Alternate Canadian Armed Forces procurement 1970s

[Scott Kenny]

Does that mean that Canada's RW purchase of Leopard 1A3s failed to meet some specific NATO obligation(s)? If so, which one(s)?

Failed? No.

But Canada was assigned to field an entire division and change in Germany.

 

[GK. Dundas]

Failed? No.

But Canada was assigned to field an entire division and change in Germany.

No it wasn't as far as I can tell we promised a Brigade, we delivered a Brigade. Granted understrength for most of its life.
It eventually became a Brigade Group( essentially a pocket division).

 

[GK. Dundas]

Canada is a wealthy, secure country. It should buy new tanks, not rebuild old ones under normal peacetime conditions. Keep them in storage and have a rebuild option available, but Canada should be moving forward with defence procurements.

The 70's were a rough period economically forthe Canada. So it would be common sense and not just from an economic point of view.
In the early 70s the Canadian Centurions were quietly rebuilt and uparmored roughly an inch was added to hull and glaicis plate. And some minor mechanical work was done.
Also this was period where both the Germans and the Americans as well as the British were developing a whole new generation of MBTs .
So what do you do buy the latest current generation ? Or do you wait for the next generation of vehicles?
I personally consider the the Centurions with the Israeli upgrade package to be superior in most ways to both the M60 and Leopard I .
The other thing I would like to do is increase our holdings by purchasing from as many NATO allies as possible their retiring Centurion stocks.
I would see if I could make the Army' orginal goal of a tank park of approximately 850 Centurions .
This would allow for giving each Brigade a tank regiment and reserve force to maintain a tank capabilities . As well a war reserve stock .

 

[Rule of cool]

A division of what exactly? Canada bought 114 Leopard 1s, enough for 2 tank regiments for 2 Mechanised brigades. Another order of the same size could provide the tanks for an Armoured brigade for a powerful division of 3 brigades. Canada is rich enough that another 114 Leapard 1s will not break the bank.

 

[GK. Dundas]

A division of what exactly? Canada bought 114 Leopard 1s, enough for 2 tank regiments for 2 Mechanised brigades. Another order of the same size could provide the tanks for an Armoured brigade for a powerful division of 3 brigades. Canada is rich enough that another 114 Leapard 1s will not break the bank.

Technically that's barely enough for a tank regiment when you add in the training requirements and a small number of spares.

 

[Rule of cool]

In the Cold War a typical tank regiment/battalion ~50 tanks, with some outliers having up to 76 in the British case. 114 gun tanks is enough to sustain 1 typical regt/btn and surge a 2nd for short time in an emergency.

 

[Apophenia]

... Canada is rich enough that another 114 Leapard 1s will not break the bank.

Were you of adult age in the 1970s? Because those of us who lived through that decade certainly felt the Canadian economy going into a tailspin.

After 1973, a period of hyperinflation had kicked in. By 1975, there was huge pressure on the GoC to limit rising consumer price while at the same time introducing wage controls. Despite those efforts, Canada's national debt more than quadrupled through the 1970s. Does a GoC spending spree on military kit sound likely under such economic conditions?

@GK. Dundas has mentioned some slightly surreptitious upgrades for the CAF Centurion fleet begun in the early '70s. That approach starts to make a lot of sense to me. For whatever reason, hard-pressed taxpayers are often less likely to notice upgrade programmes - regardless of their costs - than straight-out procurements of new kit.

 

[Scott Kenny]

No it wasn't as far as I can tell we promised a Brigade, we delivered a Brigade. Granted understrength for most of its life.
It eventually became a Brigade Group( essentially a pocket division).

The entirety of 1st Canadian Division was assigned to BAOR, with 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group at the front. It was to be reinforced by the entirety of 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and about half (~1400 men) of 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in the event of war.

 

[GK. Dundas]

That would have been in the late 80's?
There was a great deal of talk about a division in time of a war and a fair bit of literature .
I don't recall it being taken all that seriously though.

 

[Rule of cool]

The 70s were a horrific time for everyone, not just Canada. Canada may have been different to other advanced economies by degree, but it was still one of the G7 founding members in 1975, the 70s didn't make Canada a 3rd world country.

The issue about more tanks, or anything else for that matter, is more closely related to political will than lack of resources. If the Canadain government thought it was important enough they'd find the money for extra new tanks. The thing is that Canada is even more secure than Australia, without a fractious neighbourhood to motivate extra defence spending.

 

[Rule of cool]

The entirety of 1st Canadian Division was assigned to BAOR, with 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group at the front. It was to be reinforced by the entirety of 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and about half (~1400 men) of 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in the event of war.

Where was the other half of the 1st Mech Bde supposed to go?

 

[GK. Dundas]

The 70s were a horrific time for everyone, not just Canada. Canada may have been different to other advanced economies by degree, but it was still one of the G7 founding members in 1975, the 70s didn't make Canada a 3rd world country.

The issue about more tanks, or anything else for that matter, is more closely related to political will than lack of resources. If the Canadain government thought it was important enough they'd find the money for extra new tanks. The thing is that Canada is even more secure than Australia, without a fractious neighbourhood to motivate extra defence spending.

I would stack the Centurion against any tank in the world until the introduction of the Leo II ,Abrams and the Challenger.
I think it would be good enough dealing with the majority of Sov armor.
The only really advantage that the Leo C1 had was speed.

 

[Rule of cool]

I would stack the Centurion against any tank in the world until the introduction of the Leo II ,Abrams and the Challenger.
I think it would be good enough dealing with the majority of Sov armor.
The only really advantage that the Leo C1 had was speed.

I'm a big fan of the Centurion and if the money is there then a diesel and auto transmission upgrade can keep it competitive until the 80s. However, when money is tight holding on to old gear at the expense of new gear is bad procurement policy, good militaries keep up with the times first and foremost.

 

[Apophenia]

The entirety of 1st Canadian Division was assigned to BAOR, with 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group at the front...

Supporting BAOR was the 1950s and most of the '60s. By the time we are talking about, the role for 4CMBG was to support for either the US Army's VII Corps or the Bundeswehr's II. Korps, depending on need (the latter being one reasons for a RW push for Leopard 1s.)

 

[Apophenia]

...
The issue [...] is more closely related to political will than lack of resources...

That is a distinction without a difference! The two are absolutely and irrevocably linked when it comes to procurement.

Demonstrably, in OTL, the GoC of the day did think MBTs important enough to purchase 114 Leopard C1s ... but not enough to buy more. In an ATL, we should be trying to find alternative ways forward. And, sorry, being "rich enough" doesn't do that.

@GK. Dundas' suggestion to further upgrade the existing Centurion fleet has a host of political advantages - hence my shifting position on that Leopard purchase. Done in chunks, neither the upgrade programme nor the purchase of small numbers of 'donor' hulls from allies would draw much attention from the Privy Council or from parliamentary oversight committees.

 

[Rule of cool]

I'm trying to gat a handle on Canada's ground forces commitment to NATO post Korea.

IIUC the main NATO formation from the late 50s was the 4th CIBG, which grew to 3 mech inf btns, an armoured regt and SP arty regt by the mid-late 60s. This AR was on the larger side as far as tank units go. 4th CIBG was attached to BAOR until 1968 and would be reinforced in wartime to become a full division.

In 1968 4th CIBG (renamed 4h 4th CMBG) was halved in size, and moved to be a reserve unit for US VII Corps and not receive reinforcement in wartime to bring it up to a full division.

At the same time CAST was stood up with the 5th CMBG, based in Canada with the role of being deployed to Norway in wartime. 5th CBMG consisted of 3 mech inf btns and SP arty.

This structure persisted until the late 80s when 1st Canadian Division was stood up with 4th and 5th CMBs and 1st CMB as a notional 3rd maneuvre unit for CP exercises. I can't really tell how many tank units Canada had under this structure, or how big they were.

Assuming his structure history is broadly correct and consistent with government policy and supported by elections then Canada only has a single tank unit from the late 50s, attached to 4th Brigade in Germany. This regiment had it's Centurions replaced by Leopard 1s in the late 70s, much like Australia did at he same time. What would a major upgrade of Centurions do? Go to Germany, be attached to CAST, stay with Reserve units in Canada with no serious active role?

 

[GK. Dundas]

I'm trying to gat a handle on Canada's ground forces commitment to NATO post Korea.

IIUC the main NATO formation from the late 50s was the 4th CIBG, which grew to 3 mech inf btns, an armoured regt and SP arty regt by the mid-late 60s. This AR was on the larger side as far as tank units go. 4th CIBG was attached to BAOR until 1968 and would be reinforced in wartime to become a full division.

In 1968 4th CIBG (renamed 4h 4th CMBG) was halved in size, and moved to be a reserve unit for US VII Corps and not receive reinforcement in wartime to bring it up to a full division.

At the same time CAST was stood up with the 5th CMBG, based in Canada with the role of being deployed to Norway in wartime. 5th CBMG consisted of 3 mech inf btns and SP arty.

This structure persisted until the late 80s when 1st Canadian Division was stood up with 4th and 5th CMBs and 1st CMB as a notional 3rd maneuvre unit for CP exercises. I can't really tell how many tank units Canada had under this structure, or how big they were.

Assuming his structure history is broadly correct and consistent with government policy and supported by elections then Canada only has a single tank unit from the late 50s, attached to 4th Brigade in Germany. This regiment had it's Centurions replaced by Leopard 1s in the late 70s, much like Australia did at he same time. What would a major upgrade of Centurions do? Go to Germany, be attached to CAST, stay with Reserve units in Canada with no serious active role?

As I recall the Centurions were sold to Austria for use as ready made pill boxes.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Supporting BAOR was the 1950s and most of the '60s. By the time we are talking about, the role for 4CMBG was to support for either the US Army's VII Corps or the Bundeswehr's II. Korps, depending on need (the latter being one reasons for a RW push for Leopard 1s.)

Yes, and that's still the entire 1st Canadian Division, with 4CMBG getting reinforced with 5CMBG and a good half of 1CMBG (1400 men)

 

[GK. Dundas]

The only reinforcements I was aware of was the tank regiment's flyover squadron. And some supplementary units.
During Brian Mulroney's tenure as PM there was planning done to increase the Brigade group to Division size . But the equipment and people were never there.
Actually the CAST Brigade always fascinated me . That could have been incredibly useful

 

[Rule of cool]

Yes, and that's still the entire 1st Canadian Division, with 4CMBG getting reinforced with 5CMBG and a good half of 1CMBG (1400 men)

When are you talking about?

IIUC 1st Canadian Division existed 1954-58 and 1988-92, and the 5e Groupement de Combat was formed in 1968 to be the land component of CAST before joining 4th CMBG in 1st Div in 1988

 

[Rule of cool]

Actually the CAST Brigade always fascinated me . That could have been incredibly useful

It looks good, but appears to not have worked in practice.

What would be needed to make CAST work in practice? A large amphibious fleet? Some carrier air cover? A dedicated fleet of transport ships? Certainly a specialised HQ would be needed. Perhaps converting Bonnie into a fast troop transport ship like HMAS Sydney in the Vietnam war era.

 

[GK. Dundas]

Of course it didn't work in practice . CAST was political window dressing . The Government of the day wasn't the slightest bit interested in Defence spending.
Interesting thing though Both DND and the Navy were slowly working towards something along those lines.
The Navy requested funding for the purchase of 21 A4 Skyhawks in 1964 . And earlier within DND the Sutherland study was completed.
I'd love to see a copy of that study.
It called for a couple of V/STOL light carriers. Several fast RORO cargo vessels and some sort of amphibious capability for the RCN.
There had alway been a small group of Naval officers that had been uncomfortable with a pure ASW force that the Navy had become.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Something from an old thread that may be of interest here:

From 1976 to 1987, Canada was commited to reinforce North Norway with the
Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade. However, the Canadian Defense
White Paper, published in June 1987, announced that Canada was abandoning that commitment.
As of late 1988, it appeared that Canada would retain a limited commitment to
reinforce Norway: one battalion assigned to the AMF which could be sent to Norway.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a231546.pdf

 

[Archibald]

Canada begins to look beyond the Central European plain, a pure ASW navy and peacekeeping.
Bonaventure is kept on but now she's to be used as LPH /Commando Carrier. With several improved Ouragan class .
They will be used as a cross between a LSD and the old American APD concept.
Do we purchase or build a new larger carrier along with the Brits and Australians ?
Tanks , aircraft still working on that but Im considering rebuilding the Centurions possibly a small purchase of of F4Es.
Well have fun !

Do you mean these ships ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ouragan-class_landing_platform_dock

 

[Rule of cool]

CAST was political window dressing . The Government of the day wasn't the slightest bit interested in Defence spending.

This makes thinking about alternative pieces of kit difficult, much like Australia post-Vietnam.

Instead of CAST could 4th CMBG become a a REFORGER formation? The first REFORGER exercise occurred in 1969, so the timing fits and it would get unis back in Canada to save money so the intention fits.

 

[Apophenia]

Yes, and that's still the entire 1st Canadian Division, with 4CMBG getting reinforced with 5CMBG and a good half of 1CMBG (1400 men)

My point was that 4CMBG no longer supported the BAOR in the period under discussion.

Of course it didn't work in practice . CAST was political window dressing . The Government of the day wasn't the slightest bit interested in Defence spending.
Interesting thing though Both DND and the Navy were slowly working towards something along those lines.
The Navy requested funding for the purchase of 21 A4 Skyhawks in 1964 . And earlier within DND the Sutherland study was completed.
I'd love to see a copy of that study.
It called for a couple of V/STOL light carriers. Several fast RORO cargo vessels and some sort of amphibious capability for the RCN.
There had alway been a small group of Naval officers that had been uncomfortable with a pure ASW force that the Navy had become.

As a researcher, Robert Sutherland may have been a key advisor to the PMO but it was Lester Pearson's MDN, Paul Hellyer who draughted the 1964 White Paper. And, as a self-appointed expert on everything, Hellyer undermined Dr. Sutherland at every opportunity. [1]

Speaking of MND Hellyer, he was the driving force behind a sealift capability for his 'Mobile Force' darling. [2] So, it was Paul Hellyer's Mobile Force that drove the sealift and light carrier concepts referred to by @GK. Dundas. AFAIK, although it worked at cross-purposes to SACLANT fleet plans, VAdm Rayner accepted Mobile Force mainly as a way to get those 'interim' A-4s aboard the 'Bonnie'.

_____________________________________________

[1] The General Purpose Frigate was a case in point. Despite R. J. Sutherland backing VAdm Rayner's choice in GPF, Hellyer was determined to cancel the programme. Objections to Dr. Sutherland may have sprung from his having previously advised the Diefenbaker government. (Or perhaps it was just a by-product of Hellyer's overall megalomania?)

[2] BTW, that Mobile Force (and later CAST) sealift notion eventually led to ALSC (the Afloat Logistics Support Capability) which, in turn, morphed into JSS (the Joint Support Ship) programme - the latter, originally, being similar to the Dutch Karel Doorman JLOS. Once the true costs of a sealift JSS were recognised, the procurement process was halted and the programme reimagined as a much-reduced AOR. Two JSS are still being prepared by Seapan but are hugely behind schedule - hence the leased 'iAOR', the MV Asterix (aka Project Resolve). </OT>

 

[Rule of cool]

As is so often the case major changes to Defence policy/procurement hang on the opinions for a handful of key personnel.

Given that assumption, and assuming that by the mid-late 60s Canada was ripe for a major change in the Defence realm, what paths could have been taken? Presumably Canada would still get rid of nuclear weapon sharing and want to control spending without copping too much backlash from NATO.

 

[Apophenia]

Giving up nukes was a given politically. Pearson had kept his original agreement to taking on a NATO nuclear strike role as quiet as possible. But it was still very unpopular with most of the Canadian populace. Somehow, most of the political poo that resulted never stuck to 'Mike'. Dunno why.

Controlling defence spending with minimal NATO backlash would work better if source(s) of that criticism were properly identified. In more than a few cases, NATO opposites were made informal promises by Canadian officers who were in no position to back up those pledges. When it inevitably fell apart, human nature is such that the officers in question spat venom at politicos, budgets, etc., rather than acknowledge embarrassing own-goals.

The post-Unification CAF went into contraction for manifold reasons. Alas, military cultures aren't the greatest at introspection. Were you looking for specific alternative approaches?

 

[Scott Kenny]

This makes thinking about alternative pieces of kit difficult, much like Australia post-Vietnam.

Instead of CAST could 4th CMBG become a a REFORGER formation? The first REFORGER exercise occurred in 1969, so the timing fits and it would get unis back in Canada to save money so the intention fits.

Could they? Yes, but 4CMBG was deployed in Germany already.

Getting those units back to Germany for a REFORGER would require expansion elsewhere. Was prepositioning something that actually saves money versus having the troops present in the country? When you would need to also have a big air or sea lift capacity for the troops. Obviously, having the whole unit back in Canada would mean needing the sealift to haul their vehicles across the Atlantic.

 

[Rule of cool]

Were you looking for specific alternative approaches?

I was wondering what Canadian defence policy/strategy was in the Cold War. For example Australia's was 'Forward Defence' 1956-72, when we had units stationed in Malaysia and fought Vietnam, from 1973-86 it was 'Defence Self Reliance' and from 1987 it was 'Defence of the Air-Sea Gap'.

Obviously Canada had the NATO commitment, but was that linked to some defined policy and strategy? For example, dealing with the Soviets in Europe rather than over the pole, or something else?

 

[Rule of cool]

Could they? Yes, but 4CMBG was deployed in Germany already.

Getting those units back to Germany for a REFORGER would require expansion elsewhere. Was prepositioning something that actually saves money versus having the troops present in the country? When you would need to also have a big air or sea lift capacity for the troops. Obviously, having the whole unit back in Canada would mean needing the sealift to haul their vehicles across the Atlantic.

I was thinking that 4CBMG with its 3 Mech btns, AR and SP Arty regt could be reduced to 1 Mech btn, the AR and half the Arty in Germany. But leave the SP arty and vehicles for a 2nd Mech btn in place, and their troops could be flown over to marry up with these vehciles in an emergency. Additionally an entire 3rd Mech btn could be transported by sea, vehicles and all in an emergency to make up the full 4CMBG.

That would reduce the number of troops in Germany, but without the difficulties of CAST.

 

[Apophenia]

I was wondering what Canadian defence policy/strategy was in the Cold War. For example Australia's was 'Forward Defence' 1956-72, when we had units stationed in Malaysia and fought Vietnam, from 1973-86 it was 'Defence Self Reliance' and from 1987 it was 'Defence of the Air-Sea Gap'.

Obviously Canada had the NATO commitment, but was that linked to some defined policy and strategy? For example, dealing with the Soviets in Europe rather than over the pole, or something else?

Justifiable stereotypes of Canadians are that we are polite ("sorry, sorry ...") and anxious to avoid conflict (off the rink). As a result, our policy papers including White Papers tend to be more about platitudes than actual statements of intent. IOW, the GoC's defence strategy in the 1970s was about doing the bare minimum amount required. [1]

During the period in question, that approach was best illustrated by the publicly quiet drawdown of Canadian air assets in West Germany. In detail, that was about ending the nuclear strike role, withdrawing from MRCA, and muddling the NFA (into a one-type procurement). But, reality was represented by Canada reducing its six fighter squadrons in the 1960s down to three NATO squadrons in Europe by 1970.

I don't think it would be overly cynical to summarise the GoC's attitude towards NATO commitments in the 1970s as being dominated by a desire to maintain and build trade relations in Western Europe. Although, in an odd way, the NATO role also got looped into the then-growing Internationalist emphasis at Foreign Affairs. [2]

The NORAD relationship was more complicated ... but such complications would never be discussed openly in policy documents. From a pure policy point-of-view, NORAD is best viewed as 'defence from help' - something never named in official sources.

__________________________

[1] Of course, while doing the least amount possible, the GoC was wishing that it could be less still ... fitting with another justifiable stereotype (Canucks are notoriously cheap).

[2] That Internationalist bent was also a big part of the reason that Canada stayed well away from VN until peacekeeping was called for. The latter, of course, was largely of Lester Pearson's creation but embraced by PET et al as the preferable alternative to more conventional military roles.

 

[Rule of cool]

That sounds a lot like Australia's defence policy after Vietnam. We went with Defence Self-reliance, but didn't enunciate a strategy, or even a level of conflict to prepare for. In 1987 we settled on a scenario to procure against, but it was the least likely scenario, a direct attack on Australia so wasn't much help to procure against.

Internationalism is as realistic as anything else for Canada to plan and procure against, it's not as if anyone was going to directly attack Canada.

What is interesting is that when gutting 4CMBG in Germany in 1968 Canada stood up 5CMBG for CAST and the Airborne Regiment for rapid response. The Airborne had a mech btn added in 1970 and allocated to 4CMBG. It's like nobody could make up their mind.

 

[Apophenia]

I was thinking that 4CBMG with its 3 Mech btns, AR and SP Arty regt could be reduced to 1 Mech btn, the AR and half the Arty in Germany. But leave the SP arty and vehicles for a 2nd Mech btn in place, and their troops could be flown over to marry up with these vehciles in an emergency. Additionally an entire 3rd Mech btn could be transported by sea, vehicles and all in an emergency to make up the full 4CMBG.

That would reduce the number of troops in Germany, but without the difficulties of CAST.

I'm not sure that the total number of CAF troops deployed to West German was the key issue. Such postings were actually a bonus for recruiting, base housing already existed, etc. Nor was there a perceived need for Regular Force troops kept back in Canada (other than from training purposes).

Still, your concept of forward-placing vehicles/kit would be a relatively inexpensive way to grow the potential scale of 4CBMG. Then, flying in the bulk of the reinforcements at the first sign of escalation would makes a great degree of sense from an economic POV.

Getting back to @GK. Dundas' OP emphasis on 1970s procurement, an argument could be made that all required theatre combat equipment should be pre-positioned in West Germany. All that was required back home was sufficient kit to train on (for both Reg and Reserve forces) ... or, at least, that was a common attitude at the time. (And "Train like you fight" was still then a ways off.)

One of Ottawa's darlings of the time - creating French Language Units - prompted a slightly off-the-wall (and rather OT) thought. [1]

Since CAF units in West Germany were primarily anglophone, could FLUs not have been used to advantage as OpFor training units. Canadian troops were meant to operate between VII Corps and II. Korps sectors up against the Czechoslovak border. As such, it would seem to make sense to have OpFor units trained in ČSLA tactics and mimicking Czech equipment.

_____________________________________

[1] A CAF priority in response to the adoption of the Official Bilingualism policy. That was a 'hot ticket' item in English-speaking Canada but the FLUs may also have represented a recruiting opportunity for DND which was mis-handled.

 

[Apophenia]

... It's like nobody could make up their mind.

Got it in one!

 

[Rule of cool]

Got it in one!

Making a decision on what it is you want will clear away all sorts of problems, even if there's no extra money available.

Even the CAST idea would be fine if it was pursued realistically, rather than a mish-mash of political aims turned into a military strategy.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I'm not sure that the total number of CAF troops deployed to West German was the key issue. Such postings were actually a bonus for recruiting, base housing already existed, etc. Nor was there a perceived need for Regular Force troops kept back in Canada (other than from training purposes).

Still, your concept of forward-placing vehicles/kit would be a relatively inexpensive way to grow the potential scale of 4CBMG. Then, flying in the bulk of the reinforcements at the first sign of escalation would makes a great degree of sense from an economic POV.

Getting back to @GK. Dundas' OP emphasis on 1970s procurement, an argument could be made that all required theatre combat equipment should be pre-positioned in West Germany. All that was required back home was sufficient kit to train on (for both Reg and Reserve forces) ... or, at least, that was a common attitude at the time. (And "Train like you fight" was still then a ways off.)

As you note, there's not a lot of reasons to not have the 4CMBG troops already there. (about the only reason I can think of is that they're not spending their pay in Canada!)

Not having any troops there means that you're relying on (presumably) air transport to get them to their prepositioned gear, get it all issued out/ammo loaded etc, and then get in front of Ivan's leading units in time.

So RCAF would have to have some serious air transport sitting around to haul some 10k bodies across the pond, more or less in one lift.

Reforger exercises suggest that would be a bit of a fustercluck on a good day, when troops had been doing it for years and years.

One of Ottawa's darlings of the time - creating French Language Units - prompted a slightly off-the-wall (and rather OT) thought. [1]

Since CAF units in West Germany were primarily anglophone, could FLUs not have been used to advantage as OpFor training units. Canadian troops were meant to operate between VII Corps and II. Korps sectors up against the Czechoslovak border. As such, it would seem to make sense to have OpFor units trained in ČSLA tactics and mimicking Czech equipment.

I'm not sure that's necessarily a thought that would have happened then, though the old US OPFOR units were trained in Esperanto and were supposed to conduct all their ops in that language.

But I like it!

 

[Rule of cool]

Not having any troops there means that you're relying on (presumably) air transport to get them to their prepositioned gear, get it all issued out/ammo loaded etc, and then get in front of Ivan's leading units in time.

So RCAF would have to have some serious air transport sitting around to haul some 10k bodies across the pond, more or less in one lift.

During the Vietnam War Australia did one operation where 3 C130s flew 2,400 troops to SthV and Australia, a similar overall distance between Canada and Germany. HMAS Sydney could carry ~450 troops as well as dozens of vehicles including M113s, amphibious DUKWs, trucks and Land Rovers with trailers as deck cargo (one trip deployed 9 sqn RAAF complete with UH1s) from Australia to Sth V in less than 2 weeks. This is not counting what Canadian merchant ships and Air Canada might do. If Bonny was converted to a fast troop transport between her and the RCAF a couple of battalions could be sent to Germany within a couple of weeks in an emergency.

IIUC the big problem with CAST was that it was an independent command and Canada wasn't experienced with independent command conducted over oceanic distances. I think Canada could far more realistically reinforce 4CMBG within evolved existing structures without much more equipment being acquired.

 

[Apophenia]

... the old US OPFOR units were trained in Esperanto and were supposed to conduct all their ops in that language.

Cool!

... you're relying on (presumably) air transport to get them to their prepositioned gear, get it all issued out/ammo loaded etc, and then get in front of Ivan's leading units in time.

So RCAF would have to have some serious air transport sitting around to haul some 10k bodies across the pond, more or less in one lift...

Quite so. Depends on the exact date but, since we're in the '70s here, Air Transport Command would indeed have been relying on Hercs (which, as ramped transports would be better employed hauling high-priority cargo rather than troops). The CAF also had five Boeing CC-137s tanker-transports in service [1] but, when the balloon went up, they'd be reserved for IFF of CAF fighters reinforcing 1 CAG.

So, any last-minute reinforcement flights would invariably have to have been by prior arrangements with airlines. For Canadian airlines already flying to Europe, @Rule of cool has already mentioned Air Canada which flew into Frankfurt. And there was CP Air flying into Schiphol. If fading memory serves, Pacific Western also flew charters to Europe in the '70s. To tie in with commercial carriers with experience flying transatlantic routes (and personnel already in Europe) seems sensible.

_______________________________________

[1] Replacing a 12 x Canadair CC-16 Yukon (after only a decade's service).

 

[Scott Kenny]

During the Vietnam War Australia did one operation where 3 C130s flew 2,400 troops to SthV and Australia, a similar overall distance between Canada and Germany. HMAS Sydney could carry ~450 troops as well as dozens of vehicles including M113s, amphibious DUKWs, trucks and Land Rovers with trailers as deck cargo (one trip deployed 9 sqn RAAF complete with UH1s) from Australia to Sth V in less than 2 weeks. This is not counting what Canadian merchant ships and Air Canada might do. If Bonny was converted to a fast troop transport between her and the RCAF a couple of battalions could be sent to Germany within a couple of weeks in an emergency.

You missed my key point in that sentence: more or less in one lift.

RCAF would need to have enough air transport capacity to haul some 10k troops at one time. All 10k in the air at the same time (more or less). Not multiple trips unless the unload&refuel timing makes it viable. One trip over and get that plane out of the way for the next one incoming, Berlin Airlift style. For argument sake, half an hour between wheels-down and wheels-up on the way back, and the C130s are going to be landing in Wales or Cornwall (3800km range and it's 3780 Gander-Heathrow).

A contract with Air Canada etc flying 707s or 747s would be a lot less sketchy on the range and would haul double the personnel per flight for 707s, 4x for any 747s. But still only ~200 troops per plane for a 707. So that's ~50 flights you'd need available. Let's call it a 13hr round trip including turn time at both ends in 707s, so 39 hours would get you 3 flights per plane. No, you'd be better off getting 50 birds and flying them all in a single go.


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4CMBG was intended to be the reserve units of either BAOR or the US, depending on year, and I know the big boss would want troops on hand to stop the Soviet sprint for Rotterdam. So that's a serious operational argument against 4CMBG-in-Canada plans.