Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining the V-Force?

[NOMISYRRUC]

The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Eight
The V-Force 1964-75​

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/a-different-v-force-in-the-1960s.36779/

From the above thread

Plan P of March 1964 again.

1964-75 IOTL
The Medium Bomber and Strategic Reconnaissance Forces

The reduction to 88 medium bombers in 11 squadrons between 01.10.64 and 31.03.66 was actually done between October 1964 and December 1965. The ninth Vulcan B.2 squadron formed in October 1967 instead of by 31.03.66.

The second stage of the Medium Bomber Force's rundown began much earlier than planned in March 1964. The force of 88 medium bombers in 11 squadrons only lasted for two months. A Vulcan squadron disbanded in December 1968, both Victor squadrons disbanded between September & December 1968 and 2 Vulcan squadrons moved to Cyrpus in January 1969. Therefore, there were only 48 Vulcan B.2s in 6 squadrons at midnight on 30.06.69 when the Medium Bomber Force was relieved by Polaris.

In Plan P No. 543 Squadron which had been operating Valiants in the LRPR/strategic reconnaissance role since April 1955 was to have converted to the Victor SR.2 in the first half of 1965. This actually happened in May 1965 and the squadron wouldn't disband until May 1974. The squadron was relived by No. 27 Squadron which reformed on the Vulcan SR.2 in November 1973 and would operate the type in that role until disbanding in March 1982.

The Tactical Bomber Force

The 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons were grounded in January 1965 and the squadrons disbanded in May 1965. Plans to re-equip the squadrons with redundant Vulcan B.1s weren't implemented because the RAF decided to spend the money elsewhere.

The 48 Vulcan B.2s in 6 medium bomber squadrons became tactical bombers in July 1969. However, one squadron disbanded in August 1969 and another disbanded in March 1972. It would increased from 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons to 48 aircraft in 6 squadrons in January 1975 when the 2 Vulcan squadrons in Cyprus returned to the UK as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.

The 6 Vulcan B.2 squadrons were disbanded between December 1981 and December 1982. Except that one squadron had a reprieve by being converted to a tanker squadron. See below.

The Tanker Force

The 16 Valiants in 2 squadrons were grounded in January 1965 and the squadrons disbanded in February 1965.

However, the Victor K.1 force was created faster than planned. The 3 squadrons were formed in May 1965, December 1965 & July 1966 instead of between April & September 1966. Although it took longer for the squadrons to become operational. Furthermore, 31 Victor B.1s were converted to Victor K.1s instead of the 24 that were planned.

2 of the Victor K.1 squadrons converted to the Victor K.2 between June 1975 and July 1976. The third squadron disbanded in January 1977 as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1975-76 which also decreased the number of Victor B.2s converted to Victor K.2s from 29 to 24. The first of the 2 Victor K.2 squadrons disbanded in June 1986 and the second (No. 55) disbanded on 15th October 1993 over 38 years after the No. 138 Squadron reformed on the Vulcan B.1 in January 1955.

One of the Vulcan B.2 squadrons became a tanker squadron in June 1982 and served in this role until March 1984 when it disbanded.

Near East Air Force

16 Vulcan B.2s in 2 squadrons moved to Cyprus in January 1969 where they replaced 32 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons, which were disbanded. The Vulcans returned to the UK in January 1975 as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.

1964-75 ITTL
The Medium Bomber & Strategic Reconnaissance Forces.

• 31.03.64 - 120 aircraft in 15 squadrons (72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons, 40 Victor B.2 in 5 squadrons & 8 Victor SR.2 in one squadron).
• A Victor squadron disbanded in December 1964 so it could be reformed in May 1965 as the third Victor K.2 squadron.
• 2 Victor squadrons moved to Cyprus in May 1965 instead of being disbanded in May & December 1965 respectively.
• A Vulcan squadron disbanded in December 1968
• Both Victor B.2 squadrons disbanded between September & December 1968.
• 2 Vulcan squadrons moved to Cyprus in January 1969 to relieve the Victor B.2 squadrons.

Therefore, there were only 48 Vulcan B.2s in 6 squadrons at midnight on 30.06.69 when the Medium Bomber Force was relieved by Polaris (or ALT-Blue Streak). This was the same as IOTL.

The Tactical Bomber Force

There were 24 Vulcan B.2 in 3 squadrons at 31.03.64 and it was maintained at this strength until 30.06.69 instead of being disbanded in May 1965.

The 48 Vulcan B.2s in 6 medium bomber squadrons were transferred to the Tactical Bomber Force in July 1969. This increased the size of the force to 72 Vulcan B.2 in 9 squadrons. However, 4 squadrons disbanded in August 1969 and another disbanded in March 1972. This reduced the force to 32 Vulcan B.2s in 4 squadrons.

It would increased from 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons to 48 aircraft in 6 squadrons in January 1975 when the 2 Vulcan B.2 squadrons in Cyprus returned to the UK as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.

The 6 Vulcan B.2 squadrons were disbanded between December 1981 and December 1982. Except that one squadron had a reprieve by being converted to a tanker squadron. See below.

The Tanker Force

The RAF had 16 Victor K.2 in 2 squadrons which were reinforced by a third squadron squadron of 8 Victor K.2s in May 1965. The 3 Victor K.2 squadrons were reduced to 2 in January 1977, one in June 1986 and this squadron disbanded on 15th October 1993 over 38 years after the No. 138 Squadron reformed on the Vulcan B.1 in January 1955.

One of the Vulcan B.2 squadrons became a tanker squadron in June 1982 and served in this role until March 1984 when it disbanded.

Near East Air Force

16 Victor B.2s in 2 squadrons moved to Cyprus in May 1965 (instead of being disbanded in May & December 1965) where they replaced 32 Canberra light bombers in 4 squadrons. They were relived by 16 Vulcan B.2s in 2 squadrons in January 1969. The Vulcans returned to the UK in January 1975 as part of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The point of creating BSE a decade earlier is to avoid ten years of triplication. That is stop Armstrong Siddeley, Bristol & De Havilland producing competing designs and concentrate the three firms' resources on producing one design in each power-class.

Bad idea. If there's not competition in the same size/power class, there's little incentive to fix issues. See the early F100s versus when the F110 came on line.

Also, did I miss why we were dumping the Valiant in this timeline?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Bad idea. If there's not competition in the same size/power class, there's little incentive to fix issues. See the early F100s versus when the F110 came on line.

Competition is what Rolls Royce is for.

Also, did I miss why we were dumping the Valiant in this timeline?

Yes you did.

 

[martinbayer]

What is the metric for a "better job" of maintaining the V-Force? Its core objective was serving as a deterrent for preventing a nuclear exchange. Mission accomplished. Anything additional would demonstrably have been overkill, if you pardon the pun.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What is the metric for a better job of maintaining the V-Force? Its core objective was preventing a nuclear exchange. Mission accomplished.

I don't use the word metric in that way. However, see the quote from @Hood in the Opening Post.

 

[martinbayer]

I don't use the word metric in that way. However, see the quote from @Hood in the Opening Post.

The conclusion remains the same for the larger question "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?" The job that *was* done was evidently wholly adequate for its intended objective.

 

[Dilandu]

The conclusion remains the same for the larger question "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?" The job that *was* done was evidently wholly adequate for its intended objective.

Well, considering that it was never tested after 1956 - and in 1956 it was found to be completely inadequate - such conclusion seems to be premature.

 

[martinbayer]

Well, considering that it was never tested after 1956 - and in 1956 it was found to be completely inadequate - such conclusion seems to be premature.

Factually, considering that the overarching intent of an independent British strategic nuclear deterrent, including maintaining the V-Force, was to prevent a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, which thankfully never occurred until the demise of the USSR on December 8, 1991, that particular conclusion appears to be soundly foregone rather than "premature". Also, 1956 is a particularly random basis for a hindsight assessment, since it predates the service introduction of the Handley Page Victor V-bomber fleet as well as the Polaris British Naval Ballistic Missile System submarine force.

 

[uk 75]

It would be interesting to see how Victor B2 aircraft would have performed in 1982 if they had been retained in the freefall strike role (VC10s would have replaced them in the tanker, recce and alcm roles).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Nine
Stand-Off Weapons for the V-Force​

In the thread that this was spun off from the premise was that a British SLBM in the Polaris class could have been developed between 1955 and 1967, which would have been paid for with the money spent on Blue Steel, Blue Streak, Blue Water, Skybolt and the OTL British Polaris programme.

However, in this thread the Victor Mk 1 & Vulcan Mk 2 enter service in 1955 instead of 1957-58 and the Victor Mk 2 & Vulcan Mk 2 enter service sooner too. The reasons why were the earlier rationalisation of the aircraft industry and the transonic research aircraft built by the German team in Wood's Scenario 1945.

Would the rationalised aircraft industry have done a better job of developing Blue Steel Mk 1 than Avro? That is in service sooner, more reliable, safer and cheaper (R&D and production costs) so that enough could be purchased to arm 8 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 squadrons as (originally planned) instead of the 6 squadrons worth that were bought.

Having got Blue Steel into service sooner, what should the follow-on weapon be? Should it be Blue Steel Mk 2 which IOTL was cancelled in 1959 to allow Avro to concentrate on Blue Steel Mk 1? Or should it be a British equivalent to Skybolt? Or should it be something else?

Whatever weapon you choose development begins in 1955, IOC must be by 1967 and FOC must be by midnight on 30th June 1969 to match Polaris IOTL. It is paid for using the money spent on Blue Streak, Blue Water, and the British Polaris Programme IOTL, less whatever is required for Blue Steel Mk 1 ITTL. The Skybolt equivalent must have a solid-fuel motor. Whatever, weapon you choose, it takes the place of the ALT-Blue Streak SLBM in the other thread and Polaris in the "Real World".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What is the definition of [metric for] a "better job" of maintaining the V-Force? Its core objective was serving as a deterrent for preventing a nuclear exchange. Mission accomplished. Anything additional would demonstrably have been overkill, if you pardon the pun.

I was asked a similar question on the other thread (which I copied into the opening post of this thread) which was.

At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?

This was my reply.

All of the above, and in particular, the last two because more terrifying & more Union Jack improves the British SNF's value as an instrument of diplomacy.

More terrifying may mean Her Majesty's enemies take the UK more seriously. And for that matter Her Majesty's friends may take the UK more seriously too.

As I understand it the SNF was valued for the influence it had over the US Government as much as for the influence it had over the Soviet Government. E.g. having a SNF gave the UK some influence over where the USA aimed its strategic nuclear weapons. A more terrifying British SNF may increase the influence that the UK had over where the USA aimed its strategic nuclear weapons.

It was also a guarantee of US support for the UK in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack. "You might as well nuke the USSR, because we will if you don't, and the Soviets will attack you in return, because they can't tell whether they're American or British missiles".

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) means the UK can sell more of the technology to third parties. E.g. to France as an incentive/bribe to France so it doesn't reject the UK's application to join the then Common Market.

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) means more of the money is spent in the UK and less in the USA. Which helps the British economy because the Treasury gets more of it back via taxes and it eases the UK's balance of payments problems.

More Union Jack (and less Stars & Stripes) is important for national self-respect and prestige abroad. France had Mirage, MSBS, SSBS, Diamant, Airane and Airbus. The UK had a long list of expensive and often embarrassing failures which includes (but is not limited to) Comet, Swift, TSR.2 & Blue Streak and a considerably shorter list of undisputed successes. Reducing the number of failures and increasing the number of successes is one of the aims of these threads.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Also, did I miss why we were dumping the Valiant in this timeline?

Yes you did.

Ah, found it halfway down the first page:

There isn't a Valiant because the Air Ministry & Ministry of Supply want BAC (which Handley Page becomes part of between 1945 & 1948) to concentrate on the Victor. The money spent on the 3 Valiant prototypes IOTL pays some of the cost of the extra Victor and Vulcan prototypes.

 

[kaiserd]

From 1958 the UK has made the decision to trade an element of independence for greater sustainability re: their military nuclear enterprise (weapons and reactors).

It appears that for this topic “better job” is, at least for some, seen as code for “purer” re: the element of dependence on the US.
Personally I see that view (imagined national purity versus real world practical considerations) as misguided and disproved by history/ events subsequent to 1958 and the compromise the UK made. The US has and continues to effectively subsidise the UK nuclear weapons and sub-reactors (and nuclear sub) programs but clearly see it as being in their continuing interests as well as the UK coming to the same determination re: their interests.

I’m at a loss why almost certainly inferior solutions at certainly greater costs would or could be seen as “better jobs” or more desired outcomes for the UK or it’s people, apparently based on extremely nebulous and very narrowly held views re: supposedly negatively impacted national pride etc. I don’t think apparent resentment of the US and potential jealousy of the French re: different paths taken/ not taken re: this topic are either very rational or very commonly held in the UK.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In the thread that this was spun off from the premise was that a British SLBM in the Polaris class could have been developed between 1955 and 1967, which would have been paid for with the money spent on Blue Steel, Blue Streak, Blue Water, Skybolt and the OTL British Polaris programme.​

However, in this thread the Victor Mk 1 & Vulcan Mk 2 enter service in 1955 instead of 1957-58 and the Victor Mk 2 & Vulcan Mk 2 enter service sooner too. The reasons why were the earlier rationalisation of the aircraft industry and the transonic research aircraft built by the German team in Wood's Scenario 1945.

Would the rationalised aircraft industry have done a better job of developing Blue Steel Mk 1 than Avro? That is in service sooner, more reliable, safer and cheaper (R&D and production costs) so that enough could be purchased to arm 8 Victor & Vulcan Mk 2 squadrons as (originally planned) instead of the 6 squadrons worth that were bought.

As far as I'm concerned, the critical constraint to nuclear weapons production is plutonium. (oof, pardon the really bad pun)

This plan requires 1/3 more plutonium than historically produced, and requires that 2-3 years sooner. Did the UK have enough production capacity in the 1950-57 range to provide 2x heavy warheads per plane?

 

[Scott Kenny]

From 1958 the UK has made the decision to trade an element of independence for greater sustainability re: their military nuclear enterprise (weapons and reactors).

It appears that for this topic “better job” is, at least for some, seen as code for “purer” re: the element of dependence on the US.
Personally I see that view (imagined national purity versus real world practical considerations) as misguided and disproved by history/ events subsequent to 1958 and the compromise the UK made. The US has and continues to effectively subsidise the UK nuclear weapons and sub-reactors (and nuclear sub) programs but clearly see it as being in their continuing interests as well as the UK coming to the same determination re: their interests.

I’m at a loss why almost certainly inferior solutions at certainly greater costs would or could be seen as “better jobs” or more desired outcomes for the UK or it’s people, apparently based on extremely nebulous and very narrowly held views re: supposedly negatively impacted national pride etc. I don’t think apparent resentment of the US and potential jealousy of the French re: different paths taken/ not taken re: this topic are either very rational or very commonly held in the UK.

You don't see how a large employment of highly trained, highly paid people could benefit the UK?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As far as I'm concerned, the critical constraint to nuclear weapons production is plutonium. (oof, pardon the really bad pun).

This plan requires 1/3 more plutonium than historically produced, and requires that 2-3 years sooner. Did the UK have enough production capacity in the 1950-57 range to provide 2x heavy warheads per plane?

I doesn't need 2x heavy warheads per aeroplane 1950-57. It only needs one. Plus the number of aeroplanes is roughly the same in both timelines.

That being written it looks like the RAF didn't have one Blue Danube atomic bomb per V-bomber in the 1950s. Only 58 were built according to its Wikipedia article and there's what my father said about only once seeing an atomic bomb being loaded onto a V-bomber. Plus it and Red Beard had considerably lower yields for their weight than contemporary American nuclear warheads.

The problem with Blue Steel Mk 1 wasn't a shortage of plutonium for the warheads. The problem was that it took longer to develop than planned and was obsolete by the time it entered service. Furthermore, the much longer range Blue Steel Mk 2 had to be cancelled (in part because of the cost & time overruns on the Mk 1, but also) to enable Avro to concentrate on getting Blue Steel Mk 1 into service.

The time and cost overruns on Blue Steel Mk 1 are usually blamed on Avro, because it was the Firm's first guided weapons' project and the Firm was too small for the job. Although a shortage of V-Bombers to do the testing didn't help. ITTL the R&D contract for Blue Steel is let to one of the unified industry groups created 1945-48 (probably Hawker Siddeley's Dynamics Division) which by 1955 would have done some guided weapons' work 1948-55 and had more resources. Hopefully, the result ITTL would have been Blue Steel Mk 1 entering service in 1960 instead of 1963 to be followed on by Blue Steel Mk 2 or a British equivalent to Skybolt in the second half of the 1960s.

The original plan for Blue Steel Mk 1 was for 75 (plus training rounds) to support a Unit Equipment of 64 (i.e. 8 squadrons of Victor B.2s & Vulcan B.2s at 8 aircraft per squadron) but the cost overruns reduced it to 57 (plus training rounds) to support a UE of 48 (i.e. 3 Victor B.2 and 3 Vulcan B.2 squadrons at 8 aircraft per squadron). In the event Blue Steel Mk 2s was only used by 2 Victor B.2 and 3 Vulcan B.2 squadrons so the UE was 40 instead of the 64 originally planned. Therefore, we only need enough plutonium for 18 extra warheads ITTL.

IOTL the 4 Resolution class SSBN carried 64 Polaris SLBMs each for a total of 64 missiles and each missile carried 3 warheads for a total of 172 plus backing. However, the plan 1963-65 was for 5 Resolution class SSBNs with 80 missiles and 240 warheads.

Previously, the plan had been for 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons armed with Skybolt, which at 2 ALBMs per aircraft requires 144 warheads plus backing. The British ALBM developed from 1955 would have required the same number of warheads. The alternative is 144 Victor B.2 & Vulcan B.2 in 18 squadrons each armed with one Blue Steel Mk 2, so the requirement would still have been for 144 warheads plus backing.

Therefore, I think that if the UK was able to produce enough plutonium for 240 Polaris warheads, it could have produced enough plutonium for 144 Blue Steel Mk 2 or 144 ALT-Skybolt warheads. Even if the Blue Steel & ALT-Skybolt warheads had higher yields than the Polaris warheads.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This plan requires 1/3 more plutonium than historically produced, and requires that 2-3 years sooner. Did the UK have enough production capacity in the 1950-57 range to provide 2x heavy warheads per plane?

Remember Michael Gough and Kenneth Moore in "Reach for the Sky!"

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6LgYtZ0yLCM

At about 5 minutes 45 seconds Gough says to Moore.

"Never! Never! Call it a plane Bader! It's an aeroplane!"​

At about one hour 30 minutes Moore says to Michael Ripper.

"Never! Never! Call it a plane! It's an aeroplane Mister West!"​

My guess is that you'll remember Michael Gough best from playing Alfred Pennyworth in four Batman films. "Reach for the Sky!" was directed by Lewis Gilbert whose impressive CV includes "Sink the Bismarck" and three James Bond films.

 

[uk 75]

From 1958 the UK has made the decision to trade an element of independence for greater sustainability re: their military nuclear enterprise (weapons and reactors).

It appears that for this topic “better job” is, at least for some, seen as code for “purer” re: the element of dependence on the US.
Personally I see that view (imagined national purity versus real world practical considerations) as misguided and disproved by history/ events subsequent to 1958 and the compromise the UK made. The US has and continues to effectively subsidise the UK nuclear weapons and sub-reactors (and nuclear sub) programs but clearly see it as being in their continuing interests as well as the UK coming to the same determination re: their interests.

I’m at a loss why almost certainly inferior solutions at certainly greater costs would or could be seen as “better jobs” or more desired outcomes for the UK or it’s people, apparently based on extremely nebulous and very narrowly held views re: supposedly negatively impacted national pride etc. I don’t think apparent resentment of the US and potential jealousy of the French re: different paths taken/ not taken re: this topic are either very rational or very commonly held in the UK.

Although I agree with you that the UK only approach in these threads was not politically feasible (you can find my insertion of real world history at various points) the technical information about the options makes them worth examining in detail. If you dont like the threads then just ignore them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Also, did I miss why we were dumping the Valiant in this timeline?

Yes you did.

Ah, found it halfway down the first page:

There isn't a Valiant because the Air Ministry & Ministry of Supply want BAC (which Handley Page becomes part of between 1945 & 1948) to concentrate on the Victor. The money spent on the 3 Valiant prototypes IOTL pays some of the cost of the extra Victor and Vulcan prototypes.

According to Wynn in "RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces" the R&D cost of the Valiant's airframe was £10 million. The cost of the avionics and engines could not be determined because they were shared with other aircraft.

Handley Page & Vickers are part of BAC from 1948 ITTL and the idea is that the resources put into the Valiant IOTL are put into the Victor ITTL with the result that it enters service in January 1955 instead of April 1958.

As I wrote in Post 8 a total of 128 Valiants was ordered, but 24 were cancelled reducing the total built to 104. The idea (which was explained at greater length in Post 8) is that BAC builds 64 extra Victor Mk 1s and Hawker Siddeley builds 64 extra Vulcan Mk 1s in place of the 128 Valiants that were ordered.

The Victor carried 14,000lb more H.E. than the Valiant (35,000lb v 21,000lb) which might have been useful for the 4 Victor squadrons that participated in the Suez War ITTL instead of the 4 Valiant squadrons of OTL and the Victors detached to AFME & FEAF instead of Valiants. It would also mean that the 2 tanker squadrons operating Victors ITTL instead of Valiants IOTL carried more fuel.

At the very least the 128 Victors and Vulcans built instead of the Valiant ITTL weren't retired in 1965 due to metal fatigue.

Except the ex-Vickers engineers working with the ex-Handley Page engineers on the Victor ITTL may say . . . "Lets make it from DTD.683!"

Then the 173 Victors built ITTL would be retired in 1965 due to metal fatigue.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Although I agree with you that the UK only approach in these threads was not politically feasible (you can find my insertion of real world history at various points) the technical information about the options makes them worth examining in detail. If you don't like the threads then just ignore them.

Thank you for your unexpected support.

The problem isn't politics. It's economics. Was the British economy strong enough to pay for the development of the technology and production of the hardware in the time allowed? And if it wasn't which defence projects have to be sacrificed to provide the money?

Your support is unexpected because you ask questions like "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?" (which inspired this thread) and when people reply with plausible alternatives to what was done in the "Real World" you pour scorn on them. Maybe you should practice what you preach. If you don't like the answers, don't ask the questions. Or if you don't like my answers put me on ignore.

 

[kaiserd]

You don't see how a large employment of highly trained, highly paid people could benefit the UK?

The UK military nuclear enterprise continues to employ a large number of highly trained highly paid UK based people in its real world form.

And unrealistic unaffordable UK-only routes not taken would have likely resulted in the scaling back or abandonment of this capability, and fewer (not more) such people so employed.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I doesn't need 2x heavy warheads per aeroplane 1950-57. It only needs one. Plus the number of aeroplanes is roughly the same in both timelines.

That being written it looks like the RAF didn't have one Blue Danube atomic bomb per V-bomber in the 1950s. Only 58 were built according to its Wikipedia article and there's what my father said about only once seeing an atomic bomb being loaded onto a V-bomber. Plus it and Red Beard had considerably lower yields for their weight than contemporary American nuclear warheads.

The problem with Blue Steel Mk 1 wasn't a shortage of plutonium for the warheads. The problem was that it took longer to develop than planned and was obsolete by the time it entered service. Furthermore, the much longer range Blue Steel Mk 2 had to be cancelled (in part because of the cost & time overruns on the Mk 1, but also) to enable Avro to concentrate on getting Blue Steel Mk 1 into service.

The time and cost overruns on Blue Steel Mk 1 are usually blamed on Avro, because it was the Firm's first guided weapons' project and the Firm was too small for the job. Although a shortage of V-Bombers to do the testing didn't help. ITTL the R&D contract for Blue Steel is let to one of the unified industry groups created 1945-48 (probably Hawker Siddeley's Dynamics Division) which by 1955 would have done some guided weapons' work 1948-55 and had more resources. Hopefully, the result ITTL would have been Blue Steel Mk 1 entering service in 1960 instead of 1963 to be followed on by Blue Steel Mk 2 or a British equivalent to Skybolt in the second half of the 1960s.

The original plan for Blue Steel Mk 1 was for 75 (plus training rounds) to support a Unit Equipment of 64 (i.e. 8 squadrons of Victor B.2s & Vulcan B.2s at 8 aircraft per squadron) but the cost overruns reduced it to 57 (plus training rounds) to support a UE of 48 (i.e. 3 Victor B.2 and 3 Vulcan B.2 squadrons at 8 aircraft per squadron). In the event Blue Steel Mk 2s was only used by 2 Victor B.2 and 3 Vulcan B.2 squadrons so the UE was 40 instead of the 64 originally planned. Therefore, we only need enough plutonium for 18 extra warheads ITTL.

IOTL the 4 Resolution class SSBN carried 64 Polaris SLBMs each for a total of 64 missiles and each missile carried 3 warheads for a total of 172 plus backing. However, the plan 1963-65 was for 5 Resolution class SSBNs with 80 missiles and 240 warheads.

Previously, the plan had been for 72 Vulcan B.2s in 9 squadrons armed with Skybolt, which at 2 ALBMs per aircraft requires 144 warheads plus backing. The British ALBM developed from 1955 would have required the same number of warheads. The alternative is 144 Victor B.2 & Vulcan B.2 in 18 squadrons each armed with one Blue Steel Mk 2, so the requirement would still have been for 144 warheads plus backing.

Therefore, I think that if the UK was able to produce enough plutonium for 240 Polaris warheads, it could have produced enough plutonium for 144 Blue Steel Mk 2 or 144 ALT-Skybolt warheads. Even if the Blue Steel & ALT-Skybolt warheads had higher yields than the Polaris warheads.

Let's see here... The Fat Man device is said to have 6.4kg of plutonium, and I believe that's close to the amount used in Polaris warheads (small H-bombs, not 1.2MT pure atomics). (If someone happens to have a reference for how much Pu those had I'd love to see it)

So, 240x7kg is 1680kg, unless someone has a better source for Pu needed. 1680/75 makes for 22.4kg per BritNuke.

However, that's the production achieved by 1968, not 1955.

Bah, let's try this a different way.

*wikidive*

Okay, so Windscale had a production capacity of about 15 bombs worth per year per reactor, and both reactors were online by 1950 it appears. Even if one was not online until 1952, that would not prevent the production of 75 warheads by 1954.

So I think we're actually okay for the plutonium production.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The UK military nuclear enterprise continues to employ a large number of highly trained highly paid UK based people in its real world form.

And unrealistic unaffordable UK-only routes not taken would have likely resulted in the scaling back or abandonment of this capability, and fewer (not more) such people so employed.

Yet here we are, discussing what needs to be cut and/or redirected to afford such routes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From 1958 the UK has made the decision to trade an element of independence for greater sustainability re: their military nuclear enterprise (weapons and reactors).

It appears that for this topic “better job” is, at least for some, seen as code for “purer” re: the element of dependence on the US.
Personally I see that view (imagined national purity versus real world practical considerations) as misguided and disproved by history/ events subsequent to 1958 and the compromise the UK made. The US has and continues to effectively subsidise the UK nuclear weapons and sub-reactors (and nuclear sub) programs but clearly see it as being in their continuing interests as well as the UK coming to the same determination re: their interests.

I’m at a loss why almost certainly inferior solutions at certainly greater costs would or could be seen as “better jobs” or more desired outcomes for the UK or it’s people, apparently based on extremely nebulous and very narrowly held views re: supposedly negatively impacted national pride etc. I don’t think apparent resentment of the US and potential jealousy of the French re: different paths taken/ not taken re: this topic are either very rational or very commonly held in the UK.

You appear to be missing the point of this thread, which is about whether the effectiveness of the V-Force could have been improved in the period 1955-69 by spending the same money as the "Real World" more effectively. Or put another way making aircraft that were already British more effective, in part by accelerating their development and via a British stand-off bomb that was developed anyway having a less protracted development programme.

Remaining British instead of buying American doesn't happen until the late 1960s when a British equivalent to Polaris enters service.

Your comments really belong in the thread "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?" because that's about whether the UK could have developed a SLBM as capable as Polaris A-3 from 1955 and put it into service in 1967 with the money that was spent of Blue Steel, Blue Streak, Blue Water, Skybolt and the UK Polaris programme.

I suggest that you hold tight because it's going to be a very bumpy ride, or put me on ignore now, because if you don't like what I've written so far, you'll hate what's to come.

 

[kaiserd]

The question of the UK nuclear deterrent has factors that are technical, political and economic and which interact with each other. To be realistic or plausible a path not-taken has to take into account all 3.

Essentially the UK decided that the deal with the US in 1958 made their nuclear deterrent more sustainable and was the superior way to go technically, politically and economically. And events have proven them right. Proposed UK-only alternatives are inevitably going to be some combination of technically, politically and/ or economically inferior. Which does call their potential sustainability into question and at the very least makes claims of supposed superiority and “doing a better job” highly dubious.

Such paths not taken scenarios will involve significant trade-offs that don’t really appear to be acknowledged let alone discussed above. Which is all fine if you are constructing a fantasy or a fiction, but not one in which any sense of realism is important or where any one can present a scenario as actually plausible or possible. I’m not trying to be a kill-joy or ruin others fun, my concern is where fantasy appears to attempt to morph into revisionist history, and where wishful thinking appears to be confused with actual history.

 

[Hood]

Well, considering that it was never tested after 1956 - and in 1956 it was found to be completely inadequate - such conclusion seems to be premature.

Valiant performed indifferently at Suez, but it was a brand new aircraft and not all aircraft were fully equipped with the full NBS suite. Even so the 50% CEP was about 590m. During the workup for the Falklands in 1982, Vulcans managed a CEP of 228m, not bad for lashed up aircraft patched up with bits and pieces from reserve aircraft. Black Buck has admittedly been overblown in history - it was pretty impressive performance for 30 year old airframe with 40 year old bomb aiming, navigation and radar technology.

V-Force was continually tested; NATO exercises, deployments to the US, bombing contests with the USAF, QRA, overseas deployments. Just like SAC, V-Force trained for war on a daily basis.

I’m at a loss why almost certainly inferior solutions at certainly greater costs would or could be seen as “better jobs” or more desired outcomes for the UK or it’s people, apparently based on extremely nebulous and very narrowly held views re: supposedly negatively impacted national pride etc. I don’t think apparent resentment of the US and potential jealousy of the French re: different paths taken/ not taken re: this topic are either very rational or very commonly held in the UK.

Taken objectively, no nation has developed its nuclear weapons without some form of outside assistance, whether that was British and Canadian scientists on Manhattan or espionage by the Soviets during that period, or late post-war exchanges of technology from the USSR, USA, France etc.

The myth of the "secret Trident kill switch" and "we can't use them unless the US President says so" are pretty widespread in the anti-nuclear lobby. I've not seen any jealousy of the French in these arguments, most Brits would probably be fairly unaware of France's nuclear force, its not like it advertises itself, while in the UK its a fairly emotive issue, especially in Scotland. Most people probably view the deterrent as a colossal waste of money, the fact the Yanks are involved immediately raise suspicions.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Let's see here... The Fat Man device is said to have 6.4kg of plutonium, and I believe that's close to the amount used in Polaris warheads (small H-bombs, not 1.2MT pure atomics). (If someone happens to have a reference for how much Pu those had I'd love to see it)

So, 240x7kg is 1680kg, unless someone has a better source for Pu needed. 1680/75 makes for 22.4kg per BritNuke.

However, that's the production achieved by 1968, not 1955.

Bah, let's try this a different way.

*wikidive*

Okay, so Windscale had a production capacity of about 15 bombs worth per year per reactor, and both reactors were online by 1950 it appears. Even if one was not online until 1952, that would not prevent the production of 75 warheads by 1954.

So I think we're actually okay for the plutonium production.

According to Wikipedia the first Blue Danube atomic bombs were delivered to the RAF in November 1953 and 58 were made to 1958 when it was replaced in production by Yellow Sun Mk 1.

However, there were 72 V-bombers in 9 squadrons at 31.03.58 and 104 in 13 squadrons at 31.03.59 in both timelines. So there were 14 V-bombers without an atom bomb at 31.03.58 and as many as 46 without one at 31.03.59. It depends upon how many Yellow Suns were available.

The difference between OTL & TTL is that there were 72 Valiants at 31.03.58 IOTL and ITTL it was 32 Victor B.1 & 40 Vulcan B.1 plus 8 Victor PR.1 in the PR squadron instead of Valiants. Similarly at 31.03.59 it was 56 Valiants, 24 Victor B.1s & 24 Vulcan B.1s IOTL and ITTL it was 48 Victor B.1s & 56 Vulcan B.1s plus 8 Victor PR.1 in the PR squadron instead of Valiants.

Except, ITTL BAC and Hawker Siddeley might be delivering Victors & Vulcans faster than Avro, Handley Page & Vickers were able to deliver the Vulcan, Victor & Valiant respectively, which would accelerate Bomber Command's conversion from Canberra light bombers to the medium V-bombers. Therefore, there might have been even more Victors & Vulcans without an atomic bomb at those dates.

 

[Hood]

A total of 38 Yellow Sun Mk.1 were built - 33 new Green Grass warheads and 5 re-used from Violet Club.
Green Grass is thought to have had something like 60kg of fissile material (some estimates go as high as 86kg but Brian Dunnell's excellent site concludes 58.9kg is the most realistic figure given that released figures indicate that only 2,179kg of U-235 was recovered from all the warheads).

There is a slight snag with Yellow Sun Mk.1 (British understatement for colossal cockup).
The Interim Megaton Weapon used the Green Grass warhead - but it was never tested and had a dangerous quantity of fissile material so had 133,000 ball bearings, so just as useless as Violet Club and the RAF hated the weapon for its perceived unsafeness and meant that the bombers armed with it could not be dispersed from the main base due to the risks.

Green Grass was only ever a stand-in before Green Granite was ready. Green Granite never worked in the early Grapple tests and the improved Short Granite and Purple Granite were flops (300kT, nowhere near the 1MT target). In September 1958 work stopped and was replaced by Red Snow, the Anglicised US Mk.28. Penney and his team knew they would get the H-Bomb right eventually and ironically just as US know-how became available, Grapple X and Grapple Y using the 'Dick' design worked, Grapple Z did too, just before the test ban became live.

It's likely that had no agreement been reached in 1958 that 'Dick' would have been refined but it probably would have been 3-4 years before a production warhead was ready for the Yellow Sun Mk.2, so in your scenario you might need to solider on with the Blue Danubes and Yellow Sun Mk.1 is nothing more than a limited stopgap.

 

[zen]

Let's iterate that Bilateral is not one way. It's a two way sharing of information.

While it's understandable that US efforts are impressive for scale and resources, with a lot of empirical results, UK efforts are all too readily dismissed.
That is bias and prejudice. It's also historical revisionism.

US theory wasn't as good, that's the UK view, post Grapple series tests.
US safety wasn't impressive, that's a much wider UK view. Precisely because they had sweated over the problem and weren't impressed with their own early efforts.

UK efforts in Anglicisation, led to a lot redesign, not just for manufacturing standards. But safety and the underlying theory.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

A total of 38 Yellow Sun Mk.1 were built - 33 new Green Grass warheads and 5 re-used from Violet Club.

Green Grass is thought to have had something like 60kg of fissile material (some estimates go as high as 86kg but Brian Dunnell's excellent site concludes 58.9kg is the most realistic figure given that released figures indicate that only 2,179kg of U-235 was recovered from all the warheads).

There is a slight snag with Yellow Sun Mk.1 (British understatement for colossal cockup).

The Interim Megaton Weapon used the Green Grass warhead - but it was never tested and had a dangerous quantity of fissile material so had 133,000 ball bearings, so just as useless as Violet Club and the RAF hated the weapon for its perceived unsafeness and meant that the bombers armed with it could not be dispersed from the main base due to the risks.

Green Grass was only ever a stand-in before Green Granite was ready. Green Granite never worked in the early Grapple tests and the improved Short Granite and Purple Granite were flops (300kT, nowhere near the 1MT target). In September 1958 work stopped and was replaced by Red Snow, the Anglicised US Mk.28. Penney and his team knew they would get the H-Bomb right eventually and ironically just as US know-how became available, Grapple X and Grapple Y using the 'Dick' design worked, Grapple Z did too, just before the test ban became live.

It's likely that had no agreement been reached in 1958 that 'Dick' would have been refined but it probably would have been 3-4 years before a production warhead was ready for the Yellow Sun Mk.2, so in your scenario you might need to solider on with the Blue Danubes and Yellow Sun Mk.1 is nothing more than a limited stopgap.

In my timeline the history of the "physics packages" was to have been nearly the same as IOTL, because as far as I know there wasn't any room for improvement. That included still having the UK–US Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958, Project E and Red Snow. The main differences were to have been that the British Polaris analogue would have had different warheads to the Real British Polaris missiles and that the UK would have been able give the Polaris analogue a better mid-life modernisation than Chevaline.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Three
Engines for the V-Bombers​

Except, ITTL Armstrong-Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines become part of Bristol Siddeley Engines between 1945 and 1948 in my timeline. Therefore, no Olympus or no Sapphire ITTL. Which of the two engines draws the short straw in 1948? My guess is that it would have been the Olympus because the Sapphire first ran in 1948 and the Olympus didn't run for the first time until 1950.

Why not both engines?

I don't know whether I should be gratified or depressed to learn that I'm not the only blond on his forum.

If this Bristol Siddeley keeps two teams going you have AS-ex-Metrovick going down high temp/pressure single shaft route for high fast and Bristol team doing the twin shaft route for high efficiency.

Research efforts on both and pick a winner?

Because that defeats the object of the exercise.

Not sure you should give up the advantage in designing engines so easily. Having working twin-spool engines is good for bombers and transports. Most fighters can get away with single spools still you get into fighter turbofans.

The point of creating BSE a decade earlier is to avoid ten years of triplication. That is stop Armstrong Siddeley, Bristol & De Havilland producing competing designs and concentrate the three firms' resources on producing one design in each power-class.

My two pennies. Olympus is the more powerful engine, so I'd go with Olympus over Sapphire.
Sapphire probably only really kept going once Metrovick got out the aero engine business because it was a backup for Avon - but Avon was always the aircraft designer's favourite choice and Sapphire seems to have always lacked behind the Avon. You could of course argue that Avon production might not be sufficent for everything to be Avon powered, but a second set of tooling is easier and cheaper.
Now whether Olympus is better than Conway is another arguement, but of course Olympus preceedes Conway date wise.

However, could the Sapphire have been made to produce 20,000lbst ITTL?

From my notes

• P.173 - 48" diameter, 25,200lb dry, 314lb/sec
• P.172F - 44" diameter, 21,700lb, 264lb/sec
• P.159 mass flow 330lb/sec - 21,750lb

I'm torn, if I had to make a 50/50 choice I'd vote O and not S, but if pushed for S then I say, yes use it on more aircraft than ITTL.

Feasibility Check

I'd forgotten about the De Havilland Gyron in the room.

According to the research that I've been doing about the Short Sperrin, the D.Gy.1 began bench running on 05.01.53 when the designed thrust of 15,000lb was achieved, with the additional reheat thrust of 5,000lb achieved later in the year and by September 1954, the first flight-standard Gyron, the D.Gy.2, was developing 20,000 static thrust.

The Sperrin prototype VX158 first flew with one D.Gy.2 on 07.07.55 and with two on 26.06.56. It was instantly discovered that the pair of De Havilland engines delivered more power than the four Rolls-Royce engines originally fitted. When it appeared at the SBAC Show in September 1956 it was the most powerful aircraft aloft with over 53,000lb* thrust available. When it went back into test-flying mode later that month altitudes exceeding 50,000ft were regularly attained and the Sperrin was proving to be the ideal test-bed for de Havilland's promising axial-flow engine, which was meeting all its design expectations. By August 1958 (when work on the Hawker P.1121 ceased) it had been delivered to the point of delivering 29,300lb.

The above is from "V-Bombers, Valiant, Vulcan and Victor" by Barry Jones.

Therefore

The D.Gy.1 began bench running on 05.01.53 IOTL. How much earlier than that could it have run ITTL if the Olympus had been cancelled in 1948 and the resources put into it IOTL added to the resources put into developing the Gyron IOTL? Would the D.Gy.2 be producing 20,000lbst earlier than September 1954? If it does we have the engine power to put equivalents to the Victor Mk 2 & Vulcan Mk 2 into service in 1955. Or at least the Victors and Vulcans built instead of the Valiant can have an engine in the 15,000lb thrust class instead of the 10,000lb thrust class.

Meanwhile, BSE continued development of the Sapphire because it's already running and the Company needed a rival to the RR Avon.

* Clarification on 18.01.24. The 53,000lbst was on 2 Gyrons rated at 20,000lbst each and 2 Avons rated at 53,000lbst each.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The BAC Victor and Hawker Siddeley Vulcan
Not necessarily better
But in service sooner, possibly cheaper and definitely more numerous
Part Ten
Sympathy for the Short S.A.4 Sperrin​

Development of the Sperrin IOTL and ITTL

Quote from "V-Bombers, Valiant, Vulcan and Victor" by Barry Jones.

It is very easy to speculate in retrospect, but there is no doubt that had Air Ministry sights been set a little lower and the S.A.4 Sperrin, as a more basic four-jet bomber, been ordered in 1948, there would have been no need to acquire second-hand B-29s. Mind you, Vickers-Armstrongs would strongly disagree and who is to argue with them. Short Brothers' move from Rochester to Belfast has a profound effect on the timing of the programme, as did the company's lack of wind-tunnel facilities. Accepted that the Sperrin was less radical than the three V-bombers, it is pertinent to remember that two of them required design changes before becoming acceptable service aircraft, whereas the Belfast product performed all that was asked of it in its original guise.

According to him the 2 Sperrin prototypes and the static test article were built in production jigs.

The Sperrin prototypes flew on 10.08.51 & 12.08.52 IOTL, both of which were behind the 2 Vickers Valiant prototypes, which made their first flights on 18.05.51 & 11.04.52. On the other hand the first Valiant prototype crashed on 11.01.52 while both Sperrins were flying until 1955 and one was flying until 1958.

ITTL I can't do anything about the the disruption caused by the move from Rochester to Belfast, but I can have the Ministry of Supply order it in 1948 and I have strengthened the firm by having it take Boulton Paul over between 1945 and 1948. (See Post 29 of the thread "UK Industry Rationalisation 1945".)

The Boeing B-29 in RAF Service

British military serials were assigned to 105 Boeing Washingtons, but the RAF only received 87. They began replacing some of the Lincolns in RAF Bomber Command in June 1950 (when the first squadron formed) and there were 8 Washington squadrons from September 1951. Under Plans H & J the Washington force was to have been maintained at a strength of 8 squadrons until they could be replaced by V-bombers. However, the force was rundown between September 1951 and April 1954 when the last squadron disbanded. The Lincoln actually remained in service for longer. There were still 7 squadrons of Lincolns when the last Washington squadron disbanded and the last Lincoln bomber squadron didn't disband until January 1956.

Sperrin v the Canberra B.2, Lincoln and Washington

For all its faults the Sperrin did have a maximum speed of 514mph at 36,000ft on four Avons rated at 6,500lbst, a maximum ceiling of 42,000ft with, a maximum range of 3,860 miles and could carry a Blue Danube atomic bomb or 16,000lbs of iron bombs. Although, I don't know what it's range with 16,000lbs of bombs was.*

That was superior to the Washington in all but one respect. It's maximum and cruising speeds were 357mph & 342mph respectively. Its service ceiling was only 33,600ft and although its maximum range of 3,250 miles wasn't so bad, it could only carry its maximum bomb load of 20,000lb for 1,000 miles.

The Avro Lincoln had a maximum range of 3,750 miles and could carry 14,000lb of iron bombs, both of which was nearly as good as the Sperrin. It's range with its maximum bomb load was 2,640 miles which was better than the Washington. However, its maximum & cruising speeds were only 295mph & 238mph respectively and its service ceiling was only 22,000ft.

I think putting the Sperrin into service in June 1950 would be pushing things too far, but I think June 1951 is reasonable and that's when the first Canberra B.2 squadron formed. That mark of Canberra had two 6,500lbst Avon engines that gave it a maximum speed of 570mph at altitude and 518mph at sea level. Barry Jones' book didn't say what that altitude was, but it did say that its service ceiling was 48,000ft.** Therefore, the Canberra B.2 was 56mph faster than the Sperrin and had a service ceiling that was 6,000ft higher. However, it's maximum range of 2,660 miles was exactly 1,200 miles shorter than the Sperrin's and it could only carry its maximum bomb load of 6,000lb for 1,105 miles.

* According to the Flight article of 17.12.54 the performance of the Sperrin was: maximum speed, 564 mph at 15,000ft; cruising speed, 500 mph at 40,000ft; combat range 3,860 miles; service ceiling, 45,000ft; and bomb bay capacity, 20,000lb. Power was provided by four Avons rated at 6,500lbst each. The Putnams on the British Bomber since 1914 says that the maximum speed of the Sperrin was 560 mph too. It did not say what the altitude was, but it did say that it was on four Avons rated at 6,000lbst each.
** This is nearly the same as the performance of the Canberra B.2 in the Putnams on RAF aircraft. The sole difference is that the maximum speed of 570mph was at 40,000ft.

IOTL Bomber Command should have had.

• 404 bombers in 44 squadrons on 31.03.55 under Plan H. That is.
  • 144 medium bombers in 18 squadrons of 8 aircraft (48 Lincolns in 6 squadrons, 64 Washingtons in 8 squadrons and 32 Valiants in 4 squadrons).
    • And.
  • 260 Canberra light bombers in 26 squadrons of 10 aircraft.
• 404 bombers in 48 squadrons on 31.03.58 under Plan J. That is.
  • 304 medium bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 aircraft (112 Valiants in 14 squadrons, 80 Victors in 10 squadrons & 112 Vulcans in 14 squadrons)..
    • And.
  • 100 Canberra light bombers in 10 squadrons of 10 aircraft.

IOTL Bomber Command actually had.

• 318 bombers in 44 squadrons on 31.03.55.
  • 58 medium bombers in 6 squadrons of 8-10 aircraft (50 Lincolns in 5 squadrons and one squadron of 8 Valiants).
    • 64 Washingtons in 8 squadrons less than planned.
    • 24 Valiants in 3 squadrons less than planned.
    • 2 Lincolns more than planned and one squadron less than planned, because there were 10 aircraft per squadron instead of 8.
    • For a total of 86 aircraft in 12 squadrons less than planned.
  • 260 Canberras in 26 squadrons of 10 aircraft as planned.
• 171 bombers in 16 squadrons on 31.03.58.
  • 72 medium bombers in 9 squadrons of 8 aircraft and 9. The medium bombers consisted of 56 Valiants in 7 squadrons and 16 Vulcan B.1s in 2 squadrons.
    • 56 Valiants in 7 squadrons less than planned.
    • 80 Victors in 10 squadrons less than planned.
    • 96 Vulcans in 12 squadrons less than planned.
  • 99 Canberra light bombers in 7 squadrons of 9-16 aircraft.
    • Only one Canberra in 3 squadrons less than planned.
    • However, 5 squadrons had 16 aircraft, one squadron had 11 aircraft and one squadron had 10 aircraft, instead of all the squadrons having 10 aircraft.

Production of the Canberra IOTL

1,115 British military serials were assigned to Canberras.

• But 39 of them were for diverted aircraft, which reduced the total to 1,076 including prototypes.
• 286 were cancelled which reduced the total built to British contracts to 790.
• Most of the cancelled aircraft were 260 B.2s in July 1953, which had they been built would have been completed as B.6s.

Of that total.

• 626 were ordered from English Electric.
  • 75 were cancelled & 55 were subcontracted to Short Brothers so 496 were built.
• 150 were ordered from Avro & 75 were cancelled so 75 were built.
• 150 were ordered from Handley Page and 75 were cancelled so 75 were built.
• 150 were ordered from Short Brothers' and 41 were cancelled so 109 were built.
  • 20 of the 55 subcontracted aircraft were cancelled so 35 were built.
  • Therefore, Short Brother's built a total of 144 Canberras.

Of that total.

• 4 were Canberra B.1 prototypes.
• 764 were Canberra B.2s & B.6s, but.
  • 2 prototypes were transferred to the first production contract with new serials.
  • 260 were cancelled in July 1953.
  • So 502 were built.
• 85 were Canberra B.5s, B(I).6s and B.(I).8s. There were no cancellations so 85 were built.
• 70 were Canberra T.4s, but 4 were cancelled so 66 were built.
• 153 were Canberra PR.3s, PR.7s & PR.9s, but 20 were cancelled so 133 were built.

More Sperrins, no Washingtons and fewer Canberra bombers ITTL

IOTL the Canberra light bomber was only built in those numbers because a half-decent medium bomber wasn't available and the plan was to replace many of them with V-bombers when they became available. As illustrated above, under Plan J, 160 Canberra light bombers in 16 squadrons in Bomber Command were to have been replaced by 160 V-bombers in 20 squadrons between March 1955 and March 1958.

ITTL a half-decent medium bomber was available in 1950-51 in the form of the Sperrin and I think 400 would be purchased to support a force of 320 aircraft in 40 squadrons.

• Convert the 18 Lincoln medium bomber squadrons that RAF Bomber Command had on 31.03.50 to the Sperrin by 31.03.55.
• Form 20 new medium bomber squadrons on the Sperrin by 31.03.55.
• Convert Bomber Command's 2 LRPR squadrons which at 31.03.50 were operating the Lancaster & Lincoln respectively to the Sperrin in 1953 instead of the Canberra.

About 80% would be Sperrin Mk 1s with Avons rated at 6,500lbst and the rest would be Mk 2s with Avons rated at 7,500lbst. The Sperrin Mk 2 would enter service in 1954. That's analogous with the Canberra B.Mk 2 and B.6. The B.2 which entered service in 1951 had Avons rated at 6,500lbst and the B.6 which entered service in 1954 had Avons rated at 7,500lbst. About 80% of the 496 Canberra light bombers built for the RAF were B.2s and the rest were B.6s.

The number of Canberra squadrons formed in Bomber Command 1951-55 would have been reduced from 26 to 10. However, the number of Canberras built wouldn't have been reduced accordingly, because the aircraft that were surplus to RAF requirements were used to form Canberra light bombers squadrons in the overseas commands sooner or they were completed as PR.3s & PR.7s so accelerate the re-equipment of the MRPR squadrons.

Other roles.

• Sperrins would also take the place of Lincolns & Washingtons in the Command's ECM squadron and would operate in that role until replaced by Victors built in place of the Valiant.
• IOTL one Valiant medium bomber has been flight refuelling since August 1958 and a second squadron became a tanker squadron in October 1961, but they weren't officially tanker squadrons until 01.04.62.
• ITTL one Sperrin medium bomber has been flight refuelling since August 1953 and a second squadron became a tanker squadron in October 1956, but they weren't officially tanker squadrons until 01.04.57. They would serve in that role until replaced by Victor tankers built instead of the Valiant tankers.
• Sperrins would also take the place of Lincolns that were detached from Bomber Command to the overseas commands.
• Plenty of Sperrins would be available for second-line duties (especially after the V-bombers) entered service such as flying test-beds for engines and trials of air-launched guided weapons.

 

[zen]

Gyron designed '51

de Havilland Gyron – de Havilland Aircraft Museum

www.dehavillandmuseum.co.uk

Post 15 in this thread states origin is '48.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/de-havilland-gyron-engine.1574/

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Gyron designed '51

de Havilland Gyron – de Havilland Aircraft Museum

www.dehavillandmuseum.co.uk

Post 15 in this thread states origin is '48.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/de-havilland-gyron-engine.1574/

And?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Gyron designed '51

de Havilland Gyron – de Havilland Aircraft Museum

www.dehavillandmuseum.co.uk

Post 15 in this thread states origin is '48.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/de-havilland-gyron-engine.1574/

I posted my first reply before you edited it with the link to Post 15 of the DH Gyron thread on Secret Projects. For what it's worth I knew about the De Havilland Museum site. I found the entry earlier today.

I thought you were suggesting that 4 years would not be enough time to get it ready for service in 1955. You may may be correct.

The information in the Secret Projects thread seems too good to be true. Development of the engines seems to have been relatively trouble free and it looks like we could have had an engine suitable for aircraft in the same classes as Concorde, Super VC.10, Shorts SC.5 and TSR.2 in 1960.

 

[Hood]

One fly in the ointment for Sperrin in 1951 is that its blind bombing capability is no better than the Lincoln. The NBS Mk.1 with NBC and improved H2S it not ready by then. Parts of the equipment might be, but don't expect excellent results (remember the Canberra B.1 is visual bombing backed up by Gee-H if the target is within range of the beacons).
But at least it is faster and has better altitude performance.


Gyron is one of the great what-ifs. We don't know much about it, it seemed to run fine in the Sperrin but behind a mockup of the P.1121 ventral intake it surged. Now it could have been a poor intake design, or it might have been very sensitive to airflow. Even so it could easily have surpassed Olympus which was more or a new design by the time you get to the TSR.2 and Concorde era.
In my AH I have paired Bristol and de Havilland and that gave me a crazy idea. Could the Gyron have formed the basis of an alt-Pegasus? It would be effectively a BS.100 from the beginning (just without the PCB which could be added later). It would need contra-rotating compressors etc. to handle the torque but its an intriguing possibility.

 

[uk 75]

Thank you for your unexpected support.

The problem isn't politics. It's economics. Was the British economy strong enough to pay for the development of the technology and production of the hardware in the time allowed? And if it wasn't which defence projects have to be sacrificed to provide the money?

Your support is unexpected because you ask questions like "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?" (which inspired this thread) and when people reply with plausible alternatives to what was done in the "Real World" you pour scorn on them. Maybe you should practice what you preach. If you don't like the answers, don't ask the questions. Or if you don't like my answers put me on ignore.

I am sorry that you think my interventions "pour scorn" or that I "don't like the answers". My purpose is always to give an "alternative" take not to trash,
or to point out where my understanding differs.
I am very much enjoying your detailed information and approaches. I will, however, continue to intervene with my thoughts or comments. Some may find them of interest.

 

[zen]

Well I must be going slow today, no surprise.

Anyway Ministery wasn't that enamoured of Halford wanting to develop this. That he did and got so far is a testament to him and the team.

Now if we have the Ministery choose DH over Bristol at this time....it changes a lot!

Rather like the idea of Sperrin instead of Valiant and with a Gyron upgrade possible.......

 

[zen]

In my AH I have paired Bristol and de Havilland and that gave me a crazy idea. Could the Gyron have formed the basis of an alt-Pegasus? It would be effectively a BS.100 from the beginning (just without the PCB which could be added later). It would need contra-rotating compressors etc. to handle the torque but its an intriguing possibility.

Gyron or Gyron Junior?
The former could supply the fan stage.
The latter in place of the Orpheus.

Actually that prompts a concept!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Well I must be going slow today, no surprise.

Anyway Ministery wasn't that enamoured of Halford wanting to develop this. That he did and got so far is a testament to him and the team.

Now if we have the Ministery choose DH over Bristol at this time....it changes a lot!

Rather like the idea of Sperrin instead of Valiant and with a Gyron upgrade possible.......

Even if the Ministry said no Halford was working for BSE from 1948 instead of De Havilland Engines. That firm would have had more cash than DHE so it might have started the Gyron as a private venture sooner.

Say 1948 instead of 1951. Would that advance all the subsequent dates forward by 3 years? So for example bench running begins at 15,000lbst in 1950 instead of 1953, which would make the Ministry of Supply take notice. Would it be producing 20,000lbst by September 1951 instead of 1954? Would a Sperrin be flying with two Gyrons producing a total of 53,000lbst in 1953 instead of 1956?

That's probably too good to be true. But advancing all the dates one year to the left makes it more feasible to have Victors & Vulcans fitted with four Gyrons rated at 20,000lbst enter service with the RAF in 1955.