Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar and alternate projects

A well-narrated story ! ;)
 

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has anyone other than me compared the dimensions of the X-37B and the X-20, including the cross section and payload bay dimensions?
 
samardza said:
has anyone other than me compared the dimensions of the X-37B and the X-20, including the cross section and payload bay dimensions?
Me with surprise result !
what ever X-20, ALSV and X-37B had to carry, it has similar size:

X-20, Equipment compartment: 1.20 m x 1.89 m (assumption after technical drawing on X-20)
ALSV, Payload bay size: 1.52 m x 2.74 m
X-37B, payload bay size: 1.2 m x 2.1 m
 
Michel Van said:
samardza said:
has anyone other than me compared the dimensions of the X-37B and the X-20, including the cross section and payload bay dimensions?
Me with surprise result !
what ever X-20, ALSV and X-37B had to carry, it has similar size:

X-20, Equipment compartment: 1.20 m x 1.89 m (assumption after technical drawing on X-20)
ALSV, Payload bay size: 1.52 m x 2.74 m
X-37B, payload bay size: 1.2 m x 2.1 m

I think you are jumping to conclusions. There is no payload that would have stayed the same size in 1960, 1980 and 2010.
 
oh yes Passengers do not downsize over 5 decades ;)
also not Optical equipment like Cameras, because the focal length of the lens.
or Antennas for Radar scanner.
 

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And;
 

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Titan-i with Centaur ?!
what for a Surprise, extent find Hesham !
 
Hi All!

Boeing Model 814
Convair Model ?
Douglas Model 1???
Lockheed Model CL-4?? (or CL-3??)
Martin/Bell Model 3??/Bell Model D-1?? or D-2??
McDonnell Model 132A-C
North American X-15B (Model ?)
Northrop Model 1?? or Model 2??
Republic Model AP-9? (or AP-8?)
If you can write about Dyna Soar/X-20?
 
Was the X-20 Dyna Soar a reusable spaceplane?
Or every mission would have a brand new X-20?
And if reusable,how many could perform?
 
carmelo said:
Was the X-20 Dyna Soar a reusable spaceplane?
Or every mission would have a brand new X-20?
And if reusable,how many could perform?

The plan was for it to be reusable.

But keep in mind that the "X" meant that it was experimental, so they did not know how well it would perform and how many times they could fly it. Also, it would only be flown as many times as they needed to collect the data.

One of the problems with the X-20--and really the thing that led to its cancellation--was that it was not a clearly focused program. It was called an experimental X-plane program, but the Air Force really wanted it to fly operational missions. It was too expensive for an X-plane, and it was too unproven to do operational missions. So it got canceled.
 
Lockheeds System 464L Dyna Soar submission of 1958. Source

This design was suborbital, and did not quite fulfill the performance requirements of System 464L.
 

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McDonnell's System 464L submission from 1958. Data is very lean on this; how, if the Lockheed design wasn't capable of attaining orbit, the McDonnell design would've, I've no idea unless it had a substantial on-board propulsion system.

Source
 

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Amazing projects as usual my dear Scott,


thank you for sharing us.
 
Orionblamblam said:
McDonnell's System 464L submission from 1958. Data is very lean on this; how, if the Lockheed design wasn't capable of attaining orbit, the McDonnell design would've, I've no idea unless it had a substantial on-board propulsion system.


...If the two diagrams are from the same proposal set, I suggest that the Atlas Adapter also contains the engine(s), which get(s) jettisoned once the fuel in the onboard tanks are exhausted. IIRC there were a couple of post-Columbia Shuttle replacements proposed that called for the SSMEs to be tossed, and at least one similar Buran pitch was talked about on .shuttle some years ago as well.


...That being said, that first image you posted sports an awfully thin wing area. In fact, I'm more apt to call it a "flying spade" more than some actually referred to the X-20 as being. I'd love to see if any actual wind tunnel tests were done with scale models of this design, not to mention the data.


:OM:
 
You Tube is your friend

take 15 minute and feast you eyes on this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYFhUO4tnSI
X-20 Dyna-Soar Development: "Springboard to Space: The Arnold Center Story" 1965 USAF

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtFreN6iWnQ
The Story of Dyna-Soar - United States Air Force (loud intro!!!)

Test of Spacesuit on X-20 Part one
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7mRXblByxo
Test of Spacesuit on X-20 Part two
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TikodTMGdP0

NASA Langley Research Center film # L-591 on Dyna Soar
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irLVpQPriVU

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fx8HPESg6Hw
NASA Langley film # L-742 Landing Characteristics of a Winged Reentry Vehicle
 
Enjoy this scanned article just found by accident.

This source material has not been posted here yet. AFAIK, none of this material is posted on this forum, and I don't know to which extend we can.

David STERN, "Martin Bell's Alternate 1958 DynaSoar I studies revealed", QUEST, 15:1, 2008, pp.22-32

http://thehuwaldtfamily.org/jtrl/vehicle_data/X-Vehicles/X-20/Martin-Bell's%20Alternate%201958%20Dyna-Soar%20Studies,%20Quest%20V15N1,%202008.pdf

This material is available from a family-owned website operated by Joe who described this material as follows:"Welcome to my personal collection of technical reports. Most of the reports in this archive are related to my 20 some years as an aerospace engineer. However there are also reports and historical documents covering a broad array of scientific, engineering, mathematical, computer graphics, and computer programming subjects. All of the material in this archive should be public domain (most of it was created by United States Government agencies such as NASA) and I have filtered out any material from my private collection that is restricted by U.S. export laws."
source : http://thehuwaldtfamily.org/jtrl/

A.
 
Orionblamblam said:
[...] how, if the Lockheed design wasn't capable of attaining orbit, the McDonnell design would've, I've no idea unless it had a substantial on-board propulsion system.


...There had to be *something* in mind. Lookit how it damned near dwarfs the Atlas just sitting on top of it. Hell, I've always felt that Dynasoar was sahotage from inside the Pentagon, as they didn't wan anyone working with propulsion technologies that could fit the bill, but the Soviets could easily get ahold of. Not a CT Nutter Mutter from this end, just a "gut feeling". And I"m on my stomach meds, thank you very much :p

:OM:
 
"What killed Dyna-Soar, ultimately?"

Who needs a manned military capsule? It has no military value at all.
 
carmelo said:
CNH said:
"What killed Dyna-Soar, ultimately?"

Robert McNamara.

It was going to go away on its own no matter what. The Air Force was spending a lot of money on something that had no realistic operational requirement and was too expensive to be merely experimental. The Air Force would have killed it anyway once Vietnam began ramping-up.
 
blackstar said:
carmelo said:
CNH said:
"What killed Dyna-Soar, ultimately?"

Robert McNamara.

It was going to go away on its own no matter what. The Air Force was spending a lot of money on something that had no realistic operational requirement and was too expensive to be merely experimental. The Air Force would have killed it anyway once Vietnam began ramping-up.

Two down and one to go. The third factor in the death of Dynasoar was Kennedy's Man on the Moon speech and the way the country got behind that effort after he was killed. There was no way that the country was going to support two major space efforts at one time.
 
The Artist said:
blackstar said:
carmelo said:
CNH said:
"What killed Dyna-Soar, ultimately?"

Robert McNamara.

It was going to go away on its own no matter what. The Air Force was spending a lot of money on something that had no realistic operational requirement and was too expensive to be merely experimental. The Air Force would have killed it anyway once Vietnam began ramping-up.

Two down and one to go. The third factor in the death of Dynasoar was Kennedy's Man on the Moon speech and the way the country got behind that effort after he was killed. There was no way that the country was going to support two major space efforts at one time.

I dunno. Remember that they created MOL around the same time. MOL was more focused on an operational mission, and it ultimately became rather expensive.

If you step back from the gee-whiz fanboy view of this period and look at it more objectively, it becomes clear that the Air Force was funding a bunch of big expensive programs that it could not really afford and that did not have clear missions. The B-70 and Dyna-Soar were probably the two best examples. McNamara killed them for good reasons, because they were eating a lot of money and they were not going to achieve any goals that the country really needed. If you look at some other advanced USAF programs of the mid-late 1950s you can see that the Air Force spent a lot of money on projects that didn't last very long. Atlas and Titan I, for instance, had short service lives. Thor also didn't operate for very long. So the Air Force was burning a lot of cash and had to be reigned in, which is what McNamara did.
 
blackstar said:
Atlas and Titan I, for instance, had short service lives. Thor also didn't operate for very long.

I'm not sure that I agree with you 100% on your police work there, Lou. The Atlas and Thor are still flying *today.* The Titan line only died out in 2005. Fifty+ years seems like a pretty good run to me.

Had B-70 been allowed to continue, economical SST's *may* have resulted. Had Dyna Soar been allowed to continue, the Shuttle almost absolutely certainly would have been a vastly different program, based not only on Dyna Soar design work but also actual experience with maintenance and operations, and, with luck, ocean recovery of the SRB cases (which UTC examined and proposed). Dyna Soar would have either convinced NASA that the as-built-Shuttle was too hard, or it would have been redesigned to simplify things.
 
blackstar said:
The Artist said:
blackstar said:
carmelo said:
CNH said:
"What killed Dyna-Soar, ultimately?"

Robert McNamara.

It was going to go away on its own no matter what. The Air Force was spending a lot of money on something that had no realistic operational requirement and was too expensive to be merely experimental. The Air Force would have killed it anyway once Vietnam began ramping-up.

Two down and one to go. The third factor in the death of Dynasoar was Kennedy's Man on the Moon speech and the way the country got behind that effort after he was killed. There was no way that the country was going to support two major space efforts at one time.

I dunno. Remember that they created MOL around the same time. MOL was more focused on an operational mission, and it ultimately became rather expensive.

If you step back from the gee-whiz fanboy view of this period and look at it more objectively, it becomes clear that the Air Force was funding a bunch of big expensive programs that it could not really afford and that did not have clear missions. The B-70 and Dyna-Soar were probably the two best examples. McNamara killed them for good reasons, because they were eating a lot of money and they were not going to achieve any goals that the country really needed. If you look at some other advanced USAF programs of the mid-late 1950s you can see that the Air Force spent a lot of money on projects that didn't last very long. Atlas and Titan I, for instance, had short service lives. Thor also didn't operate for very long. So the Air Force was burning a lot of cash and had to be reigned in, which is what McNamara did.

Ironically the senseless,detrimental and harmful war in Vietnam burned a lot of milions, invested in a catastrophic defeat.
At least the Dyna Soar would have been a investiment in a research vehicle for a future space plane.
 
Orionblamblam said:
blackstar said:
Atlas and Titan I, for instance, had short service lives. Thor also didn't operate for very long.

I'm not sure that I agree with you 100% on your police work there, Lou. The Atlas and Thor are still flying *today.* The Titan line only died out in 2005. Fifty+ years seems like a pretty good run to me.
.


Blackstar is right. He was referring to the ICBM's. The launch vehicle versions are not the same as the weapon systems. Comparing the vehicles today to Atlas and Thor of yesteryear is like comparing the 787 to B-29's.
 
Orionblamblam said:
1. Had B-70 been allowed to continue, economical SST's *may* have resulted.


2. Had Dyna Soar been allowed to continue, the Shuttle almost absolutely certainly would have been a vastly different program, based not only on Dyna Soar design work but also actual experience with maintenance and operations, and, with luck, ocean recovery of the SRB cases (which UTC examined and proposed). Dyna Soar would have either convinced NASA that the as-built-Shuttle was too hard, or it would have been redesigned to simplify things.


1. Not really. The XB-70 contributed all it could to the SST in its research program. There would have been little to learn from the operational phase.
2. Nor really. The issue wasn't that they didn't know enough to design the shuttle for routine O&M, it was that NASA didn't have the money to do it right (much like being forced to go to SRM's vs LRB's)
 

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