An 800-ship Navy for the 1980s Maritime Strategy

[Yellow Palace]

It looks like they envisaged ordering six new destroyers – implicitly Spruance-class – in 1985 for delivery in 1989, before Burke-class construction got going. Which feels like a weird choice to me, but I guess they needed the ships in the mix in that timeframe.

Adding onto this - Janes Fighting Ships 1982-1983 mentions that the Spruance-class programme was proposed for a restart in the late 1980s to replace the Forrest Sherman-class and Hull-class, while the then-unnamed DDG-51 class would replace the Leahy, Belknap, and Coontz classes. Janes isn't always correct - see the slightly weird class names given! - but it does give some indication as to the thinking at the time.

Replacing the ex-DLGs does give 28-30 Burkes, lining up with contemporary statements that no more than 30 were planned and validating my view that they, alongside the Ticonderoga-class, were seen as DLG equivalents.

 

[Hood]

Some snippets from the contemporary Flottes de Combat/Combat Fleets of the World 1980-1981.
Again, some salt may be required.

Ohio class: 8 ordered up to FY80, plans to order 1x in each FY81, 82, 83 & 84 with 2x in FY85. That would give 14 subs.
Los Angeles class: 35 ordered up to FY80, plans to order 1x in each FY81, 82 & 83 with 2x in FY84. That would give 40.
SSN21/Seawolf class: planned prototype order FY83, 1x FY84, 4x FY85 and series production from FY86 onwards.
CG47/Ticonderoga class: 2 ordered up to FY80, "future acquisition plans uncertain" due to the likely $1 billion price tag, but did acknowledge FY80 5-year plan had 2x FY81, 3x in each FY & 83, 4x in each FY84 & 85. That would give 18 ships.
DDX class: originally scheduled for FY84 but may slip to FY86 or later. Only mentions for replacement of Forrest Sherman class.
Kidd class: 4 ships
Spruance class: no additional ships, DD997 authorised FY78, only sufficient funds to complete as a standard ship. Plans to refit with VLS from FY84. Plans to fit 8in Mk.71 cancelled 1978.
Perry class: 46 ordered up to FY80, plans to order 4x in each FY81 & 82, 3x in FY83, 4x in FY84. That would give 61 ship (10 more than completed historically).
LSD-41/Whidbey Island class: originally planned FY79, postponed to FY80 then deleted from 5-year program, pressure from Congress to request 1x in FY81, 1x in FY83, 1x FY85.

Naval Forces of the World, published in 1984 gives:
Ohio class: 5 completed/building, 5 ordered, 14 planned with 1x each in FY84, 85, 86, 87 & 88 with rest to follow. Giving 24 subs.
Los Angeles class: 30 completed/building, 11 ordered, 21 planned. Giving 62 subs.
SSN21/Seawolf class: not mentioned
CG47/Ticonderoga class: 2 completed/building, 8 ordered, 14 planned (3x each in FY85, 86, 87, 5x in FY88). Giving 24 ships.
DDX/Arleigh Burke class: 1 ordered, 59 planned with 3x in FY85, 5x in FY87 and the rest to follow. Gives 60 ships.
Perry class: 35 completed/building, 10 ordered, 5 planned, giving 50 ships (FFG7 to 60), so one less than historical.
LSD-41/Whidbey Island class: 2 building, 10 planned with 1x in each FY83, 84, 85, 86, 87 & 88 with rest to follow. Giving 12 ships, 4 more than historical.

So on the whole, the early 1980s seem pretty slack, with some improvement in order times by 1985 but there was little amphibious growth at all and indeed the Wasps were still some years off. Even the Ticonderogas seem pretty tardy.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That may not be coincidence - just because the funding wasn't there doesn't mean the missions went away!

I couldn't agree more.

E.g. enough 20-knot amphibious shipping for 2 MAF/MEF seems to have been what the "Top Brass" really wanted from the the late 1940s to at least the end of the Cold War. IIRC, it was part of the OTL 600-Ship Navy in its early days according to early 1980s editions of Jane's, before being reduced to 4 MAB/MEF or 1 MAF/MEF (of 3 brigades) and 1 MAB/MEF, depending upon how it's written in the sources.

It's particularly interesting to observe that the 1958 objectives called for 12 strike carriers and 9 ASW carriers... i.e. a total of 21, not counting the training ships. And 20-21 carriers featured in the 1967, 1968 and 1969 plans.

FWIW in reverse order.

The 20-21 aircraft carriers featured in the 1967, 1968 and 1969 plans are 15 attack carriers, plus up to 6 ASW support carriers and one training carrier, less ships having long refits.

• The requirement was for 15 attack carriers so that 5 would be forward deployed (3 Western Pacific & 2 Mediterranean) at all times. At 1967 the plan was to lay down 6 Nimitz class 1968-78 at the rate of one every two years to first replace the last 3 Essex class employed as attack carriers and then the 3 Midway class. As each ship was expected to take 3-4 years to build (like the first 9 super carriers) they'd commission 1971-82.
• There were 9 ASW support carriers in the early 1960s, but the P-3 Orion made them obsolete in their existing role. The intention was to reduce this force to 6 by 1975 so that 2 would be forward deployed (one Western Pacific & one Mediterranean) at all times to protect the forward deployed attack carriers. This was because the attack carriers couldn't outrun Soviet nuclear powered submarines (which were coming into service in ever increasing numbers) as well as the slower Soviet diesel-electric boats. AFAIK they were to initially have been 6 of the SCB-27C/SCB-125A Essex class, which would have been replaced by the SCB-100 class during the 1970s.

I think the 12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power) and 3 Large Training Carriers in the 1958 objective is a typo. I think it should have been 12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power) and 3 Midway class Attack Carriers for a total of 15 Attack Carriers.

• The USN had at least 15 attack carriers in commission from 1951 to 1975 against a long-standing requirement to have 5 of them forward deployed (2 Mediterranean and 3 Western Pacific) at all times, in peacetime.
• The first 6 Super Carriers were ordered FY 1952 to FY 1957 at the rate of one per year.
• According to Friedman the plan was to build 6 Nuclear Powered Attack Carriers at the rate of one per year from FY 1958 to FY 1963 which would be completed 1961-67 when the US Navy would have 15 large attack carriers consisting of 12 Supers (6 with Nuclear Power) and the 3 Midways.
• Friedman didn't say so, but I suspect that the longer-term plan was to build 3 CVAN (making a total of 9) to replace the Midways in the first half of the 1970s and that by 1975 the USN would have 15 Modern Attack Carriers (9 with Nuclear Power) and the Midways would have been paid off into the reserve fleet or scrapped.
• The USN had 9 Essex in the CVS role from the late 1950s to 1965 and the force was reduced to zero between then and 1973. Therefore, in common with the CVA force, it looks like the intention was to maintain the existing number of ships throughout the 1960s.
• There was only been one training carrier from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. From 1946 to 1957 it was one of the CVLs (Saipan, Wright, Cabot, Monterey & Saipan again) and from 1957 onwards one of the Essex class (Antietam and then Oriskany).

The 15 attack carrier requirement was resurrected as part of the 600-ship Navy, with its requirement for 15 multi-mission carriers, plus a 16th ship always having a SLEP refit. There was no longer any requirement for ASW support carriers because the super carriers now carried a squadron of S-3A Vikings and a squadron of SH-3H Sea Kings as part of their air wings.

 

[apparition13]

APHNAS was cancelled in 1972, along with its associated missile armament, while Seawolf-class design work started in 1983. Restarting APHNAS would be a very strange decision in that context.

With a PoD assumed circa 1981 - i.e. the start of the Reagan administration - you might get Seawolf pulled forward ayear or two, in which case the first of class might be ordered as early as 1987. In OTL, only one Los Angeles-class (CHEYENNE) was ordered after SEAWOLF.

You can get from Seawolf to APHNAS with Carter. The APHNAS missiles would be gone, but tubes for tomahawks could be installed in the extra space Carter has. Essentially a Seawolf version of the Virginia flight V, but with six or perhaps eight tubes with seven tomahawks each for 42-54 missiles rather than the 40 the flight V will have.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You can get from Seawolf to APHNAS with Carter. The APHNAS missiles would be gone, but tubes for tomahawks could be installed in the extra space Carter has. Essentially a Seawolf version of the Virginia flight V, but with six or perhaps eight tubes with seven tomahawks each for 42-54 missiles rather than the 40 the flight V will have.

You could actually get close to the Trident SSGNs that way.

Use the Trident tubes and the 7-shot payload modules. I wouldn't want to build the same length as Ohios. I'd go with maybe 14 overall tubes. 7 per side. Well, 12 Trident tubes and 2 diver lockout tubes. ~84x Tomahawks vertically, probably another dozen in the Torpedo Room. You'd be down to about 56x Tomahawks IIRC with DDS.

 

[apparition13]

Ohio is 170m long, Seawolf 108, Carter 138. If wiki is to be believed Ohio is a couple feet wider in beam, which is a fair bit of volume. The extra 62 meters of length for Ohio gets 24 tubes, an extra 30 meters in Carter with slightly less hull diameter would max out at roughly half that, or a little less. You wouldn't need full length tubes for tomahawks, but I'm assuming buoyancy considerations limit how much weight you can pack into that extra 30 meters, so I erred on the side of caution.

It would be a really expensive boat though.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Ohio is 170m long, Seawolf 108, Carter 138. If wiki is to be believed Ohio is a couple feet wider in beam, which is a fair bit of volume. The extra 62 meters of length for Ohio gets 24 tubes, an extra 30 meters in Carter with slightly less hull diameter would max out at roughly half that, or a little less. You wouldn't need full length tubes for tomahawks, but I'm assuming buoyancy considerations limit how much weight you can pack into that extra 30 meters, so I erred on the side of caution.

IIRC there's a lot of empty volume in the 7-shot modules. Plus the Tomahawks proper are pretty light.

This ship would need a turtleback like the Ohios have over the missiles. All the business end stuff is outside the pressure hull and needs streamlining. The missile tubes would be a good bit shorter, though, and that would likely keep the Soviets from completely losing their minds. ~35ft instead of ~44ft long.

It would be a really expensive boat though.

Hideously expensive, above and beyond the Seawolf price tag.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The industrial assessment of shipbuilding capacity referred to above is available on DTIC here. I've not fully read and digested it, but it's fundamentally looking at the feasibility of mobilisation shipbuilding.

It provides a specific number - 821 ships, including MSC and Reserve units, or 770 active-duty Navy - with a goal of achieving it by FY 1995. This was likely unachiveable, but substituting conventionally-powered ships for nuclear-powered ones could make it achievable in 14 years instead of 16.

Of interest is that the 700-ship option was sized to allow a 'breakout' to the 821-ship force within five years. One of the key elements needed to realise it - not assumed for the 821-ship option - is Ingalls becoming nuclear qualified. Both the 700 and 821-ship cases involve nuclear shipbuilding at naval shipyards; Mare Island, Philadephia, Portsmouth and Puget Sound still had capability for new construction.

Somewhat unfortunately, the actual fleet compositions are buried away in a classified appendix that isn't available online, at least as far as I can find it.

Hideously expensive, above and beyond the Seawolf price tag.

It would also mean losing a premier ASW asset.

 

[apparition13]

It would also mean losing a premier ASW asset.

In addition to, rather than in place of, is how I would approach it. The planned rate for Seawolf was 3 per year, so maybe 2 conventional and one SSGN, which would get you to 29 and 14-15 in around 15 years at full rate. A bit longer as you ramp up. Tough sell to Congress though.

It might be easier to keep pumping out Ohios at one per year, and just convert the oldest SSBN each year to an SSGN to maintain whatever SSBN fleet size you need to. Which frankly is the approach I'd prefer, since that way you don't have to relearn how to build SSBNs again and we don't run into the Columbia/Dreadnought problem. This might be an easier sell. If we assume a 40 year lifespan (Ohio is around 45 now) and 14 to fit treaty guidelines that would be 26 SSGNs (or a few less, with the remainder converted to something like a Carter), with them ticking over one per year, which would be really useful in land attack but also merchant raiding if armed with anti-ship Tomahawks.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The industrial assessment of shipbuilding capacity referred to above is available on DTIC here. I've not fully read and digested it, but it's fundamentally looking at the feasibility of mobilisation shipbuilding.

It provides a specific number - 821 ships, including MSC and Reserve units, or 770 active-duty Navy - with a goal of achieving it by FY 1995. This was likely unachiveable, but substituting conventionally-powered ships for nuclear-powered ones could make it achievable in 14 years instead of 16.

Of interest is that the 700-ship option was sized to allow a 'breakout' to the 821-ship force within five years. One of the key elements needed to realise it - not assumed for the 821-ship option - is Ingalls becoming nuclear qualified. Both the 700 and 821-ship cases involve nuclear shipbuilding at naval shipyards; Mare Island, Philadephia, Portsmouth and Puget Sound still had capability for new construction.

Weird, Ingalls/Pascagoula was nuclear qualified in the 1970s, building 637s. Must have been allowed to lapse.

It would also mean losing a premier ASW asset.

A "Seawolf block V" type SSGN is still a Seawolf. Still fast, still very heavily armed.

 

[Rule of cool]

Just a word on the 800 ship Navy, which appears to come up every now and then. Militaries are very conservative beasts, always thinking of the worst-case scenarios. 800 ship Navies arise I suspect because the Government states an array of threats and the Navy then lays out what is needed to deal with them in the worst-case scenario: bingo 800 ships!

In reality with a bit of risk management and diplomacy I suspect a 600 ship Navy could do pretty well against the list of threats.

 

[Hood]

I just don't see how an 800 ship Navy would be possible.
Yellow Palace has outlined a fairly sensible approach about how that figure could be obtained. Certainly industry would be hard pushed to meet that kind of target of new-build ships (as outlined earlier in the thread by the CBO Building a 600 Ship Navy report).
As we've mapped out, construction would go on well into the 1990s, but I feel the critical point would be the replacement of the late 50s and early 60s classes during the 1990s. Even in a continued Cold War environment, replacing all these ships with newer and more expensive ships and additional growth seems a big ask.

 

[Yellow Palace]

It's definitely not a realistic option, but rather the upper point in a study of what might be done under mobilisation conditions. The conclusion to which seems to be, it was actually a little more than the upper limit of what could be done even under those circumstances. Which is a very interesting finding.

But as much as it's unrealistic, I think understanding what militaries would like to have without cost constraints gives interesting insights into doctrine and perceived threats. The question I set out to answer is not 'What should have been done?', but rather 'What was that force goal?'.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I just don't see how an 800 ship Navy would be possible.
Yellow Palace has outlined a fairly sensible approach about how that figure could be obtained. Certainly industry would be hard pushed to meet that kind of target of new-build ships (as outlined earlier in the thread by the CBO Building a 600 Ship Navy report).
As we've mapped out, construction would go on well into the 1990s, but I feel the critical point would be the replacement of the late 50s and early 60s classes during the 1990s. Even in a continued Cold War environment, replacing all these ships with newer and more expensive ships and additional growth seems a big ask.

Oh, it'd be screamingly expensive to do. We're talking 10%GDP in military spending maybe more, and most of that going into the Navy for capital construction.