Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

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Unionized workers voted to rebuff the last Boeing package and for the largest strike since 2008:

About 33,000 union members at Boeing have started to walk off the job on Friday after they overwhelmingly rejected a proposed four-year contract with the troubled aircraft manufacturer.

The strike, the first at the company in 16 years, will virtually stop commercial airplane production at one of America’s biggest manufacturing giants and its largest exporter, dealing a potential blow to the US economy. Depending on the length of the strike, it could cause problems for nearly 10,000 Boeing (BA) suppliers, which can be found in all 50 US states.

The company has a total of 150,000 US employees, and it estimates its own annual contribution to America’s economy at $79 billion, supporting 1.6 million jobs directly and indirectly.
[...]
The most recent strike at Boeing was in 2008 and lasted 57 days. Holden said members are prepared to “stay out” as long as it takes to get a better deal this time.
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https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/13/business/strike-boeing-vote-iam-751-hnk-intl/index.html
 
Scott Kenny said:
Based on how they got themselves into this position? Training is utterly unimportant, all executive compensation appears to be based on number of airframes completed.

It will likely require the DOJ to demand all of these ideas as penalty actions from the violation of Boeing's plea agreement before Boeing gets the memo.
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It's hard to communicate scale of just how bad things were there. As mentioned in another thread I was there, my second to last day was when the DOJ announced the violation of the DPA (I had resigned two weeks earlier). Almost everyone who could remember the good years in the 90's was gone. For obvious reasons I won't go into details, but I saw the training piece and DPA firsthand.

The FAA Section 103 report lays things out pretty well, it's well worth the read"

Section 103 Report
 
mkellytx said:
It's hard to communicate scale of just how bad things were there. As mentioned in another thread I was there, my second to last day was when the DOJ announced the violation of the DPA (I had resigned two weeks earlier). Almost everyone who could remember the good years in the 90's was gone. For obvious reasons I won't go into details, but I saw the training piece and DPA firsthand.

The FAA Section 103 report lays things out pretty well, it's well worth the read"

Section 103 Report
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*reads*

Ouch. Ho Lee Fuk that's bad.
 
NMaude said:
I don't think you'll see any real change in Boeing's post-McD acquisition corporate culture till the Boeing senior management is held criminally and financially liable for Boeing's repeated criminal misdeeds.
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One of the people I currently work with was at Collins with Kelly years ago. His take is that he was brought in for the sole purpose of cleaning out the management house. Your milage may vary...
 
Scott Kenny said:
Can only hope that he can clean house without triggering golden parachute clauses.
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LOL, since so many of that type get paid with stock anyhow the golden parachute would be the rise in stock price from the market confidence restored by the elimination of the bad apples. ;)
 
All -

From what I've read of the section 103 report, it was the result of " expert panel " delving into the " Organization Designation Authorization " ( ODA ). The ODA was granted to Boeing to allow their own inspectors to provide inspections and oversight of Boeing work in-lieu of or as an adjunct to FAA-performed inspection oversight. The 103 reports findings and more to the point...recommendations to Boeing; are heavily weighted with ODA-specific references.

For more generalized findings and recommendations, I suggest a review of:
" Finding 16 " and it's associated " Recommendation 34 " which speak to
standards " compliance " and " Safety "; found on page 36.

See also:
" Finding 18 " and its associated " Recommendation 36 " found on page 37, which speak to the issues of " Training ".

The Expert Panel also addressed the need for Boeing to " grow the pipeline " of safe, trained and qualified workers....discussed within the pages mentioned.

The specific references above, were more inclusive of all " unit members "' ( UM ); also called employees.


With regards,
357Mag
 
As if a strike thats reportedly costing Boeing between $100m and $150m a day wasnt bad enough, the results of an internal workforce survey conducted by Boeing in May have leaked.

Only 47% of staff felt that they were not under pressure to lower standards to meet schedules.
Only 36% thought they had recieved enough training to meet quality standards.
Only 37% thought they had the tools and materials to successfully complete my work.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce9jvj83zkvo
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-con...versight-Majority-Staff-Background-Memo-2.pdf
 
Raw numbers are impressive but would need to be presented against the average in the industry.
For example, the same questionary at the burger restaurant from your local street corner would score in all probability 100% for each of the above question ;)
Just go and ask the kids there.

Still, is it bad? Yes.
 
WatcherZero said:
As if a strike thats reportedly costing Boeing between $100m and $150m a day wasnt bad enough, the results of an internal workforce survey conducted by Boeing in May have leaked.

Only 47% of staff felt that they were not under pressure to lower standards to meet schedules.
Only 36% thought they had recieved enough training to meet quality standards.
Only 37% thought they had the tools and materials to successfully complete my work.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce9jvj83zkvo
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-con...versight-Majority-Staff-Background-Memo-2.pdf
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All -

Unfortunately, Boeing continues to live up to our low expectations.

I myself wrote and E- mail to " Aviation Week ", describing the evils of Boeing / Spirit Aero
biasing " rate " ahead of quality. It was not printed. I tried to communicate with members of the Investigation Committee, but was turned away because I was not amongst their constituents. I sent an E-mail to a retired Navy Admiral that Boeing garnered as a Safety subject matter expert. I was told his company forwarded my E-mail to him, but I received no contact back.

Unrealistic manufacturing " rates " and incessant supervisory /management demand that these rates are met...is THE core driver central to Boeing's associated challenges.


With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
I myself wrote and E- mail to " Aviation Week ", describing the evils of Boeing / Spirit Aero
biasing " rate " ahead of quality. It was not printed.
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Have you emailed AW&ST querying as to why they haven't published your letter?
 
NMaude said:
Have you emailed AW&ST querying as to why they haven't published your letter?
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NM -
Howdy !

No...I did not inquire about why they didn't publish the E-mail.
I figure they have zillions to choose from. Beyond that, there are many others who write more eloquently than I do. And, we are now some months down the road since I sent the. E-mail to AW&ST.

Anywayz, much of what I said has been corroborated by more-recent FAA reporting ( link shown in above post response ). For example: the paragraphs on " Schedule Pressure Lowers Standards " seen near the bottom of page 4, and elsewhere throughout the report.


With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
For more generalized findings and recommendations, I suggest a review of:
" Finding 16 " and it's associated " Recommendation 34 " which speak to
standards " compliance " and " Safety "; found on page 36.
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They're not going to fix management retaliation for raising safety concerns without a few high-profile firings for cause. If it's still an issue at this point, it doesn't matter how large a clue-stick you apply to the problem managers, they aren't going to get it.
 
DWG said:
without a few high-profile firings for cause.
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I don't think high-profile firings will be enough, I think that Boeing management will get a clue and stop retaliating when there are high-profile criminal prosecutions of senior Boeing managers resulting in them getting lengthy prison-sentences in federal prison AND being stripped of their various stock options.
 
https://www.flightglobal.com/ntsb-c...n-to-737-rudder-system-problem/160108.article
TLDR: Mis-assembled rudder actuators from Collins are prone to water ingress and can freeze up in cold conditions. United are the only US airline affected, and that only for 9 aircraft, and had already replaced them, but if Collins delivered 353 mis-assembled actuators, then some are likely in non-US aircraft and they all need to be accounted for.
 
DWG said:
https://www.flightglobal.com/ntsb-c...n-to-737-rudder-system-problem/160108.article
TLDR: Mis-assembled rudder actuators from Collins are prone to water ingress and can freeze up in cold conditions. United are the only US airline affected, and that only for 9 aircraft, and had already replaced them, but if Collins delivered 353 mis-assembled actuators, then some are likely in non-US aircraft and they all need to be accounted for.
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This isn't the first time such 737 rudder-actuator problems have occurred, there were several fatal crashes over 30 years ago in the early 1990s caused by defective 737 rudder-actuators.
 
NMaude said:
This isn't the first time such 737 rudder-actuator problems have occurred, there were several fatal crashes over 30 years ago in the early 1990s caused by defective 737 rudder-actuators.
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Not strictly defective rudder actuators;- the problem was caused by a simplex rudder architecture, dirty hydraulic fluid and a lack of appropriate qualification testing.

As a result of the above when a hydraulic system accumulates particles contaminates (as they do with time) and the aircraft is operating experiences a thermal gradient (as happens during descent) a rudder demand in one direction would result in the rudder moving in the opposite direction. Added to this the early 737 rudder wasn’t split and was hydraulically boosted by just one hydraulic system.

This kind of problem should have been detected by the qualification testing but the testing didn’t cover this operating case.

Hence a 737 operating exactly as Boeing said it was safe to fly, had a series of sporadic fatal incidents, which are now largely forgotten. True, they did introduce dual system architecture on the -400 onwards but I don’t believe for the earlier models they did any hardware modifications, just tightened up the hydraulic system replacement and flushing.
 
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Being reported Boeing is considering issuing $10bn of new shares to restore its finances after the strike but may hold off upto a month hoping to reach a deal and so get a better deal/know how much exactly is required to restore its finances. It currently has $58bn of debt and is only one notch above junk status and bled $8.25bn in red ink during the first 6 months of the year.

https://www.sharecast.com/news/inte...0bn-selling-new-stock---report--17582829.html
 
TMA1 said:
Is that basically stock dilution?
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Arguably, but in terms of legally I don't believe so. Companies regularly do things to control the amount of stock in circulation, either for the purposes of adjusting stock value (splits and mergers) or to raise more money.

I think it becomes dilution when the company has to sell more shares than they originally set up to exist.
 
Yes any kind of raising new share capital is a form of dilution, an existing shareholder could subscribe to the share offering to maintain the same ratio share of the company, or hope that the extra capital raised increases the value of their existing shares (either through being a better capitalised company with a stronger balance sheet and less borrowing, that the investment purpose intended for the extra capital will increase the value of the company, or for example when used for an acquisition of a competitor it adds direct value to the company)
 
Really bad couple of days for Boeing. The families of the victims are currently in court arguing against the DOJ's settlement. The company has ended negotiations with the striking workers and is now suing their union, they announced they were cutting 10% of global employees within a month (17,000 jobs) due to their poor cashflow (at the same time they need to be increasing their aircraft delivery rate), the 777X has been delayed until 2026 and finally that because they are losing money on 767 freighters they will cease production of the 767 platform in 2027 except for the KC-46A variant (despite it being quite a good seller and them currently lobbying Congress for a further 5 year exemption from noise and emissions limits that come into force in 2028).


https://simpleflying.com/boeing-delays-777x-program-2026/
 
Boeing Workers "We want a 40% rise to reflect the pay cut you gave us in the mid 2010's that you assured us was temporary
Boeing "30%, final offer and wont go any higher, If you dont accept it within a few days we will take it off the table"
Boeing Workers "No, we want 40%"
Boeing "Fine 38% over four years plus a $12,000 agreement bonus"
Boeing Workers "Deal"
 
All -

In review of Boeings " Key Performance Indicators " for aircraft production, they specified 6....

" Employee Proficiency "

" Supplier shortages "

" Notice of escapes = measures time spent performing. rework in QMS, on items from Boeing fabrication and Suppliers "

" Rework hours per airplane = measures time spent performing
rework in " Final Assembly ".

" Travelers at factory rollout = Unfinished work traveling from final ".

" Ticketing Performance = measures quality escapes per ticketed airplane, prior to delivery".


As regards " Notice of Escapes ".... It is not immediately clear how Boeing re-acquiring Spirit Aerosystem's assets helps Boeing boost production quality ? That pre-supposes Boeing workers would provid better quality on components and sub-asssemblies than what Spirit Aero workers did...pretty much across the board. That question will probably remain unanswered, as the quality measure going forward will be ascribed to Boeing employees only; after the re-acquisition.
There is also a need for Supplier' responsibilty for rework to be clarified, well communicated; and agreed to between the Prime and Suppliers.

As regards " Rework hours per airplane "....
Boeing links this KPI to work performed in " Final Assembly ".
A distinction should be drawn. In order to track this KPI, digital documentation will need to be scrupulously input.
What may not be so well identified and quantified, are the levels and amount of rework production employees generate; that they find & fix before putting an item / task " up for sale "
to QA. This type of rework speaks not only to worker qualification and proficiency, but also things like rudimentary skills, worker' attitude; and " personal warranty " ( one's own quality standards ). *Those last 2 have a huge impact on day-to-day production, yet seem to lie beyond Boeing's immediate focus. Poor performance ( poor proficiency ) is corrected through additional training. Poor attitude is addressed via counseling. In other words, what will Boeing do with perpetually poor performing workers ; once they become known ? An employee that feels they are in the spotlight, may feel compelled to reach out to the Union ( if a member).

As regards " Travelers at Factory rollout "...
If it is travelling from Final, the implication seems to be the fix would take place on the pre-delivery ramp. Some travel work is also itself rework, wherever it occurs between and along the various production cells.

* While not clearly stated by Boeing within the 6 KPIs, the term " travel work " also applies to needed rework that escaped the purview of one production cell, and is eventually caught by inspection taking place at another cell further down the line. This is another situation where individual worker proficiency and attitude loom large. If a production cell receives too many items needing rework from a cell placed earlier in the manufacturing process, they are going to want corrections made; and reliefe from any extra time-consuming workload. In some instances, a maximum number of allowable rework items may need to be established; before an item or task can be input to the next production cell down the line. Otherwise, habitual offenders would simply skate through their identified work tasks; if not held responsible for reworking their own mistakes ( personal warrantee ).

While things like " Personal warrantee " and worker attitude are not unniversally boosted by wage increases, problem employees still need to be " gotten through to "; in any event.


With regards,
357Mag
 
357Mag said:
As regards " Rework hours per airplane "....
Boeing links this KPI to work performed in " Final Assembly ".
A distinction should be drawn. In order to track this KPI, digital documentation will need to be scrupulously input.
What may not be so well identified and quantified, are the levels and amount of rework production employees generate; that they find & fix before putting an item / task " up for sale "
to QA. This type of rework speaks not only to worker qualification and proficiency, but also things like rudimentary skills, worker' attitude; and " personal warranty " ( one's own quality standards ).
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When I was working at Tramco, we had a specific form for "work/rework caused by a Tramco employee", largely for cost accounting purposes, IIRC (it's been 25 years).

Simply instituting a similar form but for each work center may prove adequate.


357Mag said:
*Those last 2 have a huge impact on day-to-day production, yet seem to lie beyond Boeing's immediate focus. Poor performance ( poor proficiency ) is corrected through additional training. Poor attitude is addressed via counseling. In other words, what will Boeing do with perpetually poor performing workers ; once they become known ? An employee that feels they are in the spotlight, may feel compelled to reach out to the Union ( if a member).
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Part of the Union's job is ensuring that the member's work is up to the union's standards. If they're not willing or able to produce work to the required standards, they can and should be retrained or fired as necessary.
 
All -

As regards " re-work "...

During my last years @ Spirit Aerosystems Tulsa, QA sent out a message that doumentation would be required going forward, for all re-work performed on Boeing aircraft components ( B737 series Aft Flaps was my work area ).

Before the date specified for the start of documenting all re-work, I felt compelled to try coaxing senior leadership into abandoning the effort before it got started. I shotgun E-mailed
QA and all Management levels with the same message...at the same time.

I pointed out that the time required for workers to input the data and also to call QA for making special inspections... was simply unsupportable and unsustainable. From memory, and Aft Flap Aft Spar was assembled using a combo of 123 total rivits and " Hylock " fasteners. I asked the question of how each fastener requiring re-work could readily be identified ?
For example... how would you inform QA about the location of each & every fastener in question...when they wanted each one to have its own input documentation and inspection?
Example: " 57th rivit in from the Rt outboard edge " ?
Example: " 8th Hylock on the upper row of fasteners joining the spar web to the spar cap " ? The whole shebang would have to have been digitized, and also provide pre-formed wording and / or codes to speed use. Even then...workers would be at the SMS computer for inordinate amounts of time.

I also pointed out that QA inspection levels were already demanding, and new ( increased ) re-work documentation / inspection regimine would have over-obligated QA inspectors; with the result being greatly delayed inspections. To my suprise, QA retracted the message; and things settled back down ! My first level supervisor thanked me for getting management to change their mind.

My second-level supervisor ( who was only seen on the production floor maybe once a year ), made it a point to come down to the floor.... specically to see me. He then proceeded to try and ream me out for the amount of time I must have expended...formulating and obviously very persuasive & successful E-mail message. The day's production needs... making the " rate "... were the paramount concerns, he sternly assured . Figuring he would not take the time to personally find out how much time I had actually spent on the message,
I told him an amount about 1/3rd the actual time I had spent.
And, off he went.

My point: At Spirit, Tulsa.... You could re-work errors you found and/ or made yourself all you needed to.... right up until the task or item was " bought " by QA. Re-work after the item was sold to QA , required prior authorizarion from Engineering and QA.....before such re-work could be legally undertaken ( per QA regs ). Some re-work requires specific Engineering review and aurhorization. For example: when a worker found a " non-shear " rivit ( excess gap rivit head-to-structure), they were allowed to re-drill the hole, and install a .001" or .002"
" oversize " as needed; to straighten out the crooked hole.
However....if the hole was still crooked after trying the .002"
" over " rivit.... they had to obtain Engineering aurhorization to try the last allowable fix.....use of a .003" oversize rivit.

One can see how such items might have contributed to " travel work " in the past, and even so today.


With regards,
357Mag
 
Speaking as a (Pharmaceutical) QA its not so much recording which particular bolt required rework every time, its as much to know that a section has required rework and then we would be looking at our records for the frequency and quantity of reworking required on that section. If we saw a pattern that it was happening a lot (or on certain shifts, or from a particular suppliers materials) we would look at improving the process to be correct first time either through improved practise (better tools/training) or simplification of the task. My suspicion is the reason they wanted supervision of the final allowable fix was because if it failed the part had to be scrapped which was a financial loss for the company, but also the risk workers might not report it failing as they didn't want to be responsible for the loss and so it was passing on and potentially missed during inspection.

Its all about managing risk, one or two minor defects isn't a issue but when there is a large number the cumulative risk of failure makes the part too risky to be used, particularly when lives are on the line if it failed. When these become significant you have to write a justification on why the product is still safe to release to market.

To give an example from my work you might have say in the procedure a maximum number of hours product can wait after initial mixing between moving between along production into a final mixing and then compression, if it broke it for a couple of hours due to a production machine breaking down and requiring repair then you wrote a justification for why that was a minor risk. If the machine was down all week you would have to either write a justification for it being done on a sister production line mixer instead (same equipment model, end result already validated) but you couldn't put it on another machine of a different design that wasn't validated as that would require product stability trials and extensive sampling over a year to validate that it had been properly mixed which would be costly, so you would write that the time interval was now too large and the batch should be binned rather than waiting into the following week. Similarly if a batch was compressed and the pills were too hard or too soft (which affects the speed of digestion in the stomach and dose absorption by the body) which was usually due to varying moisture content from atmospheric conditions you would assess them against the product license (manufacturing tolerances are tighter than the limits in the product license, so if they are still within the license tolerance you could still release them) or if not you could decide whether you want to crush them down and recompress them as a 5 or 10% addition to another different batch to balance out the moisture.

Being a QA for a life sensitive product is a tough balancing act between the interests of the shareholders and the safety of the public, but when you do it right you can not only increase the consumer protection but also find ways of reducing the rejection rate, finding alternative cheaper but same or better quality suppliers and also reducing production material wastage from new processes/altered inputs and saving the company money.
 
New setback in Max 7 and 10 certification.
In the event of a bird strike the CFM Leap mechanically disengages the fan to prevent further vibration damage (like shedding blades). However the fan also supplies the bleed air system to the cockpit and passenger cabin (Engine 1 cockpit, engine 2 cabin), when the fan blade disconnects from the bleed air system it allows noxious fumes to enter these compartments. This discovery has been prompted by an NTSB investigation into several incidents last year where the Max 8 aircraft cockpit filled with smoke from an unknown source, the load reduction device is another undocumented MAX aircraft feature. In the interim aircraft operators have begun independently writing procedures that in the event of a bird strike the bleed air system should be switched off.

https://airinsight.com/737-max-7-and-max-10-likely-to-be-further-delayed/
 
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