If you were Sandys or Mcnamara?

uk 75

uk 75

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As we have had some interesting 50s and 60s what-ifs I thought it would be fun to go for a big one.

Put yourself in the chair of Sandys, McNamara or any other key Defence Minister of your choice.

Now put together a better balance of options than they did.
 
I would have preferred to be Michael Portillo to find out what really happened with that ugly UFO thing, besides, the guy has had a very good life traveling in luxury hotels with his TV show.:)
 
Australian PM Menzies should have taken LtGen Morshead's recommendation and merged the Dept of Defence (FKA DoD Coordination) and the Depts of Army, Navy and AF in 1958 into a single large Dept with a senior Minister.

As for Kit.
  • Get the 105mm gun for the Centurions when Britain does in 1960.
  • Get some more Saladins and Saracens (10 each?) in order to stand up a cavalry/recce regiment in 1960
  • Buy Westland Scouts instead of the 53 Bell 47s after 1962, and
    • Buy Scouts or UH1s for Woomera instead of 3 Allouette IIIs.
      • This will avoid the big Bell 206 buy in 1970. (The RAN had 2 Scouts)
  • Buy a 4th Charles F Adams DDG
  • Do a joint programme with the RN on the Type 21 Frigate for the DD/L project.
    • Buy UH2/SH2 for these Frigates and to replace the UH1C and Scout helicopters
      • which get transferred to the RAAF and Army
  • Don't make the carrier Melbourne an ASW helicopter carrier from 1959 only to reverse the decision in 1963,
    • buy Skyhawks and Trackers from 1959.
  • Upgrade Bloodhound to Bloodhound 2
  • Buy the Mirage III with single-point, pressure refueling, so it can be fitted with in-flight refueling
  • Acquire tankers in the 60s or 70s
  • Replace the carrier Melbourne with either Centaur or Hermes when offered
    • failing that drastically upgrade her
  • Buy the 11 AH1Gs as planned in the big early 70s helicopter buy
  • Buy all 8 Oberon class subs as planned
That's enough to be getting on with.
 
I would throw myself from a cliff in shame !

You forgot Diefenbaker and the Arrow. What was needed was a serious reality check and shakedown of the RCAF blue sky requirements. And of RCA (Astra-1 radar) and Canadair (Sparrow II).
The Arrow airframe was sane, and so where the Iroquois engines. Both worked superbly. What send the program into a brickwall was the radar and the missiles. There are two ways out, however
- Return to the F-106 MA-1 & Falcons. It will help the Arrow integrating into NORAD and ADC on the other side of the border.
- Move from Sparrow II (unworkable) to Sparrow III and in passing: borrow the Phantom APQ-72 radar. Contract that to Canadian Westinghouse, with a twist: antenna grows from Phantom 32-inch to Arrow 40 inch.
 
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uk 75 said:
As we have had some interesting 50s and 60s what-ifs I thought it would be fun to go for a big one.

Put yourself in the chair of Sandys, McNamara or any other key Defence Minister of your choice.

Now put together a better balance of options than they did.
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Wouldn't it be better to ask what happens if Eden isn't on drugs and the Suez Crisis doesn't happen?

Which would mean the White Paper is in 1956, instead of '57 and under less extreme circumstances.

As is Sandys extreme prohibition on any manned fighter in 10 years is probably the worse self destructive act and saddled next generation technology on one aircraft to OR.339.
 
Zen as you know I love open threads. Would be happy to see a 1956 Defence Paper.
Although I agree about Eden and Suez, some kind of military option was probably inevitable. Happy to include that tangent here.as Suez is pretty fundamental to later UK defence decisions.
 
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uk 75 said:
Zen as you know I love open threads. Would be happy to see a 1956 Defence Paper.
Although I agree about Eden and Suez, some kind of military option was probably inevitable. Happy to include that tangent here.as Suez is pretty fundamental to later UK defence decisions.
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We'd have to construct the means by which the Suez Crisis doesn't lead to the UK US relations reaching such a nadir, which is not to say they would be great. As the US needs to support some solution, and that means recognising the consequences of a Soviet warm water port is a much longer term risk than potential economic collapse and famine in Europe. Which could hand Western Europe to the Communists. Making a warm water port in Egypt an irrelevance.

Being confronted with this by Eden, would drive a grudging willingness to support some action, short of recolonisation.
Arguably Nasser would have to be removed or brought to the table to agree not to interfer with civilian shipping through the Canal. This deal would need US backing or the US would need to agree that Anglo-French intervention would be justified if that treaty was broken.

Eden would thus get his Minister to implement the already developed plan that was the 1957 White Paper, but in '56.
This would be under Selwyn Lloyd, who'd served in the Army and was involved in planning Overlord .....or... Anthony Head a former career Army man who replaced him.

Lloyd was a crucial figure in the development of the MoD and was a key figure as Foreign Secretary in trying to find peaceful solutions to the crisis. His logistical experience had him opposing the invasion.

Such logistics thinking, has implications if he stays in the MoD to oversea the White Paper.

Head would I suspect be quite favourable to the volunteer professionalisation of the Army. Essentially what his early career had been. But I need to read more to gauge his views on other areas.
 
The Americans made their second biggest mistake after Korea, they expelled their allies from the Middle East to replace them with Israel, then they continued to make mistakes in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Afghanistan, in Libya... it's not easy to be the world's policeman, they should have hired Columbo instead of Kissinger.:)
 

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zen said:
As the US needs to support some solution, and that means recognising the consequences of a Soviet warm water port is a much longer term risk than potential economic collapse and famine in Europe. Which could hand Western Europe to the Communists. Making a warm water port in Egypt an irrelevance.
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Which is why avoiding Suez means avoiding the need for an Anglo-French intervention. The US decision to withdraw funds for the Aswan Dam as a way to embarrass the USSR massively backfired.
 
Furthermore to the '56 sideline....

The surviving case for Fighters post White Paper, is divided into 'warm wars' on the one hand and BARCAP on the other.

At this stage both AWA.169 and Fairey Delta III are still vying to F.155. This is likely to just straight up be cancelled as per history.

The Avro Arrow in Canada has yet to fly, but is still a live program there. Potentially a return to this option licensed from Canada, might become a more bipartisan collaboration, as the UK radar and missile system might provide an initial capability and RR could become involved in the engines.

But Red Dean was still live and could be driven forward in it's radically revised form to arm Javelin and Sea Vixen. A stepping stone to the future.

F.177 is ongoing and only Saro is proceeding since 21 April '55.

It's arguable then that F.177 should go ahead as the basis of RAF and RN Light Fighter as per planning.
At this point German Airforce and Navy be interested with Heinkel negotiating a license.
German desire for more multirole capability would be matched by RAF interest since these would replace Hunters. This becoming the warm war fighter attack solution.
If changes need be wrought, then the earlier the better....and the cheaper!
A switch to Avon actually accelerates the program as predictions for reheated Gyron Junior were 1958.
AI.23 1959.

Key question is do certain actors string Camm along as per OTL?
But equally with more cash available, does the minister swing support over from Saro P.177 to Hawkers P.1103 to P.1121?

This being much more able to tote the heavy avionics and much less reliant on rocket for high performance.

Timing suggests Hawkers hasn't a hope of actually achieving their predictions, whilst DH has become deeply involved with Saro to achieve First Flight in '58 and IOC by '62.

Only EE can challenge this with suggestions it's P.8 revision of the Lightning. Offering more performance including a larger radar scanner. All based on known technologies and proven aerodynamics.
But that is also the case for F.177 as the SR.53 is proving.

Main issue is can Saro up jet only performance?

The wider perspective is Saro's machine can deliver to both RN and RAF from '62 in bulk as a higher performance system compared to the Hunter. In turn pushing back higher performance solutions to the period of next generation technologies.
 
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If I were Sandys... hmm...

The "no manned fighter" rule is dropped.

For the RAF:

The Delta 3 is cancelled as being a one-trick pony that's just too expensive. Fairey is compensated by being directed to develop a fully militarized development of the Delta 2, an initial order with AI23 and Blue Jay for an earlier IOC, but space and weight to be reserved for an illuminator for SARH Blue Jay as soon as it can reasonably be done. Once the interceptor variant is worked out, a developed FGR.2 will be ordered as the Hunter replacement. The Lightning is cancelled as having insufficient stretch potential; EE will be compensated by becoming a second source for the FD2 aircraft, perhaps starting the FGR.2 development work to let Fairey get the interceptor in the air ASAP. If the SARH AAM program continues to run into strife then American technical know-how will be sought if necessary, but the missile will be British.

Saro, with SR.177 airframes in the jigs and foreign interest hammering on their door, are directed to manufacture their initial pre-production batch as proof of concept for a rapid reaction interceptor.

The Canberra replacement role gets filled by the Buccaneer, the RAF having been called out on their desire to get a back-door strategic bomber. Vickers are instructed to switch production of the Valiant to the B.2 version for this purpose.

This particular universe sees the cancellation of the Delta 3 and the P.1121 as in the real world. It also sees the elimination from existence of TSR.2.
 
Continued from above:

Royal Navy:

Assumed to be a customer for SR.177 also, sorting out their interceptor needs.

Buccaneer already exists to be the strike aircraft; this stays.

The same SARH radar/missile system earmarked for FD2 (see above) is to be fitted to Sea Vixen FAW.2, initially as a trials platform and then as a retrofit if integration is easily feasible, to give the aircraft a head-on capability against supersonic targets until such time as SR.177 replaces it in service.

Missiles:

AFAIK Red Dean was already dead and Red Hebe also vanishes with the cancellation of the Delta 3/F.155T concept. In the presence of a SARH missile there's no need for Red Top's head-on IR capability. However the missile probably evolves naturally anyway (albeit with only an expanded rear-hemisphere acquisition capability), if only out of De Havilland's desire to tidy up the internal workings of Firestreak and progressively improve the seeker.

Long-term planning is for Sea Vixen and eventually SR.177 to be replaced by P.1154 (perhaps a CTOL version to keep development difficulties at bay), with an IR/SARH missile combination and tac nuke capability. Scimitar also goes.
 
1957 onwards from '56 DWP. First draught.

DH sensing the winds might drive forward private venture offerings based on Saro's work as a solution to RN and RAF needs. In this a close to the 'final bids' to F.155 of a twin Gyron Junior development of F.177 using a larger dish AI.23 or AI.18.
This latter becoming a merger with DH.117. Essentially new delta wings and tail. Conceptually this is a sort of F4.

Ministery revises N/A.47 (jet only and including NA.38 elements) and this resolves the matter, F.177 prototype and a potential limited run will go ahead to prove aerodynamics act as interim or backup and DH will build the twin. To Camm's fury the Board back DH and Blackburn over his P.1103 developments.

By '58 the priority both in the Ministery and DH is this twin engined fighter, the new Airliner and the IRBM Guidance system.

New AI radar effort to succeed AI.18 and AI.23 as per history. AAM effort in new seekers as per history. But in both cases the objective is to equip the new revised N/A.47 fighter.

The '56 DWP ought to switch efforts to a solid rocket IRBM effort, as by this point both US solid work is proving and the rumours of miniaturised nuclear weapons should have fed through. Liquid motor option remains backup.
Smaller missiles using solid radically reduce scale of hardened silo concept.

Ministery will ask for solid rocket isp of +220 sec BM, and 240 sec ABM.

Aldermaston starts theoretical work on scaled Granite package.

OR.339 Issued but focus on interim solutions as avionics are felt to not be yet upto the task. Prime focus is the 600nm RoA rather than 1,000nm. Which is left as a drop tank and or IFR development.

Vickers B.2 Pathfinder, is to provide a practical development platform for research avionics. While modified Canberras ordered built for testing components.

EE, Vickers and Avro Downselect to compete for this. DH being loaded with new Fighter project and airliner.
Interim solution is RN type Buccaneers for 1962-64. Blackburn and RAF push for reheated Gyron Junior and a stretched version for 1966-68 as a progressive development spiral towards full capability around 1972-74.

Bristol bid BS.75 scaled straight through Pegasus against RR Medway and Scaled Medway (Spey).
DH engines attempt mating Gyron front compressor to Gyron Junior turbine and a possible revised two shaft core turbofan.
AS. Bid low altitude optimised turbojet based on earlier work.

Tactical Medium Range Interdiction options examined. Hunter now, Buccaneer soon ('63), F.177 or N/A.47 developments by '65.
P.1127 research and tripartite exploration.
NMBR.3 diversion Hawkers last gasp, joint win with Dassault kills this. Focus returns to F.177 or N/A.47 against P.1127 Kestrel.
h
Hawkers given work on improved Kestrel.

Seaslug MkIII work is ruthlessly constrained to a Polyrod SARH system rather than theoretical NIGS, aiming for 60nm to 90nm ranges. IOC aiming for 1968.
This becoming the logical upgrade to County Class and a Frigate/destroyer magazine system explored for a lower cost lightweight development. These aiming for new twin or single arm launchers.
Anti-ship options explored. New seeker required.

While NMBR.11 development SIGS is continuation of earlier Orange Nell efforts in anti-missile-missile defence systems with new transistorised technologies.
By 1960 Heavy (500lb) missile VLS option examined against lighter (80lb) manual loaded missile launchers option.

ASWRE told to focus on 3D radar system scalable from Frigates to Carriers and not to waste resources chasing PESA/AESA of NIGS. That being a much longer term development.
 
zen said:
OR.339 Issued but focus on interim solutions
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I remain convinced that the first step on the long road to cancellation was taken when the winning design to OR.339 was regarded as merely the starting point as opposed to the competition winner that should actually be built without changes.

Handley-Page called it at the start. The irony is that this probably made him the best man to give the RAF what it actually, secretly wanted, but he rightly wasn't having a bar of it.

DH joining SARO is an interesting choice, but it gives SARO a bigger company to work with to build their airplane, and it brings the weapons development company in-house since Firestreak/Red Top is a DH baby.

Replacing the rocket with a Gyron Junior brings the potential for an extensive rear fuselage redesign, which is going to be expensive given how far Saro had got IRL with producing the jigs for the aircraft and essentially being ready to start manufacturing. SR.177 works in part because the rocket gives it high-altitude oomph that a jet engine literally CANNOT provide. Take that out and the concept fails. A twin jet version (or one redesigned around Big Daddy Gyron) is probably best worked on as a successor, as the high-altitude threat turns out to not be as nasty as envisaged and attention turns to lower levels and less complexity. But the first few squadrons at least need to be delivered as first drafted.

The bigger problem with Gyron Junior is that history showed it to be a very thirsty beast, incapable of pushing Bristol's 188 fast enough for long enough and making the Buccaneer rather gutless in its unreheated form (hence replacement with Spey). Of all the engines to select, it's probably the worst choice.
 
I contend similar over HP's view of OR.339 but I'll add DH also took the requirements and threw back with rockets for STOL....

Almost an FU when you think about it.

Vickers also just went "use a catapult".

EE palmed the original SSTOLside of things off on Shorts...."you go play lift jets while we do grown up things"

Shades of the most experienced firms knowing it was an unworkable mess from day 1.
 
zen said:
EE palmed the original SSTOLside of things off on Shorts...."you go play lift jets while we do grown up things"
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That made me chuckle.

Yep everyone knew it was a tough beast. When they were called into Thames House and told to "amalgamate or die" on this project, that was a big hint that GOR.339 was gonna be a tough ride.
Don't participate and you die, participate and you probably fail and die. Tough choices.

I suppose in crazy AH land all the companies could have given Sandys the V-sign and just not submitted anything!
 
Which is why it would have made sense to run two complex programs rather than one or run a simple program as well as OR.339.

And it would also have been more pragmatic and honest to run an interim effort first and accept wonder weapons later.
 
This is a very difficult question to answer, as any answer is going to be influenced by hindsight. However, I will still give my two cents.

My first start would be binning F.155T and the eventual TSR.2 program, as these are overly-ambitious projects without an effective production, service or budgeting plan.

I would also look at finding a substitute to the SR.177, as there are aircraft which are similar in performance but have much more potential. I would keep it as a research program alongside the SR.53, but I just don't see much potential in mixed-power interceptors from this point on.

I would also probably shelve the DH.110/Sea Vixen program, as by now the aircraft would already be more or less outdated by the time it entered service, unless substantial reworks are given by improving the engines and radar system, as well as trying to integrate whatever missiles are in development in either the US or the UK that would at least give the aircraft the ability to outrange potential opponents. Funding should be allocated for studies, with a decision to be made depending on future budgeting constraints, and the benefits or drawbacks of such a system.

My main area of concern would be replacing the Canberras and the various fighters and strike-aircraft currently in service at this point in time. I would look into creating a competition between the P.1121, Gnat Mk.2/4/5 and an armed Delta II as a strike-fighter for use in Central Europe, all-weather air defence over the UK and for export, leveraging previous deals done by these companies. This would fill in the lower end, whilst the higher-end can be filled in by an improved derivative of the Buccaneer.

The Buccaneer would also serve as the basis of the future carrier strike capability, but a fighter variant can also be built for long-range patrol against bombers, which could also interest the RAF. This could also lead to more competition between the derivatives of the Scimitar and the Buccaneer, with the most suitable being chosen out of the two.

Upgrades to the V-Force would also be given, Skybolt is still on the table at this point, and with additional funds for the future, companies could study cruise missiles.

Funding should also be allocated to transport aircraft, as these could eventually be used as the basis for civil designs.


As I said, hindsight affected this a lot, and I tried my best to involve as many seemingly rational choices, combined with my thoughts on how the planners thought certain decisions would play out. This means that some decisions may ultimately be incorrect in hindsight, but may seem like good decisions from that point of view, such as the reliance on missiles, which was a trend already developing at this point.
 
if i were an Italian Defense Minister in the 50s and 60s the options i would try to implement would have been the following:
1: the search for a capable fighter would have likely led to Italy adopting something different than the F-104 starfighter, the likely choice i would pick is the F-11F-1F Super Tiger to be produced under licence and the likely development of the plane by Fiat would have led to it being a capable plane up to the halfway part of the cold war, leading to the latter defense minister (if they stay in charge for long enough that is) to make more EF-2000 once available or more Tornados, in the meantime the Super Tiger in question would have had similar works done to it as the F-104S.ASA.M, imagine that monstrocity if it happened.
2: use the G 95 as a conventional fighter aircraft to supplement said F-11, (i'd settle for the G.95/3 design to use because it resembles the Phantom for easiness sake or i could make the Fiat G.95/4 a reality with the british B.S.100 engine which i would desperately want to in order to acheive the carrier i want, it's a Garibaldi and a Cavour in essence) the G.95/3 would need to be larger than the F-11 in order to be the F-4 equivalent, the goal Is to acheive the construction of a fighter that would lead to a bit more leverage in future european wide projects, an example can be a parallel development of the Tornado as a true multirole platform in the long run without getting stuck in the mess the british had.
3: get the Leo1 to be developed into the OF-40 asap in order to keep OTO safe and try to acheive a competent availability of it in all tank forces in country, the subsequent Ariete is a problem for future DM, also OTOMATIC will be acheived at some point
4: get the Agusta company comfortable enough to experiment without being interfered with by the US manufacturers too much which will lead to interesting developments down the line,leading likely to a Cobra equivalent heli and a Mangusta early
5: pushing very hard to have an actual carrier as flagship (conventional or nuclear that depends on the necessity, i'd prefer nuclear but knowing history with my country the 80s would lead to issues) and a fleet that can handle soviet/filosoviet forces in the Med, such a carrier should be roughly Midway sized,treaty be damned and if the US doesnt mind too much we can always attempt to get a supercarrier but that is a dream and if Italy gets a supercarrier It would be best It Is nuclear powered at least.
6: examine very hard the servicemen that might be harbouring love for fascism and try to either get them to renounce their beliefs or throw them out of the army and barring anyone with said ideas from entering the service, and subsequently getting the army loyal to the Country rather than the politicians, ie the only loyalty they must have is to the President of the Republic as the commander in chief and the government.
7: requirements for standard weapons will be compliant with enviromental laws that are in the works,the necessity of putting this as a priority is the goal of acheiving a re-engineering and try to stimulate engine manufacturers to produce more efficient powerplants earlier as a mean of attempting to ease any high costs in the field.
8: having strict requirements of naval composition of 1 carrier/supercarrier, 3 LHD/LHS (San Giorgio class like) 4-6 DDG,10 Frigates and 10 corvettes (later to be replaced with Pattugliatori d'Altura) and the historical number of smaller vassels, for other strict requirements the defense budget must always be at a minimum 2% of the GDP,regardless of politics, regardless of governments and regardless of any shifts in the International sphere because,and that must always be said, Italy has threats in the Mediterranean at least untill 91, considering Gheddafi we would have to have a threat untill 2011, i know It goes far but it Is necessary in order to not be strongarmed by any regime.
9: making continous reports that must be released to the pubblic of the reality of foreign situations regarding defense, being transparent about the money spent, the requirments, the wages,where the funding goes and how does it help the national industry, the MoD has also a duty of defending the country from disinformation so It must be always explained to the pubblic,regardless of political ideas
 
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If I were Sandys I'd do the 57 DWP pretty much as standard, but without the 'manned aircraft are obsolescent' dogma.

  • Tell the RAF that it's Lightning or nothing, order the F2s in 1957 (not late 59) and get FGA/FR versions ordered in 58-59.
  • Stop calling the TSR2 a Canberra replacement, recognise early that it is both Valiant and Canberra replacement and a tech leader.
  • Arrange shipbuilding so it can lead to carriers being built directly after the LPDs
  • Replace Blue Streak with Polaris A2 in 1960, not Skybolt.
  • No ban on tactical nuke development over 10kt, WE.177 B is 150-200kt.
  • Retain an interest in the P1127 until it matures with the Kestrel, then buy it.
  • Don't change the Chieftain engine from the RR diesel V8 to the Leyland L60 multi-fuel, tell NATO you'll comply next time.
  • Demand the RAF's 'pity buy' of VC10 Super 200s retain the full 28' fuselage stretch.
  • Throw MoD support behind the full (Medway) sized DH Trident, on the grounds the RAF might like to buy it later.
  • Do not involve Britain in NBMR3 & 4, only 3B with the P1127 when it evolves later on.
 
McNamara is really tempting, but as a short aside, India and Egypt, and full cooperation on the HA-300, Marut, and Brandner E-300 engine to power them.

Co-production of the engine and both aircraft in both countries, hopefully jumpstarting both aviation industries. With the E-300 engine both aircraft should be superb performers, the HA-300 would be right along the lines of what Boyd and the boys were advocating and the Marut, which was already a pretty good attack aircraft, would have been a good enough fighter to self escort as well. A growth version of the engine could even get both aircraft above 1 to 1 thrust to weight.

The next step would be the Project 206 regional jet (using the Brandner engine) and then the HF-73. Maybe Helwan and HAL could find themselves in a position like Embraer is now, with perhaps a Saab or Dassault like
presence in the military market as well.

I know, it would probably fall apart in due course, but I think a commitment on the part of both parties could have seen both designs through, even if nothing more came of the cooperation.
 
Why buy new F11's that nobody else wanted? If you are talking 50s and 60s then you are buying F-4s, F-104s, or F-8s from the US; Lightnings or Hunters from the UK; or Mirages from France.
 
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Because the F-11F-1F is a much Better platform to sutisfy all the needs of the Italian air force at the time,the plane had potential, It was considered by Germany,the Swiss and the Japanese and was capable of all the things and F104 could do and and F8 but better, the F-4 purchase would be justified if the yugos had adopted the Mig 23 asap, i belive It was better for the AMI to have a plane that didn't kill It's pilots every time you started It (like the F104) but a plane that can do more than Just going fast in a straight line,besides performance wise this F-11F-1F Is also better in every aspect to the 104
 
Few countries would take the risk of being the lead customer for a foreign designed and built aircraft, as they assume all the risk without any of the control to ensure success or benefits if things are successful. for all its faults the F104 was bought into service and purchased in the hundreds by the USAF before an export was made.
 
I am not willing to play with the lives of my pilots most importantly, Lockheed already was important for the purchase of transport planes, i'll buy the Hercules dispite it all,what really convinced me that the Super Tiger would be the better option is the video Ed Nash made,i also know Grumman Is not going to play a country when they need success,this also gives the nations like Switzerland,Germany and Japan the option of choosing the Super Tiger purchase because a country already took the risk, i am not willing to do what Italy historically did with the Lookheed Affairs, doing so will most certanly force a resignation of my DM, procurement is not only a military matter but also a political matter, in order for me to acheive the prefixed goals i illustrated here i must take the risk of the F-11F-1F and frankly It convinces me more and more the longer i find info about the plane,i think It would be a missed opportunity if i don't take It. Plus i can always make changes to the design as required.
 
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ItalianAFDFail said:
I am not willing to play with the lives of my pilots most importantly,
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Then why are you buying a paper plane instead of one that's been widely accepted by NATO?

With the benefit of 60 years of hindsight, yes, I can see why you might think that. But in that timeframe, the F-104 is the safe option. A failed Navy fighter that Grumman has spruced up and which has always lost to the F-104 looks very risky.
 
The only way a Lockheed plane may be viable in any way Is if they made a Lancer early,i do not trust a plane like the normal 104 that Is only good at interception,i Need a plane that can be an all rounder and that can give me better survivability than a 104, i would rather buy a Draken than a 104 because i am not willing to be bribed by Lockheed and i would prefer to have something that can deal effectively with anything, and i do mean anything the Yugos or the other southern warsaw pact countries May have, i will still prefer to get the Super Tiger over the Starfighter any day.
 
Rule of cool said:
Stop calling the TSR2 a Canberra replacement, recognise early that it is both Valiant and Canberra replacement and a tech leader.
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I assume your logic is "Well, we're really producing a replacement for two airplanes here, and therefore accepting the much higher costs for the much higher spec"?

If you openly admit that the TSR.2 is in effect a small, two-man V bomber, then I think the acceptance of tac nukes in the 100 kiloton range has to follow as a corollary.

Rule of cool said:
Tell the RAF that it's Lightning or nothing, order the F2s in 1957 (not late 59) and get FGA/FR versions ordered in 58-59.
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Do you also tell Ferranti to get a move on with putting an illuminator in the AI.23, or does this follow as a corollary with the extra aircraft built?

Rule of cool said:
the 57 DWP pretty much as standard, but without the 'manned aircraft are obsolescent' dogma.
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I think this is the most important thing. Remove that and DWP57 becomes a nasty but necessary exercise in cost-saving which MIGHT potentially offer things like P.1121 a foot in the door, but at least doesn't shut them out absolutely.
 
Yellow Palace said:
Then why are you buying a paper plane instead of one that's been widely accepted by NATO?

With the benefit of 60 years of hindsight, yes, I can see why you might think that. But in that timeframe, the F-104 is the safe option. A failed Navy fighter that Grumman has spruced up and which has always lost to the F-104 looks very risky.
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A "paper plane" that was so preferred by everyone who flew it that Lockheed's smoke and mirrors sales magic failed and they had to turn to bribery to get their F-104 contracts?
 
For the British, the Lighting/Bucc/Canberra combo is a given (plus the 4-engined bombers). Add the Phantoms there, since these are the premier naval fighters, and there will be a surplus of them if/when RN is to loose it's 'normal' carriers.

Use the American money to the max, not just to push the future Harrier into production and service.

As a new high-speed bomber, make it either around two afterburning Speys, or around a single Olympus. TSR2 is probably out of reach due to monetary concerns. A design around a single TF41 would've been also viable. 1960s saw a good deal of time lost in the international cooperations to the British, so don't embark on these.

Make a simple fighter for training and combat, sorta British Mirage F1 by the mid-1960s. Also export it aggressively.
 
tomo pauk said:
As a new high-speed bomber, make it either around two afterburning Speys, or around a single Olympus. TSR2 is probably out of reach due to monetary concerns. A design around a single TF41 would've been also viable. 1960s saw a good deal of time lost in the international cooperations to the British, so don't embark on these.

Make a simple fighter for training and combat, sorta British Mirage F1 by the mid-1960s. Also export it aggressively.
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Ironically this is effectively what the P.1121 was, it would have in effect provided a Hunter and Canberra replacement in a single platform, whilst providing an aircraft that fit bang in the middle of the Mirage and Phantom. I believe it would've been an incredibly popular and useful aircraft had it entered service.
 
pathology_doc said:
I assume your logic is "Well, we're really producing a replacement for two airplanes here, and therefore accepting the much higher costs for the much higher spec"?

If you openly admit that the TSR.2 is in effect a small, two-man V bomber, then I think the acceptance of tac nukes in the 100 kiloton range has to follow as a corollary.


Do you also tell Ferranti to get a move on with putting an illuminator in the AI.23, or does this follow as a corollary with the extra aircraft built?


I think this is the most important thing. Remove that and DWP57 becomes a nasty but necessary exercise in cost-saving which MIGHT potentially offer things like P.1121 a foot in the door, but at least doesn't shut them out absolutely.
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Last first. The 57 DWP wasn't just a cost cutting exercise, it was a realisation that war was changing. Prior to about 1957 it was assumed that WW3 would be like WW2 but with nukes, there would still be mass armies, mass production of weapons and the need for convoys to protect global trade etc. With the introduction of thermonulear weapons fighting on after losing tens of millions in days simply wasn't a realistic option. In addition mass production of something like a Lightning wasn't possible the way it was with a Hunter, so the wars of the future were going to have to be deterred or fought and won/lost with whatever was in the inventory at any one time. In a lot of ways Sandys DWP was a good reaction to these wider circumstances.

Stating the TSR2 will replace the Victors as well as Canberra will change expectations, I'd also push that its cutting-edge technology will keep Britain at the forefront of aviation. I don't know if this would avoid the 10kt nuke ban, so I threw it in.

If Sandys pushes the Lightning as the RAFs 'limited war' plane I'd think well over 200 would be in service or on order by the time the radar Red Top is mooted from about 1962. I'd almost think a CW emitter could be standard with the AI23B.
 
The British evaluated Sparrow, Sidewinder C, R530, and existing SAM technologies before eventually settling on joining the sparrow program. Skyflash was merely fleshing out options that could be added on to the Sparrow base without building their own. Their offshoots of the Sparrow in any alternative history would likely end with the same outcome. So its unlikely there is any RedTop SARH option.
 
When and what circumstances did these investigations take place? Especially the Aim9c and R530.

I know that the RN decided on the Sparrow as the main weapon of the Phantom, but the Phantom wasn't ordered until mid 1964 so I doubt the Sparrow was looked at seriously before then.

The radar Red Top was looked at as a weapon for the P1154 in about 1963, the RAF wanted a CW seeker. Once that was abandoned the seeker from the Matra R530 was looked at bur not proceeded with.
 
Rule of cool said:
it was a realisation that war was changing. Prior to about 1957 it was assumed that WW3 would be like WW2 but with nukes, there would still be mass armies, mass production of weapons and the need for convoys to protect global trade etc. With the introduction of thermonulear weapons fighting on after losing tens of millions in days simply wasn't a realistic option.
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That was the problem. Sandys went all-in on the belief that the next war would be an all-out nuclear exchange with nothing for Britain to do but retaliate to the maximum extent possible. He lost, and in losing he dealt a severe blow to the British aerospace industry. It was pure luck that what actually happened led to the ONE aircraft which could successfully have fought the only war Britain has ever single-handedly fought since then against an enemy of similar technical capability.
 

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