Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining the V-Force?

[NOMISYRRUC]

One fly in the ointment for Sperrin in 1951 is that its blind bombing capability is no better than the Lincoln. The NBS Mk.1 with NBC and improved H2S it not ready by then. Parts of the equipment might be, but don't expect excellent results (remember the Canberra B.2 is visual bombing backed up by Gee-H if the target is within range of the beacons). But at least it is faster and has better altitude performance.

For what it's worth, I'm aware that the Sperrin is effectively a four-engine Canberra B.2 and therefore would have shared its limited avionics. On the other hand it has about a third more range than the Canberra and can carry 2½ time more H.E. or a Blue Danube atomic bomb.

About 25% are Mark 2s with more powerful Avon engines, which enter service in 1954. Could they have been built with NBS Mk 1 with NBC and improved H2S?

However, other than that are you okay with the Sperrin entering service in mid-1951? That's when the Canberra B.2 entered service and IOTL the Canberra first flew 27 months before the Sperrin. Although Short Brothers is a bigger company, it flies earlier & more prototypes were built IOTL and in common with OTL they're built in production jigs so production can start sooner, I thought that 1951 might have been pushing it and 1952 was more realistic.

 

[zen]

Mid '51....Korea and cascades of US cash to fund bombers NOW.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Back to the 'splodeys for a moment.

According to Wikipedia the first Blue Danube atomic bombs were delivered to the RAF in November 1953 and 58 were made to 1958 when it was replaced in production by Yellow Sun Mk 1.

However, there were 72 V-bombers in 9 squadrons at 31.03.58 and 104 in 13 squadrons at 31.03.59 in both timelines. So there were 14 V-bombers without an atom bomb at 31.03.58 and as many as 46 without one at 31.03.59. It depends upon how many Yellow Suns were available.

The difference between OTL & TTL is that there were 72 Valiants at 31.03.58 IOTL and ITTL it was 32 Victor B.1 & 40 Vulcan B.1 plus 8 Victor PR.1 in the PR squadron instead of Valiants. Similarly at 31.03.59 it was 56 Valiants, 24 Victor B.1s & 24 Vulcan B.1s IOTL and ITTL it was 48 Victor B.1s & 56 Vulcan B.1s plus 8 Victor PR.1 in the PR squadron instead of Valiants.

Except, ITTL BAC and Hawker Siddeley might be delivering Victors & Vulcans faster than Avro, Handley Page & Vickers were able to deliver the Vulcan, Victor & Valiant respectively, which would accelerate Bomber Command's conversion from Canberra light bombers to the medium V-bombers. Therefore, there might have been even more Victors & Vulcans without an atomic bomb at those dates.

In terms of fissile materials, even with the second Windscale Pile not coming online until 1 January 1952, you have:
1950: 15 bombs worth
1951: +15 bombs worth, 30 total
1952: +30 bombs worth, 60 total
1953: +30 bombs worth, 90 total
1954: +30 bombs worth, 120 total
1955: +30 bombs worth, 150 total
1956: +30 bombs worth, 180 total
1957: +20 bombs worth due to fire, 200 total
1958: +15 bombs worth due to closing of one pile, 215 total
1959: +15 bombs worth, standard production from now on; 230 total

So fissile production is NOT the limiting factor in bomb production.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In terms of fissile materials, even with the second Windscale Pile not coming online until 1 January 1952, you have:
1950: 15 bombs worth
1951: +15 bombs worth, 30 total
1952: +30 bombs worth, 60 total
1953: +30 bombs worth, 90 total
1954: +30 bombs worth, 120 total
1955: +30 bombs worth, 150 total
1956: +30 bombs worth, 180 total
1957: +20 bombs worth due to fire, 200 total
1958: +15 bombs worth due to closing of one pile, 215 total
1959: +15 bombs worth, standard production from now on; 230 total

So fissile production is NOT the limiting factor in bomb production.

And Calder Hall came on stream in 1956 followed by Chapelcross in 1959.

Are you sure that it's 30+ Blue Danubes worth of plutonium 1952-56?

Edit: You probably are. I didn't read the following properly first time.

Bah, let's try this a different way.

*wikidive*

Okay, so Windscale had a production capacity of about 15 bombs worth per year per reactor, and both reactors were online by 1950 it appears. Even if one was not online until 1952, that would not prevent the production of 75 warheads by 1954.

So I think we're actually okay for the plutonium production.

Which begs the questions.

• Why were so few Blue Danubes produced?
  • And.
• What was done with the surplus Plutonium?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Which begs the questions.

• Why were so few Blue Danubes produced?
  • And.
• What was done with the surplus Plutonium?

I can only guess that the limit was in bomb assembly, not in fissile production. Probably an issue in assembling the implosion lenses.

As to the surplus plutonium? Probably made into pits ready to assemble.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I can only guess that the limit was in bomb assembly, not in fissile production. Probably an issue in assembling the implosion lenses.

As to the surplus plutonium? Probably made into pits ready to assemble.

There was actually significant scope for increasing plutonium production: Windscale No.3 had the foundation slab poured before cancellation (it's still there, apparently), Chapelcross had provision for another four reactors, and three of the 'civil' MAGNOX reactors were designed for dual use if required. Fuel processing facilities would need expanding, which wouldn't be cheap but wouldn't be a massive problem.

 

[Hood]

Gyron or Gyron Junior?
The former could supply the fan stage.

Its a crazy concept I know but it kind of leapt into my mind, Gyron having such large thrust and Pegasus needing thrust.

About 25% are Mark 2s with more powerful Avon engines, which enter service in 1954. Could they have been built with NBS Mk 1 with NBC and improved H2S?

Yes the Mk.2 would work out ok I think with that kit at that time.

However, other than that are you okay with the Sperrin entering service in mid-1951?

Assuming that the flight testing goes ok and Shorts can build enough in good time, I don't see why not in theory.

 

[alertken]

UK Ministers' management of all things atomic, 1950-58: Silo (insulated from the team next door) and Mushroom (fed on manure, kept in the dark). Counter-productive secrecy.
The 1949 spy scandals caused Positive Vetting for anybody to be in contact even with paper: Rainbow codes we bandy familiarly were themselves Secret - it was a secret that we had a secret. PV was a slow trawl by the Security Services through your family's history, looking for Reds under their Beds. One (only one) middle-rank Treasury Official was allowed to see (discouraged from querying) the money guesses, even Wilder than was then Aero-normal. AWRE/ROF Burghfield had little or less contact with RAF or with Aero firms, so interface/co-ordination/integration were not words in common parlance. People beavered on their job, ignorant of any wider world.

If you think I exaggerate: - PM instructs Hd,Wpns.Grp/AWRE Sir W.Penney to start on an H-Bomb 3/54 “(don't) know how to make any form of H"; to be Sir W.Cook, D/Hd. 2/12/55: " 'does anybody (know) how it’s done?’ embarrassed silence.” L.Arnold,(Official Hist) Br.& the H.Bomb, Palgrave' 01,Pp.43/87.
- 7/7/60 (we plan for UK Bombs in all MBF by 6/61 as our US Bombs had) "only ½ the nominal yield (expected. Mk.5’s) advantages (cf. Red Beard) now seem to be much smaller (we had believed they) were (in) MT class....it had been established (in kT) range” Wynn, Pp.266/270: so, wef 2/7/59 all TBF, wef 10/58 much MBF, 10/59 all RAFG carried unknown yield!

Whitehall routes to the money were confused: AERE/Harwell was pre-occupied with electricity power generation; AWRE with...AW, while all people Naval pondered propulsion: I doubt they were ever in one room together...until, maybe, Sandys' 1957/58 US Agreements.

So, ah, misleading for Ministers 18/3/54 to write that one Blue Danube Mk.1 at BCBS/Wittering meant that AW "delivery to the Forces has begun" Wynn,P.98. R.Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Palgrave, 2010,P.112 has BD (Mk.3) MoS CA Release as 7/57: that Event brings Technical Publications, spares, tools...into inventory, fit for mere mortals (many then still conscripted). I have one Sqd each Medium, so 24 a/c, opnl by 1/7/58, all gone by 8/60. Wynn,P.327: RAF/MBF 13/7/60: "96 Mk.1 a/c, with the necessary (AW)", which, that day, I have as 16 BD Mk.3, 16 Yellow Sun Mk.1, 64 US Mk.5. MBF's last US weapon was withdrawn 30/6/61 (Valiant TBF's, 26/1/65).

So could MBF+UK Bombs have been more, sooner, better armed? In industrial/techno-terms, above discusses maybes. But: With the Art of the £/political Possible: No. Because the intent in 1947 had been for UK to face down a USSR Threat by 1957...as we did...-ish.
At ginormous cost. Proudly a newspaper visit in 1956 to a Valiant Sqn lauded their £1,000-a-year men: that was an impossible dream for lesser folk. Politicians' Intent was not to fight with AW, but to deploy the Minimum Force to Deter. 96 UK/US Bombs, 7/60, probably did so; 16 Small+16 Fraught UK Bombs not, but the Bad Guys might not have known that: the Press was not told that the 1956 Valiant Sqn had only HE.​

In '56 Sperrin B.1 would not have Deterred: Wynn,Pp.371/467: RAF recognition 26/1/62, no ECM, slow (?&low) Valiant was vulnerable to MiG-17: 6,000 built '52-59. Thoughts: 1. how dare their Airships hazard 1,475 of our best and finest; and 2. better than Sperrin.

 

[red admiral]

My impression is that the Gyron isn't really a good engine unless you want to do Mach 2 for short periods of time, and so it's not really a good choice for the V bombers. It had a very low pressure ratio in order to provide greater thrust at supersonic speeds, which led to worse fuel consumption. It provided more thrust by simply being bigger to incease mass flow.

So for the V bombers then this means better take-off performance, maybe slightly better altitude performance due to the higher thrust (but pressure ratio also matters), but likely 20-30% less range. And the engine is much wider than Olympus/Conway so doesn't even fit in the V bombers.

At least in my view, then Gyron is the "dumb" approach to jet engine design - but dumb still works and is low risk, there's just trade offs on performance.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

However, other than that are you okay with the Sperrin entering service in mid-1951?

Assuming that the flight testing goes ok and Shorts can build enough in good time, I don't see why not in theory.

Re the flight testing it seems to have gone okay IOTL so I don't see why it should have been worse ITTL.

This is the quote from "V-Bombers, Valiant, Vulcan and Victor" by Barry Jones which was originally in Post 72 with the last sentence in bold.

It is very easy to speculate in retrospect, but there is no doubt that had Air Ministry sights been set a little lower and the S.A.4 Sperrin, as a more basic four-jet bomber, been ordered in 1948, there would have been no need to acquire second-hand B-29s. Mind you, Vickers-Armstrongs would strongly disagree and who is to argue with them. Short Brothers' move from Rochester to Belfast has a profound effect on the timing of the programme, as did the company's lack of wind-tunnel facilities. Accepted that the Sperrin was less radical than the three V-bombers, it is pertinent to remember that two of them required design changes before becoming acceptable service aircraft, whereas the Belfast product performed all that was asked of it in its original guise.

IOTL Specification B.14/46 was originally issued on 11.08.47. Two Sperrin prototypes & a static test article were ordered on 19.01.48. The Sperrin prototypes flew on 10.08.51 & 12.08.52.

Meanwhile, Specification B.9/48 was issued on 03.08.48. Two Valiant prototypes & a static test article were ordered on 10.12.48. Despite being nearly a year behind the Sperrin the Valiant prototypes flew on 18.05.51 & 11.04.52, which was 3 months & 4 months earlier than the Sperrin respectively.

Double the number of Victor & Vulcan prototypes, static test articles and development aircraft were built ITTL to complete the flight testing sooner so they entered service sooner, but the first flight dates were still 24.12.52 & 30.08.52 respectively.

Double the number of Sperrin prototypes and static test articles were built ITTL too. But, all other things being equal the first flight would still have been on 10.08.51 (two months after I want it to enter service) and four prototypes would be flying by August 1952 instead of two, with the first production aircraft following soon after because (in common with OTL) the prototypes & STAs were built in production jigs) and because the aircraft was ordered into production "off the drawing board" in January 1948 too. IOTL the first 5 or 6 production V-bombers were development aircraft for the flight testing and in my timeline I've doubled that. ITTL the first 10-12 Sperrins would have been assigned to the flight testing programme too which as the Sperrin was a simpler aircraft would have been completed in even less time. Therefore, I think the best that could have been done is that the RAF formed its first Sperrin squadron in the first half of 1953 which is 18 months to 2 years too late.

If Short Brothers & Harland had done as well as Vickers Armstrong Aircraft the four Sperrin prototypes built in my timeline would have made their first flights between May 1950 and April 1951 with the first production aircraft following soon after. Then the first Sperrin squadron would have been formed in the first quarter of 1952 which is 6 to 9 months too late.

Jones attributed some of that delay to the move from Rochester and the company's lack of wind-tunnel facilities. He also wrote that the Sperrin was cancelled as a bomber in May 1950 and that might have accounted for some of the delay too.

ITTL I can't do anything about the the disruption caused by the move from Rochester to Belfast, but I have strengthened Short Brothers & Harland by having it absorb Boulton Paul between 1945 and 1948. (See Post 29 of "UK Industry Rationalisation 1945".) That would have provided more men with drawing boards and slide rules to help with the design work.

Boulton Paul may have had the wind-tunnel facilities that Short's required too as the firm built the P.111 & P.120 research aircraft IOTL. These aircraft were ordered on 07.02.47 to Specification E.27/46 which was issued on 31.01.47.

This brings me to my final and probably contentious change to the Short Sperrin. Put it into service at the required date by issuing the specification sooner and ordering the prototypes sooner. Spec. E.27/46 was written in the same financial year as B.14/16 and because 14 comes before 46 one would think that it was issued first. It was not. E.27/46 was issued on 31.01.47 and B.14/46 wasn't issued until 26.09.47 nearly 8 months later. Furthermore, the P.111 & P.120 were ordered 07.02.47 and the Sperrin prototypes were ordered on 19.01.48, nearly a year earlier.

Issue B.14/46 a year earlier & order the prototypes a year earlier and all other things being equal the four prototypes ordered ITTL fly between August 1950 & August 1951. However, all other things were not equal ITTL because Short's has them flying in the time that it took Vickers to get the Valiant prototypes flying which advances the first flights to May 1949 & April 1950 with the first production aircraft flying soon after. Therefore, the first RAF squadron would have formed in the first quarter of 1951, which is 3-6 months ahead of my schedule.

I think the Sperrin was effectively a bigger Canberra with four Avon engines (of equal power) instead of two.

• It was built to Spec. B.3/45 Issue 2 which was issued to English Electric on 11.07.46 (14 months before B.14/46).
• The first four prototypes were ordered on 07.01.46 (36 months before the two Sperrin prototypes) which was three months before B.3/46 Issue 1 was issued (11.03.46).
• The first Canberra flew on 13.05.49 (27 months before the first Sperrin prototype).
• The first production contract was let in March 1949.
• The first prototype Canberra B.2 flew on 23.04.50. The first production Canberra B.2 flew on 08.10.50.
  • And.
• The aircraft entered service with No. 101 Squadron at Binbrook in May 1951.

If a specification for a "Big Canberra" had been issued alongside the specification of the Real-Canberra and a contract for four prototypes & two STAs let to Short's in January 1946 they could have been flying between August 1948 & August 1949 all other things being equal. However, all other things were not equal because (in addition to the extra resources the absorption of Boulton Paul made available) this is before the move from Rochester to Belfast. Therefore, the first flights might have been advanced to as early as May 1947 to April 1948. Although they'd have to use Nene engines until the Avon was ready. My guess is that it would be ready to enter service with the RAF before August 1950 which at least 9 months early and when the Boeing (B-29) Washington entered service with No. 115 Squadron at Marham IOTL.

However, I'll stick to first flights between August 1949 and May 1950 with service entry in the middle of 1951.

Does that work for you?

I'll write a separate post on whether the Short Brothers & Harland could build enough in good time.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

However, other than that are you okay with the Sperrin entering service in mid-1951?

Assuming that the flight testing goes ok and Shorts can build enough in good time, I don't see why not in theory.

Question: Can Short Brothers & Harland build enough Sperrins in due time?
Answer: Err!​

IOTL 987 Canberras were ordered from four companies in four batches between March 1949 and April 1951.

• 132 March 1949 including 90 bombers, 34 PR aircraft and 8 trainers.
  • All 132 from English Electric.
• 515 November 1950 including 443 bombers, 35 PR aircraft and 37 trainers.
  • 215 from English Electric.
    • Which included the 35 PR aircraft and 37 trainers.
  • 100 from Avro.
  • 100 from Handley Page.
  • 100 from Short Brothers & Harland.
• 340 April 1951 including 280 bombers, 40 PR aircraft and 20 trainers.
  • 190 from English Electric.
    • Which included the 40 PR aircraft and 20 trainers.
  • 50 from Avro.
  • 50 from Handley Page.
  • 50 from Short Brothers & Harland.
• 987 Total including 813 bombes, 109 PR aircraft and 65 trainers.
  • 537 from English Electric.
  • 150 from Avro.
  • 150 from Handley Page.
  • 150 from Short Brothers.
• 712 were built including 540 bombers, 109 PR aircraft and 63 trainers.
  • 453 by English Electric.
    • Which included the 109 PR aircraft and the 63 trainers.
  • 75 by Avro.
  • 75 by Handley Page.
  • 109 by Short Brothers & Harland.

What's of interest to us is the 259 aircraft built by Avro, Handley Page and Short Brothers & Harland.

According to the Putnams on English Electric Aircraft.

• Avro
  • First flight 25.11.52.
  • 75 Canberra B.2s delivered from March 1953 to March 1955.
• Handley Page.
  • First flight 05.01.53.
  • 75 Canberra B.2s delivered from March 1953 to May 1955.
• Short Brothers & Harland.
  • First flight 30.10.52.
  • 60 Canberra B.2 delivered from December 1952 to August 1954.
  • 40 Canberra B.6 delivered from November 1954 to October 1955 from the November 1955 contract.
  • 9 Canberra B.2 delivered from November 1955 to April 1956 from the April 1951 contract.

The RAF would initially want enough Sperrins to re-equip Bomber Command's 18 Linconln medium bomber squadrons and the 2 squadrons operating Lancasters & Lincolns in the PR role. At 8 aircraft per squadron that's a total UE of 160 aircraft which with backing aircraft produced a requirement for 200 aircraft. Then the Rearmament Programme added another 160 medium bombers in 20 squadrons which with backing aircraft produced a requirement for another 200 aircraft. That makes a total of 400 aircraft (including at least 20 PR versions) of which 300 (including the PR versions) would have been built with Avons rated at 6,500lbst and 100 would have been built with Avons rated at 7,500lb.

Therefore, my guess is that a production contract for 200 Sperrins would have been let in March 1949 (alongside the first Canberra production contract) of which at least 20 would have been the PR version. Another 200 would have been ordered in November 1950. These would have replaced the contracts for 450 Canberras ordered from Avro, Handley Page & Short's in November 1950 and April 1951. Preferably, all the aircraft would have been ordered from Short's but in common with the Canberras it may be necessary to spread production of the aircraft over a number of firms.

I'm letting Short's first production contract for Sperrins ITTL 18 months before the its first Canberra contract. All other things being equal the first production Sperrin would have flown in April 1951 because the first Short-built Canberra flew in October 1951 and the first delivery would have been in June 1951 because the first Short-built Canberra was delivered in December 1952. That's about when I need them to be delivered for the Sperrin to enter service in mid-1951.

However, I think deliveries would have commenced earlier than that. In Post 90 I've had the four Sperrin prototypes making their first flights between August 1949 and May 1950 with the first production aircraft flying soon afterwards. 400 aircraft have to be delivered by the end of 1954 and if the first aircraft was delivered in July 1950 an average of 7½ aircraft a month would have to be delivered.

• IOTL Short Brothers' delivered its first 100 Canberras between December 1952 to October 1955 at a rate of 3 per month over 34 months.
• ITTL if Short Brothers' could deliver the larger Sperrin at the rate of 3 a month from June 1950 it would only have delivered 165 aircraft by the end of 1954.

So we're 235 aircraft short if the Company can't deliver more than 3 aircraft a month ITTL and in common with the Canberra IOTL the balance has to be aircraft made by other companies.

As already written above Avro & Handley Page received their first production contracts for Canberras in November 1950 and if we alter them to contracts for Sperrins let in March 1949.

• Avro
  • The first flight is advanced from 25.11.52 to 25.05.51.
  • 75 Canberra B.2s delivered from March 1953 to March 1955.
    • Become.
  • 75 Sperrin B.1s delivered from September 1951 to September 1953 if Avro can build the larger aircraft at the same rate.
• Handley Page.
  • The first flight is advanced from 05.01.53 to 05.07.51.
  • 75 Canberra B.2s delivered from March 1953 to May 1955.
    • Become.
  • 75 Sperrin B.1s delivered from September 1951 to November 1953 if Handley Page can built the larger aircraft at the same rate.

Which increases the total to 310 aircraft, which is still 90 aircraft short. In common with Short Brothers' both companies were delivering their aircraft at the rate of 3 a month. If they continued to build their aircraft for another year each factory could have delivered another 36 aircraft which would reduce the deficit to 18 aircraft. However, the Avro & Handley Page factories have to stop building Sperrins in 1953 and re-tool to build Victors & Vulcans if the TTL in service date of January 1955 is to be met.

It's no problem if the 3 factories can increase their production rates to 4 aircraft a month because then Short Brothers' delivers 220 to the end of 1954 while Avro & Handley Page deliver 100 each 1951-53.

Another alternative is to build the extra aircraft at a fourth factory. The obvious one being Vickers. IOTL it received its first Valiant production contract in February 1951, the first aircraft flew on 22.12.53, but the first delivery to the RAF wasn't until December 1954 and the 104th production aircraft was delivered in September 1957. That's 23 months after they would have received their first production contract ITTL which would advance the first flight date to 22.01.52 and the last delivery to October 1955, which is about a year too late for the purposes of delivering the 400 Sperrins on time. Furthermore, the Vickers factory may not be available because it many be building the 104 Victors built instead of Valiants ITTL.

The next obvious fourth factory is Boulton Paul. It was taken over by Short Brothers' between 1945 & 1948 ITTL and helped the parent company design the Sperrin. Although I didn't say so in the other post the Balliol advanced trainer and the P.111 & P.120 research aircraft were cancelled as a result. Neither aught to have been a great loss because most of the 470 pre-production & production Balliols ordered from the Company & Blackburn were cancelled anyway and I think little of consequence was learned from the P.111 & P.120 (especially the latter) and ITTL we've got the high speed research aircraft designed by the German team & the non-cancelled Miles M.52. The company built 3 prototypes, 17 pre-production aircraft, 145 Balliols for the RAF, 12 that were exported, 30 Sea Balliols for the RN, one P.111 and one P.120. between 1947 & 1954. That's a total of 209 aircraft. A one-to-one substitution with Sperrins insn't possible because it's a much larger aircraft. Or is it?

If a contract had been let in March 1949 (which is when the others were ITTL) it could have flown its first aircraft in mid 1951 like Avro & Handley Page and if it delivered its aircraft at the same rate as the other factories delivered 126 to the end of 1954. Plus these would have been preceded by 2 prototypes (& a STA) that flew 1949-50 to help with the development flying and in common with the Short Brothers' built prototypes (& STAs) built IOTL & TTL they were built in production jigs too. As a result deliveries of Boulton Paul built production aircraft began in mid-1950 instead of mind 1951 and that increased the number built to the end of 1954 to 162.

@Hood, does that work for you?

I don't expect it to because I've spent over a day working on this and I think it isn't a satisfactory answer. I may have to hand wave and say that the British Government pays for an expansion of Short Brothers' and Boulton Paul factories so they can build the 400 aircraft required without the assistance of other firms. If each factory had been able to built 4 aircraft a month from mid-1950 to the end of 1954 that would have produced a total of 432 aircraft and delivered the 400th in August 1954.

 

[southwestforests]

What took place historically was the effect of the causes, a different effect would have required different causes, and given that those causes were themselves an effect of other causes, with those causes themselves being effects of yet more causes,
the answer to, "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining its V force?",
is most likely, no.

 

[Hood]

Does this work for me? Hmmm well let's see!

Therefore, I think the best that could have been done is that the RAF formed its first Sperrin squadron in the first half of 1953 which is 18 months to 2 years too late.

I would agree that with a IOTL rate of prototype production that this outcome would be likely - and would be highly unfavourable.

If Short Brothers & Harland had done as well as Vickers Armstrong Aircraft the four Sperrin prototypes built in my timeline would have made their first flights between May 1950 and April 1951 with the first production aircraft following soon after. Then the first Sperrin squadron would have been formed in the first quarter of 1952 which is 6 to 9 months too late.

Jones attributed some of that delay to the move from Rochester and the company's lack of wind-tunnel facilities. He also wrote that the Sperrin was cancelled as a bomber in May 1950 and that might have accounted for some of the delay too.

I suspect that Short could have done as well as Vickers, arguably they had less on the factory floor in Belfast to hinder them. I suspect the move from Rochester would have caused delays, as would the lack of wind tunnels, though that's partly what the RAE is for and Sperrin is not exactly a cutting-edge design. I suspect that the relegation of the Sperrin resulted in it languishing - if you look at the Avro 707s, its clear that sometimes the prototype bombers don't take as long as you think they might, whereas research types do.

I have strengthened Short Brothers & Harland by having it absorb Boulton Paul between 1945 and 1948. (See Post 29 of "UK Industry Rationalisation 1945".) That would have provided more men with drawing boards and slide rules to help with the design work.

Boulton Paul may have had the wind-tunnel facilities that Short's required too as the firm built the P.111 & P.120 research aircraft IOTL. These aircraft were ordered on 07.02.47 to Specification E.27/46 which was issued on 31.01.47.

True, you could move the Sperrin team to Wolverhampton to finish the research and design work. I'm not sure that you would get many takers for BP staff to move from the Midlands to Northern Ireland though. You might need some cash/housing incentives to entice them not to simply pack up and go somewhere else.

Issue B.14/46 a year earlier & order the prototypes a year earlier and all other things being equal the four prototypes ordered ITTL fly between August 1950 & August 1951. However, all other things were not equal ITTL because Short's has them flying in the time that it took Vickers to get the Valiant prototypes flying which advances the first flights to May 1949 & April 1950 with the first production aircraft flying soon after. Therefore, the first RAF squadron would have formed in the first quarter of 1951, which is 3-6 months ahead of my schedule.

The key date for me is when the Sperrin/Valiant were selected - which is 17 December 1946 when the decision was made to order two interim standby designs. Obviously the haggling etc. over what to put in and what to leave out of the new B.14/46 spec had delayed its formal issuing until 11 August 1947. The ITP to Shorts was in November. B.98/48 was not issued until 19 July but Vickers had actually received their ITP in April! In theory I don't see any reason why Shorts could not have received the ITP anytime from March 1947 while the Air Ministry/Ministry of Supply hashed out the spec. It's not the 12 months you were hoping for, but its 8 months sooner and with some proper impetus to the programme things don't look bad to meet your 6-9 months late scenario.

If a specification for a "Big Canberra" had been issued alongside the specification of the Real-Canberra and a contract for four prototypes & two STAs let to Short's in January 1946 they could have been flying between August 1948 & August 1949 all other things being equal. However, all other things were not equa

Is this 'Big Canberra' spec still a V-bomber or just a fast conventional bomber? The reason I ask is that for Sperrin to have been selected in January 1946 its design would have to had been completed in 1945 and therefore all the B.35/46 would automatically become a B.?/45 and everyone gets a year's head start. I think that this is perhaps pushing things - unless I'm mis-reading this and what you are proposing is that Shorts design was designed as a pre-V-bomber concept as a stand-alone project?

The company built 3 prototypes, 17 pre-production aircraft, 145 Balliols for the RAF, 12 that were exported, 30 Sea Balliols for the RN, one P.111 and one P.120. between 1947 & 1954. That's a total of 209 aircraft. A one-to-one substitution with Sperrins insn't possible because it's a much larger aircraft. Or is it?

No, a trainer is nowhere near the manpower and material effort needed to build a four-engined bomber. I'd have to check but I'm not necessarily sure that they would have a large enough factory space or access to sufficiently long runways. As you say someone would need to pay out for the upgrading work.

Having four manufacturers feels like overkill - and if you are competing with Canberras for production space then there are issues.
I feel that Short, HP and Avro would easily be able to handle the production need, possibly just two of them. For example you give the spare Squire's Gate factory in Blackpool to Short as a second/third production line.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Does this work for me? Hmmm well let's see!

Thank you for you reply. Some of wasn't what I wanted to read, but I was expecting you to disagree with some of it, so fair enough.

I would agree that with a IOTL rate of prototype production that this outcome would be likely - and would be highly unfavourable.

Fair enough.

I suspect that Short could have done as well as Vickers, arguably they had less on the factory floor in Belfast to hinder them. I suspect the move from Rochester would have caused delays, as would the lack of wind tunnels, though that's partly what the RAE is for and Sperrin is not exactly a cutting-edge design. I suspect that the relegation of the Sperrin resulted in it languishing - if you look at the Avro 707s, its clear that sometimes the prototype bombers don't take as long as you think they might, whereas research types do.

The book I used as my source said that the move to Rochester did cause delays.

Maybe the move to Belfast would have been delayed given the high priority of the programme and the prototypes built at Rochester. Except what they'd gained on that roundabout would have been lost of the swing of building the prototypes & STA in production jigs IOTL. That is the prototypes would have flown sooner, but it would have taken longer to set up the production line at Belfast.

As a compromise. Could the design team remain at Rochester until the design of the Sperrin was complete and the prototypes & STA still be built in production jigs at Belfast? Would that have worked?

I'd not thought about RAE doing the wind-tunnel work for Short Brothers'. It's one of those things that seems so obvious that it makes me wonder why it wasn't done IOTL.

True, you could move the Sperrin team to Wolverhampton to finish the research and design work. I'm not sure that you would get many takers for BP staff to move from the Midlands to Northern Ireland though. You might need some cash/housing incentives to entice them not to simply pack up and go somewhere else.

I'm going off having Short Brothers' take Boulton Paul over. With hindsight it might have been better to make it part of Hawker Siddeley because of its relative proximity to the Avro, Armstrong-Whitworth, DH Chester and Gloster factories or let it die as IOTL, which was my original choice.

The key date for me is when the Sperrin/Valiant were selected - which is 17 December 1946 when the decision was made to order two interim standby designs. Obviously the haggling etc. over what to put in and what to leave out of the new B.14/46 spec had delayed its formal issuing until 11 August 1947. The ITP to Shorts was in November. B.98/48 was not issued until 19 July but Vickers had actually received their ITP in April! In theory I don't see any reason why Shorts could not have received the ITP anytime from March 1947 while the Air Ministry/Ministry of Supply hashed out the spec. It's not the 12 months you were hoping for, but its 8 months sooner and with some proper impetus to the programme things don't look bad to meet your 6-9 months late scenario.

I think you misread that part. The target is to have it enter service in the middle of 1951 which is when the Canberra entered service. In the paragraph you were quoting I've brought the in service date from 6-9 months late to 3-6 months early.

I'm confused by Instructions To Proceed and production contracts. The former seems to precede the latter. What's the difference? I've been using the latter for this thread.

Is this 'Big Canberra' spec still a V-bomber or just a fast conventional bomber? The reason I ask is that for Sperrin to have been selected in January 1946 its design would have to had been completed in 1945 and therefore all the B.35/46 would automatically become a B.?/45 and everyone gets a year's head start. I think that this is perhaps pushing things - unless I'm mis-reading this and what you are proposing is that Shorts design was designed as a pre-V-bomber concept as a stand-alone project?

You have misread it. I am proposing that the "Big Canberra" specification isn't still a V-bomber and is a stand-alone project. That is it's for a four-turbojet medium bomber to replace the Lincoln and compliment the Mosquito which as I understand it was built to replace the Mosquito. Therefore B.35/46 doesn't become B.?/45 but B.14/46 does become B.?/45. However, giving everyone a year's head start appeals to me because it helps them get the Victor & Vulcan into service in January 1955.

For what it's worth I've wondered for a long time why (apart from the cost) a four-Avon medium bomber wasn't developed alongside the two-engine Canberra light bomber and I think it could have been put into service at the same time as the Canberra. To paraphrase Harve Bennett* "The Short Sperrin with be that four-turbojet medium bomber" and its the Sperrin because giving it to one of the firms that becomes part of BAC or Hawker Siddleley in my rationalisation of 1945-48 might take resources away from the bombers that are developed to B.35/46.

* Harve Bennett said "Steve Austin will be that man".

No, a trainer is nowhere near the manpower and material effort needed to build a four-engine bomber. I'd have to check but I'm not necessarily sure that they would have a large enough factory space or access to sufficiently long runways. As you say someone would need to pay out for the upgrading work.

Fair enough and as already written I've changed my mind about Short Brothers' taking Boulton Paul over.

Wolverhampton many have had a runway that wasn't long enough. Sydenham did have runway that wasn't long enough. The two prototypes had to be dismantled and driven in sections to RAF Aldergrove where they were reassembled which was an additional reason why they flew after the Valiant prototypes.

Having four manufacturers feels like overkill - and if you are competing with Canberras for production space then there are issues. I feel that Short, HP and Avro would easily be able to handle the production need, possibly just two of them. For example you give the spare Squire's Gate factory in Blackpool to Short as a second/third production line.

It may be overkill. However, four manufacturers were involved in the Real-Canberra programme and I estimated that the resources needed to make one Sperrin were equal to two Canberras. Therefore, the 400 Sperrins needed for the 40 squadrons by March 1955 would have been equal to 800 Canberras and IOTL nearly 1,000 Canberras were on order for the RAF in 1951. That's why I thought four might be necessary to build the required number of Sperrins in the required time.

There is no competition with Canberras for production space because fewer Canberras were built in my timeline. However, there is one thing that there may be competition for which is Avon engines. 400 Sperrins will require 1,600 Avons over 4-5 years and although there are several hundred fewer Canberras there aren't 800 fewer. Therefore, the production capacity at RR for Avons or BSE for Sapphires will have to be increased.

My guestimate on the OTL production of Canberras by those firms is that they would have been able to deliver 3 Sperrins a month. However, if its increased to 4 a month. Then the required number could have been built by Avro, Handley Page & Short Brothers' ITTL.

However, one thing I didn't mention (because it was complicated enough as it was) is that BAC and Hawker Siddeley would have been building the extra Sperrins, not Avro & Handley Page. Maybe that would have made a difference.

I like the idea of using Squires Gate. For one thing it's closer by air to Sydenham than Wolverhampton.

Finally, I've said that Short Brother's built the two Sperrin prototypes and the STA in production jigs so more could be built quickly in the event of receiving a production contract. I've seen photographs of the three fuselages side-by-side in said jigs. ITTL four prototypes & two STAs were built along with six sets of production jigs to build them in and there would be photographs of the six fuselages side-by-side in said jigs. Would that have enabled Short Brother's to build Sperrins in double the numbers of OTL ITTL had they received a production contract for 200 Sperrins in March 1949?

 

[uk 75]

It would be interesting to know what NATO wanted the UK to do to the Soviet Union with its light and medium bomber forces.
While the "national deterrent" role required the removal of Moscow and a number of Soviet Russian cities, NATO had more military targets on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc in mind for RAF bombers.
The large numbers of Canberras make sense if you take into account NATO (and then CENTO and SEATO requirements).
It is hard to see Vulcans even with Blue Steels getting through to Moscow after 1960. Polaris is the only alternative that is credible.
Up to a point this did not matter, RAF Bomber Command worked so closely with SAC that there were plenty of other targets for the V force.
Between 1960 and 1970 the available Vulcans and Victors could still hit enough cities and other key targets to give the Soviet Union pause for thought (even if only a handful of SS4 and 5 missiles were needed to obliterate Britain).

 

[uk 75]

Concerning the "national deterrent" the two occasions it might have been needed do not inspire confidence.
In 1956 as Russia threatened to rain down rockets on imperialist aggessors France and Britain Eden could not use his Valiant bombers to take out Moscow.
In 1961 if war had started at Checkpoint Charlie but Kennedy had agreed with Kruschev to keep US and Soviet targets off the kill list Macmillan was not in a much better position even though the V force had reached its full strength.

 

[zen]

In 1956 as Russia threatened to rain down rockets on imperialist aggessors France and Britain Eden could not use his Valiant bombers to take out Moscow.
In

Bluster, a handfull of rockets using LOx....
Besides he wanted a free hand for Hungary and had told Nasser he was not even able or willing to come to Egypt's rescue.

In 1961 if war had started at Checkpoint Charlie but Kennedy had agreed with Kruschev to keep US and Soviet targets off the kill list Macmillan was not in a much better position even though the V force had reached its full strength.

Still not enough missiles.
The 'missile gap' was mostly paranoid US fiction for internal consumption.
Your better example might be in the late 60's.

 

[red admiral]

For what it's worth I've wondered for a long time why (apart from the cost) a four-Avon medium bomber wasn't developed alongside the two-engine Canberra light bomber and I think it could have been put into service at the same time as the Canberra.

What is the need for a "heavy" bomber in this time frame?

Following from WW2 experience with Mosquito which offered better cost -effectiveness than the 4 engines heavies in terms of bomb-nm per £, the UK doubled down on this approach with Canberra. Why spend more money on a less survivable, less efficient aircraft when you can just build more Canberras?

Canberra can't carry big bombs, and doesn't go the desired 1500nm but that's what the V bombers are being built for. Anything in between is very much an interim, in which case it's hard to beat free B-29s on loan.

A major war isn't meant to be happening anyway

 

[uk 75]

Bluster, a handfull of rockets using LOx....
Besides he wanted a free hand for Hungary and had told Nasser he was not even able or willing to come to Egypt's rescue.

Still not enough missiles.
The 'missile gap' was mostly paranoid US fiction for internal consumption.
Your better example might be in the late 60's.

My point is the lack of capability of the V force. Only a handful of Soviet missiles needed to reach London to take Britain out.

 

[uk 75]

I am enjoying the technical info about the various programmes and industrial capabilities.
It has been suggested (Bill Gunston?) that the Pathfinder Valiant BMk2 should have been developed.
The V force as built seemed to me to give the numbers required for:
Blue Steel ops (Vulc and Vic) 1962 to 1969
Theatre freefall nuclear for NATO SACEUR from UK and Cyprus(Val then Vulc) 1958 to 1982
Had the UK required more freefall nuclear or a conventional bomber force East of Suez from 1966 to 1982 the Victor BMk2 could have been retained.
TSR2 then F111K would have been better for NATO than retaining the Vulcans. Tornado lacked the range to replace them but the US stepped in with more F111s to Lakenheath and then Tomahawks to the Newbury Womens Institute.

 

[zen]

My point is the lack of capability of the V force. Only a handful of Soviet missiles needed to reach London to take Britain out

Only if command in London is taken out. A-Bombs for '56, not H-Bombs.
'61 is more likely.

 

[uk 75]

Eden would have had a hard time speaking to Parliament and telling them that although we had received A bomb strikes on the UK RAF Bomber Command was unable to do the same to Russia in spite of all the millions spent on the V Force instead of the NHS.

 

[Scott Kenny]

What is the need for a "heavy" bomber in this time frame?

Something big enough to carry 1st generation nukes at 10,000lbs each.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What is the need for a "heavy" bomber in this time frame?

There was a need for a "heavy" bomber in this timeframe. The facts prove it.

• Bomber Command had a front-line of 144 of "heavy" bombers (Lincolns) in 18 squadrons of 8 aircraft at the end of March 1950 and only 16 Mosquitos in 2 light bomber squadrons.
• The plan in 1950 was to maintain those 144 "heavy" bombers in 18 squadrons until March 1955.
  • Except that 8 of the Lincoln squadrons would convert to B-29s.
  • Then they would be replaced one-for-one by V-bombers by the end of March 1958.
• Under the same plan the Light Bomber Force would be increased from 16 Mosquitos in 2 squadrons to 260 in 26 squadrons by March 1955.
  • The Light Bomber Force would then be reduced to 100 Canberras in 10 squadrons by March 1958.
  • This was because the other 160 Canberras in 16 squadrons would be replaced by 160 V-bombers in 20 squadrons.
• Therefore.
  • 160 bombers (144 medium & 16 light) in 20 squadrons at 31st March 1950.
    • Would become.
  • 404 bombers (144 medium & 260 light in 44 squadrons at 31st March 1955.
    • And.
  • 404 bombers (304 medium & 100 light) in 48 squadrons at 31st March 1958.

Therefore, it's obvious that, had a four-Avon medium bomber been ready to put into service circa 1950, it would have been built in large numbers for the RAF and the number of Canberras built would have been much reduced. The RAF's own plans prove it.

What actually happened is that.

• The Light Bomber Force of 260 Canberras in 26 squadrons did exist on 31st March 1955.
• The Medium Bomber Force of 144 aircraft in 18 squadrons (8 with B-29s and 10 with Washingtons) was maintained until 31.05.52 when the number of Lincoln squadrons was reduced from 10 to 8, but the total number of aircraft was still 144, because the 8 remaining squadrons had 10 aircraft each instead of 8.
• The 8 B-29 squadrons were disbanded between March 1953 and April 1954 instead of being maintained until March 1955.
  • My guess is that their military value wasn't worth the cost.
  • However, if the 8 squadrons had been equipped with more survivable Sperrins they would have been retained until 1955-58 when they'd have converted to V-bombers.
• The force of 80 Lincolns in 10 squadrons was disbanded between April 1954 and January 1956.
  • There were still 50 in 5 squadrons in January 1955 when the first Valiant medium bomber squadron formed.
  • There were still 50 in 5 squadrons in March 1955 when the Canberra force reached its maximum strength.
  • There were still 30 in 3 squadrons in December 1955 when there was still only one Valiant medium bomber. squadron.
  • However (in common with the B-29 squadrons) if the 8 squadrons had been equipped with more survivable Sperrins all 8 squadrons would have been retained until 1955-58 when they'd have converted to V-bombers.

Therefore, it's patently obvious that there was a need for "heavy" bombers in this time frame because the RAF had "heavy" bombers in this time frame.

I concede that the number of "heavy" bombers in March 1955 was only a third of the number planned, but they nevertheless existed and I think there would have been more of then had a better aircraft been available.

Following from WW2 experience with Mosquito which offered better cost-effectiveness than the 4 engines heavies in terms of bomb-nm per £, the UK doubled down on this approach with Canberra. Why spend more money on a less survivable, less efficient aircraft when you can just build more Canberras?

Was the Sperrin significantly less survivable than the Canberra?

• The difference between the performance of the Sperrin and the performance of the Canberra was considerably smaller than the difference between the performance of the wartime four engine heavies.
  • The maximum speed of the Sperrin prototypes was about 10% less than the Canberra B.2. Both aircraft had Avon engines producing 6,500lbst.
  • The maximum speed of the Lancaster B.1 was about 25% slower than the Mosquito B.IV.
  • The maximum speed of the Lincoln B.1 was about 30% slower than the Mosquito B.XVI.
• It was certainly more survivable than the Lincolns and Superfortresses that Bomber Command had to make do with until the V-bombers arrived. I've posted the statistics in this thread.

Was it less efficient than the Canberra? Was it less cost-effective as the Canberra?

• It had double the crew and double the number of engines which made it more expensive to operate.
• However, that was cancelled out by carrying more than twice the weight of conventional bombs than the Canberra (16,000lb v 6000lb).
• Plus (as you wrote) it flew further than the Canberra and (as you also wrote) carried bigger bombs than the Canberra.
• Therefore, I argue that the was as cost-effective as the Canberra and was as versatile.

Canberra can't carry big bombs, and doesn't go the desired 1500nm but that's what the V bombers are being built for. Anything in between is very much an interim, in which case it's hard to beat free B-29s on loan.

Yes the Sperrin is very much interim. I haven't pretended that it's anything but interim.

However, being interim doesn't mean it's not worthwhile and the interim was longer than you may think. IOTL the first Valiant squadron medium bomber squadron formed in January 1951, however the second didn't form until January 1956, the third didn't form until April 1956 and the seventh (and final) Valiant medium bomber squadron didn't form until January 1957. The first Vulcan squadron didn't form until May 1957. The first Victors squadron didn't form until April 1958 when there was a total of 10 V-bomber squadrons (7 Valiant, 2 Vulcans & one Victor). In my timeline the Sperrin enters service in mid-1951 and if only 12 squadrons were formed in the early 1950s the last one wouldn't convert to a V-bomber until the spring of 1958. That's 7 years of operational service as a "heavy" bomber. That's a rather long for an interim.

The Canberra was an interim aircraft too. It remained in RAF service for decades. The British taxpayer certainly had a lot of value for money from it. Who's to say that the British taxpayer would have had the same value for money from the Sperrin? "Do not despise the Sperrin for being an interim aircraft because who is to say that it won't fall to pieces like the Valiant" as Burt Kwouk might have said.

It's very easy to beat free B-29s on loan because the Sperrin out performed it by about 150 miles. If B-29s were so hard to beat, why were they returned early and the Lincolns retained.

As far as I know many of the V-bombers were paid for by the USA via MDAP. I suspect that the USA would have paid for some of the Sperrins too. That would have reduced the cost advantage of the free B-29s considerably.

A major war isn't meant to be happening anyway

If a major war isn't meant to be happening anyway, why develop the Canberra? If the RAF can make do with Lincolns until the Year of Maximum Danger, it can make do with Mosquitos too. The money saved can be used to develop a higher performance light bomber to serve alongside the V-bombers in the Year of Maximum Danger.

 

[Hood]

As a compromise. Could the design team remain at Rochester until the design of the Sperrin was complete and the prototypes & STA still be built in production jigs at Belfast? Would that have worked?

I don't see that being a problem - its what would have happened if the MoS hadn't rationalised Short as a Northern Ireland only company.

I'd not thought about RAE doing the wind-tunnel work for Short Brothers'. It's one of those things that seems so obvious that it makes me wonder why it wasn't done IOTL.

I suspect they were busy but would have been preliminary work on the submissions I would have thought to give input on the aerodynamics of all the various weird and wonderful designs. It might not have worked out, but surely Short could have leased some tunnel time somewhere.

You have misread it. I am proposing that the "Big Canberra" specification isn't still a V-bomber and is a stand-alone project.

I thought that might be so, glad I checked.

I like the idea of using Squires Gate. For one thing it's closer by air to Sydenham than Wolverhampton.

It is a neat solution. A Plan B is the old Miles factory at Newtownards that was built mid-war on an airfield to build Messengers and which Miles hoped to make a go of as Miles Northern Ireland before the company collapsed. It became a linen mill but in theory Short could have moved in and taken over the site for sub-assemblies etc.

I'm confused by Instructions To Proceed and production contracts. The former seems to precede the latter. What's the difference? I've been using the latter for this thread.

An ITP is usually a pretty insignificant looking document - a small minute sheet (something like 4 x 6 in) - which gives the official go-ahead to start work. The contract usually follows after that from the Contracts Branch. The company generally already knows what needs to be done and has costed it and has a contract fee negotiated/under final negotiation. But the company won't start any work until it gets that ITP as a sign that everything is agreed and that they will get paid for it.
Oddly the cancellation notices are much the same - a small scrap of paper. I'll have to dig a couple out of my Kew stash as examples.

However, there is one thing that there may be competition for which is Avon engines. 400 Sperrins will require 1,600 Avons over 4-5 years and although there are several hundred fewer Canberras there aren't 800 fewer. Therefore, the production capacity at RR for Avons or BSE for Sapphires will have to be increased.

That is one headache for sure.

However, one thing I didn't mention (because it was complicated enough as it was) is that BAC and Hawker Siddeley would have been building the extra Sperrins, not Avro & Handley Page. Maybe that would have made a difference.

Fair enough.

Finally, I've said that Short Brother's built the two Sperrin prototypes and the STA in production jigs so more could be built quickly in the event of receiving a production contract. I've seen photographs of the three fuselages side-by-side in said jigs. ITTL four prototypes & two STAs were built along with six sets of production jigs to build them in and there would be photographs of the six fuselages side-by-side in said jigs. Would that have enabled Short Brother's to build Sperrins in double the numbers of OTL ITTL had they received a production contract for 200 Sperrins in March 1949?

If Short has the room to install them, the manpower to work them and can get the metal supplies then I don't see why not. You'll need a bigger workforce but I'm sure that could be sorted.

Canberra can't carry big bombs, and doesn't go the desired 1500nm but that's what the V bombers are being built for. Anything in between is very much an interim, in which case it's hard to beat free B-29s on loan.

A major war isn't meant to be happening anyway

Lincoln was hardly a decent bomber for the task in hand, especially for trying to reach targets behind the Iron Curtain. B-29 had more range and more sophisticated armament. Unarmed Sperrins in the daytime might still have faced stiff odds against the day jet fighters, but at night they could have been very dangerous in the early 1950s.

Bomber Command had a front-line of 144 of "heavy" bombers (Lincolns) in 18 squadrons of 8 aircraft at the end of March 1950 and only 16 Mosquitos in 2 light bomber squadrons.

Interestingly Lincoln production did not cease until early 1950.

The 8 B-29 squadrons were disbanded between March 1953 and April 1954 instead of being maintained until March 1955.

• My guess is that their military value wasn't worth the cost.

They were replaced by Canberras, they were interims for jet bombers and once Bomber Command started receiving Canberras in numbers there was less need to keep the B-29s. The Wright R-3350s had proved unreliable and the equipment in them was all American and required different crew training courses etc. so was actually quite expensive to keep running. The airframes were effectively "free" but nothing else was.

As far as I know many of the V-bombers were paid for by the USA via MDAP. I suspect that the USA would have paid for some of the Sperrins too. That would have reduced the cost advantage of the free B-29s considerably.

MDAP was paying for numerous things, but for me, MDAP money freed from B-29 can be used elsewhere where it can do more good (even as you say building a second jet bomber, MDAP-built airframes do come with strings attached though when it comes to disposal).

Plus (as you wrote) it flew further than the Canberra and (as you also wrote) carried bigger bombs than the Canberra.

The one major benefit of Sperrin is that Bomber Command has a jet capable of carrying the Tallboy internally.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Interestingly Lincoln production did not cease until early 1950.

For what it's worth Bomber Command still had a squadron of Lancaster bombers (No. 214) on 1st January 1950 and (according to RAFWEB) it didn't convert to the Lincoln until February 1950.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The one major benefit of Sperrin is that Bomber Command has a jet capable of carrying the Tallboy internally.

Obviously that capability wasn't considered valuable enough.

To me, that would have been the primary business case for it!

 

[uk 75]

I had always assumed that the Valiant was primarily an atom bomb carrier. Certainly its conventional bombing at Suez was not very impressive.
The Canberra force on the other hand was primarily conventional until suitable US weapons were made available for their NATO role.
The B29 Washingtons served at a time when the US deployed B29 and B50 aircraft to the UK.
I can see a bigger Canberra (Sperrin) being useful but I am not sure how it would have fitted in with the development of the V force.
The Canberra replacement aircraft has a long gestation once the Mig 15 to 19 demonstrate how vulnerable Canberras are.
But most Canberras are roled to operate against third world opponents by 1960 with the NATO assigned aircraft getting US nukes and AS30 missiles.
In the absence of Buccaneer S2 before 1964 the only suitable Canberra replacements were US aircraft like the Thunderchief and Vigilante. TSR2 had become the fourth V bomber and could not enter service before 1968 so was no help at all.

 

[red admiral]

Lincoln was hardly a decent bomber for the task in hand, especially for trying to reach targets behind the Iron Curtain. B-29 had more range and more sophisticated armament. Unarmed Sperrins in the daytime might still have faced stiff odds against the day jet fighters, but at night they could have been very dangerous in the early 1950s.

I'm really wondering what they thought they were going to try and bomb with these heavies (whether Lincoln, Washjngton or Sperrin)? Tactical bombing of supply dumps, railheads etc. At night? It's not like WW2 style just go and dump bombs into the Ruhr

I'm not fancying their day bombing chances given experience in Korea vs relatively small numbers of jet fighters

 

[Hood]

I'm really wondering what they thought they were going to try and bomb with these heavies (whether Lincoln, Washjngton or Sperrin)? Tactical bombing of supply dumps, railheads etc. At night? It's not like WW2 style just go and dump bombs into the Ruhr

I'm not fancying their day bombing chances given experience in Korea vs relatively small numbers of jet fighters

The pre-V-Force era does tend to get overlooked, and the conventional bombing capability that Bomber Command sought.
I agree that there does seem to be a disconnect about what Bomber Command was actually meant to do while it kicked its heels waiting for the A-Bomb. It lacked the range to reach Russia and hitting targets in eastern Germany and Poland probably wouldn't have contributed much. Daytime bombing would have been very dodgy, even with jet fighter escorts, B-29s managed it in Korea but with losses, and that wasn't the same level of danger as going up against the VVS and PVO.
Lincolns were quickly ditched for Canberras - yes shiny new jets but only tactical bombers with a blind-bombing capability only as far as Gee-H reached. So B-29 was vital for some kind of long-distance punch. I suspect at this stage Bomber Command would have slotted into whatever A-Bomb bombing plan the USAF had for its UK-based B-29s and B-50s to fill in around the edges.

But yes, judging by what I've seen in the files, many in Bomber Command seemed to be gearing up for a repeat of WW2 tactics and force structure with pathfinders and mass raids.

 

[red admiral]

But yes, judging by what I've seen in the files, many in Bomber Command seemed to be gearing up for a repeat of WW2 tactics and force structure with pathfinders and mass raids.

Yes, area bombing bits of Eastern Germany and Poland in Lincolns at night in the early 50s seems pretty odd

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yes, area bombing bits of Eastern Germany and Poland in Lincolns at night in the early 50s seems pretty odd

hitting rail yards and bridges etc is not bad tactics.

 

[Hood]

*shameless plug alert*
When I was researching for my recent two articles in Aviation Historian, Striving for Accuracy: The RAF and Post-war Bombing Technology, I was struck by once you piece all the developments in navigation, pathfinders, radio beacons, visual bomb aiming, radar, guided weapons etc. that the majority of that effort was aimed at delivering conventional HE with ever greater precision.

By 1950 the head of Bomber Command was just twigging to the reality that massed raids were a thing of the past and that what he needed was accurate navigation and accurate destructive bombing to allow fewer aircraft to penetrate and hit hard.
By this measure, the idea of a Sperrin heavy would be very useful in at least aiding the chances of penetration.

The big problem - which goes back to Red Admiral's question - was actually quite fundamental. Lack of high quality maps of the Western USSR and even Eastern Europe in the right scales to be useable for accurate navigation. A lot of ex-Luftwaffe intelligence was floating around but outdated. Bomber Command simply didn't know where 'Power Station X' or "Marshalling Yard Y' was, at best a vague idea, certainly not to within 250yds.
The ludicrous situation was that if WW3 broke out, Bomber Command would have to spend the first one or two days making photo-reconnaissance sorties to make the maps before they could send the bomber boys out. Let alone "wheezy ideas" like dropping radio beacons all over the place in the hope nobody on the ground would spot them or smash them up - or simply sling them on the back of a ZIL and move them into an open field....

Presumably by the time the V-Force was operational and on QRA the target information data was much more reliable than it had been in 1950-56. A four-minute scramble gave no time for mucking about to do a recce first. In some ways the monster-scary H-bomb on an ICBM seemed a lot easier, just lob the thing and incinerate hundreds of square miles.

 

[Hood]

I'd not thought about RAE doing the wind-tunnel work for Short Brothers'. It's one of those things that seems so obvious that it makes me wonder why it wasn't done IOTL.

Update on this. Hawker didn't have any wind tunnels either. They used the RAE or NPL tunnels.
So it wouldn't be an unusual situation within the industry.

 

[red admiral]

Bomber Command would have to spend the first one or two days making photo-reconnaissance sorties to make the maps before they could send the bomber boys out.

I imagine that you can wind things like RAF operation of RB-45s in the early 50s into this story; these sorties doing overflights if Eastern Europe to get this sort of intelligence.

Where there any specific UK reconnaissance aircraft projects in this time frame? I can't really think of any. I suppose plan would be use Mosquito and Spitfire PR variants until Canberra came along? And then there's the likes of Valiant B.2 and Avro 730 a bit later on, but they were more for working for the V force

 

[Pirate Pete]

I know this discussion has been on-going for a considerable time now, but I thought I would throw in a suggestion (which will no doubt appall some of not many of those contributing!)
I think the idea of putting the Sperrin into production has great merit, especially if the specification/contract dates are advanced slightly.
I’m not a fan of building ‘hundreds’ of Sperrins, I am thinking more along the lines of enough squadrons to equip RAF Bomber Command so that jet bomber tactics can be developed - I’m thinking something in the region of 100 aircraft max…
we then look at Vickers Valiant…
the Mk.1 in actuality flew slightly earlier than the Sperrin, but in this TL, I see the Valiant 1 being cancelled as the Sperrin is already in production and the ‘ultimate’ V-bomber (yes, singular) will come on stream shortly (or at least earlier than in OTL).
Due to the death of Chadwick at Avro, the Vulcan is seriously hampered in design and development (sorry real work design team) and Handley Pages‘ (this TL, part of BAC) Victor is selected as THE V-bomber…the Vulcan is therefore cancelled (I can hear the screams of anguish even as I write this).
Therefore the V-force is built around the (in my personal opinion as I am biased) the better performing (in it’s originally intended role) BAC Victor 1 and 2 - the 2 following into service quicker than OTL.
Vickers (BAC) in this TL turn to their attention to the low level role and produce the Valiant B2 (no dodgy DTD683 alloy!) which goes into production in the mid to (early) late 1950’s….
the Sperrin gets relegated to second-line duties as production of the other two aircraft ramps up (recce, flight refuelling), whilst some are transferred to other (Commonwealth?) countries so they can develop their own large jet-bomber skills.
The change to low-level operations results in Victors being armed with stand-off weapons and/or conversion to Tankers/Recce, replacing the aged Sperrins in that role.
Mk 2 Valiants operate successfully in the low-level role before being replaced by English Electric TYPE P.17’s (no absurd TSR-2 fiasco here) - IF a TSR-2 type is to appear, it is later as a P.17 replacement years later!

just my two-penny-worth….

 

[alertken]

Please don't base 1950 Defence of the Realm on Shorts. Shorts and Defence was a problem in Industry Rationalisation, 1945,1950, 1957.

McMahon Act cut access to the atomic secret 1/8/46 for UK, Canada, Free France, who had helped to create it. What PM Attlee 8/1/47 funded into R&D was a Bomb. Per Hood #110/113, some hundreds were assumed by their Airships. Spec B.35/46 was issued 24/1/47 for a Medium Bomber capable of carrying a Fat Man copy, its weight/dimensions defining a/c designs. Tender Design Conference was 28/7/47; design+2 prototypes ITPs* to Avro and HP, 11/47.

WSC 15/1/45 confined funding to projects "capable of substantial opn. status by Autumn,46” W.Brown/D.Bancroft, M.52-Gateway to Supersonic Flight, Sp'mount,12,P.85. That, plus money, is why Controlled Weapons and G2 fighters were later in UK than elsewhere....until:
Foreign Sec.Bevin 3/3/48 circulated Cabinet Memo: The Threat To Western Civilisation: it's online: read; imagine receiving it!. For UK it was the start of the Cold War. It led to: 14/4/48: CoS Tasked to repel USSR in (Bizonia) Germany.

Vickers-Armstrongs, nursing twice ejection from Mediums, did not know that. They did know 3/4/48: US Economic Cooperation Act (European Recovery Program: “Marshall Aid”). V-A 3/48 offered freshly-flush Ministers a tighter schedule for T.660 than was expected for Avro or HP (vacuous - V-A had no control over engine, NBS, and much more inc Bomb interface, but):

16/4/48: R&D ITP (to be)Valiant; 2/2/49: ITP, 2xprototypes (1xAvon RA.3, 1xSapphire); 11/50 ITP 1xT.673 Pathfinder; 9/2/51: ITP, 25xB.1.​

Vickers’ vigour delivered 1st. in 82 months - seen as just 4 months late C.Barnett, Verdict of Peace,Mac,'01.P331. At #88 I note no Bombs for them till early-'58, so, as Hood,#113, HE till then (Target integration, so Grid Refs, was 1/7/58 under USAF/RAF CAS' Agt. 21/5/57 (plus Note 8/8/57). Wynn, Pp.103/4/261/2/327/605). No AH can change all that; but nor could Sperrin be advanced.

We owned Shorts and like any owner, must pay or close, so, despite WSC 15/1/45 (and maybe unknown by him) MAP paid Rochester from 2/45 to Study a jet Heavy (sort-of-free, as the Design Team was otherwise idle - Sturgeon, Shetland shackled, 15/1/45). We chose in 1946 to close Rochester and put all work in Belfast. S.A.4 was schemed,'46/47. MoS ITP, 2 prototypes 19/1/48 as insurance, redefining them 3/50 as MBF-supportive Research, first flight 10/8/51. T.660 first flew 18/5/51. We backed T.660 as it was better than S.A.4; so:
Q: why did we continue to fund S.A.4 after 16/4/48?
A: SB&H/H&W was the largest/highest-skilled Employer in the North.

For the same reason we favoured Harland's shipyard. An ad in Janes AWA 1952 shows Carrier Row (Bulwark/Centaur/Eagle/Powerful).

Eire's PM Costello took the Republic of Ireland out of the Commonwealth, 18/4/49. NATO was formed 4/4/49: the Western Approaches would benefit from RN, or USN in ports and MR airfields in the South. PM told HST he would join NATO if US arranged for the Anglos to leave the North: Oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail1949022300018?opendoc.
Declined, neutrality ensued until 1999. MoS loaded SB&H with work of manageable Security sensitivity, MBF equipped elsewhere.

(* ITP: in Treasury parlance a Contract has a definition of Consideration: a price, or pricing arrangement, against a Specification. That can take years to sort out. So to get work underway a simple Statement of Work+"Price to be Agreed" can be issued (Treasury detests them, since any chance of holding the threat of competition, to keep the Supplier faintly honest, is lost). US DoD calls an ITP a Letter Contract).​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Re the comments about the RAF conducting area bombing and mass raids with its Lincolns.

It didn't have the "force mass" (if that's the right expression) to do that as It's front line in early 1950 was a Main Force of 144 Lincolns in 18 squadrons and a Target Marker Force of 16 Mosquitos in 2 squadrons. There were no first-line elint or ECM squadrons to support them.

Contrast that to Bomber Command at the end of March 1945. Its Main Force had 73 squadrons (56 Lancaster & 17 Halifax), a Light Night Strike Force of 12 Mosquito squadrons supported by 7 Mosquito night fighter, one electronic recce and 5 ECM squadrons. Plus there were more aircraft per squadron.

However, as @Hood notes the last of the 528 Lincolns built for the RAF wasn't delivered until early in 1950. Does that mean there were another 380-odd Lincolns in aircraft storage units? Was the plan to increase the number of aircraft in the existing squadrons and form new ones with them? In 1950 there were thousands of recently demobbed Lancaster aircrew from World War II to call up & fly them and tens of thousands of recently demobbed Lancaster groundcrew to maintain & arm them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The poor performance of the Valiant in the Suez War is new to me.

At the end of October 1956 there were 5 Valiant medium bomber squadrons (No 49, 138, 148, 207 & 214) and 4 of them (Nos 138, 148, 207 and 214) participated in the Suez War. However,

• No. 148 was formed in July 1956.
• No. 49 was formed in May 1956.
• No. 207 was formed in April 1956
• No. 214 was formed in January 1956.
  • And.
• No 138 was formed in January 1955.

So one of the 4 squadrons that took part in the war had been in existence for 3 months, one for 6 months one for 10 months and one for 22 months. Was the poor showing in part due to 2 or 3 of the 4 squadrons not being fully worked up? Furthermore, I suspect most of the training had been for their "day job" of dropping Blue Danubes on the USSR.

Meanwhile, there were still 20 Canberra medium bomber squadrons. The last of these had formed in August 1954. Therefore, they'd have all been fully worked-up for day bombing with H.E. bombs. I'm assuming that the best squadrons with the best aircrew took part in the war. Furthermore, the Canberra had been in service as a light bomber for 5½ years at this point and the teething problems that all aircraft have in their early days of service were a distant memory by October 1956.

Are they important reasons why the Canberra performed better than the Valiant in the Suez War?

If they are it's likely that the Sperrins employed in the TTL version of the Suez War would have performed closer the Canberras IOTL than the Valiants IOTL. Like the Canberra it would have been in service for 5½ years by October 1956 so its bugs would have been cured. The squadrons would have been in service for a number of years so they would have been fully worked up. Said working up would have included training for day bombing with H.E. and until 1954 that's all they'd have been able to do because Blue Danube didn't enter service sooner.

Furthermore, as the Sperrin entered service 3½ years before the Valiant enough aircraft would have been available to deploy the 4 squadrons at full strength so 32 would have taken part instead of 24. Plus as the force was larger and had been in existence for 3 times as long there would have been a bigger pool of trained aircrew to choose from so the squadrons and crews with the most conventional bombing experience could have been used.

 

[uk 75]

Something which has emerged from this this most interesting thread is the distinction between nuclear and conventional bombers in RAF service.
Until the late 1950s the majority of RAF bombers can only be given conventional bombs.
Arguably a V bomber in the nuclear role is not needed before 1957 as there are hardly any bombs available.
Canberras are the main tactical bomber replacing Lincolns and B29s which are almost useless unless used as part of a USAF designed bombing campaign around the peripheries of the Soviet bloc (Dropshot).
Valiant B1s are more useful than Sperrins in carrying early UK A and H bombs in the various 1950s but not by much.
So we are left with the type to provide the RAF V force in the 1960s (and longer if a decent theatre bomber is not available).
Vulcan B2 is the best missile carrier with its longer u/c and big wing. Victor B2 has the larger weapons bay and better performance.
Valiant B2 the solo black pathfinder might have been a better choice.
Much of the RAF's problems stem from the awareness that dense Soviet fighter and missile defences make their main nuclear delivery role too difficult. So we get Avro 730, Blue Streak, Blue Steel and Skybolt. TSR2 as the only strike aircraft programme is made as close to the V bomber spec as the RAF can get away with. The answer would have been FB111 with SRAM but by then Polaris is on the way.