Current Nuclear Weapons Development

The impetus for all this is whether Russia and China are obeying the ban (its already a given that N Korea/Iran et al don't bother with it). Then the question becomes does self banning simply ratify the cheating. In cases like this, I would favor releasing the technical data (seismic data, imagery, etc) that is driving the concern due to the seriousness of the issue.
 
Okay. Let's imagine for a second (which itself is laughable) that Russia/China are fuzing nukes someone far away. And let's give Iran remark slip down since it's not less laughable and even more speculative. What exactly starting of US live tests will achieve. "We'll show those bastards!"? That's it?
 
fredymac said:
The impetus for all this is whether Russia and China are obeying the ban (its already a given that N Korea/Iran et al don't bother with it). Then the question becomes does self banning simply ratify the cheating.
Click to expand...

It is funny that you should use the word ratify in this context.
 
GARGEAN said:
Banning new live nuclear test is stupidity how?..
Click to expand...

A major problem is that the idea of solely relying on computer simulations to help maintain the existing nuclear arsenal, much less design new weapons, has had its credibility seriously undermined in recent years by scandals such as that relating to FOGBANK.
 
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GARGEAN said:
Okay. Let's imagine for a second (which itself is laughable) that Russia/China are fuzing nukes someone far away. And let's give Iran remark slip down since it's not less laughable and even more speculative. What exactly starting of US live tests will achieve. "We'll show those bastards!"? That's it?
Click to expand...


Your standard of “laughable” is different than mine. I do not find nuclear powered cruise missiles or radioactive Tsunami bombs to be humorous (or the accidents associated with them). They also provide the context to consider whether other associated behavior would be likely or “laughable”.

As for US tests, the first thing they do is impose consequence for violations. Otherwise, the ban is unilateral.
 
www.realcleardefense.com

America’s New Quest for Adequate Nuclear Deterrence

Being able to conduct a nuclear test is not the same as performing one. Nuclear testing is a hot-button issue once again. First, days after reports that administration officials had discussed resuming
www.realcleardefense.com www.realcleardefense.com
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“Alarmism over the administration’s mere discussion of nuclear testing distracts from any reasoned conversation of a legitimate issue worthy of debate: the state of nuclear test readiness. Conducting a nuclear test is no easy, routine task, and if the SASC amendment is approved, then the $10 million would not be spent on conducting one. Rather, it would be used to maintain the capabilities and infrastructure necessary to conduct a nuclear test, should the need arise.”
 
It all looks very convincing painted like that, until you realize that (like so many analogies) it is flawed, because:

1) The uncertainties from uploading are mutual - the article acts as though only Wyatt has these problems, but logically they apply equally to Ike. And it's not just a hypothetical equivalence either, Wyatt's Trident D5 revolver causes Ike the same anguish as Ike's own R-36M2 does to Wyatt. Also, Ike is called out for not being entirely honest in his dealings with Wyatt, but the fact that Wyatt's own slate is not perfectly clean either is conveniently omitted. For example, Ike has good reasons to suspect Wyatt is not being truthful when he states that a Trident D5 can hold at most 8 rounds. He has observed Earl, an English aristocrat friend of Wyatt's, handling such a revolver (borrowed directly from Wyatt, no less) at a firing range in a way that suggests it might be able to take up to 12 (http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/treaty_compliance_controversie.shtml).

2) While unlike Ike, Wyatt has not bought himself new revolvers, two of the new weapons Ike has acquired were conceived and designed before he knew precisely what form the next limitation and verification regime would take. As a result, he built them (Bulava and Yars) to accommodate something not unlike the preceding scheme (START I), resulting in sharply reduced throw weights. In other words, although Ike has been getting himself shiny new guns, their fire power is in fact substantially *lower* than the old weapons (R-29RMU, R-39 & UR-100N) he gave away in their favour. Admittedly Ike is currently working on another gun (Sarmat) that can take advantage of the new wiggle room. But he wants it to fit the same holster (have the same cardinal dimensions and launch weight) and use the same powder (same propellant combination) as the R-36M2 revolver which it is to replace. Hence there is little scope for a radical improvement in fire power here either.

3) Wyatt may not have invested in new guns, but the analogy neglects to mention that he nevertheless has definitely not been sitting idle. He used to have an agreement with Ike to limit body armour to just a ballistic helmet, but has abrogated that accord and since developed a protective vest. Informally he has assured Ike that he will wear it exclusively in fire fights with other opponents, but there is only Wyatt's word for Ike to rely on in this regard. So far the commitment has held, but Ike is not comfortable with having no binding agreement to hold him to and has started to develop new weapons to hedge against Wyatt taking advantage of his protection. These include a special flechette round for one of his revolvers (Avangard), a hand grenade (Burevestnik) and a Claymore (Poseidon). Wyatt is objecting strongly to these, and as well he might, since at least the latter two are far more accident-prone than guns, but he steadfastly refuses to acknowledge the direct causal link with his body armour. Ike's new toys fall partially outside his commitments to Wyatt, but then these agreements also fail to satisfactorily account for protective equipment.

4) Last but definitely not least, the contentious rule about counting the actual number of rounds loaded in a random sample of Ike's revolvers as opposed to limiting their potential maximum fire power was actually Wyatt's own idea! To save money he wanted to load his Trident D5 revolver with only half the number of rounds it could actually hold, a situation that would cause his fire power to be grossly inflated according the previous treaty's rules. Under that agreement, his Trident D5 would count as having 8 rounds, even if it only ever held 4, meaning he might be forced to ditch other guns to keep it, despite his total ammo load not in fact exceeding limits. To its credit, the article does link to the source for this fact, though it fails to directly acknowledge it and certainly does not appropriately moderate its accusatory tone toward Ike.

Is New START a perfect treaty? Absolutely not, telemetry exchange and other transparency measures are lacking. But it is absolutely good enough to be worth retaining until a better agreement can be secured! And since Ike/Russia can objectively not be blamed for all of its failings, Wyatt/USA would do well to adopt a more conciliatory approach that better recognizes and reflects his own significant contributions to the problem.
 
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fredymac said:
Your standard of “laughable” is different than mine. I do not find nuclear powered cruise missiles or radioactive Tsunami bombs to be humorous (or the accidents associated with them). They also provide the context to consider whether other associated behavior would be likely or “laughable”.

As for US tests, the first thing they do is impose consequence for violations. Otherwise, the ban is unilateral.
Click to expand...

There is nothing laughable about Burevestnik or Poseidon at all, I would go so far as to characterize them as borderline criminal. But your logic does not compute nonetheless, because they are *delivery vehicles* and hence do not provide any context whatsoever for considering *warhead testing*.

And even if it comes to that, it's not like nuclear tests have a particularly reassuring safety record, either. "If Russia can have nuclear accidents, we need to as well"?
 
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Trident said:
There is nothing laughable about Burevestnik or Poseidon at all, I would go so far as to characterize them as borderline criminal. But your logic does not compute nonetheless, because they are *delivery vehicles* and hence do not provide any context whatsoever for considering *warhead testing*.

And even if it comes to that, it's not like nuclear tests have a particularly reassuring safety record, either. "If Russia can have nuclear accidents, we need to as well"?
Click to expand...


You answered your own question. If you are of a mind to build a radioactive Tsunami bomb, what would you find scandalous about cheating on a treaty.

The accidents associated with Russia’s new weapons did not arise from testing their warheads so it is your analogy that fails. Unless you are advocating we also eliminate nuclear propulsion for submarines and carriers.
 
fredymac said:
You answered your own question. If you are of a mind to build a radioactive Tsunami bomb, what would you find scandalous about cheating on a treaty.
Click to expand...

Except this superficially compelling logical construct plainly does not actually translate into reality, as there is no credible evidence that Russia cheated on either New START or CTBT. With the recent CTBT accusations, if pressed on specifics US officials admit they can't even tell you precisely when those supposed violations are thought to have taken place! Considering the last time this happened the US was forced to back-track embarrassingly because the suspected test turned out to be an earthquake (and it was found the difference should have been distinguishable), this comes nowhere close to meeting the required standard of evidence.

Besides, having not ratified the treaty (and therefore continuing to be a roadblock to its entering into force, including the related verification measures like on-site inspection), US criticism of anything related to CTBT doesn't really have a leg to stand on.

fredymac said:
The accidents associated with Russia’s new weapons did not arise from testing their warheads so it is your analogy that fails. Unless you are advocating we also eliminate nuclear propulsion for submarines and carriers.
Click to expand...

Well, the logic of equating the two was yours not mine - I was merely playing devil's advocate. In any case, I doubt the victims of a preventable nuclear accident would give credit for differentiating such nitty-gritty specifics. It also ignores that for all their hair-raising implications, the rationale (outflanking missile defences that are not adequately accounted for in established arms control treaties to preserve MAD) behind Burevestnik and Poseidon is fundamentally sound. They may not be solutions that I'm comfortable with, much less endorse, but the issue they seek to address is a perfectly legitimate one. The same cannot be said for the US resuming nuclear tests, however - it is hard to find a charitable interpretation for the intent behind that, given the apparent lack of a technical requirement to do so.

Even if we assume for argument's sake that there was a good reason to resume testing, it follows that Russia and especially China (then free to also test) would benefit more from it. The US has a more extensive testing database under its belt and better facilities (NIF, supercomputing) to simulate underlying nuclear weapons physics, so it is actually better equipped to accommodate a world without nuclear testing.
 
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Trident said:
Except this superficially compelling logical construct plainly does not actually translate into reality, as there is no credible evidence that Russia cheated on either New START or CTBT.
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Remember, with the military and intelligence gathering, not everything is publicly available, which is why the general public doesn't get the full picture.
 
So how will the general public decide a party has cheated? Because the people telling us are blue-eyed innocents?
 
fredymac said:
Your post illustrates why Russia thinks it can get away with cheating.
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Because it spells out how US failure to ratify CTBT is effectively shielding Russia from more intense monitoring measures?

Because it spells out how examples of the US egregiously failing to take arms control seriously while publicly claiming the polar opposite might embolden Russia?

Because it spells out that Burevestnik and Poseidon, while irresponsibly dangerous, were in fact prompted by a perfectly legitimate concern rather than willful Russian evilness?

Because it spells out that resuming US nuclear testing would also be irresponsibly dangerous and *would* in fact amount to a willfully evil act, due to absence of a legitimate reason?

If so, congrats. At last you are coming round to the realization that the US owns a decent share of the problems with arms control today.

(Which in no way exonerates Russia of course, but it might stimulate a dose of humility which could make for a constructive environment conducive to resolving these problems.)

In_A_Dream said:
Remember, with the military and intelligence gathering, not everything is publicly available, which is why the general public doesn't get the full picture.
Click to expand...

I realize that divulging certain information could allow the other party to make deductions about sources and methods, which might then be rendered ineffective by countermeasures in the future. Somehow I doubt something as basic as the exact date of the alleged CTBT violation(s) comes into that category though.

With the current administration in particular there is also the bad precedent that in those cases where their rhetoric on arms control can be benchmarked against facts in the public domain, their claims tend to fare appallingly. Open Skies for example - the volume of disinformation from official US sources on this subject is terrible, to the point where you can plausibly argue that Russia has a better record!
 
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Trident said:
fredymac said:
Your post illustrates why Russia thinks it can get away with cheating.
Click to expand...

Because it spells out how US failure to ratify CTBT is effectively shielding Russia from more intense monitoring measures?

Because it spells out how examples of the US egregiously failing to take arms control seriously while publicly claiming the polar opposite might embolden Russia?

Because it spells out that Burevestnik and Poseidon, while irresponsibly dangerous, were in fact prompted by a perfectly legitimate concern rather than willful Russian evilness?

Because it spells out that resuming US nuclear testing would also be irresponsibly dangerous and *would* in fact amount to a willfully evil act, due to absence of a legitimate reason?

If so, congrats. At last you are coming round to the realization that the US owns a decent share of the problems with arms control today.

(Which in no way exonerates Russia of course, but it might stimulate a dose of humility which could make for a constructive environment conducive to resolving these problems.)

In_A_Dream said:
Remember, with the military and intelligence gathering, not everything is publicly available, which is why the general public doesn't get the full picture.
Click to expand...

I realize that divulging certain information could allow the other party to make deductions about sources and methods, which might then be rendered ineffective by countermeasures in the future. Somehow I doubt something as basic as the exact date of the alleged CTBT violation(s) comes into that category though.

With the current administration in particular there is also the bad precedent that in those cases where their rhetoric on arms control can be benchmarked against facts in the public domain, their claims tend to fare appallingly. Open Skies for example - the volume of disinformation from official US sources on this subject is terrible, to the point where you can plausibly argue that Russia has a better record!
Click to expand...


Automatic blame the US.

Automatic sympathize with Russia.

Dogmatic embrace of treaties uber alles.

And simultaneously for a missile defense system that doesn't and can't work supported by people controlled by Putin.

Doesn't leave much for argument.
 
GAO finds risks in NNSA's 'unrealistic' W80-4 program schedule
The National Nuclear Security Administration has created potential risks for the W80-4 life-extension program by setting an unrealistic deadline to deliver the first production unit, according to a government watchdog
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I’ve made this point before during a time of five active warhead programs we build 3000 W76s in five years
 
www.rollcall.com

Trump team's case for new nuke cites risks in current arsenal - Roll Call

The Trump administration, in a closely held memo, justified new atomic weapons by citing rarely discussed vulnerabilities in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
www.rollcall.com www.rollcall.com
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They trot out the same “experts” never noting they are all decades long pro-disarmament advocates
 
www.defensenews.com

Inside America’s newly revealed nuclear ballistic missile warhead of the future

The W93 would be the first new nuclear warhead design for America's military since the 1980s.
www.defensenews.com www.defensenews.com
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Did anyone notice how the 'official' mentioned swapping the location of the primary and secondary? If its in reference to the W88 (I can't see why they'd say that in reference to a W76) it sounds more like they're trying to redesign the W76 with IHE and all the other toys they couldn't cram into the W88 or otherwise retrofit onto the W76. Short of cradle to grave cost cutting I can't figure out the rationale considering its going on top of the same missile and without completely reengineering the RV bus it would end up with reduced yields and reduced RV capacity. I don't think they know what the hell they want to do because they can't get the budget for what they'd really like to do; and they won't tell anyone what they would like to do because they know it won't get appropriated. Please correct me if I'm wrong but I don't see any way this ends well. ;)
 
I could be wrong but I believe this is the first test in awhile with three warheads. Potentially re-uploading after the NST expires?
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www.airforcetimes.com

Air Force conducts test flight of unarmed Minuteman 3 missile

An unarmed Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from California early Tuesday on a test flight to a target in the Pacific Ocean, the Air Force Global Strike Command said.
www.airforcetimes.com www.airforcetimes.com
 
bobbymike said:
I could be wrong but I believe this is the first test in awhile with three warheads. Potentially re-uploading after the NST expires?
————————————————————-
www.airforcetimes.com

Air Force conducts test flight of unarmed Minuteman 3 missile

An unarmed Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from California early Tuesday on a test flight to a target in the Pacific Ocean, the Air Force Global Strike Command said.
www.airforcetimes.com www.airforcetimes.com
Click to expand...
The article give no indication of warhead load - and in any case as it was a test firing it would be carrying at most a test warhead and/ or ballast.....
 
kaiserd said:
bobbymike said:
I could be wrong but I believe this is the first test in awhile with three warheads. Potentially re-uploading after the NST expires?
————————————————————-
www.airforcetimes.com

Air Force conducts test flight of unarmed Minuteman 3 missile

An unarmed Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from California early Tuesday on a test flight to a target in the Pacific Ocean, the Air Force Global Strike Command said.
www.airforcetimes.com www.airforcetimes.com
Click to expand...
The article give no indication of warhead load - and in any case as it was a test firing it would be carrying at most a test warhead and/ or ballast.....
Click to expand...
“The missile blasted off at 12:21 a.m. from Vandenberg Air Force Base and its three reentry vehicles traveled 4,200 miles (6,759 kilometers) to the Kwajalein Atoll“
 
Also they said it was a 'development test'...which makes me think it wasn't one of the standard tests just done for assurance of the systems operation.
 
bobbymike said:
www.militarytimes.com

Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear

Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation, the military warned in an article published Friday.
www.militarytimes.com www.militarytimes.com

Opponents of the CPGS mission use this as justification to cut funding in 3.....2......1.....
Click to expand...
And how would you expect the US to react to a ballistic missile fired at its territory?
 
kaiserd said:
bobbymike said:
www.militarytimes.com

Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear

Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation, the military warned in an article published Friday.
www.militarytimes.com www.militarytimes.com

Opponents of the CPGS mission use this as justification to cut funding in 3.....2......1.....
Click to expand...
And how would you expect the US to react to a ballistic missile fired at its territory?
Click to expand...
Where in my post do I question or disparage the Russian policy? I am speculating how it will be used domestically within the US
 
kaiserd said:
bobbymike said:
www.militarytimes.com

Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear

Russia will perceive any ballistic missile launched at its territory as a nuclear attack that warrants a nuclear retaliation, the military warned in an article published Friday.
www.militarytimes.com www.militarytimes.com

Opponents of the CPGS mission use this as justification to cut funding in 3.....2......1.....
Click to expand...
And how would you expect the US to react to a ballistic missile fired at its territory?
Click to expand...

Then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake said, in terms, "we'd let it detonate first."

Or we'd try to intercept it and determine what material the warhead contained; that's a
big motivator for the Spacebased Kill Assessment system.
 
www.heritage.org

The W93/Mk7 Program: Ensuring the Future of U.S. Nuclear Deterrence

Part of the current effort to maintain a viable U.S. nuclear deterrent is the development of a warhead dubbed the W93, the request for which was first introduced in the President’s 2021 budget request. The W93, along with its Mark 7 (Mk7) re-entry vehicle that holds the warhead, will replace W76...
www.heritage.org www.heritage.org
 

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