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I think you mean 127mm rather than inches. I do that a fair bit these days so I get the point you are going to make.
A freaking USN press release.Could you at least restate the name of the site that gave that info? I have a hard time believing accommodating a 57mm was hard or that 127” was considered mission critical for DDGX. Even CPS seemed optional in the renders I saw, and of course I feel like it has no place on that platform anyway. But I would love to know who thought these two systems were necessary and why.
I'm uncertain how many relays will be required for these sats as the region of intrest is near China which is conviently where their ground stations and other intel costumers are. They can also just downlink when they are away from jamming sources over a different part of the world but that would invovle 10s of minutes of intel stallness. Though this delay is likely still acceptable. Additionally if you have a automatic system, the sat itself is unjammable as it would just broadcast its data to the downlink station regardless of how jammed it is. You would need to jam/destroy the downlink stations.Most current LEO satellite systems still rely on relays (or time delays), with Starlink and Starshield being the only two constellations I know of that exist in significant numbers. That will change in a matter of years of course, but it is probably still true for most commercial satellite constellations or even most PRC remote sensing satellites. Directing a lot of energy at GEO or Molniya orbits from the ground could be modestly effective in many cases. Laser cross links do pretty much prevent any practical uplink/downlink jamming. Another alternative might be jamming or spoofing command signals to the ground units carrying out the fire mission.
Radar satellites are pretty easy to jam with available surface based power; the trick is more in not having your target be the source of the jamming. Visual sensors are much harder to spoof but have much smaller collection footprints.
Obscurants and decoys are mostly only useful against the terminal sensors in the weapons themselves, though that combined with navigation denial could potentially be quite effective. Not a lot of sensor phenomologies are available to hypersonic or ballistic weapons.
I am not saying soft kill and ISR disruption is something that can be relied on but there is also a lot potential there, if you have a very good understanding of the enemy’s kill chain. What I certainly know is the case is that matching every hypersonic and ballistic missile with 2+ interceptors is unworkable, and no BBGX is not the least bit more survivable along any timeframe that matters if that is the only means of defense.
So trump supporters can't do coherent analysis. Understood. The elephant in the room is much bigger than I expected.
No one here would suggest the USAF buy 8,000 low end F-16 that could suffer significant casualties without a total loss of capacity. Instead we support buying high end F-35 and F-47 with unmanned escorts.
The USN under the democrats was specifically looking for smaller low end solutions that would suffer significant casualties. The USN under Trump would instead use unmanned escorts and keep all it's personnel safe in a high end ship. One solution values the lives of it's citizens greater than the other.
It is total hypocrisy if you support the USAF policy of high end aircraft with unmanned escorts but think it's bad for the Navy. TDS is real.
As long as it's not nuclear, we can have the beast fitted out in Pascagoula.So, Newport News is supposed to do final assembly on this new battleship. No shock, since they are probably the only yard big enough with experience in complex systems integration.
However, IIRC, they don't have a spare dock, so this inherently displaces carrier builds. That's a terrible trade if you ask me.
As long as it's not nuclear, we can have the beast fitted out in Pascagoula.
HII has built a whole lot of Burkes, and is currently building Burke IIIs.
Nothing new but standard "we should invest into distributed platforms instead", while omitting the fact, that Chinese industrial advantage there even greater. Basically he is providing criticism, but no alternate solutions.Worth reading.
His arguments are basically boil down to "it would cost too much" and "distributed solutions are better". For the first - the cost is NOT a major limitation for USN, the industrial capabilities are (and industrial limitations favor large units, that require less high-tech components). For the second - distributed solutions by now are the symmetrical approach, where USN would always be in losing position toward the PLAN.A comment on content, as opposed to attacking the messenger.
The PRC took its time building those capabilities. Successive US governments with suitably sustained long term policies could remedy that. But will they? Would voters accept that?the cost is NOT a major limitation for USN, the industrial capabilities are
I have difficulty in seeing any large USA-PRC armed conflict NOT escalating into nuclear conflict.the symmetrical approach, where USN would always be in losing position toward the PLAN.
His arguments are basically boil down to "it would cost too much" and "distributed solutions are better". For the first - the cost is NOT a major limitation for USN, the industrial capabilities are (and industrial limitations favor large units, that require less high-tech components). For the second - distributed solutions by now are the symmetrical approach, where USN would always be in losing position toward the PLAN.
Yes, but don't forget that USS Stark should be able to engage (theoretically) at least three missiles - with its Mk-31 GMLS, 76-mm autocannon and Vulcan CIWS. But on practice, she didn't even fire a single shot.
I really doubt anything under 500 miles altitude is talking directly to China from more a thousand miles off their coast in UHF, but I could be wrong. How long until a friendly station is available depends totally on the orbit, but a polar orbit typical of observation satellites basically lets the world travel to it, not the other way around. US recon satellites typically upload to a satellite in GEO or to a satellite in a Molniya orbit over the target area (invariably Asia, also similar orbit for ELINT satellites like JUMPSEAT or TRUMPET). However you dice it, sans laser mesh network, which is a newer thing and requires a certain sized constellation, LEO needs to uplink to a higher orbit to downlink to a control station in (near) realtime. The US also has the advantage of global downlinks connected to hard wired, be it Hawaii, Australia, Diego, Qatar, or wherever.
Those relay satellites are at around 20,000 miles where they can receive most any signal, including a shit load of ground based jamming with a lot more power and only marginally more distance (if any, depending on geometry) than a LEO satellite. The only publicly known system that does anything like this is a relocatable US one with a really forgettable generic name - counter communication system, new version Meadowlands. But there’s no reason an entire building sized antenna in Guam could not be dedicated to the purpose either. ETA: always wondered if some of the numerous satellite com domes on USN ships did not have a dual/alternate function of uplink jamming - plenty of power on a mobile platform).
You can download data next time you pass over a friendly download site, and I assume that’s how most current commercial systems work. But that is with an obvious severe lag time that is not target grade information.
Obviously laser mesh networks solve all of this, and I know China has two separate ones it is beginning to orbit. So that is just a matter of time. But my point is, reliable realtime satellite communications are non trivial.
You need ships hundreds of miles infront of the taskforce for mile course interception which makes most of the kill chain disruption methods applicable. I don't believe those sats are designed to downlink to anything other than land based ground stations. So there would still be relays of some nature required to get it to ships/aircraft in theatre.CEC has been replaced with NIFCCA and I believe most of the system utilizes internal lines of communication within the task force, which should be difficult to jam. But clearly early warning of ballistic attack is essential and could potentially be denied. The main difference I see is that current US ballistic early warning satellites operate in GEO or Molniya orbits to begin with, and should not need a relay, and that the new LEO SDA missile tracking system is explicitly laser mesh linked along with the tactical communications network being orbited next to it. A additional MEO system is also about to orbited. None of that is fool proof, but it is probably harder to jam or screw with either compared to a non mesh LEO satellite, and clearly the US is attempting to cover every base when it comes to BM warning/tracking. I am unaware of similar PRC programs outside their GEO IR satellites, but then the US is hardly a major ballistic missile threat…currently…
At the end of the day, the question becomes how many long range missiles hard to intercept can you launch at known targets while risking the smallest amount of equipment/money yourself. Carriers are absolutely the wrong answer, BBGX is slighlty less wrong, USV even less, and semi-submersible UUV are are another increment less wrong.The difference I see is that any major force projection by PLAN requires actual ships, even a blockade, and certainly an invasion. So a smaller number of USVs that are difficult to completely eliminate is a much more credible threat. If any of several dozen medium sized unmanned platforms with four containers on its back deck might be able to launch a dozen aeroballistic missiles a thousand kilometers, that’s a harder problem than one big BBGX. It gets even harder if the local Allie’s allow the basing of much smaller semisubmersibles that might carry mines, short ranged missiles, or themselves act as IEDs. And UUVs are probably a better investment still. This forces a much larger counter effort by the PLAN than BBGX, which is a more straight forward PLARF problem. Going in the other direction, something like the Alaska class or Lewis&Clark class fitted out as a CPS platform can put coastal targets at risk outside most any practical ballistic missile range, and potential blend in with other TKO/tanker traffic. Cheaper platform with about as much long range threat as BBGX. Give it an escort if necessary or have it just do laps around Guam.
Defensive escorts are still needed, so DDGX or something like it is necessary. But BBGX fills no practical role outside looking cool.
Thaad specifically example is going ~M8 and has MWIR sensors (though at higher altitudes) done with gas film cooling and windows recessed into side wells. There's some Chinese papers on dual mode EO/radar terminal guidance for BM's so I wouldn't be surprised if it's implemented on their newer BM/hypersonics. Generating smoke screens only sort of works as it's clear where the large smoke sources are when the targets are moving and you're coming in near vertically so you can just hit those. Also it would require a tremendous amount to not thin out over 1/2 a mile to protect a carrier in the middle.I consider it questionable that hypersonics or ballistics have anything multispectral. AFAIK all previous guided MARVs were radar, and it is hard for me to imagine hypersonic gliders or re-entry vehicles having optical or IR sensors. That said, basic bitch SRBOC could potentially push chaff and flares to obscure a target. IR obscurent smoke is standard on any modern ARV. Pandara Fog was experimented with by the USN using army smoke generators integrated with uptake stacks of Burkes. So you could literally generate a wide spectrum optical/IR/x band smoke screen en mass, assuming you had to. I always wondered if perhaps tactical munition dispensers with mixed obscurent smoke could not simply be heavily loaded on to F-18s so they could rapidly “bomb” their own carriers with 10,000 lbs of mixed cluster munitions for cover.
A smarter way to go about this might be to instead use a swarm of UAVs to fake a target rather than obscure one. The USN experimented with Perdix drones drones from flare dispensers that effectively could act as smart chaff. If you needed to fool an EO sensor, that might be as simple as massed upward facing LED lighting, especially if the actual target was obscured.
There also was an entire program dedicated to persistent hovering decoys, basically super nukla.
I do know what the USN project Nemisis cooked up, but many years ago they were already hard at work trying to creating realistic cross spectrum decoys. I would not rule out the possibility that real targets might be obscured and false positives might be injected during the 10-20 minute flight time of any DF-21/26.
ETA: I am also interested in the max elevation angle of the USNs test laser systems. That might be another way to narrow spectrum options for an incoming seeker, even if dazzling orbital sensors is not practical.
Strongly disagree. Submarines have torp tube launched hypersonics, high end supersonics, in addition to VLS cells. Also gen5/6 aircraft launching them at ships without CV/AWACS near by.By 2029, an unrealistically optimistic timeframe for the BB to be operational, the USS Stark attack will be closer in time to WWII. The only way a high end surface combatant gets attacked with high end super/hyper-sonic weapons unaware in the 2030s is if one side has achieved complete dominance in space, and if that happens it will be to our advantage not China's IMO.
The strategic advantage in this conflict is that one is defending, and there is no need for "power projection" or mobility when you can build fortresses.Nothing new but standard "we should invest into distributed platforms instead", while omitting the fact, that Chinese industrial advantage there even greater. Basically he is providing criticism, but no alternate solutions.
You can get a dozen starships for a BBGX, and a dozen starships is dropping a "destroyer" worth of tonnage of hypervelocity projectiles in a single sortie cycle. People are counting the tubes and shots when you are kilotonnage with conventional explosives.At the end of the day, the question becomes how many long range missiles hard to intercept can you launch at known targets while risking the smallest amount of equipment/money yourself. Carriers are absolutely the wrong answer, BBGX is slighlty less wrong, USV even less, and semi-submersible UUV are are another increment less wrong.
There are Chinese studies where hypersonics have a space component that does the observation at standoff and does command guidance of munition. We know it would work, see starship reentry livestreams.I consider it questionable that hypersonics or ballistics have anything multispectral. AFAIK all previous guided MARVs were radar, and it is hard for me to imagine hypersonic gliders or re-entry vehicles having optical or IR sensors.
Politicians are good at politics and worst than random forum goers at military stuff. "Rope a dope" is legit, the dreadnaught won ww1 (by getting high seas fleet built). Also, consider Chinese Carriers (not actually relevant for the next war they plan to fight). Stranger things happens.Defensive escorts are still needed, so DDGX or something like it is necessary. But BBGX fills no practical role outside looking cool.
Trump class as a incoherent, do everything vehicle that is Vickers A1E1 Independent than relatively focused concepts like F-35 or F-47. Its logic is predreadnaught~No one here would suggest the USAF buy 8,000 low end F-16 that could suffer significant casualties without a total loss of capacity. Instead we support buying high end F-35 and F-47 with unmanned escorts.
I disagree on this point.Trump class as a incoherent, do everything vehicle that is Vickers A1E1 Independent than relatively focused concepts like F-35 or F-47. Its logic is predreadnaught~
It has at least twice the range of a conventionally-armed Tomahawk (3500 vs 1700km) and that 3500km figure is probably ballistic range only without including glide range. Airspace closures during testing indicate around 4500km.I disagree on this point.
1) CPS/Dark Eagle is effectively a Tomahawk in terms of range and effect on target. Just faster. The physical size of the CPS means it needs a big chunk of space in the ship or just flat a big ship to haul it around, but I expect it to be used in much the same way as a Tomahawk.
I disagree on this point.
1) CPS/Dark Eagle is effectively a Tomahawk in terms of range and effect on target. Just faster. The physical size of the CPS means it needs a big chunk of space in the ship or just flat a big ship to haul it around, but I expect it to be used in much the same way as a Tomahawk.
This means that a ship big enough to trivially carry ~20something CPS is the new "destroyer" size. 6-8x APM tubes (18-24x CPS) plus 92-96x Mk41. The "cruiser" equivalent is ~10-12x APM plus 122-128x Mk41. And yes, I would expect the ships to still have a few Tomahawks in the Mk41s for a little bit, but not the full 20-30 like now. Probably 10-15 Tomahawks.
But by early 2030s the army does plan to have thousands delivered per year, costing similar to a cruise missile.
Was not talking about castelion missile but lrhw. Armys name for cps. 5 year army budget plans have them ordering thousands per year at like a million or two each.That is a different system and it remains to be seen if Castelion lives up to the hype. Right now that’s vaporware.
Also if some kind of Blackbeard weapon is adopted for mk41, presumably everyone can stop obsessing about putting CPS on escorts?
Please show us exactly what you're talking about. 7 ton missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles are not in the realm of a million or two each. Maybe PrSM would be about that expensive.Was not talking about castelion missile but lrhw. Armys name for cps. 5 year army budget plans have them ordering thousands per year at like a million or two each.
Was not talking about castelion missile but lrhw. Armys name for cps. 5 year army budget plans have them ordering thousands per year at like a million or two each.
I think something else is going on here. The current Dark Eagle AUR+C unit cost is $35 - 40 million. The Navy expects to pay $50+ million per AUR+C for CPS. The tables on the subsequent pages don't break down procurement between AUR+Cs and all of the GSE and other equipment like they do with other programs like the Javelin on the next set of pages.
The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program has paid Lockheed Martin since 2018 to develop and produce the hypersonic Dark Eagle missile, which includes the Dynetics Common Hypersonic Glide Body and a two-stage Northrop Grumman booster rocket. However, each Lockheed missile—also being supplied for the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program—came with a roughly $40 million price tag, which limited annual orders to 2-3 dozen.
Castelion entered the missile business in 2022 with a new approach, informed by the founders’ experience at SpaceX. The company bypasses traditional aerospace suppliers of low-volume, high-cost components that come qualified for the rigors of rocket launches. Instead, the company acquires as much as possible—electronics, pumps and more—from the high-volume, low-cost automotive industry, then adapts them for aerospace. Castelion also builds its own thermal protection systems, propellant and rocket motors.
Although the company has yet to produce at scale, the Army’s leadership has embraced its low-cost concept for hypersonic missile manufacturing. The fiscal 2027 budget proposal calls for shutting down Dark Eagle production for the service and transitioning all management of the program to the Navy, which will continue acquiring the Lockheed missile for submarines and ships.
Starting in fiscal 2029, the LRHW program is to ramp up orders substantially, buying 500 that year and 2,000 each in fiscal 2030 and 2031, according to budget justification documents. Castelion selected a 1,000-acre site in November for a solid-rocket motor manufacturing campus in Sandoval County, New Mexico.
Blackbeard is small enough to go on an F/A-18E/F (the Navy has just given Castelion a $105m contract for integration as the winner of MACE), which means it's almost certainly small enough to fit an M-270/HIMARS pod.I also don't know how the Army thinks they will even be able to use 4,500 missiles with the limited number of launch batteries they will field.
The confusing part is that the Justification Statement associated with the LRHW entry in the budget request specifically describes the Dark Eagle battery structure (BOC + 4 launchers with 8 AUR+Cs and 8 reloads) and the missile with the C-HGB and the 34.5-inch booster.If the Army is abandoning LRHW/Dark Eagle for Blackbeard or similar, how secure is CPS/Dark Eagle? And should the USN be making major design decisions around it?
The 4,500 missiles make plenty of sense for the Blackbeard procurement, although I have heard that the Blackbeard unit cost is supposed to be closer to $400k per. I have never found conclusive numbers for the weight and dimensions of the Blackbeard. I have seen 12-inch diameter and 4 m length with a mass of 1,250 kg, but that mass makes no sense compared to the weight of GMLRS and ATACMS or the BM-30 Smerch, which was a 12-inch rocket with a length of 7.6 m and a mass of 800 kg. The size would position it between GMLRS and PrSM, possibly with four missiles per pod. I don't know how the Blackbeard with the booster that looks like a Mk 12 figures into any plans, or if there is actually a smaller Blackbeard that is supposed to fit in an F-35 and be about the size of an AMRAAM.Blackbeard is small enough to go on an F/A-18E/F (the Navy has just given Castelion a $105m contract for integration as the winner of MACE), which means it's almost certainly small enough to fit an M-270/HIMARS pod.
Like I said, the program description clearly describes the Dark Eagle LRHW as we know it, but the acquisition numbers and the cost figures don't seem to match. I wouldn't want to draw any real conclusions from this document.So they have a name for a program which then got reused for a completely different system of a completely different class and abilities?? That is totally not gonna cause any issues...
So they have a name for a program which then got reused for a completely different system of a completely different class and abilities?? That is totally not gonna cause any issues...
Wouldn't be the first time that a major typo/copypasta oops has appeared in official government documents.The confusing part is that the Justification Statement associated with the LRHW entry in the budget request specifically describes the Dark Eagle battery structure (BOC + 4 launchers with 8 AUR+Cs and 8 reloads) and the missile with the C-HGB and the 34.5-inch booster.
You can use a fat booster on things going in an F-35, the bay will physically fit 20x19x168"if there is actually a smaller Blackbeard that is supposed to fit in an F-35 and be about the size of an AMRAAM.
The same railgun these abject fools claim will replace carrier based air power and missiles?nuke it with a railgun from a Trump BBBG(X) (Bigly Battle Boat of Gold (X= cool)).