CSBA "Third Offset" paper

Status
Not open for further replies.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/12/split-nsa-and-cybercom/171033/
Such a move would have a rough precedent in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position. The law allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to retain its authorities and responsibilities, but its director was no longer forced to lead both an operational agency and the entire U.S. intelligence community...

We would also advocate for moving the NSA from its organizational home in the Defense Department. It should be led by a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed civilian who reports to the DNI. Such a move would improve NSA’s existing authorities and capabilities, place it under the intelligence umbrella for which it’s best suited, and improve its ability to serve national-level and military-specific intelligence requirements.

The DCIA had no problem leading both an operational agency and the entire IC.. The DNI and that office is redundant.. Everyone in the know, knew the 2004 Act was a step backwards. NSA/CSS can go back to being a Joint CSS Command (like the Joint Cybercom) , w Nat'l NSA elements going back over to the CIA.
 
Last edited:
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/older-weapons-pentagon/172104/
Talk about a headless headquarters (s) and living in their own private Idaho.

When asked to define “legacy equipment,” a Washington insider once told me: “It’s something made in someone else’s state or district.”

Indeed, linked to every piece of “legacy” equipment in production are jobs, which, in turn, are wired directly to the central nervous system of every Congressional delegation. Cutting active production of a ship, armored fighting vehicle, or jet fighter in favor of investment in a yet-to-be designed AI-equipped robot might sound attractive, but it trades current jobs for an uncertain future.

It’s also worth noting that Congressional opposition isn’t always parochial. Sometimes it acts as a necessary brake on a decision which may benefit just one service at the expense of another or lacks sufficient justification.

Indeed, the Pentagon can rarely carry the divestment day without very careful messaging and working closely with Congress. Several principles should guide those interactions, the first being “no surprises.” When there is a proposed divestment, DOD must identify the affected Congressional delegations and inform them quickly and privately, before word can leak out.

Further complicating divestment decisions is serious disagreement on what even constitutes “legacy.” Army Chief of Cavalry Maj. Gen. John Herr showed an infamous lack of discernment when he declared, “Not one more horse will I give up for a tank.” That was in 1938, just a year before German tanks rolled into—and over—Poland.

With the responsibility to support a conflict that could break out tomorrow, Lyons was not in the position to accept divestment without a replacement. And he shouldn’t. When a divestment is called for, the replacement should be ready—not in the form of a PowerPoint briefing or an uptick in research-and-development spending on a program—but in the form of a tangible capability.

the RD&TE community invests nearly nothing on finished innovations.. see uninspiring Skyborg and future attack helicopter proposals, lame artillery tech etc. rehashs.

If DoD wants a viable BOS replacement the DoD must 'not just pick, but develop complete winners'.

First, though the Svcs need to determine what they need. Instead uniformed officers wait for an LSI to throw mediocraty over the transom and then spend the remainder of the their career claiming the mediocre products are the answer for future warfare. These officers pedal this stuff so they can land a post retirement job w/that LSI.

It is going to take risk w/ small biz, not decadent, non delivering, half thief traditional LSIs. LSIs can be brought in later as needed as policed subcontractors There are plenty of dying on the vine small biz w/ much innovation to look into. Instead we'll see more LSI/Political rot dressed up to look like progress.
 
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06..._term=Editorial - Military - Early Bird Brief
Hunt forward entails CYBERCOM teams deploying overseas to help allies and partners assess the cybersecurity of their networks.

“The teams deploy at the invitation of a host nation to gather insight and a better understanding of adversary behavior on the host nation’s government networks,” the spokesperson said. “These robust information-sharing operations are just one part of our ‘defend forward’ strategy — where we see what our adversaries are doing and share that information with our partners in an effort to better bolster both our homeland defenses.”

CYBERCOM said that hunt-forward operations are defensive — not offensive.
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB 04.01.21
But the pace of military innovation slowed in the 1960s with the advent of a centralized procurement system that prioritized performance and predictability over speed. That didn’t matter much back then, because the Soviet Union was not moving fast either, as Bill Greenwalt, who worked on acquisition reform as a staffer to now-deceased Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), describes in a new research paper.
Today, it typically takes more than a decade to develop and field new weapons systems, Greenwalt found, which sometimes means technology is out of date by the time it becomes operational.
Part of the problem is a planning and funding process that typically requires two years before a new weaponry or technology program can be included in the budget. This leads to what insiders call the “Valley of Death,” the long lag time between when a company develops a new technology and when the Pentagon fully funds it. That is particularly hard on smaller companies, contributing to the dominance of a handful of large “defense prime” firms.
In addition, navigating the labyrinthine military procurement system requires specialized knowledge and resources — which many smaller firms don’t have.
 
Last edited:
jsport said:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB 04.01.21
But the pace of military innovation slowed in the 1960s with the advent of a centralized procurement system that prioritized performance and predictability over speed. That didn’t matter much back then, because the Soviet Union was not moving fast either, as Bill Greenwalt, who worked on acquisition reform as a staffer to now-deceased Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), describes in a new research paper.
Today, it typically takes more than a decade to develop and field new weapons systems, Greenwalt found, which sometimes means technology is out of date by the time it becomes operational.
Part of the problem is a planning and funding process that typically requires two years before a new weaponry or technology program can be included in the budget. This leads to what insiders call the “Valley of Death,” the long lag time between when a company develops a new technology and when the Pentagon fully funds it. That is particularly hard on smaller companies, contributing to the dominance of a handful of large “defense prime” firms.
In addition, navigating the labyrinthine military procurement system requires specialized knowledge and resources — which many smaller firms don’t have.
Click to expand...
I wonder if this is another McNamara boondoggle? He singlehandedly set back strategic weapons development by decades and in my opinion extended the Cold War by decades.
 
bobbymike said:
jsport said:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB 04.01.21
But the pace of military innovation slowed in the 1960s with the advent of a centralized procurement system that prioritized performance and predictability over speed. That didn’t matter much back then, because the Soviet Union was not moving fast either, as Bill Greenwalt, who worked on acquisition reform as a staffer to now-deceased Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), describes in a new research paper.
Today, it typically takes more than a decade to develop and field new weapons systems, Greenwalt found, which sometimes means technology is out of date by the time it becomes operational.
Part of the problem is a planning and funding process that typically requires two years before a new weaponry or technology program can be included in the budget. This leads to what insiders call the “Valley of Death,” the long lag time between when a company develops a new technology and when the Pentagon fully funds it. That is particularly hard on smaller companies, contributing to the dominance of a handful of large “defense prime” firms.
In addition, navigating the labyrinthine military procurement system requires specialized knowledge and resources — which many smaller firms don’t have.
Click to expand...
I wonder if this is another McNamara boondoggle? He singlehandedly set back strategic weapons development by decades and in my opinion extended the Cold War by decades.
Click to expand...
this malfunction is continuous from the sixties till today. As systems cost more the phenom worsens. If nothing changes as one of these "war on the rocks" commentators exclaims 'a brigade of burning hulks will be the wake up call'. The commentator would a appear to prescient, for instance, if the Afghanit APS can really intercept even APDS anti-tank rds. If true, all Armata class vehicles (tank+ IFV) could prove nearly impervious while US armor is destroyed.
 
No shortage of impending trainwrecks at all, it would seem.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom