jeffryfontaine said:
sferrin said:
Okay start with an M-1 chassis, replace Javelin with CKEM, the 25mm with a GAU-8, Stinger with RAM. . .that oughta do it. ;)

Better to redesign the M1 and put the engine/transmission up front like the Merkava, that way you would have a rear entrance and space available for troops or other equipment.

In the 1970's, I saw concepts for a MIAG (Mechanized infantry Assault Gun, AFAIK), that had a six man dismount team, with a vehicle that was armored to tank standards and had an external 105mm cannon. I wsa never able to find much more information on it then the picture and sadly lost that some years ago (so if anyone can help me there...), but the designed seemed very effective although It came out during the hysteria about the Russian introduction of Reactive armor where people were talking about the unstoppable red horde tanks laughing off TOWS on their march to France, so I'm not certain if there was any real work done on it or if it was a artist concept only.
 
Interesting AUVSI report on LM FCS from 2005
http://www.auvsipathfinder.com/2005_Symposium_Files/Wednesday,%2030%20March/FCS%20UGV%20Update%20-%20Mr.%20Keith%20Anderson/thomas%20Keith%20Anderson%20Brief%20to%20AUVSI.pdf
Some weird machines there
 
Well,

I think a few comments from the resident FCS Skeptic (Heretic?) are in order here:

1. The technology demonstrators all look great and if the technology matures enough for some of these ideas to actually come to fruition, all the better.

2. That said, IMHO, we've been there and done that already -- during the 1950s and 1960s (the so-called Questionmark Conferences and so-forth). Lots of ideas were put forward to replace all the MBTs/APCs/Heavy combat vehicles in the Army's inventory, not a single one of these proposals actually reached fruition -- in most cases they never even cut metal.

3. By contrast, ideas worth looking into -- like ELKE, CVAST, and MIAG -- were never given sufficient attention or funding because they fit the mold that some technocrats decided was the wave of the future. Thus we never got the light tank we needed -- the T-92 wasn't amphibious (and was replaced by the M-551) -- nor the MBT we needed (we made do upgrading the basic M-47/48/60 chassis, hull, and turret).

4. Why in heaven's name would anyone want to put a 25MM -- or a GAU-8 for that matter -- on an Abrams hull?

5. Yasotay, I can only call 'em the way I see 'em -- read between the lines of most articles on transformation and FCS in Armor Magazine and, especially read carefully the incisive articles and letters by Major Korjo (the one in this issue is a gem) -- and I see a great deal of skepticism on the whole idea from the vrey people who should be its most ardent advocates.

6. To be honest, I wouldn't be so bull-headed on this issue if the Army would just call things by their "real" names. FCS Mounted Combat system (FCS/MCS) is a light tank. The Army has needed a proper light tank for years (possibly as many as sixty!) and thus FCS/MCS could be a useful vehicle. But, to make believe that a 20 ton vehicle is going to be as effective in tank-on-tank combat as the 60+ ton Abrams is lunacy, folly, self-delusion, or outright fraud. And, I'd hate to be the tanker who proves that point at the sharp end.

7. Finally, again to Yatosay: I repeat that the M-1 never ended up in Afghanistan because they weren't thought necessary, not because they weren't transportable. Recent reports mention that the Canadians have shipped Leaopard IIs to provide heavier fire support for their troops in Helmand Province. You tell me with a straight face that Canada has better air transport capabilities than the US!

Best to all!

Abraham
 
Ranger6 said:
...Recent reports mention that the Canadians have shipped Leaopard IIs to provide heavier fire support for their troops in Helmand Province. You tell me with a straight face that Canada has better air transport capabilities than the US!

The Leopard 2A6Ms were flown into KAF in Antonov 124-100s. Previously, Leopard C2s (ie: 1A5s) were flown to Manas AB onboard An-124s, then on to Kandahar in leased USAF C-17As.

So, no Canadian "air transport capabilities" involved at all (unless slapping down the Gold Card counts). For the record, the Canadian Forces do have four C-17s (CC-177s).
 
"So, no Canadian "air transport capabilities" involved at all (unless slapping down the Gold Card counts)."

-- This is exactly my point: where there is a will or a perceived need, there's a way to transport even the heaviest AFV!

Abraham (R6)
 
Ranger6 said:
... exactly my point: where there is a will or a perceived need, there's a way to transport even the heaviest AFV!

Quite so. From those limited Canadian experiences, though, it seems that existing transport aircraft are not ideally suited to the current crop of up-armoured tanks.

The CC-177 could manage a single Leopard 2A6M but needs flying boom refueling (which the CF doesn't have). The Antonov was designed to handle two T-72s but the An-124-100 can only carry a single Leopard 2 (even the lighter Danish 2A5DK) -- half of the cargo area is empty to allow for landing weight limitations.

That leaves two options. Reduce vehicle weight (the FCS solution) or tailor strategic transport aircraft for moving 65-to-70 tonne+ tanks. The aircraft option suggests an opportunity for ADB -- build a short-bodied An-124 to lease specifically for armour (and other overly-heavy vehicles).
 
The United States Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was canceled on June 23, 2009 with the following ground vehicles being canceled:

  • XM1201 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV)
  • XM1202 Mounted Combat System (MCS)
  • XM1203 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C)
  • XM1204 Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M)
  • XM1205 Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV)
  • XM1206 Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)
  • XM1207 Medical Vehicle-Evacuation (MV-E)
  • XM1208 Medical Vehicle-Treatment (MV-T)
  • XM1209 Command and Control Vehicle (C2V)
 
From the Japanese Type 10 thread:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AZe8jOuGpo&feature=player_detailpage​

An early FCS design concept, unfortunately not proceeded with. The vehicle shown was actually an unarmed 'proof of concept', you could call it a mobile mock-up.
 
An old FCS PR video:​

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X11K35lOWZE&feature=player_detailpage​
 
On a related note, a short video from AUSVI 2010 on the Armed Robotic Vehicle Assault Light, which was intended to be an armed derivative of the MULE. Also briefly mentions the Common Controller project:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHTayhNlLkc​
 
"...Because the FCS program is developing and
procuring several different types of systems, CBO used a
weighted average of the rates of cost growth that apply to
different types of systems to determine an estimated rate
of overall cost growth risk—roughly 60 percent. That
rate reflects the fact that ground vehicles are the most
costly component of the FCS program and in the past experienced
rates of cost growth that exceeded 70 percent.
If costs for the FCS program grew as those for similar
programs have in the past, the annual funding needed
from 2015 through 2025 could rise from the current
estimate of $8 billion to $10 billion to $13 billion to
$16 billion. From 2015 to 2022, the Army intends to
procure 1.5 brigades’ worth of FCS components each
year, a plan that could require $15 billion annually in the
years from 2016 to 2018 if costs grew at historical rates.
The total funds allotted to the Army’s procurement account
in 2011 are currently estimated at $21 billion (in
2006 dollars) and if the account grew only at the rate of
inflation would remain at that level. Devoting $15 billion—
or more than 70 percent—of that amount solely to
purchases of FCS components in 2016 would leave just
$6 billion in procurement funds for other programs, both
large and small, that are currently slated to receive a total
of $20 billion in 2011..."

Thank you GH, this speaks to the broken procurement system ... a theme.
 
Here's another official FCS video from 2006, this one based around a 2014 North Korean scenario:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjsychklJBg&feature=player_embedded
 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a489297.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a428302.pdf
 
"The SBCTs possessed the most advanced digital battle command systems available
to any army at the time, and through these systems the SBCT could
access national-level sources of intelligence and information. Even with
these capabilities, however, there is no evidence that the SBCT was able
to significantly enhance its survivability through detailed situational
awareness of the enemy’s capabilities, intentions, and dispositions. The
nature of the irregular adversary rendered much of this capability inap-plicable. This suggests that while digital battle command systems are
very useful, particularly in making planning and execution more rapid
and precise, they cannot substitute for armor protection."

amen
 
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2000/Army/stamped/0602601a.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234372.pdf
 
From the mid-2000s, the French answer to FCS: bulle opérationnelle aéroterrestre (BOA) (Air/Land Operational Bubble Net-Enabled Close-Combat System)

On 8 December 2005 the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA) awarded the Thales led team a 129 million Euros contract to develop a concept design demonstrator for BOA1. The program will span over seven years and include the establishment of an integrated battle lab, where new concepts will be studied in a realistic, synthetic virtual environment, using collaborative development tools and simulators. An engineering study of "system of systems" will be evaluate advanced architectures and technologies for close combat, that could be used for in the future by the French Army.

A new network-enabled system called TACTIC3 will be developed as part of this study. TACTIC3 will provide network-enabled architecture supporting close combat operations in the air-land theater, including infantry, armor, UAVs and sensors. This technology demonstrator will provide an important step toward the future BOA, enabling operational evaluation of the benefits derived by new net-enabled capabilities (including collective protection, situational awareness, employment of precision indirect fire etc.) Such tests will be representative of a joint regimental-level operation.
 

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http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a534965.pdf

The French Armed Forces has interest in weapons, autonomy, and night vision
and electronic sensors related to robots, particularly for countermine and demining applications.
The tank-based AMX30B2DT minefield breacher built by Giat Industries is an
example of a UGV for countermine operations. The remotely controlled robot passed its
testing in 2005, and plans for procurement of 10 tele-operated systems are reported.

For advanced concepts for robotic operations, Thales is heading a consortium to
develop the Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre (BOA) (French Air/Land Operational
Bubble networked air-land warfare concept) demonstrator (see Figure III-3). BOA, a
€ 144-M, 7-year French defense procurement effort, is a network-enabled, close-combat
system. BOA introduces new concepts of net-centric warfighting with existing and future
forces, as it ties together all the assets in the air-land theatre, including land vehicles, sensors,
UAVs and infantry in mounted and dismounted formations. Integration of robotics
is a major part of the effort. Planning started in 2000, and work commenced in 2005.

Other BOA project participants include Groupe SAGEM, Giat Industries, the
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), and MBDA (jointly owned
by BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica).44 The € 144-M budget appropriation does
not provide a breakdown showing the amount of funding that will be dedicated to UGV.
However, initial planning documents identified ground robots as a significant focus of
the effort and cited a figure of € 10M for 10 teleoperated AMX 30 tanks and € 8M for
image processing to support increased autonomy and improved teleoperation.45 These
efforts comprise only part of the planned effort (and by logical extension, probable
investment) in ground robotics.

As part of the BOA and in support of advanced integrated soldier systems, France
has been pursuing a family of smaller robots under the Mini-Robots de Choc (MiniROC)
program. This is a family of vehicles (see Figures III-4a–4c) is primarily intended for use
by dismounted soldiers in assault missions, with an emphasis on urban operations. The
family of systems features three complementary designs:
1. A manportable UGV called the Petit Robot Modulaire (PRM) (see Figure
III-4a)

2. A somewhat larger (130-kg), wheeled, articulated UGV known as Robot
Eclaireur Reconnaissance (REC) (see Figure III-4b)

3. The smallest of the MiniROC vehicles, a 2.1-kg Inbot Mini Robot Specialise
(MRS) developed for reconnaissance in confined areas such as inside
buildings and tunnels and underneath vehicles (see Figure III-4c).46

The Laboratoire d’Intégration des Systèmes et des Technologies (LIST) (Laboratory
for Systems Integration and Technology) of the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique
(CEA) (French Atomic Energy Commission), is a Center of Excellence for robotics.
Research interests include man-machine interfaces, the mechanical design of complex
systems, novel actuators, and intelligent control. The Interactive Robotics Unit includes
engineers, technicians, and students, a Mesorobotics and Robotics Laboratory, and a
Cobotics and Telerobotics Laboratory. The laboratory also conducts research concerning
sensors and signal processing, with potential application to robotics.
<hr>

44 Projet de loi de finance pour 2008. Defense-Environnement et soutien de la politique de defence.
(Finance Bill for 2008. Defense-Environment and support for defence policy). Available:
http://www.senat.fr/rap/a07-094-7/a07-094-71.html (Accessed January 2008).

45 Delegation Generale Pour L'Armement (DGA) (General Delegation for Ordnance) Press Release.
6 June 2002. Project BOA (Bulle Operationelle Aeroterrestre).

46 Defense Update Web Page. MiniRoc. Available:
http://www.defense-update.com/products/m/miniROC.htm (Accessed January 2008).
 
Charles Gray said:
jeffryfontaine said:
sferrin said:
Okay start with an M-1 chassis, replace Javelin with CKEM, the 25mm with a GAU-8, Stinger with RAM. . .that oughta do it. ;)

Better to redesign the M1 and put the engine/transmission up front like the Merkava, that way you would have a rear entrance and space available for troops or other equipment.

In the 1970's, I saw concepts for a MIAG (Mechanized infantry Assault Gun, AFAIK), that had a six man dismount team, with a vehicle that was armored to tank standards and had an external 105mm cannon. I wsa never able to find much more information on it then the picture and sadly lost that some years ago (so if anyone can help me there...), but the designed seemed very effective although It came out during the hysteria about the Russian introduction of Reactive armor where people were talking about the unstoppable red horde tanks laughing off TOWS on their march to France, so I'm not certain if there was any real work done on it or if it was a artist concept only.

Came across a ARMOR (Jan-Feb 1972) article on the MIAG yesterday. Pages 34 - 41 (PDF pages 36 - 43). Unfortunately Charles Gray hasn't been online since August 2011.
 
An amazing find Grey Havoc. Having a crew of 5 but not infantry was interesting.
 
image

US Army
Lockheed Martin's "Animal," the prototype for the XM1217 transport, a component of the Future Combat Systems program, which the Army canceled in 2009.

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25350/this-robot-the-10th-mountain-is-testing-could-become-the-armys-revolutionary-mechanical-donkey​
 
From 2003: https://linux.slashdot.org/story/03/03/02/0216215/us-armys-future-combat-system-will-run-linux
 
The United States Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was canceled on June 23, 2009 with the following ground vehicles being canceled:

  • XM1201 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV)
  • XM1202 Mounted Combat System (MCS)
  • XM1203 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C)
  • XM1204 Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M)
  • XM1205 Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV)
  • XM1206 Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)
  • XM1207 Medical Vehicle-Evacuation (MV-E)
  • XM1208 Medical Vehicle-Treatment (MV-T)
  • XM1209 Command and Control Vehicle (C2V)
XM1202 Mounted Combat System (MCS) prototype actually partially built?
 

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two of which could actually be carried by a C-130 vs all the MPF etc being proposed now especailly those completely unprotected vehicles being sent 18th ABCorp.
 
I believe the C-130 transport requirement had been dropped by the time FCS MGV had been cancelled. The armor was intended to stop medium caliber autocannons and that normally requires more weight than a C-130 can carry.

I don't know what that vehicle in the photo is but it definitely has a turret from an M2A2 on top of it. The profile of the hull resembles a command vehicle like the M577 but it isn't one of those.
 
yep, tests in Aberdeen
thank you for the vehicle ID. fairly sure contemporary armor would allow this vehicle if updated to fit 2 on a C-130 and be quite superior to what is being looked at now for the 18th AB Corp.
 
again patents from public sector Natick researchers which were not commercialized to the detriment of the troops.
  • The Weapon Subsystem, Lethality Central, permits direct and indirect target engagements. The weapon weighs 5 pounds, and combines 5 tubes of soft-launched, 15mm intelligent seeker munitions and 1 tube of stacked 4.6mm kinetic energy projectiles for close quarter combat.
 
Via the FOG-M, EFOGM and LongFOG thread, some information on what was being worked on in the 1990s, before the U.S. Army got diverted down the dead end that was FCS:

A little bit on EFOGM in the linked PDF (first article):
Another paper regarding the 1990s era Rapid Force Projection Initiative, or RFPI (including RAND's closely linked Rapid Force Projection Technologies project), which EFOGM had become intertwined with:

EDIT:
 
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