Fairey Delta 2, not the English Electric Lightning

The deployment of Russian IRBMs (SS4 and 5) altered the situation along with the arrival of thermonuclear (supernuclear warheads).
At this stage it was assumed that both sides would resort to nuclear weapons quickly (massive response).
It is hard to fault Sandys' conclusion that manned interceptors would have no role against this Soviet threat.
Although the V force practised Quick Reaction Alerts (QRA) and dispersed operations to alternate bases the future now lay with the Polaris system (Mountbatten and Rickover).
The reduction to nine Lightning squadrons was reasonable given the Soviet Il28 and Tu16 aircraft had many other targets than the UK.
The evolution of Soviet fighters available to clients like Egypt and Indonesia was a more urgent problem. Lightning with Firestreak was seen as adequate but the Hunter replacement (P1154) reflected concerns about Migs.
The UK was badly placed in that unlike Saab and Dassault no single UK company had experience of evolving a family of fighter aircraft into service types.
The RAF lurched from straight wing Meteors and Venoms to the ghastly Supermarine Swift. The Hunter was so late that Canadair Sabres had to fill the gap. The fiasco continued with the DeHaviland 110 and Gloster Javelin, again obsolete before they entered service.
As in the 1930s the limitations of British resources condemned the RAF to inadequate equipment. Even successful types like the Canberra, Hunter and the V bombers had to serve much longer than comparable US types.
So while the technical types can discuss the merits of British solutions like Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi role Lightnings they are like Skiffle groups trying to compete with the Beatles.
 
The reduction to nine Lightning squadrons was reasonable given the Soviet Il28 and Tu16 aircraft had many other targets than the UK.
For what it's worth it wasn't 9 squadrons in the UK it was 5 squadrons. Of the remainder 2 were in Germany, one was in Cyprus and one was in FEAF. Furthermore, some of the 5 squadrons in the UK were for overseas reinforcement, i.e. they were part of the Strategic Reserve.
 
So while the technical types can discuss the merits of British solutions like Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi role Lightnings they are like Skiffle groups trying to compete with the Beatles.
Really?

According to Wikipedia . . .
A large number of British musicians began their careers playing skiffle in this period, and some became leading figures in their fields. These included leading Northern Irish musician Van Morrison and British blues pioneer Alexis Korner, as well as Ronnie Wood, Alex Harvey and Mick Jagger; folk musicians Martin Carthy, John Renbourn and Ashley Hutchings; rock musicians Roger Daltrey, Jimmy Page, Ritchie Blackmore, Robin Trower and David Gilmour; and popular Beat-music successes Graham Nash and Allan Clarke of the Hollies. Most notably, the Beatles developed from John Lennon's 1957 skiffle group the Quarrymen; Paul McCartney was added after a few months and George Harrison joined in 1958. Similarly, the Bee Gees developed from Barry Gibb's skiffle group The Rattlesnakes.
If the Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi-role Lightnings were a tithe as successful as that lot . . .
 
This is true, from 1957 the number of 'fighter' sqns in the RAF fell to ~20 with the Lightning equipping about half of them. Developing a second Mach 2 aircraft to fill the 9 sqns that the Hunter conversions filled in real life is very poor procurement policy indeed.
For what it's worth there were only 9 Lightning squadrons too and that strength wasn't reached until May 1967.
 
Alternate history is not an excuse for fantasy. It is an attempt to examine things that might have happened if different decisions had been taken.
I only challenge things that remain true despite those decisions.
Britain might well have produced an evolutionary family of fighters like Dassault or Saab, if De Haviland, Gloster, Hawker, Supermarine or Vickers had designed and brought into service the right aircraft. This would be an alternate history.
Simply rejigging unsuitable aircraft is fantasy not alternate history.
 
Really?

According to Wikipedia . . .

If the Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi-role Lightnings were a tithe as successful as that lot . . .
This may seem pedantic but I dont recall any Skiffle groups topping the charts when the Beatles had their hits. Fairey Deltas and multi role Lightnings could not match Phantoms.
 
This may seem pedantic but I dont recall any Skiffle groups topping the charts when the Beatles had their hits. Fairey Deltas and multi role Lightnings could not match Phantoms.
The Phantom set a bar for doing it all so high that nothing else in its technological era could even come close.

That being said, there's no harm in trying for second best. Dassault certainly did, or are you arguing that France should have thrown its hands up and bought the F-4 along with everybody else? And if you aren't - if you would argue in an alternative history for France's right to keep its military aviation in-house, regardless of whether the F-4 was better than the Mirage III - why would you deny this right to Great Britain?
if De Haviland, Gloster, Hawker, Supermarine or Vickers had designed and brought into service the right aircraft.
France and Sweden backed their aircraft industries. Britain, gripped by doomsday pessimism, told its aircraft makers never to design another fighter.
 
The flaw in the argument is that before the 1957 White Paper the UK had already failed to evolve a family of fighters that matched France or Sweden let alone the US.
The absurd aircraft lost in 1957 (SR177 et al) were no great loss either to the RAF or to the taxpayer. Lightning was the best of a bad bunch. It became a useful point defence fighter, albeit hampered by obsolete missiles (Red Top Vs Sidewinder).
Yes, it could have been different.
If the Supermarine Swift had been more capable (like the Lansen or Mystere).
If Hunters had been in service in the mid 50s in large numbers
If a sensible multi role fighter had been about to fly in prototype form in 1957 instead of the test pilot toy Lightning
That is the alternate history that competent players (RAF/RN, Government, and Industry) could have written.
 
The whole point of technical types exploring AH is that in digging into the details, one can see where things were going right and where they were going wrong. You cannot learn if you don't.

Glib and ignorant pronouncements that "reasons, reasons, reasons, and therefore we(the Elite) were correct to do what we did", may indeed satisfy political and ideological needs for continued faith in the Elite and the decisions they make.

This is because some value the political aspects above the technical and wish to affirm their loyalty to the Elite.

In the technical analysis, these reasons fall apart in the main. There be elements that do vex and impose certain constraints. But too much is made of them. A technical view concludes effort and financial (ultimate political) backing is all that is needed.
To sum up, the will was lacking.

It was not lacking on The Bomb, and the result was a working weapon entered production.
It wasn't lacking on nuclear submarines either.

The details of why such a lacking of will really do far exceed the scope of this site and this section within it.
Suffice to say that the Elite failed, but failed in a graceful degradation manner, that has boiled the frog of the UK slowly.

Sandys Said we didn't need manned fighter in ten years.
Wilson said we were getting out of the aviation business.

They were both wrong.
We did need manned fighters in 1967, in '77 in '87, even now heading towards 2027, and we still remain in the aviation business too.

Much as events East of Suez and South of Ascension do matter and do require the UK to try to influence what is going on there. Requiring a military component.

In context, the Fairey Delta II, is a stepping stone to a solution to RAF needs. But timing didn't work out, and leads back to resourcing. The group Fairey was a part of didn't distribute the effort, much as DH wasn't given the resources to pull off the DH.116 in '52. Despite much enthusiasm from the Admiralty for it.

Had those resources been made available.......
And Government could have forced that.....which means this traces back to those politicians.
It was entirely in their power to make it happen.

No amount of "RAF and RN got it wrong", or "aviation firms were rubbish", really stacks up compared to Ministers not making it happen. They didn't and why is down to the compromise between increasing incompetence, domestic priorities and external influences.

When more competent Ministers sat in the chair and Prime Ministers realised the risks raised the priority especially as external influences were understood, thanks to the efforts of more competent advisors.....then the Industry was made to succeed, despite it's own flaws.
And do the Jaguar, ADV Tornado, the Typhoon and currently GCAP.

While a Delta II sort of UK F.106 type might have resulted and flown for decades as a reasonably effective Fighter. It is entirely an reasonable AH scenario.
 
The problem with Sandys bashing is that the polemic is not matched by actual events.
Yes, the absurd giant fighters and their missiles of 1957 were junked.
But by 1962 plans were in hand for a comprehensive modernised RAF.
Rather than lacking will or energy they proved to be too ambitious.
Valiant and Canberras were to give way to TSR2s
Hunters were to be replaced by P1154s
Lightnings would be upgraded to carry Red Tops and then replaced in the 70s by more capable aircraft
A jet powered transport (AW681) would replace Hastings and Beverley while VC10 and Belfasts would provide long range lift.
In due course a variant of the Comet was designed to replace the Shackleton.
So much for Sandys' missile only RAF.
As has been commented above the Phantom was to have a decisive impact on the plans for TSR2, P1154 and Lightning because it was a remarkable aircraft.
To argue that the 1957 dinosaurs would have been a match for Phantom is the triumph of hope over experience
 
Britain needed a fleet of mach 2 fighters in service from 1959, having some beginning development in 1962 is indicative of the failure of Sandys policy.
 
Britain needed a fleet of mach 2 fighters in service from 1959, having some beginning development in 1962 is indicative of the failure of Sandys policy.
No Britain did not need additional fighters to Lightning until the 1970s.
You cannot seriously think the awful 1957 aircraft would have been of any use to the RAF much less the clumsy primitive British missiles.
 
The whole point of technical types exploring AH is that in digging into the details, one can see where things were going right and where they were going wrong. You cannot learn if you don't.

Glib and ignorant pronouncements that "reasons, reasons, reasons, and therefore we(the Elite) were correct to do what we did", may indeed satisfy political and ideological needs for continued faith in the Elite and the decisions they make.

This is because some value the political aspects above the technical and wish to affirm their loyalty to the Elite.

In the technical analysis, these reasons fall apart in the main. There be elements that do vex and impose certain constraints. But too much is made of them. A technical view concludes effort and financial (ultimate political) backing is all that is needed.
To sum up, the will was lacking.

It was not lacking on The Bomb, and the result was a working weapon entered production.
It wasn't lacking on nuclear submarines either.

The details of why such a lacking of will really do far exceed the scope of this site and this section within it.
Suffice to say that the Elite failed, but failed in a graceful degradation manner, that has boiled the frog of the UK slowly.

Sandys Said we didn't need manned fighter in ten years.
Wilson said we were getting out of the aviation business.

They were both wrong.
We did need manned fighters in 1967, in '77 in '87, even now heading towards 2027, and we still remain in the aviation business too.

Much as events East of Suez and South of Ascension do matter and do require the UK to try to influence what is going on there. Requiring a military component.

In context, the Fairey Delta II, is a stepping stone to a solution to RAF needs. But timing didn't work out, and leads back to resourcing. The group Fairey was a part of didn't distribute the effort, much as DH wasn't given the resources to pull off the DH.116 in '52. Despite much enthusiasm from the Admiralty for it.

Had those resources been made available.......
And Government could have forced that.....which means this traces back to those politicians.
It was entirely in their power to make it happen.

No amount of "RAF and RN got it wrong", or "aviation firms were rubbish", really stacks up compared to Ministers not making it happen. They didn't and why is down to the compromise between increasing incompetence, domestic priorities and external influences.

When more competent Ministers sat in the chair and Prime Ministers realised the risks raised the priority especially as external influences were understood, thanks to the efforts of more competent advisors.....then the Industry was made to succeed, despite it's own flaws.
And do the Jaguar, ADV Tornado, the Typhoon and currently GCAP.

While a Delta II sort of UK F.106 type might have resulted and flown for decades as a reasonably effective Fighter. It is entirely an reasonable AH scenario.


The UK did continue to spend a lot of focus and resources in the military industrial sphere through out this period, it’s that a lot of it was moved away from (seriously flawed) UK-only aviation projects to some purchases of US equipment with a view shifting to multinational aviation projects.
In few (any?) of the procurement decisions made did the UK objectively end up weaker militarily or in a worse position than if the/ an alternative decision had bee made. The UK aviation industry had to evolve to survive, those parts able to do so eventually survived and prospered.

It’s a very particular mindset that resents the RAF having used the F-4 rather than an inferior domestic alternative. It’s a myopic view that negatively obsesses about the UK’s involvement in successful multinational aviation programs but appears little troubled by the earlier far more consequential and significant (and similarly in the round likely correct) decision to hitch the UK’s continuing nuclear deterrent to require ongoing US support (no failure of “will” here, apparently). It’s a very clear set of agendas to visit the “blame” for this onto politicians and “the Elite” that includes people you don’t like but very selectively not those individuals/ sectors/ occupations you do like, and the claimed obediences by those you don’t like to nefarious “external influences”.
 
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No Britain did not need additional fighters to Lightning until the 1970s.
You cannot seriously think the awful 1957 aircraft would have been of any use to the RAF much less the clumsy primitive British missiles.
When you die, I hope God puts you in the same room as Derek Wood so the two of you can spend the rest of eternity thrashing it out. Sydney Camm can be the technical adjudicator on aircraft and John Forbat for missiles. Should be fun to watch. :p
 
No Britain did not need additional fighters to Lightning until the 1970s.
You cannot seriously think the awful 1957 aircraft would have been of any use to the RAF much less the clumsy primitive British missiles.

The Lightning is fine as a basic type in the circumstances, it's the Hunter that's the problem. No fighters were ordered under Sandys, so not only was his tenure lost in a conceptual sense but also a procurement sense.
 
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"Minister you cannot cancel these overblown interceptor and missile projects because if you do, British Industry will not be able to build an aircraft like the F102 or F106 by 1962"
"But Gentlemen you have the Lightning to work on and provide a defence for the V bomber bases."
"Minister what will replace the Hunters in the ground attack and recce roles in the 1960s?"
"Gentlemen, Hawkers have a new vertical take off prototype funded by the US, unlike their 1121 pipedream proposal. Surely this can become a Hunter replacement in due course?"
 
That's all fine and dandy, except nobody appears to have given much if any thought to replacing Venom Fighter bombers and meteor and Swift fighter recces until 1958. Of course by then it was all obsolete this and interim that, and the Hunter wasn't even included in the Venom replacement trials initially and Hawker had to lobby for its inclusion. Going down this route forced Britain down the P1154-Phantom-Jaguar nightmare.
 
Hardly a nightmare. P1154 was a too ambitious project (though more realistic than SR177 and co) but it led to a combination first of Phantom then Jaguar with P1127RAF as a Hunter replacement.
Even TSR2 was not a nightmare. The lessons learnt on TSR2 improved Jaguar and made Tornado possible. The Vulcan B2 stood in pretty well until 1982.
Overegging the pudding and not realising that simpler more affordable solutions are better plagues UK defence procurement to this day.
As a bureaucrat rather than an engineer I would have relaxed the requirements and got TSR2, 1154, and 681 into service by making them more realistic.
(How?
TSR2 more like A5 Vigilante with no short field stuff
1154 short rather than vertical take off so that ground heat not an issue
681 a simpler plane like Kawasaki C1 or Il76)
 
I've read that the Firestreak seeker coolant gas (ammonia) was stored in spherical 'bottles' because Britain couldn't make high pressure gas cylinders at the time. This meant fuselage mounted missiles so the pluming from the spherical ammonia bottles to the missiles was short.

Where on earth did that come from?

There’s plenty of examples of high pressure gas cylinders produced in the U.K. from that period;- ejection seat O2 bottles for example, approx 150mm long and 50mm diameter, loads of others. I would suggest from experience, it’s more difficult to make a spherical high pressure gas bottle ( the U.K. sourced He spheres on Chevaline were challenging;- cryogenically forged eb welded).

Spherical is preferred because they’re the ultimate in structural efficiency giving the lightest solution.
 
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Where on earth did that come from?

There’s plenty of examples of high pressure gas cylinders produced in the U.K. from that period;- ejection seat O2 bottles for example, approx 150mm long and 50mm diameter, loads of others. I would suggest from experience, it’s more difficult to make a spherical high pressure gas bottle ( the U.K. sourced He spheres on Chevaline were challenging;- cryogenically forged eb welded).

Spherical is preferred because they’re the ultimate in structural efficiency giving the lightest solution.

I read it once, it came up in a conversation about having AAMs on the underwing pylons of Lightning. That said I was doubtful because of the F155s drawings with wingtip AAMs.
 
This may seem pedantic . . .
Correct.
. . . but I don't recall any Skiffle groups topping the charts when the Beatles had their hits.
Skiffle or more accurately the British Skiffle Revival was in the 1950s and the Beatles had their hits in the 1960s so you're comparing apples and pears. Furthermore, The Beatles began as a Skiffle group called The Quarrymen so its probable that we wouldn't have had The Beatles without Skiffle.
Fairey Deltas and multi role Lightnings could not match Phantoms.
Apples and pears again. They couldn't match the Phantom, but they could match the Mirage III, Mirage 5, Starfighter, the F-5 family and maybe the Mirage F1.
 
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The UK only built and got into service one home built supersonic fighter. No amount of moaning about Sandys or the establishment alters this fact.
The RAF turned to Canadair Sabres in the 50s and the Phantom in the 60s because we were behind the game.
BAC finally got its act together by importing know how and methods. Jaguar, Tornado and Typhoon worked because of this.
The reason is simple. Britain tried to develop too many different projects and was content to let small inefficient companies get contracts for small numbers of equipment. We did so despite being financially ruined by two world wars and the costs of postwar social reforms like the NHS. Until the rude awakening of 1967 we tried to maintain a global presence which had more to do with nostalgia than reality.
The V force shows the incompetence of this approach. Even the US only built and deployed the B47 Stratojet (the closest thing to a Valiant) and then the B52. France similarly had the Vautour and then the Mirage IV.
Perhaps because of the Spitfire we ascribe significance to designs like the Meteor, Canberra, Hunter and Lightning which ignores the fact that they entered service too late and had then to be kept in service too long.
 
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If you step back and look at it - the only companies who actually built a supersonic fighter in the post-war era (ignoring the ADV based on the IDS) up to the 1990s were English Electric, Fairey and Saro.
One a company who pre-1945 was a contractor assembling bombers and Vampires but who poached Petter and struck it lucky with the Canberra and just got the P.1 on the drawing board before Petter legged it; Fairey were famous but since 1933 had been stuck in a rut with naval biplanes and general postwar tinkering with gyrodyne and tailsitter VTOL (FD.1), that they built Ultralight alongside FD.2 is rather incongruous. Saro was a builder of flying boats (though overshadowed by Shorts for military contracts) and had never done anything else previously and soon became arch tinkerers of hovercraft, rockets, helicopters.

All the big names - Supermarine, Vickers, Hawker, de Havilland, Gloster, Bristol, Avro, Armstrong Whitworth all talked a good game but all they had was masses of graph paper and drawings to show for it. None of the companies that we would associate with fighters actually secured a contract.
If you were a betting man you would never place your money in 1949 on EE, Fairey or Saro building a supersonic fighter for the RAF. Mind you, Supermarine were a flying boat company and begat the Spitfire, so there was perhaps historical precedence that genius could flourish anywhere.
Perhaps what I am saying is - fame and fortune don't guarantee success and I think its too easy to get caught up in the bright lights - I think the MoS were probably guilty of this sometimes.
 
Correct.

Skiffle or more accurately the British Skiffle Revival was in the 1950s and the Beatles had their hits in the 1960s so you're comparing apples and pairs. Furthermore, The Beatles began as a Skiffle group called The Quarrymen so its probable that we wouldn't have had The Beatles without Skiffle.

Apples and pairs again. They couldn't match the Phantom, but they could match the Mirage III, Mirage 5, Starfighter, the F-5 family and maybe the Mirage F1.

And you may be guilty of comparing apples to pairs to oranges.

The Starfighter, F-5s and F-4s bought by non-US customers were often (if not necessarily always) tied up with US military aid. Almost completely irrespective of other factors the UK could never effectively compete with this. Indeed the domestic and international orders of the Hunter and the preceding generation of UK jet fighters had similarly been subject to US military aid. When this aid ended or evolved (the US in a sense moved over to subsiding the UK nuclear deterrent instead) is part of the reason the UK’s export successes reduced.

And for potential customers paying with their own money and choosing on quality the F-4 looks unassailable versus the theoretical UK competition. And that’s before considering the wider military, political and economic advantages of deals with the US for all concerned. Hence all comparisons with US export success look fundamentally misconceived.

The closer comparison is versus the French and their initial Mirage series, and Sweden and the Draken. As referenced above there is no certainty that any UK path-not-taken emerges as a direct Mirage III analogue but with a better RR engine. Given the prevailing UK own perceived needs and requirements it is probably more likely to emerge as a single engined Lightening equivalent, and represent a less flexible design than the Mirage III proved to be, and inherently less attractive to many potentials export customers.

Plus there is a need to factor in the reduced, in relative terms, military, political and economic clout behind any UK offer in this period of time. The French were able to demonstrate their greater degree of independence from the US to those clients for whom this mattered, while also being able to operate as a US proxy when convenient for all involved, a trick the UK generally found that bit harder to pull off consistently.

Hence quite likely this theoretical UK design could do marginally better than the Lightening on the export market but it’s very unlikely to be up there with what the Mirage III did in the real world. Hence it’s probably more of an analogue to Sweden and the Draken.
 
Sandys Said we didn't need manned fighter in ten years.
Wilson said we were getting out of the aviation business.
Was Sandys really a fool? The fighter of 1967 was of a magnitude greater than anything dreamed up in 1957. And the aircraft in development in 1957 had been designed 5-10 years earlier and still not in service!!!! The aircraft on the drawing boards like F.155 would not have entered service until 1964-66, and they would have been rather pointless (one can imagine Healey cancelling them in 1965 saying they were obsolete in the face of Soviet ICBMs).

Wilson didn't say that - Plowden foresaw that Britain couldn't - or wouldn't - fund its own programmes given all the diverse needs then existing and that money had to come from overseas investment - ideally Europe. That shift was already happening.
And as for not investing - well the aircraft companies weren't exactly coming up with the goods. I doubt that they could even get through The Apprentice without Sir Alan Sugar being rude to them before showing them the door.

"This week's task was to design me a world-beating airliner, how did you do de Havilland?"
"Well our first try fell apart but we came up with a three-engined airliner, but only found one buyer and they asked us to shrink it."
"Who wants a shrunken plane? Team Boeing over there built hundreds of 727s. How do you explain that? You let the ball slip. Vickers, what have you got?"
"Well we came up with a plane we call Vanguard..."
"Yawn, boring. Everyone wants jets now, that's why its called the 'jet age'.
"Yes Sir Alan, so we came up with the VC10, it has four engines, can take off in hot tropical places with short runways."
"But its expensive, Team Boeing's 707 is cheaper to run."
"Yes but it has a quieter cabin and you get the STOL performance."
"I don't care about quiet, I want to pack in the punters. The fact is I could buy two 707s for the price of your VC10 and still have enough cash left over to get the builders in to lay more runway. Didn't that occur to you? Ok, Bristol what did you do in this challenge?"
"We came up with Concorde, its supersonic and cuts travel times and is a high-profile item for the high-end market."
"Yeah its fast, bloody expensive and who wants sonic booms every ten minutes. Transatlantic operation is limiting your market badly. Now Team Boeing came up with a bigger and faster project, but at least you got yours flying, they couldn't manage that. Beagle, what did you do with general aviation?"
"Well Sir Alan, we put a new engine in an old Auster, gave it a new cute dog name. We had a bit of a falling out with Miles, it got quite. Heated."
"So I heard, what's this about the Basset - who the hell wants to buy a plane called Basset! - that you redesigned it THREE times to get it right."
"Yes Sir Alan, we did but we did get the Pup right at the first attempt."
"Yeah but its costs a fortune, how many Sunday fliers want to do full high-g aerobatics after a Sunday lunch. Piper, Cessna and Beech over there shifted thousands of airframes - you barely sold any. Ok I need to make my decision..."

"Team UK, you're fired."
 
All the big names - Supermarine, Vickers, Hawker, de Havilland, Gloster, Bristol, Avro, Armstrong Whitworth all talked a good game but all they had was masses of graph paper and drawings to show for it. None of the companies that we would associate with fighters actually secured a contract.
But they weren't actually given the opportunity to compete:

EE P.1, F.D.2 and SR.177 were all single sourced. SR.53 was the only one competed (F.124), as an earlier research aircraft and not a fighter.

The main issue comes back to the fragmented nature of the Industry. The main companies and design teams are busy actually delivering the aircraft that the RAF needs and aren't viewed as having sufficient capacity to dabble with research projects - hence single sourcing to the less busy "tier 2" teams as make work projects.

I don't think that the technocratic view of "all the individual bits are technically feasible so they can all be put together in a cost effective and timely manner". Engineering complex systems is much more around social interaction between different groups of people.
 
But they weren't actually given the opportunity to compete:

EE P.1, F.D.2 and SR.177 were all single sourced. SR.53 was the only one competed (F.124), as an earlier research aircraft and not a fighter.
This is a good point and the only competitor to SR.53 was Avro 720, which would have been relevant to Fairey's Delta II.
For quite a while some senior voices were raised in favour of Avro over Saro.
The main issue comes back to the fragmented nature of the Industry. The main companies and design teams are busy actually delivering the aircraft that the RAF needs and aren't viewed as having sufficient capacity to dabble with research projects - hence single sourcing to the less busy "tier 2" teams as make work projects
This and above does turn the mind to the firms most competent and by consequence at times the most disappointing to the Ministery. At times the Ministery stated they were too cautious.
Yet the likes of DH, Avro, HP and Vickers all had the most experience with the complex issues of such aircraft and there's something obvious that connects them.
 
4 pages of nothing useful (other than lessens pollution of other threads) time to call this one done ?
4 pages of discussion which cover many facets of the postwar UK aircraft and defence industry's challenges.
Inevitable disagreement since there are many shades.
On the whole conducted in a polite and well informed manner by all participants.
Lively debate as 'pollution' is an interesting concept.
 
Britain needed a fleet of mach 2 fighters in service from 1959, having some beginning development in 1962 is indicative of the failure of Sandys policy.

The Mach 2 EE Lightening entered RAF service in 1960. No idea what you are referencing there.

In comparison the Mach 2 F-104 and F-105 entered US airforce in 1958. In 1959 the F-106 entered US airforce. The F-4 entered US Navy service in 1960 and US airforce service in 1963.

The issue is not that the Lightening was too late, it was that it was very (arguably too) specialised and was not a good candidate to evolve to meet other roles, especially given that it became almost the only survivor after the 1957 cancellations. The other survivor being what became the TSR.2.
 
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The closest US analogue to the Lightning is the F104 with its twin Sidewinders. It beats the Lightning into service by two years, which given the short life of combat types before being replaced in those days, was significant.
Lockheed managed to sell the F104 as a multi role fighter, bomber, recce platform.
It was not a whole lot better at this than the Lightning might have been. Mirage III might have been a better bet for the countries that bought F104.
 
One flaw of the Mirage III was its 200 kt landing speed, related to non-FBW delta wing. This heavily tortured the main landing gear tyres and led to a few explosions - and bad takeoff / landings. I can remember one israeli Mirage III crashing that way during the six days war, think his pilot was I. Baharav, who ended with burned hands. The Mirage was salvaged nonetheless and ended its career with 13 victories.


The broadly similar (weight / size / delta) Mirage 2000 with analog FBW had the landing speed drop to 140 kt, with a much better nose design and lower AoA - and it was a major relief for pilots.
 
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One flaw of the Mirage III was its 200 kt landing speed, related to non-FBW delta wing. This heavily tortured the main landing gear tyres and led to a few explosions...
A trait shared by most early supersonic platforms. F-104 also had a very high landing speed too. Lightning as well I believe with the thing high pressure wheels needing replacing after almost single digit landings.

However I don't ever recall it being an issue in SAAF service with their Mirage IIIs and later Cheetahs. Couple burst tyres here and there but that is normal for any aircraft ops. I can think of a hard landing or two but again, that could be and was done on lesser types in service too. Non-issue really. Later developments to bring the approach speed down were welcome sure, but it wasn't unique or much of an issue on Mirage III vs its peers.
 
It was not a whole lot better at this than the Lightning might have been.
How about you explain that to us all, as without the dreaded technical details......it's just an assertion without substance.
What specifically made the F-104 a better system than the Lightning?
 
The closest US analogue to the Lightning is the F104 with its twin Sidewinders. It beats the Lightning into service by two years, which given the short life of combat types before being replaced in those days, was significant.
Lockheed managed to sell the F104 as a multi role fighter, bomber, recce platform.
It was not a whole lot better at this than the Lightning might have been. Mirage III might have been a better bet for the countries that bought F104.

This is an example of the trend to see 2nd Generation fighters as essentially interchangeable, when the devil is in the details to show that they weren't.

The radar of the early F104s had a range of ~32km compared to the AI23's ~65km and later versions had ranges of ~64km and ~100km respectively. The Lightning was BVR interceptor and the F104 was not.

In terms of weapons the Firestreak and Red Top are vastly more capable than the Aim9B and Aim9D respectively. Able to engage from considerably greater distances, with much higher kinetic performance and much larger warheads and the Red Top able to make head-on shots in good circumstances and beam shots in a lot of circumstances.

Other than that their performance may be considered broadly comparable, with swings and roundabouts of course.
 
The Mach 2 EE Lightening entered RAF service in 1960. No idea what you are referencing there.

In comparison the Mach 2 F-104 and F-105 entered US airforce in 1958. In 1959 the F-106 entered US airforce. The F-4 entered US Navy service in 1960 and US airforce service in 1963.

The issue is not that the Lightening was too late, it was that it was very (arguably too) specialised and was not a good candidate to evolve to meet other roles, especially given that it became almost the only survivor after the 1957 cancellations. The other survivor being what became the TSR.2.

I'm referencing that the RAF bought Hunter conversions for about half of it's 'fighter' fleet, as an interim aircraft until missiles took over that role. A better path would have been to acknowledge that tactical fighter aircraft had a future and to equip the RAF with a mach 2 tactical fighter capable of fighter-bomber and fighter-recce roles with a 20 year service life.

I don't think I'm the Lone Ranger in thinking this, however where I differ from others is that from a post 57 DWP fleet management perspective the best course of action would be to develop the Lightning for these roles.
 
How about you explain that to us all, as without the dreaded technical details......it's just an assertion without substance.
What specifically made the F-104 a better system than the Lightning?
The F104G was able to carry a standard nuclear weapon. Its wing tip Sidewinders could be upgraded easily as new variants appeared. Later versions had the Kormoran anti shipping missile and the Italian F104s even had Sparrows.
Unlike Lightning Lockheed developed it into a comprehensive weapons system.
Its single engine made it cheaper and easier to operate than Lightning
With plenty of space in the nose for radar and recce upgrades
Lockheed even developed its Lancer as an F104 replacement using parts of the F104.
 
I am not denying Lightning did what the RAF wanted it to do. Its value as an interceptor allowed it to remain in service long after its "replacement" the Phantom entered service.
Unfortunately in common with other UK aircraft of the period it was not suitable to be evolved into a multi role weapons system.
 
Was Sandys really a fool? The fighter of 1967 was of a magnitude greater than anything dreamed up in 1957.

Yes he was, because his wartime experience was all about missiles so he was too keen on believing the claims about them.

The fighters dreamed up in 1957 were still capable of holding their own 20 years later with reasonable updates.
 

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