- Joined
- 27 September 2006
- Messages
- 5,744
- Reaction score
- 5,626
This thread may seem too political but I think it is essential to decide when a country, in my case the UK, should be willing to commit its main ground forces as opposed to Special Forces, Air and Naval power.
My view has always been that the main commitment for the British Army was and is the Article 5 commitment to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
After that, I find life gets difficult.
Aid to the Civil Power found its most extreme form in Northern Ireland after 1969. I would only say that it should never be repeated anywhere in the UK. Troops cannot substitute for "policing with consent".
Self Defence is exemplified by the Falklands. It should never have been allowed to get that far but once it did, ground troops were unavoidable.
Since 1990 the UK has been involved in a series of conflicts which have been either supporting allies (1991 Kuwait and Sierra Leone) or Peacemaking (Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq). These have been wars of choice and in some cases divided the country bitterly.
I think such wars were entered into too lightly before alternatives were exhausted or with a larger commitment than we needed to make.
In 2021 I think that apart from our remaining NATO commitment the UK would find it nearly impossible to secure Parliamentary approval to send what is left of the British Army anywhere else much.
This potted history is relevant to our study of various projects in that it explains what is possible for Defence planners.
NATO has clear requirements, renewed annually, for what the UK contribution should be. Over and above that it gets very political very quickly.
Until 2003 the MOD had kept a sort of Armoured Division in existence against a possible need to repeat 1991. Other than that the Army was only commited in penny packets around the world.
This explains the atrophying of our ability to manufacture armoured vehicles when compared with the 1951 to 1991 to equip Armoured Divisions in Germany and until 1976 a Strategic Reserve able to go anywhere.
My view has always been that the main commitment for the British Army was and is the Article 5 commitment to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
After that, I find life gets difficult.
Aid to the Civil Power found its most extreme form in Northern Ireland after 1969. I would only say that it should never be repeated anywhere in the UK. Troops cannot substitute for "policing with consent".
Self Defence is exemplified by the Falklands. It should never have been allowed to get that far but once it did, ground troops were unavoidable.
Since 1990 the UK has been involved in a series of conflicts which have been either supporting allies (1991 Kuwait and Sierra Leone) or Peacemaking (Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq). These have been wars of choice and in some cases divided the country bitterly.
I think such wars were entered into too lightly before alternatives were exhausted or with a larger commitment than we needed to make.
In 2021 I think that apart from our remaining NATO commitment the UK would find it nearly impossible to secure Parliamentary approval to send what is left of the British Army anywhere else much.
This potted history is relevant to our study of various projects in that it explains what is possible for Defence planners.
NATO has clear requirements, renewed annually, for what the UK contribution should be. Over and above that it gets very political very quickly.
Until 2003 the MOD had kept a sort of Armoured Division in existence against a possible need to repeat 1991. Other than that the Army was only commited in penny packets around the world.
This explains the atrophying of our ability to manufacture armoured vehicles when compared with the 1951 to 1991 to equip Armoured Divisions in Germany and until 1976 a Strategic Reserve able to go anywhere.
