Carrier attack on airbases 1982

[publiusr]

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Stage an attack while all hands are on the airfield wasting time picking them up. Low casualties…No barracks to warm yourself.

 

[Rule of cool]

Apart from the incident above RN bombers were rarely used in anger between Suez and the Falklands. Shows of force in Kuwait, Malaysia and Tanzania do count.

A controversial what-if that was the closest thing to a war in the 1960s was the possible military response to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This was quickly rejected but RAF Javelins were detached to Zambia to reassure the government there.

It is telling that in dealing with one of the most serious disputes of the withdrawal from Empire in the 60s the UK preferred negotiation and UN sanctions to military force. This and the decision to withdraw from Aden and then the Gulf and Singapore left little need for carrier force projection.

Hunters were used to attack targets during the Aden fighting.

 

[H_K]

Agreed here. But you'd have to push Hermes within about 200nmi of the coast to do it. Or buddy-store and lose 11 birds from the attackers.

I don’t think the ratio is 1 buddy tanker per strike aircraft. Typically it’s more like 1 tanker for 3-4 strikers. That will give you a range extension of ~25% if you top up after launch. So 3 buddy tankers for 12 strike aircraft should be enough.

This thread, as hypothetical and unlikely as it is, really shows what Britain lost when they gave up fleet carriers from 1966. Any mainland attack by the real TF sounds so feeble compared to what a pair of CVAs could do.

Indeed. Part of the problem also seems to have been the limited, mostly defensive, mission set expected of the CVS/Sea Harrier combo. By contrast the Clemenceaus maintained a strike focus even though their air group wasn’t fundamentally better or bigger than what the RN could muster with Hermes + 1 CVS.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Clem and Foch, if surged together, would be able to muster maybe 35 SEs and still protect their TF with maybe a dozen F8s and provide 6 recce/buddy tanker IVMs. That would be enough to attack 2 airfields.

 

[H_K]

The Clem and Foch, if surged together, would be able to muster maybe 35 SEs and still protect their TF with maybe a dozen F8s and provide 6 recce/buddy tanker IVMs. That would be enough to attack 2 airfields.

I’ve been noodling on this too… here’s my math on a Clemenceau-sized carrier in this scenario.

1) Assuming one 30,000ton carrier with 30x jets (10x fighter / 20x fighter-bomber) and 10 ASW/AEW

2) To keep things simple I’m going with a historical air wing of 10x F-8 Crusaders, 16x Super Etendards, 4x Etendard IVP tankers, 6x Alize, and 4x helos (but one could throw alternate types into the mix - including non-French types)

3) That’s 4 strike packages of:
4x fighter bomber (Super Etendard)
1x buddy tanker (Etendard IVP)

Plus 2x escort pairs of 2x fighters (Crusader). Holding back the other 6 fighters for CAP duties.

4) Strike load-out is:
- 1 “fighter” pair with 2x anti-runway bombs (e.g. Durandal) on centerline, 2 tanks, and on the outer pylons 1x AAM (Sidewinder or Magic) and 1x ECM pod or Phimat chaff launcher
- 1 “attack” pair with 1x rocket pod (4 100/127mm or 18-19 68/70mm) instead of the AAM

5) Tactics are the same as Israel during the 6 Day war. Low altitude ingress to minimize warning time. Single high speed pass down the runway, drop bombs, followed by 1-2x rocket/gun passes using a 270 degree wheel to throw off AAA aim and maintaining high speed (>500 knots). The “fighter” pair prioritizes any aircraft in the air or ready to launch at the end of the runway. The “attack” pair uses 68/70mm rockets & guns on open apron areas. If hardened shelters are present, 100/127mm rockets are carried instead. ECM and chaff are used to disrupt AAA tracking radars. The Crusader escort zooms to altitude on the ingress to keep any fighter CAP busy.

6) High altitude return followed by quick turnaround - 250kg bombs replacing the Durandals, load ammo & fuel, and replace spent rocket pods. Aim for 3 strikes in one day (initial anti-runway strike + 2 follow-ups).

This provides a modular template to strike at ~300nm range, with 1 to 4 strike packages depending on need. Personally I would split the strike packages across as many airfields as possible for the initial strike (so target 4 runways each with 4x aircraft), aiming to damage most of them and ascertain enemy strength. But another option (assuming good intelligence) would be to prioritize the airfields and double-up on the highest threat. Either way, once enemy strength is known, the follow-on strikes could focus on the most dangerous airfields first.

The highest risk is if the initial strike fails to damage the runway(s) or if the carrier is detected before the strike, then the operation might have to be aborted and the carrier would have to bug out and attempt to survive the likely enemy counter strike. Losing aircraft to AAA and enemy fighters would also be a problem, but based on Israeli experience losses of 5-10% would be expected and still acceptable (ie. 1-2 aircraft per wave).

 

[Scott Kenny]

I don’t think the ratio is 1 buddy tanker per strike aircraft. Typically it’s more like 1 tanker for 3-4 strikers. That will give you a range extension of ~25% if you top up after launch. So 3 buddy tankers for 12 strike aircraft should be enough.

25% range increase means 250nmi instead of 200, we really need 300nmi range.

Not sure how you'd juggle the logistics, but I'll take 1 buddy tanker per 2 strikers.

I think I was getting the 1:1 ratio from USN folks complaining about Hornet/SH range.

 

[uk 75]

Neither France nor the UK ever used carrier aircraft against airfields. You are inventing this role which only the US carriers had the numbers and package of aircraft to execute (F14 for top cover A6 for all weather A7 or F18 for ordinance E6 for ECM and anti SAM and E2 for AEW).

 

[Rule of cool]

Neither France nor the UK ever used carrier aircraft against airfields. You are inventing this role which only the US carriers had the numbers and package of aircraft to execute (F14 for top cover A6 for all weather A7 or F18 for ordinance E6 for ECM and anti SAM and E2 for AEW).

Britain attacked Port Stanley airfield with carrier aircraft in strength (such as it was) on 1 May 1982, and harassed it constantly afterwards.

This is easy to write off, however between April 19 and 29 Argentine AIr Force transport aircraft and civil airliners flew into Port Stanley over 200 times, and the Navy's transport aircraft did at least 50 flights. These flights included the Anti Aircraft guns among their cargo. Later flights bought in a 155mm artillery battery and an Exocet launcher.

MB339s and Pucarsa were based at Port Stanley, one of the former discovered and attacked the amphibious landing and one of the latter shot down a British helicopter.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Neither France nor the UK ever used carrier aircraft against airfields. You are inventing this role which only the US carriers had the numbers and package of aircraft to execute (F14 for top cover A6 for all weather A7 or F18 for ordinance E6 for ECM and anti SAM and E2 for AEW).

Pretty sure USN attacked airfields in North Vietnam, but yes, the RN carriers were grossly inadequate in terms of being able to deliver a complete strike package to the target.

Read just how many planes I am assigning to air escort, versus carrying bombs. The CVA01 strike groups were getting 4x Phantoms, the historical Harriers were getting 2x SHAR. Which is roughly the same % of aircraft assigned in both cases.

 

[uk 75]

The Falklands was a one-off case and is over used by those who cling on to UK out of area commitments. I do not see it (and nor did UK planners in 1960s) justifying the high cost of a carrier force when NATO wanted us to focus on the Soviet sub threat in the N Atlantic.

 

[Archibald]

I checked out the Clemenceau air group when it sailed to Lebanon in the fall of 1983

Historique

Le CA Klotz, CTF 452, embarque avec son état-major le 5 octobre, et le groupe aérien (six Crusader (12F), quinze Super Etendard (11F, 14F, 17F), trois Etendard IV P (16F), cinq Alizé (6F), six Super Frelon (32 et 33F) est récupéré le 6 octobre après l'appareillage des deux porte-avions

Super Frelons were pretty large choppers, could be swapped for a few more Super Etendards.

 

[zen]

For relevance on AH we should also remind people of Ark Royal's East Coast Rampage.
Somewhat embarrassing for the US at the time.

 

[uk 75]

For relevance on AH we should also remind people of Ark Royal's East Coast Rampage.
Somewhat embarrassing for the US at the time.

Crew ashore in Florida? Can you share more?

 

[H_K]

I found a fascinating article about Argentinian air defenses and British plans for Vulcan strikes on the mainland in an article in The Aviation Historian (issue 44) - highly recommend it.

"Vulcans are Coming" https://pocketmags.com/the-aviation-historian-magazine/issue-44

In particular there is a map of radar coverage (pic 1) at different altitudes (1,000 ft, 5,000 ft, 10,000 ft and 20,000 ft), which shows the blindspots that would be critical for any successful surprise attack, whether by land-based bombers or carrier-based aircraft. Although this map seems incomplete (perhaps compiled pre-war) as it omits the Argentinian radars installed near Port Stanley and also army radars at civilian air fields (San Julian & Puerto Santa Cruz), it's possible to add in that missing coverage based on the excellent Radar Malvinas site.

In pic 2 I've added the approximate Falklands radar coverage at 20,000 feet. This shows a pretty big blindspot halfway between the mainland and Port Stanley where aircraft could operate up to 20k feet without fearing detection. This would enable strike aircraft to cruise at higher altitudes to extend their range. I've drawn range circles to illustrate a possible launch position south west of the Falklands, at the following distances from the 4 key airfields:

310nm from San Julian (red dashed semi-circle)
300nm from Santa Cruz (green)
275nm from Rio Gallegos (purple) - Main target
215nm from Rio Grande (pink)

There's another symmetrical launch position to the north west of the islands, but I haven't drawn it.

I believe the threat of Argentinian ships (Belgrano etc) made this type of strike a little more complicated than it seems, but still well within reason that a carrier could sprint overnight into a launch position. A more limited strike on just the 2 southern airfields might be a safer choice as it would move the launch position further away from the mainland.

 

[Rule of cool]

For all its practical unreality this thread is an interesting thought exercise. I'm going to have to dig up that big paper the RAAF did on airbase vulnerability.

 

[uk 75]

I wonder whether we could broaden this thread into analysing how effective raids on enemy airfields were prior to 1991. We know what massive allied air power was able to do to Iraq in 1991 and 2003 but other examples like the strikes against Serbia suggest it is not cut and dried.

The Israeli raids on Egypt and Syria against open airfields were dramatic but did they halt Arab air operations?

 

[H_K]

wonder whether we could broaden this thread into analysing how effective raids on enemy airfields were prior to 1991. We know what massive allied air power was able to do to Iraq in 1991 and 2003 but other examples like the strikes against Serbia suggest it is not cut and dried.

The Israeli raids on Egypt and Syria against open airfields were dramatic but did they halt Arab air operations?

I remember reading an analysis somewhere that was critical of typical US/NATO campaigns, as literally thousands of sorties are spent on force protection (CAP, SEAD, CAS) and fixed targets with dubious military value. Whereas the Israelis excel at smaller targeted strikes and accept higher risk. Plus they are very good at outsmarting their enemy with better training/planning/intelligence.

I would expect the same pattern applies to airfield strikes and to carrier ops in general. You can do things by the book if you’re a USN CVN with 60 jets. But if you only have 15 or 25 jets either you say “I give up” or you throw the book out and figure out smarter ways of operating.

The RN overall did this very well in 1982, even if the airfield strikes on Port Stanley were not one of the campaign’s more successful aspects.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Israeli raids on Egypt and Syria against open airfields were dramatic but did they halt Arab air operations?

Yes, after the first day of the 6 Day War the Israelis had air superiority verging on supremacy over Egypt in particular. The IAF was able to support the ground forces almost unhindered.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I wonder whether we could broaden this thread into analysing how effective raids on enemy airfields were prior to 1991. We know what massive allied air power was able to do to Iraq in 1991 and 2003 but other examples like the strikes against Serbia suggest it is not cut and dried.

The Israeli raids on Egypt and Syria against open airfields were dramatic but did they halt Arab air operations?

While I'm in favor, I suspect that most of the examples are going to be huge US raids.

 

[kaiserd]

You may want to look into the differences between the effectiveness of Israeli attacks on their opponents airfields in the 1967 War versus the 1973 War.

It is my understanding that the success of the 1967 attacks has lead to the introduction by the 1973 attacks of many of the changes in practices and technology that would later be seen more widely deployed around the world; hardened shelters, better active defence systems, greater provision of auxiliary taxi ways, greater/ wider dispersal of aircraft etc, if not as in quite as sophisticated and evolved forms as seen later. My recollection (not from the time but later related reading) is that early in the 1973 conflict the Israeli airforce attempted similar knock out blows against opponent airfields as in 1967 but without the same element of surprise and now facing more effective active defences and passive measures than in 1967. My understanding is that these 1973 attacks were much less effective and suffered more losses.

These 1973 raids are not perfect equivalents to any 1982 attacks on Argentinian airbases (Arab airbases probably had better air defences, at least re: SAMs), but they are the closest I can think of off the top of head and show the potential relative effectiveness of even just the passive measures like partially hardened shelters etc. in an airfield attack scenario at this time; that even just measures that make strafing significantly less effective have a real impact on the outcomes of such attacks at this time.

 

[Rule of cool]

That's 100% true.

The measures don't have to be expensive or permanent. I posted some pictures in the P1154 thread of RAF Hunters and Beverlys in Aden parked between rows of gravel filled oil drums stacked 3 high. Cheap and easy, but an effective damage limitation method. Similarly in Vietnam USAF Phantoms were parked in 3 sided revetments of what look like retaining walls filled with dirt or whatever.

Even parking aircraft haphazardly on aprons and wherever hardstands can be found makes the attackers job harder.

 

[Hood]

My recollection (not from the time but later related reading) is that early in the 1973 conflict the Israeli airforce attempted similar knock out blows against opponent airfields as in 1967 but without the same element of surprise and now facing more effective active defences and passive measures than in 1967.

I remember reading an article about this fairly recently - may have been in Aeroplane Monthly, it seems that in 1973 the Israeli Air Force was torn between whether to strike Egypt or Syria first and dithered about so that the planning went awry. I'll see if I can dig out the article.

 

[Archibald]

Israeli losses of Skyhawks and Phantoms were indeed pretty severe. This shook NATO (and USAF) to the core and was a key event in stealth pre-history. HAVE BLUE started right here, kinda.

From memory, between 1967 and 1973 - with the Attrition war right in the middle, 1969-1970 - the Soviets provided Arab air forces with massive amounts of deadly AAA systems
- ZSU-23-34 Shilka
- SA-7 portable missiles (did not worked at all: 4300 fired, barely 5 israeli jet downed: a 1% "success" rate. The IR guidance sensor was absolutely shit, being lured by sand dunes, because heated by the Sun so - INFRARED HEAT SOURCE !!)
- SA-6 ultra deadly SAMs.
- On top of SA-2s which were already a major PITA over Vietnam, but SA-6 was the next level.

Broadly speaking, israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks trying to fly low to escape SA-2s and the new deadly SA-6s ran straight into the Shilkas, - and losses were severe.

Truth be told, pre - Yom Kippur war israeli intelligence (1970-73) blundered badly. They more or less missed the SA-6 deliveries and how deadly they would be.

 

[zen]

Crew ashore in Florida? Can you share more?

I can't comment on the Navy's trawl through American drinking establishments. Let alone during that specific exercise....

I can reccal, but not immediately find accounts of such an exercise during the 70's, likely among Ark Royal's last.
Essentially she drove up close to shore bending the rules of the exercise, were if you stayed low you wouldn't trigger their air warning radar.....and proceeded to launch strike after strike, which caught the yanks off guard.
Worse the USN threw assets at the task of finding her but never thought to look so close to home and so several days of strikes all judged successful by adjudicators 'took out' aircraft and defense infrastructure up and down the US East Coast.

Eventually a MPA on return from search happened to fly close enough and one of it's crew saw her.
Obviously it was over after that as a Anti-ship strike package took her out.

USN wasn't unhappy as it just proved how dangerous even one carrier was if sufficiently motivated to risk things and some typical finger wagging by those who didn't like the Brits habit of going 'off script' on exercises. The script being how useless carriers were and all powerful the US was.

RN was....well some were happy they'd gone out with a bang and some unhappy because they'd just been shown up as 'coping' with the coming loss of 'proper' carrier airpower.

 

[Pioneer]

The Phantoms on a single carrier (it is highly unlikely that CVA 01 and 02 would both have been in commission in 1982) would bring Sparrow/Skyflash to the party but small Argentine A4 and Daggers might not be as easy to hit as Russian bombers

Saying that, I distinctively remember reading (and hearing) experts saying that the weather experienced in and around the Falklands at the time of the Falklands War would have prevented conventional carrier operations and the Sea Harrier's unique V/STOL allowed it to fly.......
If this is still perceived as being an exceptable analogy, I can't help wonder how many times Phantom II's aboard CVA 01, let alone CVA 02 would have not been permitted to take off, let alone difficulties (and casualties of landings).....


Regards
Pioneer

 

[H_K]

Saying that, I distinctively remember reading (and hearing) experts saying that the weather experienced in and around the Falklands at the time of the Falklands War would have prevented conventional carrier operations and the Sea Harrier's unique V/STOL allowed it to fly.....

AFAIK this claim was mostly because of bad visibility, with V/STOL aircraft having lower minimums for landing. There were a handful of days with poor visibility with little flying by either side, and 1 instance of visibility worsening unexpectedly that might have led to the loss of a CTOL aircraft (whereas a Sea Harrier famously landed in near zero visibiity)

Though in reality a CTOL carrier probably would have just launched its buddy tanker and waited out the fog (as typically it didn't last long or was only localized).

 

[Archibald]

AFAIK this claim was mostly because of bad visibility, with V/STOL aircraft having lower minimums for landing. There were a handful of days with poor visibility with little flying by either side, and 1 instance of visibility worsening unexpectedly that might have led to the loss of a CTOL aircraft (whereas a Sea Harrier famously landed in near zero visibiity)

Though in reality a CTOL carrier probably would have just launched its buddy tanker and waited out the fog (as typically it didn't last long or was only localized).

I heard about this. With a variant: the state of the sea shaking the carriers. Seems VTOL had an advantage over CTOL. That is, from the same HMS Hermes in the South Atlantic horrible weather, a Buccaneer could not have takeoff and landed, unlike a SHAR.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Though in reality a CTOL carrier probably would have just launched its buddy tanker and waited out the fog (as typically it didn't last long or was only localized).

The CTOL carrier also has the option of going where the weather isn't, since its aircraft have much longer ranges.

There's also the consideration that it was USN officers saying that USN carriers wouldn't have been able to operate in those conditions. The RN has always been willing to operate in worse conditions (not all, just lower minimums/higher maximums) than the USN.

That's not to say the weather wouldn't have imposed difficulties for CTOL, just that some Harrier enthusiasts overstate them.

 

[orlovsky]

Has anyone information about USN or RN ctol carrier operation in various sea states? It was an issue with the french carriers, CdG being able to operate in sea state 5 and 6 with a stabilization system (SATRAP). French wiki claims (with a source referenced) that the Clems were at least initially limited to 13 ton aircraft (probably landing weight?) in sea states 3 and 4.

Ignoring the 80k+ ton classes: the Audacious class was much heavier so should have done better?

 

[Rule of cool]

Given the 60s RN had a NATO role in the North Atlantic I cant imagine the likes of CVA01 being designed to operate in smooth seas only.