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The period in question was one in which the best policy for the RN would have been to keep its head down. Starting a major project at a time of such economic stretch, coupled with the rapidly changing role of the UK in the world proved to be disastrous. The justification for carrier air power that seemd to be waning in the mid to late 60s was sufficiently clear again by the 70s as the RN felt under enough threat to order 14 Type 42s and the Sea Harrier and for the RAF to have to pretend they could fly F4s from Scotland in defence of the fleet in the North Atlantic. The RAF also had Buccaneers based on the former RNAS Lossiemouth dedicated to maritime attack, also dependent on air to air refuelling. They even practised flying in support of the Marines in their role of reinforcing Norway, again dependent on limited air to air refuelling. Had this air power been carrier based it would have been much more potent as its sortie rate would have probably doubled and its reaction times would have been much faster. The RN certainly could have manned carriers throughout the 70 to 80s, so the turning over of this air power to the RAF is hard to justify without the political element.

I quite agree with Zen that F4s on Hermes looks completely impractical and Victorious isn't much better I would have thought. In fact I seem to recall Zen demonstrating as much on another board. Interestingly there was an early proposal by Rolls Royce, I think to the USN and USAF, in 62 for a Spey engined F4. There does not appear to have been much interest and it is doubtful that a RN involvement would have tipped the balance, but it is intriguing to think what a Spey F4 would have been like if the programme had been a Phantom III or II.5 with the fuselage redesigned around the new engine as opposed to the engines shoehorned into airframes from the normal production line. This takes us a long way from the Spey engined Vixen, unless you see it as the natural stable-mate on Hermes in the 70s for the F4 equipped Ark and Eagle.
 
stargazer said:
but following the fate of the French in Algeria and elsewhere
What has this to do with the British retreat from East of Suez ??

The experience of the former imperial powers, the British saw the mess and did not want it repeated under a Union Jack in another land.
 
sealordlawrence said:
stargazer said:
but following the fate of the French in Algeria and elsewhere
What has this to do with the British retreat from East of Suez ??

The experience of the former imperial powers, the British saw the mess and did not want it repeated under a Union Jack in another land.
This is very doubtful. The Algerian rebellion had nothing to do with communism, it succeeded well after Great Britain had decided to withdraw from East of Suez, and the British decolonisation process itself had already produced a large amount of mess, civil and international wars, from Cyprus to Malaysia through India/Pakistan. The Brits had enough disasters of their own in that area without having to look at others'. And BTW Algeria was not legally a colony.
 
stargazer said:
sealordlawrence said:
stargazer said:
but following the fate of the French in Algeria and elsewhere
What has this to do with the British retreat from East of Suez ??

The experience of the former imperial powers, the British saw the mess and did not want it repeated under a Union Jack in another land.
This is very doubtful. The Algerian rebellion had nothing to do with communism, it succeeded well after Great Britain had decided to withdraw from East of Suez, and the British decolonisation process itself had already produced a large amount of mess, civil and international wars, from Cyprus to Malaysia through India/Pakistan. The Brits had enough disasters of their own in that area without having to look at others'. And BTW Algeria was not legally a colony.

No it is fact. Algeria's legal status and opposition is inconsequential, its lesson obvious.
 
To pretend that Algeria was the reason for Britain to decolonize and withdraw from East of Suez is laughable.
 
SLL: policy taken in the early 50s that would have seen RN carriers going into the Barents Sea and hitting Soviet naval bases with nukes and mines supporting submarines on close operations. PM Attlee had challenged RN, 1/46: "who is there to fight at sea"; in Dec.,47 the only carrier at sea was Triumph (12 Seafire XV/16 Firefly F.R.1). Yet despite deep fiscal pain he funded Strike carriers: Victorious to be refitted (10/10/50-1/58); Eagle, long stored after launch 19 March,1946, to be commissioned 1 October,1951; Ark Royal to be resurrected on stocks, launched 3 May,’50, commissioned 25 Feb.,1955. (Air Groups delayed and confused; his successor funded NA.39 and its Green Cheese, then Red Beard). Neither Korea, nor the (just) pre-Korea Global Strategy Review were the triggers for this spend, but hubris was. Tell me more, pls, about the notion of RN Strike Force working with USN to bottle the Sovs in Murmansk. Did we really perceive we could/should try such a thing? Very large targets in range of land-based Air?
 
This is getting OT I think.

However, UK was still a global player with huge commitments alll over at that time.

And the idea a war with the USSR was only going to be against Murmansk is laughable.

The greatest relevence Algeria might have had is with Suez had we not left.
 
I'm inclined to start deleting political posts. This thread pertains solely to an improved Vixen proposal from circa 1960, which basically means that any discussion of the subsequent abandonment of the "East of Suez" mission is utterly irrelevant to this concept. Moreover, there is absolutely no reason to bring up the issue of the Algerian conflict, which again, was settled subsequent to this proposal and has absolutely no bearing on this particular topic.
 

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