r49kd
View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/12r49kd/why_are_some_infantry_squads_big_and_others_small/
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Thanks... do you have any more links for such studies?
jsport said:
why are three teams of 4-5 not seen as logically better than two? flanking and reserve/backup tms etc --seem to be always better.

how does one start backwards in planning...first one establishes a squad then one figures out what vehicles and log is needed not the other way around...that is how we ended up in the bastardized position we are in.
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I'm also trying to make it feel 'organic', where it evolved to that point.

@Foo Fighter: at its core, one of the things that came out of current and past conflicts is that we'll be fighting more and more in urban areas, which requires much more manpower (and firepower besides). In addition to that, those experiences tell us that the current infantry squad makeup is extremely vulnerable (the USMC discovered that their previous squad setup was far too vulnerable, leading to the 15-man squad today). In addition to that, smaller squads are far more vulnerable to being taken out of the fight as combat is ineffective.

Note that the USSR went to the logical extreme with smaller infantry squads, and when faced with any sort of stiff resistance, they melted (i.e., VDV mech infantry).
 
A small section on it's own makes zero sense but, more small squads or sections operating dependantly does make sense. The brick, was a way of dealing with a lot of the situations we faced where a larger unit did not work (Northern Ireland). We operated in a situation whereby each 'brick' carried 80 rounds of ammo and the average ASU carried something like 200 rounds per member but because we operated as a cell of a larger unit, it mostly worked.

A lot of the small unit tactics I have seen from the Russians appears to behave as though the small section is disposable and recce or trip wire in nature. Smaller sections, two per vehicle. make use of more vehicles but can also cut down losses form vehicle casualties. And on, it goes round and round I know.
 
An interesting and valid subject. thanks GruntFox

I can only reflect on my personal experience in the Green Machine for 27-years, which encompassed numerous infantry Section size and structures - including going from 11-man Section to 8-man Section to that of Brick structure.
One thing that defiantly resonated with me was my army's seeming willingness to follow trends, instead of setting them.
It has become very obvious to me that with 24-hour operations, you can't effectively operate anything below an 8-man Section.
From a command perspective, I personally appreciated the flexibility and firepower when we introduced the Gun Group and Assault Group arrangement within the Infantry Section (the only down side originally being that it consisted of two F89 guns. But thankfully this was later rectified with one MAG-58 and a F89....).

Looking forward to watching this subject progress.

Regards
Pioneer
 
10 makes a sustainable section. It was what I trained with for 10 years in the Australian Army. It basically worked.
 
given the modern Ukr context w/ RISTA -armed drones - UGVs, wide areas of responsibility (AOR), long duration independent positioning, need for longer term casualty stabilization all while having to retain the ability to assault trenches & urban areas sqds need to be much larger than 15.

Perhaps 30 ie 3 Maneuver tms, a command, security, support elements to meet growing technology and operational demands. Yes maybe 6xIFVs for a freakin squad. Future battlespaces & tech will require smaller units taking on much more responsibility to insure units can not be flanked over overwhelmed for instance.

Also for instance, the Ukrs allegedly want Drone companies in Bdes. but ..would argue that is great for drone swarm offensives, but small units are increasing going to seek organic UGV UAS to accomplish an increasing number of tasks and those missions and others may well demand more "auxiliaries" at the lowest operational echelon.

Amazing how few westerners are acting as direct observers/advisors on the Ukr front.
 
jsport said:
Perhaps 30 ie 3 Maneuver tms, a command, security, support elements to meet growing technology and operational demands.
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Congratulations, you just described a platoon.
 
not too many support 5 person squads.. more like suicide sqds which Russian chronically undermanned assaults seem to have penchant for. gruntfox is correct on that..check out what unmanned assaults do.
www.battleorder.org

Russian Assault Detachments

New video examining the Russian Assault Detachment manual that's going around, with some added historical context and why it's not new
www.battleorder.org www.battleorder.org

The DSB 1996 Summer Study coined the term distributed Combat Cell (DCC) w/ 30-40 pax which generally seem to replace both squads and plts.
..would envision Plts w/ even more supporting elements pushing the way beyond 90 to the 150 number mentioned in Army organization. Territory needing coverage and technology will not bring numbers down but up to do it right.
 
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Pioneer said:
An interesting and valid subject. thanks GruntFox

I can only reflect on my personal experience in the Green Machine for 27-years, which encompassed numerous infantry Section size and structures - including going from 11-man Section to 8-man Section to that of Brick structure.
One thing that defiantly resonated with me was my army's seeming willingness to follow trends, instead of setting them.
It has become very obvious to me that with 24-hour operations, you can't effectively operate anything below an 8-man Section.
From a command perspective, I personally appreciated the flexibility and firepower when we introduced the Gun Group and Assault Group arrangement within the Infantry Section (the only down side originally being that it consisted of two F89 guns. But thankfully this was later rectified with one MAG-58 and a F89....).

Looking forward to watching this subject progress.

Regards
Pioneer
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That sounds like you're British or from the Commonwealth.
Rickshaw said:
10 makes a sustainable section. It was what I trained with for 10 years in the Australian Army. It basically worked.
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Though it breaks the 'rule of three' from what I've seen.
TomS said:
Congratulations, you just described a platoon.
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The problem is that the technological context is kind of forcing the squad to have such equipment available to them from the onset.
 
GruntFox said:
That sounds like you're British or from the Commonwealth.

Though it breaks the 'rule of three' from what I've seen.

The problem is that the technological context is kind of forcing the squad to have such equipment available to them from the onset.
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Three sections to the Platoon. That seems to satisfy the, "rule of three" to me. As the section is organised as a scout group (with section commander), an MG group of three, with 2-i-C and rifle group of four diggers..
 
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I'm in favor of the U.S. Marine Corps' traditional 13-man triangular rifle squad organized into three four-man fireteams commanded by a squad leader. The addition of one or two men to assist the squad leader in commanding the squad is also an interesting concept.

For a U.S. Army mechanized infantry platoon reorganized around three 13- or 14-man squads, the platoon could be organized around a six-BFV [Bradley Fighting Vehicle] platoon similar to the ABCT's [Armored Brigade Combat Team] BFV scout platoon.

Another concept that has been on my mind is how the U.S. Army's current triangular rifle platoon organized around three 9-man rifle squads could be reorganized into a binary rifle platoon of two 13-man rifle squads. The Alpha and Bravo fireteams of one squad could be split up and reassigned as a third fireteam each for the other two squads. The extra redundant squad leader could then be reassigned to either the platoon headquarters or the weapons squad.
 
jsport said:
not too many support 5 person squads.. more like suicide sqds which Russian chronically undermanned assaults seem to have penchant for. gruntfox is correct on that..check out what unmanned assaults do.
www.battleorder.org

Russian Assault Detachments

New video examining the Russian Assault Detachment manual that's going around, with some added historical context and why it's not new
www.battleorder.org www.battleorder.org

The DSB 1996 Summer Study coined the term distributed Combat Cell (DCC) w/ 30-40 pax which generally seem to replace both squads and plts.
..would envision Plts w/ even more supporting elements pushing the way beyond 90 to the 150 number mentioned in Army organization. Territory needing coverage and technology will not bring numbers down but up to do it right.
Click to expand...
 
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Rickshaw said:
Three sections to the Platoon. That seems to satisfy the, "rule of three" to me. As the section is organised as a scout group (with section commander), an MG group of three, with 2-i-C and rifle group of four diggers..
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The USMC is going to 15-man squads because they discovered that the old squad model is too vulnerable in an urban setting, especially when your enemy knows your tricks.
jsport said:
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Oh my, there are more studies that I can read for info. :) Funnily enough, those came out when MIT published its Electronic Communities paper.
 
GruntFox said:
The USMC is going to 15-man squads because they discovered that the old squad model is too vulnerable in an urban setting, especially when your enemy knows your tricks.
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If I understand correctly, the two additional riflemen will assist the squad leader in managing the squad. They are the Assistant Squad Leader (Corporal) who helps with the squad workload management and the Squad Systems Operator (Lance Corporal) who operates the squad's new quadcopter drone.

Battle Order has an article explaining the USMC's new rifle squad and platoon organization for the 2020s:
https://www.battleorder.org/us-marine-platoon-2020

Future%20USMC%20Squad-01.png
 
Christopher Wang said:
If I understand correctly, the two additional riflemen will assist the squad leader in managing the squad. They are the Assistant Squad Leader (Corporal) who helps with the squad workload management and the Squad Systems Operator (Lance Corporal) who operates the squad's new quadcopter drone.

Battle Order has an article explaining the USMC's new rifle squad and platoon organization for the 2020s:
https://www.battleorder.org/us-marine-platoon-2020

Future%20USMC%20Squad-01.png
Click to expand...
Pretty interesting, to say the least. The biggest problem is we're in 'interesting times' these days, and this will probably change in the future.
 
Another thing that people should have gotten into their heads but haven't: humans can't completely generalize. "Humans aren't ants" is a very dangerous phrase that goes completely against reality.
 
This is dependent on mission and roles. For instance, for a squad level patrol, you would generally have a recon element, security element, and support element as well as a patrol leader and assistant PL; each element would be a 4-person fireteam to enable two mutually supporting pairs. From this structure, the squad size would 13 or 14 people to enable the execution of most squad-level tasks.
 

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