Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining an independent strategic nuclear deterrent?

[Dilandu]

The main unique problem is launch via a gas bubble enveloping the missile as it moves upwards through the water. This is not beyond UK theory or scientific development, but it is more cost.

Sigh. Just make it surface launched. Seriously, guys, you are trying to put the whole missile development upside down! You are trying to figure out "how could Britain invent its own Polaris", instead of "what missile Britain would be able to develope and how"

I repeat; Polaris could not be a goal. For mid-1950s, large solid-fuel missiles were too high-risk. USN could afford such jump into unknown; not the Britain. It's virtually impossible for 1950s Britain to suddenly decide "hey, let's build a huge missile based on less efficient fuel technology that we knew little about, assuming that we would be able to build a fusion warhead small enough despite not having any fusion bombs yet, and put it on some fantastic huge submarine, which we didn't even knew how it would looks like. Oh, and it must also launch from underwater, despite nobody knew is it even possible".

This simply wouldn't work. Even for USN the gamble was big. For UK, it's pretty much impossible even to consider such combination of ideas, because most of them simply did not exist in 1950s, and UK have no experience.

Just try the logical approach. Not the "bold jumps into unknown", but stage-by-stage development. Look at Soviet SLBM program as example, not American or French (because French followed American example, already knowing that it's possible - and France have much more experience in rocketry than Britain). Start with developing a short-range "bombardment missile" in late 1940s - a British Army analogue of MGM-5 Corporal. Then try to adapt it to the Navy as experimental system, launched first from surface ships, then submarines. Then, by late 1950s, you would have enough technological confidence to create longer-range missile, actually capable of carrying fusion warhead of enough capability to NOT be useless (accuracy is the problem).

 

[Scott Kenny]

Oh, quite possibly. One problem; in 1955 they COULD NOT BE SURE they would be able to do it by 1963. Even for Americans - which lead the world in nukes at this time - it was a gamble. And considering how bad was early Polaris warheads, they almost lose. Britain could not afford such gamble; it neither have technological confidence, nor resources to fall back.

The way I see it, the difficulty the British would have compared to the US is the testing cycle. If they do a full-up test, the US scientists can jump in a car or on a train/plane and be at the Nevada Test site in a week, tops. While the British have to test clear on the other side of the planet, which requires a good 4 months trip one way. Maybe faster if they take an RN warship instead of a passenger liner.

So the British would have to be very confident in their designs to take the time to run a full scale test instead of just firing the implosion lens.

The problem is, Jupiter was made by engineers, who already have many prior experience with designing ballistic missiles - Corporal, Redstone, numerous test vechicles. Which wouldn't be the case for Britain.

But it gives an idea of what is possible with liquid fuels, arguably with data the UK could get ahold of or maybe had already since it's just a big kerolox engine.

Had the UK gone the Soviet route for storable liquids, N2O4 and UDMH, the R29 series shows what was the low-hanging fruit in terms of liquid fuel rocket engines.

But even a "British Jupiter" was small enough to fit into a submarine. A fairly large submarine, mind you, but not a submarine that couldn't be built in the 1960s.

 

[Dilandu]

So the British would have to be very confident in their designs to take the time to run a full scale test instead of just firing the implosion lens.

Exactly. Also, weapon-grade nuclear fuel production in Britain is far less than in USA, so UK could not make blasts so often without depleting their own weapon supply (which wasn't exactly plentful in first place).

By mid-1950s, Britain have only first-generation fission bombs, and started to experiment with fusion. Britain did not have compact/tactical nuclear devices till 1960s. So for Britain, logical assumption in mid-50s would be that any useful warhead (capable of overcoming the missile inaccuracy by the power of yield) would be rather heavy.

But it gives an idea of what is possible with liquid fuels, arguably with data the UK could get ahold of or maybe had already since it's just a big kerolox engine.

Yes, but Britain in mid-50s have no such experience and could not knew the outcome of US programs. All they have "on hands" till 1957 (when Sputnik demonstrated that Very Big Rockets are reality) was MGM-5 Corporal. There were also Viking and Redstone, still in development. So Britain could not be sure in larger missiles, since they did not produce any.

Had the UK gone the Soviet route for storable liquids, N2O4 and UDMH, the R29 series shows what was the low-hanging fruit in terms of liquid fuel rocket engines.

Yes, it's most probable approach. It allows to circumvent several uncertainties; the solid fuel, the warhead weight and the missile accuracy. Liquid-fuel missile could be made powerful enough to carry megaton-scale fusion warhead, capable of compensating for guidance inaccuracy.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yes, but Britain in mid-50s have no such experience and could not knew the outcome of US programs. All they have "on hands" till 1957 (when Sputnik demonstrated that Very Big Rockets are reality) was MGM-5 Corporal. There were also Viking and Redstone, still in development. So Britain could not be sure in larger missiles, since they did not produce any.

Ugh, one of those IRFNA burners.

Didn't the Royal Society have some Kerolox rockets they were playing with?

Yes, it's most probable approach. It allows to circumvent several uncertainties; the solid fuel, the warhead weight and the missile accuracy. Liquid-fuel missile could be made powerful enough to carry megaton-scale fusion warhead, capable of compensating for guidance inaccuracy.

Not going to lie, just writing N2O4 and UDMH makes my eye twitch. I don't know how the Soviets managed to avoid blowing any ships in half with that...

 

[Dilandu]

Not going to lie, just writing N2O4 and UDMH makes my eye twitch. I don't know how the Soviets managed to avoid blowing any ships in half with that...

Well, experience, pre-planned safety features, and capsulation ot the missiles. Of course there were incidents - K-219 as example of two, the second led to her sinking (after crew evacuated) - but not to unacceptable level.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The way I see it, the difficulty the British would have compared to the US is the testing cycle. If they do a full-up test, the US scientists can jump in a car or on a train/plane and be at the Nevada Test site in a week, tops. While the British have to test clear on the other side of the planet, which requires a good 4 months trip one way. Maybe faster if they take an RN warship instead of a passenger liner.

I've no idea what @Dilandu or @alertken are saying on this thread because I have the pair of them on ignore.

However, the biggest ship at the RN task force that took part in the Christmas Island hydrogen bomb tests was the Colossus class aircraft carrier HMS Warrior. Furthermore, No. 216 Squadron which had recently reformed on Comet C.2s was conducting regular route flying from the UK to Australia and Christmas Island.

For what it's worth my father did his National Service as an electrician in No. 138 Squadron, the first Valiant squadron at RAF Wittering, which he said was attached to the Bomber Command Development Unit. According to him it was the Valiant squadron that participated in Operation Grapple except that Wynn & RAFWEB say it was No. 49 Squadron. He also said that his flight was to have gone to Christmas Island but the flights were swapped and his flight became the reserve flight. Finally, he said that a prototype Vulcan was used to transport the bombs to Christmas Island but the bomb doors weren't wide enough for the bomb and the aircraft had to be sent back to the factory to have that fault corrected.

However, the warheads for ALT-Blue Streak were the developed instead of the warheads for the Real British Polaris. They can't have been tested in the open air in the Pacific because the UK Polaris Programme began in 1962 and the UK stopped atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963 in accordance with the terms of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that came came into force the same year.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I've no idea what @Dilandu or @alertken are saying on this thread because I have the pair of them on ignore.

However, the biggest ship at the RN task force that took part in the Christmas Island hydrogen bomb tests was the Colossus class aircraft carrier HMS Warrior. Furthermore, No. 216 Squadron which had recently reformed on Comet C.2s was conducting regular route flying from the UK to Australia and Christmas Island.

For what it's worth my father did his National Service as an electrician in No. 138 Squadron, the first Valiant squadron at RAF Wittering, which he said was attached to the Bomber Command Development Unit. According to him it was the Valiant squadron that participated in Operation Grapple except that Wynn & RAFWEB say it was No. 49 Squadron. He also said that his flight was to have gone to Christmas Island but the flights were swapped and his flight became the reserve flight. Finally, he said that a prototype Vulcan was used to transport the bombs to Christmas Island but the bomb doors weren't wide enough for the bomb and the aircraft had to be sent back to the factory to have that fault corrected.

However, the warheads for ALT-Blue Streak were the developed instead of the warheads for the Real British Polaris. They can't have been tested in the open air in the Pacific because the UK Polaris Programme began in 1962 and the UK stopped atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963 in accordance with the terms of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that came came into force the same year.

Here's the paragraph I was responding to:
"Oh, quite possibly. One problem; in 1955 they COULD NOT BE SURE they would be able to do it [make a polaris-sized warhead] by 1963. Even for Americans - which lead the world in nukes at this time - it was a gamble. And considering how bad was early Polaris warheads, they almost lose. Britain could not afford such gamble; it neither have technological confidence, nor resources to fall back."

And then my comment about the much longer testing cycle for the UK to have to go to Oz to test. Go there, test, come back and make changes, go back to Oz for a re-test, etc.

Though I was obviously assuming that they'd send the warheads there via ship to test. Flying there is a lot faster, you just have to forget to tell anyone you have live ordnance onboard the plane...

And thank you for reminding me that I need to question the comment about the early Polaris warheads being bad.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Oh, quite possibly. One problem; in 1955 they COULD NOT BE SURE they would be able to do it by 1963. Even for Americans - which lead the world in nukes at this time - it was a gamble. And considering how bad was early Polaris warheads, they almost lose. Britain could not afford such gamble; it neither have technological confidence, nor resources to fall back.

What do you mean how bad the warhead was? It's a 1.2MT boom out of 330kg, which is pretty good yield to weight ratio for the time. The bad part of early Polaris was guidance, not warhead.

 

[Yellow Palace]

And thank you for reminding me that I need to question the comment about the early Polaris warheads being bad.

AIUI, the issue is supposed to have been with the safety system, which involved a boron wire inside the pit, which would be pulled out onto a spool when the warhead was armed. It was perfectly good at preventing a nuclear reaction. Unfortunately, the wire was brittle, so there was a high likelihood of it snapping, leaving much of its length inside the pit. Result, a nuclear warhead that fizzles about half the time.

It was resolved with time, and it's not like the UK didn't have its own dubious safety systems on nuclear weapons (looking at you, Violet Club!), but it does illustrate the issues that can arise with nuclear weapons design.

The way I see it, the difficulty the British would have compared to the US is the testing cycle. If they do a full-up test, the US scientists can jump in a car or on a train/plane and be at the Nevada Test site in a week, tops. While the British have to test clear on the other side of the planet, which requires a good 4 months trip one way. Maybe faster if they take an RN warship instead of a passenger liner.

This can be partially eased by convincing the Ministry that a rocket range in Benbecula is easier to get to than one in Woomera. You'd think that a map would do this, but seemingly the fact that Scotland was too far away was one of the arguments in favour of Australia.

Doesn't help with nuclear warheads, of course.

 

[Dilandu]

What do you mean how bad the warhead was? It's a 1.2MT boom out of 330kg, which is pretty good yield to weight ratio for the time. The bad part of early Polaris was guidance, not warhead.

I meant the very poor reliability for initial model. If I recall correctly, less than 1/3 of them were considered workable. Later models were better.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Anything short of 1000nmi might as well stay as a technology demonstrator.

That may be ALT-Black Knight ITTL. That is it used solid fuel instead of hydrogen peroxide/kerosene.

An update of this.

Greater Westland & Bristol Siddeley (both created in 1948 instead of 1960) receive contracts to built a small ballistic missile & its engines for research purposes instead of the Princess, Saro 53 & Saro 177 and the latter types rocket engines. This is effectively the Black Knight brought forward several years. It has the bonus that there's the chance of making an upgraded Black Knight or a Black Arrow type rocket in time to beat Sputnik. There wasn't an Avro 720 either. My original idea was to use the money to make an earlier start on Blue Steel (although the contract might have been given to a different firm) but as I've decided to use the money spent on that weapon to pay some of the R&D cost of ALT-Blue Streak, the money spent on Avro 720 & its rocket engine was instead spent on the Westland research rocket.

Elsewhere on this form I've said that Greater Westland is created in the late 1940s (instead of circa 1960) from Fairey, Saunders Roe & Westland itself and that Bristol Helicopters' Division & Cierva-Weir become the Helicopters' Division of the British Aircraft Corporation. I've also written that Greater Westland is told to stop developing fixed-wing aircraft and concentrate on ballistic missiles and helicopters.

To that end Saunders Roe (which was soon to become part of Greater Westland) received a contract to develop a small ballistic missile (which would be a technology demonstrator for Blue Moon, the predecessor of Blue Streak) in May 1946 instead of its OTL contract for 3 prototypes of the Princess flying boat. This was paid for with the £9.1 million spent on the Princess to May 1954, the £0.7 million spent on Red Rapier, the £1.0 million spent on the Avro 720 to September 1955 and £3.2 million on the SR.177 to December 1957. That is a total of £14.0 million.

Meanwhile, Armstrong-Siddeley (which was soon to become part of Bristol Siddeley Engines) was given a contract to develop the engines for Saunders Roe's small ballistic missile. This was paid for with the £0.65 million spent on the AS Screamer & £1.2 million spent on the RR Soar to March 1956, the £1.25 million spent on the Napier Scorpion to February 1959 and the £5.75 million spent on the DH Spectre & the £0.85 spent on the DH Super Sprite to October 1960. A total of £9.7 million.

They are the aircraft and engines that I have costs for. I don't have costs for the Saro SR.A.1 which IOTL was under development to June 1951 but was abandoned in June 1946 ITTL. I don't have the costs for the Fairey Delta 1, Fairey Delta 2 & Saro SR.53, which weren't built ITTL either. Furthermore, there wasn't a Blue Rapier and yet again I don't have a cost for it. Finally, I don't know how much money was spent on Black Knight, Black Arrow and their Armstrong Siddeley (later BSE) Gamma engines.

Development of Real-36" Black Knight began in 1955, 25 rounds were built and 22 launched 1958-65. It then proposed a 54" Black Knight and the Black Arrow small satellite launch vehicle. However, HM Treasury said there wasn't enough money to develop both. Black Arrow was the design chosen for development in 1964, but the hardware wasn't ordered until 1967 and 5 rounds were built of which 4 were launched 1969-71. Meanwhile, the missions planned for the 54" Black Knight were undertaken by 10 Sparta missiles (modified surplus Redstones) which were launched from Woomera 1966-67.

All other things being equal 25 ALT-36" Black Knight rounds were built & 22 were launched 1949-56. This was followed by the 10 launches of the ALT-54" Black Knight 1957-58. Meanwhile, ALT-Black Arrow was selected as the UK's IGY Satellite in 1955 and 5 rounds were ordered immediately & they were launched 1957-59. If the first lunch was successful the UK beats Sputnik 1 and if the second launch was successful the UK beats Explorer 1.

All other things being equal there would have been another 50 Black Knight & Back Arrow launches 1958-71 instead of the OTL Black Knight, Black Arrow & Sparta launches of OTL. Some of these may have been of an ALT-Black Knight Mk 3 which had solid fuel rocket engines as a technology demonstrator for the sold fuel rocket engines that ALT-Blue Streak used.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Doesn't help with nuclear warheads, of course.

For what it's worth . . . According to my father (who was at RAF Wittering in 1957) the bombs were flown to Christmas Island and this was the only time that he saw bombs loaded onto a V-bomber.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Here's the paragraph I was responding to:
"Oh, quite possibly. One problem; in 1955 they COULD NOT BE SURE they would be able to do it [make a polaris-sized warhead] by 1963. Even for Americans - which lead the world in nukes at this time - it was a gamble. And considering how bad was early Polaris warheads, they almost lose. Britain could not afford such gamble; it neither have technological confidence, nor resources to fall back."

Are they aware that it doesn't have to be ready by 1963? It has to be ready by 1967 when Her Majesty's Submarine Resolution is completed in both timelines.

 

[Archibald]

Ugh, one of those IRFNA burners.

Didn't the Royal Society have some Kerolox rockets they were playing with?



Not going to lie, just writing N2O4 and UDMH makes my eye twitch. I don't know how the Soviets managed to avoid blowing any ships in half with that...

Digging about H2O2 danger vs purity vs performance.

High-test peroxide - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Dilandu]

Are they aware that it doesn't have to be ready by 1963? It has to be ready by 1967 when Her Majesty's Submarine Resolution is completed in both timelines.

Sigh. Someone please tell NOMISYRRUC that I couldn't even recall any conflict with him, but if I said something that offended him, then I'm sorry. So could he PLEASE read my arguments? His logic have a major flaw in it; he is working from known result to the development, instead of tryinh to see what could be developed from given point.

 

[uk 75]

Alertken is right to say that the UK could put a nuclear head on its Tomahawks or Storm Shadows. But why would we compromise our ability to use the conventional ones by doing this?
The point of Trident is to ensure that the US has to take us into account in developing their SIOP, especially now they have fewer Ohio boats. Cooperation at this level would not be available if we were talking about British weapons that were obviously (to an enemy) not launched by the US.
This is why every PM from Macmillan to Sunak has accepted that without US supplied missiles there is no point in a UK deterrent.

 

[Hood]

I think all the arguing would probably indicate that the broad answer to the OP is no.
At least without defining what "better" means? Cheaper, more reliable, more numerous, more destructive, more terrifying, more Union Jack on it?

Mountbatten set the RN on the course for nuclear-armed submarines in 1957, something more akin to Regulus-equipped rather than SBLMs, which at that time did not really exist.
The crux seems to boil down to the infamous Kennedy-Macmillan summit, because at any time before that an 'independent deterrent' already existed and was in our grasp. If Kennedy says "no way pal", then Britain has a problem. Easiest path of least resistance is to keep V-Force operational with some kind of ALBM, Britain could have just brought Skybolt as a DIY kit but wasn't convinced by it. UK industry could probably have completed it or an Anglo analogue reasonably easily - though not cheaply. Replacing the bombers or re-lifing them wasn't cheap but cheaper than building SSBNs. V-Force can also support CENTO and SEATO easily enough.
Another option is making a mobile MRBM so that Kent and Cambridgeshire golf courses don't get dug up. Again not cheap but enough been done on Blue Streak and Blue Water to pick up the threads. Not as much use for CENTO and SEATO though to knock out China.
Replicating Polaris/Freedom Class seems on the face of it the most expensive and convoluted way simply because it presents so many challenges - an entirely new class of missile when previous rockets have been flops/cancelled and needs new tech. Also disrupts the SSN building programme. The RN would say "yes please" of course, but that doesn't mean the RAF would sit back - with Polaris there was no Plan B to offer to counter-argue against Kennedy's offer. It's not impossible to do but would be pricey and longer-term, I can't see a UK SLBM with an ITP of 1963 having IOC much before 1973.

On costs, the problem with Derek Wood-esque price list cutting is that you are not saving costs. Fine to say, no Blue Steel, no Avro 730, no Blue water, no PT.428, no Blue Steel 2, no TSR, no Concorde, but that means industry/science learns nothing. It's structures, aerodynamics, avionics knowledge remains circa 1955. Good luck building an SLBM when the last rocket was.... Bloodhound?

 

[Dilandu]

Replicating Polaris/Freedom Class seems on the face of it the most expensive and convoluted way simply because it presents so many challenges - an entirely new class of missile when previous rockets have been flops/cancelled and needs new tech.

Exactly my point, yes.

The RN would say "yes please" of course,

I'm actually not sure. RN wasn't very eager about taking deterrence mission at least till late 1950s. In early-to-mid 50s, it was more likely "let's leave all this atomics to RAF and concentrate on catching Soviet surface raiders"

 

[Pirate Pete]

From ‘Project Cancelled’ by Derek Wood…
May help with some potential sources of cost ‘savings’
I’ve Added a second table from the same source which also helps with potential sources of financial savings…

 

[uk 75]

Hennessy in his work about the British nuclear deterrent makes it clear that if Kennedy had said "No" Macmillan was not prepared to go it alone.

 

[zen]

Link to my thread again

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rn-sea-based-ballistic-missile.34917/

In the opening post, I note a series of facts.

In 1955 it was envisioned that the RN could achieve a Sea Based Ballistic Missile for launch from submarines, launching from North of Russia or in the Black Sea by 1965.

Superintendent of the Admiralty Gunnery Establishment assumed a 750nm (extendable to 1,000nm) range weapon would weight 90tons, be 90ft long of diameter 96 inches, required accuracy of 250-2,000yards.
RAE had abandoned plans for a 2,500nm range missile and was working on a 1,600nm single stage weapon. Using three transmitters 100nm apart for initial guidance.
DNO estimated 20 years to develop best possible weapon, and that a weapon based on existing technology would be available in 12 years for a 8 year life.

To which we can add that in the late 40's nuclear submarine work was postponed due to then lack of uranium production.
Treasury noted that unlike HTP powered submarines, nuclear powered subs could potentially have used fuel harvested for plutonium. Which was a potential saving.....unlike the need to constantly manufacture HTP in bulk. Because of chemical decay.

It wasn't until the 70's that refrigeration showed decay halted at low (5 to -5 if my memory works) but still liquid temperatures for HTP.
All chemicals decay.

But by the mid 50's nuclear submarine effort was back on due to sufficient uranium production. Which was only increasing throughout this period.

Note that UK interest in HTP goes back to 20's paper on Walter Cycle submarines (for high speed) and that RAF was ordered to spare German HTP production plant during WWII in order for post 1945 direct lift and move to UK.

This is why HTP figures from late 40's in Submarine Rockets and Torpedos.

 

[zen]

Hennessy in his work about the British nuclear deterrent makes it clear that if Kennedy had said "No" Macmillan was not prepared to go it alone.

And how long do you think MacMillan would last if he tried to abandon Deterrent?
No PM is that secure, especially when he needs support to Long Knife-ing rival factions .. ..

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From ‘Project Cancelled’ by Derek Wood…
May help with some potential sources of cost ‘savings’
I’ve Added a second table from the same source which also helps with potential sources of financial savings…

Which is where my figures came from, which in turn came from this.

Page 262
FLIGHT International, 17 August 1967
CANCELLED PROJECTS: THE LIST UP-DATED

DETAILS of aircraft, engine and missile projects cancelled since 1951 were given by the Minister of Technology, Mr Wedgwood Benn, in a written Parliamentary answer on July 28. This latest list includes a figure of £2.5 million for the AFVG, cancelled last month, and £0.26 million for the P35, the "dynamic leap" vehicle on which British Aircraft Corporation made a project study.

​

Expenditure figures have been extracted from records extending over a number of years and may not all be on an identical basis. For more recent cancellations, estimates have been given. Both sets of figures should be regarded as approximate.

Source: The Flight Global Archive - Aviation History19671967 - 1672.PDF

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1967/1967%20-%201672.html

Note:

1. Square brackets contain the equivalent description from Appendix 5 of Project Cancelled by Derek Wood.
2. There are some discrepancies between Wood's list and Flight's list, which are noted.
3. Wood included the cancellation costs of the Vickers variable geometry projects (£1.5 million) and the cost of the Bristol 188 supersonic aircraft (£20.5 million), but the Flight article omits them.
4. Wood also wrote £46.4 million for the F-111K, which isn't in the list above because it was cancelled in January 1968.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Replicating Polaris/Freedom Class seems on the face of it the most expensive and convoluted way simply because it presents so many challenges - an entirely new class of missile when previous rockets have been flops/cancelled and needs new tech. Also disrupts the SSN building programme. The RN would say "yes please" of course, but that doesn't mean the RAF would sit back - with Polaris there was no Plan B to offer to counter-argue against Kennedy's offer. It's not impossible to do but would be pricey and longer-term, I can't see a UK SLBM with an ITP of 1963 having IOC much before 1973.

I think the most realistic route may be for the UK to form a view, for some reason, that depending on US weapon systems isn't strategically sustainable. This probably needs a PM with a different view than Macmillan in 1962-1963.

Say that after Skybolt falls through, our hypothetical AntiMac decides the Americans can't be trusted. The Rocket Propulsion Establishment is told to figure out how to build a British Polaris. Yesterday if possible. Realistically, 1971 will take a miracle, and later is more likely. The RAF is told that the V-bombers will just have to soldier on until the British missile comes in. That probably means that the 'interim' solution will need to be more capable than laydown bombs on Vulcans.

The costs of this probably do mean that other things have to go. The TSR.2 vs CVA-01 issue probably gets elevated from 'debate' to 'all measures short of war'.

You could bring the whole thing forward two-three years by ordering development of an all-British submarine deterrent when Blue Streak is cancelled on survivability grounds. But probably not much earlier than that.

 

[Archibald]

If you wanna know, by 1959 France has absolutely zero clue about Polaris and Minuteman solid fuel tech. To the point that bribing Boeing or force US government hand was seen as the only hope to get a viable deterrent past Mirage IVA IOC in 1964. Repeated queries and atempts were made even by De Gaulle - to no avail. It was though bargaining to get a 1958 like US-UK agreement, except for rockets.
When it all failed, France did it alone and by February 1966 was firing a first S112 10-ton solid-fuel rocket out of Biscarrosse missile test center. Took a few failures until 1968 and then it worked, by 1971-72 IOC was in sight for solid-fuel IRBMs and SLBMs (plateau d'Albion & Redoutable)

A lot of words to say that if british Skybolt and Polaris go to hell around 1962, 1972 IOC can still be done even starting from scratch. And V-bombers were far from done - Victor tankers lasted to 1991, so...

Compared to France UK has two aces uppon their sleeves
A) nuclear attack subs as a template for boomers (France did it the other way around, Rubis after Redoutables)
B) the 1958 agreement for warheads

 

[Archibald]

Also the extensive work on Veronique / Diamant liquid propulsion was many times considered as a possible "Plan B" if S112 failed. Diamant was hitting orbit (= 9 km/s) by 1965, which was more than enough to turn it into a pocket Titan II ICBM (only needs 6 km/s)
Black Knight / Blue Steel H202 rocketry could have played a similar role... Black Arrow ICBM !

 

[Archibald]

Solid-fuel rocketry is often described as "fertilizer -like fuel in steel tubes" - which is an apt description. As a result raw performance certainly sucks ; but ICBMs actually don't care... as they don't go to orbit. It only takes 6 km/s to throw a nuke 12 000 km away, and 7 km/s to 20 000 km, hence the ability of vaporizing any point on planet Earth.
Compared to 9 km/s to orbit, that's a walk in the park: single stage chemical rocketry very much collapses at 7 km/s.
Thing is the rocket equation is exponential and thus even solid fuel propulsion can do the job for 6 km/s if provided with two stages.

 

[uk 75]

Unfortunately British politicians are not as enthusiastic about the nuclear deterrent as French ones.
Perhaps because we have a weaker economy. Sir Alec Douglas Home, Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and James Callaghan would all have shared Macmillian's view based on Treasury and MOD advice.
Now I hear you say, what about Mrs Thatcher. Even she, although a strong supporter of Trident and the US relationship, privately admitted doubts about nuclear use and the deaths required.

 

[Arjen]

Now I hear you say, what about Mrs Thatcher.

1981 Defence White Paper - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Nott announced the intent to order five additional nuclear-powered attack submarines, eventually increasing the total to 17 and placing greater emphasis on the fleet's sub-surface forces. A new class of conventionally-powered attack submarines (the Type 2400) was also to be ordered. The Royal Navy's existing building programme of 20 surface warships was to be unaffected by the cuts, though the surface fleet would be downsized as ships were withdrawn from service at a faster rate than their replacements entered service. The White Paper also confirmed that the navy's acquisition of the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile would move forward as part of the Government's plan to modernize the British nuclear deterrent.[4]

 

[Dilandu]

Compared to France UK has two aces uppon their sleeves
A) nuclear attack subs as a template for boomers (France did it the other way around, Rubis after Redoutables)
B) the 1958 agreement for warheads

And several disadvantages:

* Before 1960s, Britain could not even be sure that such large solid-fuel missile is possible.
* Britain have much less rocketry experience than France in 1950s.
* Royal Navy is not much interested.

 

[Archibald]

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/frances-cancelled-first-generation-ssn-q-244-later-converted-to-gymnote.1410/

First atempt at a nuclear submarine (Redoutable was Q-252 hull number)
Unworkable, but the hull certainly did not went to waste. Q-251 Gymnote fired all SLBMs up to M4...

 

[Dilandu]

Hm. It seems that Oberon-class submarine would most likely be the one that from mid-1950s point of view could be considered as prototype of 1960s missile-armed one.



Not exactly much, but, well, if we add another compartment behind control room and lenghten the sail, we could fit a pair - maybe even three - missile tubes here. Thus obtaining a rough analogue of AB611-class submarines:



Yeah, it's not exactly the glamorous gleaming super-Polaris nuclear boomer that everyone WANTS to have for RN, but guys, this is what RN could really design and build within reasonable time & expenses.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Yeah, it's not exactly the glamorous gleaming super-Polaris nuclear boomer that everyone WANTS to have for RN, but guys, this is what RN could really design and build within reasonable time & expenses.

I think you're being a little harsh on the RN here. There was, as @Hood mentions, an expectation that the deterrent would wind up on nuclear-powered submarines. Such submarines were in fact built and in service with the Royal Navy quicker than a solid propellant missile could realistically have been produced.

A wholly UK-developed PWR plant would have taken longer and cost more than in OTL, but that was a path the UK had already embarked on.

The costs of this route would be higher than in OTL, the capability achieved later, and it would probably be less capable than in OTL. But it would be a wholly UK sovereign capability.

Is that worth it? I don't really think so. US/UK collaboration in nuclear weapons and submarine power has been an excellent deal for the UK, and - at least in the Polaris era - lack of full sovereignty over the system wasn't a concern.

 

[Dilandu]

I think you're being a little harsh on the RN here. There was, as @Hood mentions, an expectation that the deterrent would wind up on nuclear-powered submarines. Such submarines were in fact built and in service with the Royal Navy quicker than a solid propellant missile could realistically have been produced.

Yes, but to get workable 2000+ km range missiles and workable nuclear sumbarines by the late 1960s, they would need to gain experience before that. So building an experimental diesel-powered submarines for short-range missiles in late 1950 - early 1960s would be quite useful. Yes, they would be of little military value, but they would allow RN to gain experience, test concepts and work out flaws before going for expensive nuclear submarine with R-21 analogue missiles.

 

[Dilandu]

I think you're being a little harsh on the RN here. There was, as @Hood mentions, an expectation that the deterrent would wind up on nuclear-powered submarines. Such submarines were in fact built and in service with the Royal Navy quicker than a solid propellant missile could realistically have been produced.

Essentially I'm trying to work out a realistic scenario - when UK start in late 1940s - early 1950s with short-range ballistic missile (R-11/Corporal analogue), most likely a joint Army & Navy program (maybe even with RAF involvement at least for test vechicles). It wouldn't be anything impressive - a short-range, 150+ km liquid-fuel missile, most likely with radar command guidace and option for "Red Beard"-based warhead installation. But it would gave Britain at least SOME experience in designing ballistic missiles and integrating them on warships/submarines. So by the late 1950s, they would be able to realistically think about 1000+ km missile for either "Red Snow", or (if it wouldn't be avaliable) "Green Bamboo"/"Violet Club" warhead.

 

[Archibald]

Can't help thinking about early Soviet missile subs - Echo, Hotel, November...

Category:Nuclear submarines of the Soviet Navy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

List of ships of the Soviet Navy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Soviet Submarines

 

[Dilandu]

Can't help thinking about early Soviet missile subs - Echo, Hotel, November...

Exactly. USSR approach was to move step by step, starting with small, short-range surface-launched missiles (essentially the adapted version of Army's ones to modified diesel-electric submarines), and patiently working to long-range, megaton-scale underwater-launched missiles of R-27/R-29 class. Such approach basically guaranteed that Soviet ballistic missile submarine program would not fail just because some component did not performed as expected. Low-risk, guaranteed-result program, albeit relatively slow and not as impressive as Polaris.

For the concept of British independent deterrence - which must be low-risk, guaranteed-result also, since Britain did not have resources for the "fallback" projects - such approach is much more practical. Instead of trying to solve all problems at once, solve them gradually; work out the problems of launching small, short-range missile from surfaced submarine, then start to work over longer range and underwater launch.

And while liquid fuel SLBM's aren't as convenient as solid-fuel ones, they allow for large warhead weight - thus making neither excessive miniaturization of warhead nor strict demands to accuracy very important.

 

[zen]

After too much scrolling because search with poor memory isn't a pleasant experience.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/british-and-american-advanced-sub-designs-c1945.29740/#post-320221

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/royal-navy-small-nuclear-submarine.10660/#post-126930

Also "The UK Magnox reactor programme was producing weapons grade material from 1956 onwards and by about 1962 there were at least 8 reactor units producing plutonium as well as power."

Because this site is literally filled with such information to my everlasting wonderment and appreciation.
But you do have to go looking for it rather than just declare something.

 

[TheKutKu]

And several disadvantages:

* Before 1960s, Britain could not even be sure that such large solid-fuel missile is possible.
* Britain have much less rocketry experience than France in 1950s.
* Royal Navy is not much interested.

I'd probably say the British solid rocketry was not THAT bad...


Skylark first flew in February 1957, it used the Raven motor, ground tested in August 1956, with its 1 ton propellant loading, ⌀0.45m and 1.5 MN.s of total impulse it was frankly larger than comparable French Plastic propellant rockets of the time, by early 1957 Bordeaux's solid propulsion plants were just starting to cast ~500kg; ⌀0.5m plastic engines; such engines would be first tested in the SEPR-732 booster (⌀0.56m 0.47t loading, 0.89 MN.s total Impulse "Vesuve-Block") of the SE-4400 ramjet missile prototype in May 1957 (also used on Masurca and late Matra R422) ; it'd take until 1958 to surpass the Raven in pure propellant loading mass on the ground.

Then the french lept forward, thanks to the funding and a well-directed national Missile program from 1959 onward, but it still took some years for the effects to show, the ⌀0.8m diameter Mammouth block, starting from development for the cancelled Casseur Tactical missile, was first ground tested 1960; first flight tested on the Nord NA801 motor of the VE110 Aigle in June 1961 (⌀0.8m; 1900kg loading; 3.420 MN.s of impulse). That's already starting to be good engines for a tactical missile, and the British weren't that far behind; Royal Ordnance Corp ground-fired a prottoype Stonechat in May 1961 (⌀0.91m), sadly there the lack of interest and funding shows, since it'd take until 1969 for this type of motor to fly in the Stonechat MKI (⌀0.91/3.85t Loading/8.46 MN impulse); a single ⌀1.37m motor was ground-tested at Westcott in June 1965.

And on the smaller end of solid propulsion, the Black Arrow's Waxwing kick stage had a similar mass ratio to the Diamant/Rubis P0.64 third stage (but half the propellant loading), albeit a few years late, also respectable.

Now I think that the French had better propellant by the late 50s, but it's not very important because they then, starting from 59, just reverse engineered those of Licence-Produced american Hawk missiles to make Isolane grains...

(J.Harlow '92/'98; P.Jung '92; J.Serra & P.Jung '05; P.O.Moor '92; C.N.Hill '11; P.Varnoteaux '16)

So clearly, to me, the British had the technical capabilities to not be too far behind and mostly execute a similar missile development plan as the French did on the propulsive side (given that the British had a clear advantage on the guidance side of things by the late 50s), of course, this depends on adequate and sustained funding and good organisation.

What I'd give to the French is that the rocketry development industry was more diverse and dynamic already before De Gaulle.

If you wanna know, by 1959 France has absolutely zero clue about Polaris and Minuteman solid fuel tech. To the point that bribing Boeing or force US government hand was seen as the only hope to get a viable deterrent past Mirage IVA IOC in 1964. Repeated queries and atempts were made even by De Gaulle - to no avail. It was though bargaining to get a 1958 like US-UK agreement, except for rockets.
When it all failed, France did it alone and by February 1966 was firing a first S112 10-ton solid-fuel rocket out of Biscarrosse missile test center. Took a few failures until 1968 and then it worked, by 1971-72 IOC was in sight for solid-fuel IRBMs and SLBMs (plateau d'Albion & Redoutable)

A lot of words to say that if british Skybolt and Polaris go to hell around 1962, 1972 IOC can still be done even starting from scratch. And V-bombers were far from done - Victor tankers lasted to 1991, so...

Compared to France UK has two aces uppon their sleeves
A) nuclear attack subs as a template for boomers (France did it the other way around, Rubis after Redoutables)
B) the 1958 agreement for warheads

Admiral Rickover's famous (for nuclear submarines) "The French will certainly never do anything with enriched Uranium" (which purpotedly enabled the American transfer of Enriched uranium in 1959) and "The French will never have a credible deterence force".

The development of the FdF was spectacular, but the recent history, and historiography indeed eclipses just how much was still in flux around 1957-1960;
looking at late 4th and even early 5th Republic (first 1-2 years of de Gaulle) documents and studies, showing that yes, large collaboration with the US on the strategic arsenal like the British would do was seriously considered and discussed, it's unbelievable now.
For missiles, French Polaris and Thor had preliminary accords... And as late as 1960 SAGEM was in official cooperation with Kearfott for long range missile inertial guidance development.

 

[zen]

From D.K Brown I note.

Early studies '50
Twin screw 2400tons to 25kts
Reactor size increased 3400tons to 22kts
shock protection 4500tons to 20kts.
Diameter rose from 25ft to 31ft.
Early efforts divided with HTP powered studies.

53 low priority due to limited supply of reactor fuel.
Much time spent trying to mount entire reactor on springs for shock resistance.

'54 section at Harwell set up for getting a submarine plant running on shore by '61.
'56 draft Staff requirements for SSN.
'56 Treasury approval for shore based prototype at Dounreay hoped to be running by Jan '60.
Core settled by latd '56 for zero power running by early '57.

NCRE ahead of US on shock and fatigue 1957.
simulation on computer done for radiation, actual figures close to predicted.
'57 wooden mockup full size.
Neptune went critical November '57 moved to Derby '59.
Purchase an incorporation of S5W (agreed Jan '58,) for Dreadnought actually delayed Valiant.
Replica hull in mind steel.
Austenitic steel decision.
By '59 most research at Harwell was complete.
DSMP Dounreay commissioned in '63.
Replaced nickel alloy small bore pipework with chromium molybdenum low alloy steel in '64

Dreadnought completed April '63 on time and cost. She would have completed 6 months earlier had they not re-brazed all joints in the sea water systems to UK standards.