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http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a229037.pdf
1991 IDA paper for DARPA relating to the 'SuperTroop' concept
- Thread starter Grey Havoc
- Start date
jsport
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"High intensity battle is expected to be short and sharp: decisive results in
minutes or hours. Conversely, circumstances of low intensity conflict are expected often to
deprive infantry of tactical initiative. Infantry combat is unlikely to be decisive in high
intensity conflict, almost certain to govern low intensity conflict. In sum, technology that
improves infantry combat effectiveness probably would exert higher leverage in low
intensity conflict than in mid- or high intensity conflict."
a nuance often forgotten. being wounded etc in non-decisive actions where one can not take the initiative is debilitating. Near imperviousness is therefore a mitigator in order to maintain moral.
minutes or hours. Conversely, circumstances of low intensity conflict are expected often to
deprive infantry of tactical initiative. Infantry combat is unlikely to be decisive in high
intensity conflict, almost certain to govern low intensity conflict. In sum, technology that
improves infantry combat effectiveness probably would exert higher leverage in low
intensity conflict than in mid- or high intensity conflict."
a nuance often forgotten. being wounded etc in non-decisive actions where one can not take the initiative is debilitating. Near imperviousness is therefore a mitigator in order to maintain moral.
jsport
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"In Arlington, General RisCassi, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, stated that if
DARPA could, in its R&D, interrelate SIMNET, Leavenworth's Battle Command Training 0
Program, and the Army's emerging Command and Control System, DARPA would
advance the Army a long step forward to "where the Army has always wanted to be."
IDA's Advanced Simulation Technology Facility proposed a proof-of-principle
demonstration involving, first, Observation Posts, then anti-armor and anti-aircraft
weapons fired by individual gunners.
The Leavenworth conferees also discussed the use of Training Developments
to lead Combat Developments, especially to explore the man-weapon interface
(MANPRINT), and the fit of the weapon to the combined arms team (what
General Thurman, then Commanding General, TRADOC, termed FIGHTPRINT). While
it is well understood that national security entails adapting advancing technology for
military purposes ahead of any potential adversary, few military professionals appreciate I
the possibilities of speeding up the materiel development cycle through adroit use of
training technology. Every manager of a weapon system development ought to appreciate
what training technologists have thoroughly substantiated: ultimately the worth of any
system will depend importantly on the humans who use it in battle. This truism can be
stated in a mathematical paradigm: E = f (W,P,T)
where:
E is effectiveness in combat
W is inherent weapon system capability
P is the proficiency of those who man the system
T is the tactic or technique of system employment.
The T parameter is seldom considered, but technologically well-founded systems
(high W), in the hands of very proficient crews (high P), can be rendered impotent by an
inept tactician (low T). The fact is that over the next two decades more and more armed
forces throughout the world will acquire weapons of range and striking power entirely
outside the experience of serving leaders. As General RisCassi pointed out, with
SIMNET-like technology, the U.S. forces have a powerful new way of teaching tactics,
i.e., by providing vicarious battle experience through which tactical commanders can learn
to optimize the effectiveness of the weapons and the men in their charge."
The above seems to agree w/ the argument that Arma 3 /Oculus (and maybe some real life experience
trained
"IronGeneral" leading far fewer Ironmen could accomplish ever larger scale missions. Potenital huge paradigm shift.
Do bad tactician's suffer from low T ? }
DARPA could, in its R&D, interrelate SIMNET, Leavenworth's Battle Command Training 0
Program, and the Army's emerging Command and Control System, DARPA would
advance the Army a long step forward to "where the Army has always wanted to be."
IDA's Advanced Simulation Technology Facility proposed a proof-of-principle
demonstration involving, first, Observation Posts, then anti-armor and anti-aircraft
weapons fired by individual gunners.
The Leavenworth conferees also discussed the use of Training Developments
to lead Combat Developments, especially to explore the man-weapon interface
(MANPRINT), and the fit of the weapon to the combined arms team (what
General Thurman, then Commanding General, TRADOC, termed FIGHTPRINT). While
it is well understood that national security entails adapting advancing technology for
military purposes ahead of any potential adversary, few military professionals appreciate I
the possibilities of speeding up the materiel development cycle through adroit use of
training technology. Every manager of a weapon system development ought to appreciate
what training technologists have thoroughly substantiated: ultimately the worth of any
system will depend importantly on the humans who use it in battle. This truism can be
stated in a mathematical paradigm: E = f (W,P,T)
where:
E is effectiveness in combat
W is inherent weapon system capability
P is the proficiency of those who man the system
T is the tactic or technique of system employment.
The T parameter is seldom considered, but technologically well-founded systems
(high W), in the hands of very proficient crews (high P), can be rendered impotent by an
inept tactician (low T). The fact is that over the next two decades more and more armed
forces throughout the world will acquire weapons of range and striking power entirely
outside the experience of serving leaders. As General RisCassi pointed out, with
SIMNET-like technology, the U.S. forces have a powerful new way of teaching tactics,
i.e., by providing vicarious battle experience through which tactical commanders can learn
to optimize the effectiveness of the weapons and the men in their charge."
The above seems to agree w/ the argument that Arma 3 /Oculus (and maybe some real life experience
trained"IronGeneral" leading far fewer Ironmen could accomplish ever larger scale missions. Potenital huge paradigm shift.
Do bad tactician's suffer from low T ? }
jsport
what do you know about surfing Major? you're from-
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" The drawback with a passive, brace-like device, such as the proposed airborne exoskeletal reinforcement unit (AERU), is that soldiers, particularly soldiers under fire, are likely to need more assistance. They face not only landing-shock, but the strength-debilitating effect of fear. Hence, the design might better be active, powered, and computer-controlled, as proposed for the exoskeletal subsystem of (Super trooper) ST/I-Port. The members of the exoskeleton might be very light structure of a composite material like graphite epoxy, and take full advantage of recent advances in small,
powerful actuation systems. A powered exoskeleton for the legs and pelvic girdle only (provided it were properly coordinated with the wearer's load-bearing equipment) may suffice, especially for a ST/LIC (SuperTroop/Low Intensity Conflict) ensemble, adequate in threat environments such as that troops faced in Panama.
There are a number of advantages to a powered exoskeleton for assault parachute landings, not the least of which is its potential ability to assist the wearer in carrying large loads off of a fire-swept drop zone without having to stop to unlatch, as with the AERU described above.
S.L.A. Marshall put the issue succinctly to any CINC who might in the future be contemplating a JUST CAUSE-like projection of forces from CONUS:
"On the field of battle man is not only a thinking animal but a beast of burden. He is given great weights to carry .... Rare indeed is the high commander who will fight consistently and effectively for the opposite. In fact, it is chiefly the high commanders who have laid this curse on the back of the fighting man right down through the ages...."
Marshall's interviews of participants in the Normandy landings led him to conclude that overloading of OVERLORD's assault infantry was a primary cause of casualties on the beaches. He wrote:
" In the measure that the man is shocked nervously, and that fear becomes
uppermost, he becomes physically weak. His body is drained of muscular
power and of mental coordination. For these reasons, every extra pound he
carries on his back reduces all his tactical capabilities."
.....
"To recapitulate:
In JUST CAUSE-like operations of the future, measures aimed at casualty reduction will have a high political payoff, as well as obvious military utility in keeping assault troops pursuing mission."
"Injury-avoidance ought to become an objective for research and development for contingency forces, especially Special Operations Forces and other assault troops especially vulnerable to hostile ordnance."
Given future helios may not even internally transport vehicles it may be that Powered Exoarmor is one of the remaining hopes especially as the materials may be bulky but lighter than air. Makes is hard for the pressure plate landmine to function.
powerful actuation systems. A powered exoskeleton for the legs and pelvic girdle only (provided it were properly coordinated with the wearer's load-bearing equipment) may suffice, especially for a ST/LIC (SuperTroop/Low Intensity Conflict) ensemble, adequate in threat environments such as that troops faced in Panama.
There are a number of advantages to a powered exoskeleton for assault parachute landings, not the least of which is its potential ability to assist the wearer in carrying large loads off of a fire-swept drop zone without having to stop to unlatch, as with the AERU described above.
S.L.A. Marshall put the issue succinctly to any CINC who might in the future be contemplating a JUST CAUSE-like projection of forces from CONUS:
"On the field of battle man is not only a thinking animal but a beast of burden. He is given great weights to carry .... Rare indeed is the high commander who will fight consistently and effectively for the opposite. In fact, it is chiefly the high commanders who have laid this curse on the back of the fighting man right down through the ages...."
Marshall's interviews of participants in the Normandy landings led him to conclude that overloading of OVERLORD's assault infantry was a primary cause of casualties on the beaches. He wrote:
" In the measure that the man is shocked nervously, and that fear becomes
uppermost, he becomes physically weak. His body is drained of muscular
power and of mental coordination. For these reasons, every extra pound he
carries on his back reduces all his tactical capabilities."
.....
"To recapitulate:
In JUST CAUSE-like operations of the future, measures aimed at casualty reduction will have a high political payoff, as well as obvious military utility in keeping assault troops pursuing mission."
"Injury-avoidance ought to become an objective for research and development for contingency forces, especially Special Operations Forces and other assault troops especially vulnerable to hostile ordnance."
Given future helios may not even internally transport vehicles it may be that Powered Exoarmor is one of the remaining hopes especially as the materials may be bulky but lighter than air. Makes is hard for the pressure plate landmine to function.
jsport
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More anedotal from Panama justifiing full body exoarmor.
"U.S. casualty data from CONUS hospitals reported on 225 cases with 267 instances of injury, of which only 14 percent were inflicted on regions of the body protected by Kevlar armor, while 86 percent were inflicted on exposed body regions."
"U.S. casualty data from CONUS hospitals reported on 225 cases with 267 instances of injury, of which only 14 percent were inflicted on regions of the body protected by Kevlar armor, while 86 percent were inflicted on exposed body regions."
jsport
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"They face not only landing-shock (parachutist) , but the strength-debilitating effect of fear. Hence, the design might better be active, powered, and computer-controlled, as proposed for the exoskeletal subsystem of ST/I-Port. The members of the exoskeleton might be very light structure of a composite material like graphite epoxy, and take full advantage of recent advances in small, powerful actuation systems.39"
Threat avoidance technologies applied to the proposed GVX vehicle concept might be applied to suits w/ small powerful actuation systems. Many of the exo technologies presented in COD Advanced Warfare vid game may well be worth waiting for. These capabilities may not matured for some time.
The article of course does not discuss the amplified fear if the Exosuit breaks upon landing for instance. Thus reliability is as important as capability.
"In the 1960s, General Electric experimented with a powered exoskeletons..", Either more focus and emphasis than is currently being resourced is sought in order to attain higher capabilityreliability/useability or the technology will again be seen as too hard, too unreliable etc. and it will be shelved again.
Passive systems don't cut it. "The drawback with a passive, brace-like device, such as the proposed AERU, is that soldiers, particularly soldiers under fire, are likely to need more assistance." ..but powered systems invite the need for armor etc..back in the dilema.
Threat avoidance technologies applied to the proposed GVX vehicle concept might be applied to suits w/ small powerful actuation systems. Many of the exo technologies presented in COD Advanced Warfare vid game may well be worth waiting for. These capabilities may not matured for some time.
The article of course does not discuss the amplified fear if the Exosuit breaks upon landing for instance. Thus reliability is as important as capability.
"In the 1960s, General Electric experimented with a powered exoskeletons..", Either more focus and emphasis than is currently being resourced is sought in order to attain higher capabilityreliability/useability or the technology will again be seen as too hard, too unreliable etc. and it will be shelved again.
Passive systems don't cut it. "The drawback with a passive, brace-like device, such as the proposed AERU, is that soldiers, particularly soldiers under fire, are likely to need more assistance." ..but powered systems invite the need for armor etc..back in the dilema.
jsport
what do you know about surfing Major? you're from-
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There are credible claims the number of groups which might be encountered in the current ME contingency is from 1000 to 1500. The number of separtists groups in Ukr at one time was beleived to over 100. In such environments not only are dismounts not going to gain and sustain initiative as mentioned in IDA paper but they are going to encounter and potentially be attrited by far too many chance engagements for there not to be a strategy for powered armor. The below mentioned Integrated Fighting System is at least on the path to the right language. As suggested in the other important DSB 1996 study Tactics and ..for 21st Militiary Superiority there is a requirement for "Dominance Bubbles" which maintain a margin away from any threats not just RISTA but engagement. Therefore we are not talking about a suit but a system which hides as well as projects at as far a distance a "dominance bubble" as is phyiscally possible and still be an organic asset to small unit. If discovered the suit must be prepared to counter swarms of up to 14.5mm fire rather than the 12.7mm and actively actuate avoidance of anything bigger. Such as system needs to include its own fight thru logistics/LOC concepts for each individual suit/system as well.
"The notional Integrated Fighting System is a modular layered protective suit....The wearer will move about as though he is carrying no load through the application of an exoskeleton (which also provides armor protection)
controlled by muscle-like actuators. ....Much work clearly needs to be done, and time will be required to mature
both the technologies and the techniques. The user community must also be advised of the vast implications and potential capabilities such a system represents as these components evolve. This will permit the early integration of those components that have the highest operational payoff from the user's perspective.
It was also clear from our visits to the various Army RD&E Centers and Laboratories that these institutions are primarily engaged in finding solutions to the more near-term needs and deficiencies that are articulated in the several AMC and TRADOC requirements documents. It was also equally apparent that they were enthusiastically interested in the idea of a systems approach to the development of the individual combatant's fighting system, but not in taking the lead for the whole system. They saw their particular institution in a supporting role within the framework of their charter and areas of expertise. If there is to be such a system, however,there must be an agency or organization that can: monitor technological developments throughout the RD&E Centers, Laboratories, and industry; understand user needs, and coordinate and integrate this wide variety of activities. These actions cut across the traditional lines of responsibility and interest and involve the needs of more than one of the armed services.Within the framework of the DoD developmental system, it appears that an organization such as a joint program office, with a wide scope of responsibilities, should be established to perform these monitoring, integration, and coordination functions. The report listed some 17 areas of technological risk, and estimated a time frame for development to resolve each. Those time frames ranged from 5 to 30 years, the average was 15-20 years. In short, the Battelle investigators would not expect enabling technologies to be on hand, even were a joint program office to pursue them adroitly, until the first decade of the 21st century." guess what we are past the first decade of te 21st century we have almost nothing compared to what is now required.
"The notional Integrated Fighting System is a modular layered protective suit....The wearer will move about as though he is carrying no load through the application of an exoskeleton (which also provides armor protection)
controlled by muscle-like actuators. ....Much work clearly needs to be done, and time will be required to mature
both the technologies and the techniques. The user community must also be advised of the vast implications and potential capabilities such a system represents as these components evolve. This will permit the early integration of those components that have the highest operational payoff from the user's perspective.
It was also clear from our visits to the various Army RD&E Centers and Laboratories that these institutions are primarily engaged in finding solutions to the more near-term needs and deficiencies that are articulated in the several AMC and TRADOC requirements documents. It was also equally apparent that they were enthusiastically interested in the idea of a systems approach to the development of the individual combatant's fighting system, but not in taking the lead for the whole system. They saw their particular institution in a supporting role within the framework of their charter and areas of expertise. If there is to be such a system, however,there must be an agency or organization that can: monitor technological developments throughout the RD&E Centers, Laboratories, and industry; understand user needs, and coordinate and integrate this wide variety of activities. These actions cut across the traditional lines of responsibility and interest and involve the needs of more than one of the armed services.Within the framework of the DoD developmental system, it appears that an organization such as a joint program office, with a wide scope of responsibilities, should be established to perform these monitoring, integration, and coordination functions. The report listed some 17 areas of technological risk, and estimated a time frame for development to resolve each. Those time frames ranged from 5 to 30 years, the average was 15-20 years. In short, the Battelle investigators would not expect enabling technologies to be on hand, even were a joint program office to pursue them adroitly, until the first decade of the 21st century." guess what we are past the first decade of te 21st century we have almost nothing compared to what is now required.
jsport
what do you know about surfing Major? you're from-
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"One response to these trends might be to develop and field forces built around a
two-man tank, a vehicle with extraordinary sentience, armament, and protection, possibly
controlling one or more robotic vehicles. But land vehicles have thus far proven vulnerable
to enemy countermeasures, too expensive to buy and own, and problematical for strategic
mobility. They would certainly be questionably effective in low intensity conflict: even a
very high-technology tank might not be able to rescue American hostages in a hotel in San
Salvador or Manila. There will be places on every imaginable battlefield where vehicles
simply cannot go--e.g., cities and forests--places where dismounted soldiers will have to
be used to gain or maintain control. And foot soldiers who can be conveyed abroad in
passenger aircraft are inherently strategically mobile. But could they be rendered less
vulnerable?"
Not opposed to the proposed DARPA GXV concept but the above speaks to and whatever happened to DARPA FANG these concepts expansion protect anyone from anyone actually building..
two-man tank, a vehicle with extraordinary sentience, armament, and protection, possibly
controlling one or more robotic vehicles. But land vehicles have thus far proven vulnerable
to enemy countermeasures, too expensive to buy and own, and problematical for strategic
mobility. They would certainly be questionably effective in low intensity conflict: even a
very high-technology tank might not be able to rescue American hostages in a hotel in San
Salvador or Manila. There will be places on every imaginable battlefield where vehicles
simply cannot go--e.g., cities and forests--places where dismounted soldiers will have to
be used to gain or maintain control. And foot soldiers who can be conveyed abroad in
passenger aircraft are inherently strategically mobile. But could they be rendered less
vulnerable?"
Not opposed to the proposed DARPA GXV concept but the above speaks to and whatever happened to DARPA FANG these concepts expansion protect anyone from anyone actually building..
jsport
what do you know about surfing Major? you're from-
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"Cf., Department of the Army, Training Circular 25-1, Training Land, 4 August 1978, pp. 4-11. A
useful summary of changes in methods and means for waging war over the centuries of recorded history
is Kenneth Macksey, The History of Land Warfare, New York, 1974. N.B., graphics on the end
papers. Macksey held that there were definite limits on trends evident as he wrote, and that, for midand
high intensity warfare, "somewhere about 1980 a point will be reached when it will no longer be
possible for battlefield movement to take place without an opponent being instantly aware of it and
without an almost immediate and whole destructive engagement. In essence, the advantage of surprise
may be almost impossible to acquire by the methods of the past and the defensive will again become
supreme.""
The prevasiveness of complex enviroments w/ hundreds if not thousands of separate distinct groups w/ various idealogies, capabilities, overlapping areas of control combined w/ the above mentioned requires te stealth of individuals suit/systems as well as Defensives so powerful as to be Offensives..
useful summary of changes in methods and means for waging war over the centuries of recorded history
is Kenneth Macksey, The History of Land Warfare, New York, 1974. N.B., graphics on the end
papers. Macksey held that there were definite limits on trends evident as he wrote, and that, for midand
high intensity warfare, "somewhere about 1980 a point will be reached when it will no longer be
possible for battlefield movement to take place without an opponent being instantly aware of it and
without an almost immediate and whole destructive engagement. In essence, the advantage of surprise
may be almost impossible to acquire by the methods of the past and the defensive will again become
supreme.""
The prevasiveness of complex enviroments w/ hundreds if not thousands of separate distinct groups w/ various idealogies, capabilities, overlapping areas of control combined w/ the above mentioned requires te stealth of individuals suit/systems as well as Defensives so powerful as to be Offensives..
jsport
what do you know about surfing Major? you're from-
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"Dupuy, Col. T.N., Numbers, Predictions, and War, MacDonald and Jane's, London, 1979, p. 7, in
which the author plots lethality (killing capacity per hour) increasing from 400 B.C. to the present by
six orders of magnitude, while dispersion (square meters per man in combat) increases by four orders of
magnitude. Dupuy notes that the technological change which had the greatest influence on modem
ground warfare occurred between 1850 and 1860, when the introduction of conoidal bullets enabled
infantry to deliver accurate, lethal fire for hundreds of meters, vice tens."
the above quote speaks to trending towards a "Integrated Fighting System/Suit" which again stretchs the "Dominance bubble" mentioned in the DSB 1996 Summer study from "hundreds of meters" to kilometers assuring Full Spectrum Defense/Dominance to the maximium distance while the below quote speaks to the absolute importance of dismounts defense/dominance of the indirect fire fight. Early conclusions: The IFS primary serves as the base for an armed UAS that works in tandem w/armed ugvs and multi=spectrum decoy technology (must be made cost effective) also emphasized in the DSB study. oh and these technologies must be reliable or they will have multiplied counter-productive effect.
3 Ellis, John, The Sharp End, New York, 1980, pp. 176-177. British medical records trace the
transformation from domination of direct-fire weapons to supremacy of indirect fire: in the first two
years of World War I, bullets caused more than three out of four wounds, but as the war continued,
fragmentation wounds became more common. In World War II, three out of four wounds among British
forces were caused by explosive munitions: grenades, mines, mortar and artillery projectiles, and aerial
bombs.
which the author plots lethality (killing capacity per hour) increasing from 400 B.C. to the present by
six orders of magnitude, while dispersion (square meters per man in combat) increases by four orders of
magnitude. Dupuy notes that the technological change which had the greatest influence on modem
ground warfare occurred between 1850 and 1860, when the introduction of conoidal bullets enabled
infantry to deliver accurate, lethal fire for hundreds of meters, vice tens."
the above quote speaks to trending towards a "Integrated Fighting System/Suit" which again stretchs the "Dominance bubble" mentioned in the DSB 1996 Summer study from "hundreds of meters" to kilometers assuring Full Spectrum Defense/Dominance to the maximium distance while the below quote speaks to the absolute importance of dismounts defense/dominance of the indirect fire fight. Early conclusions: The IFS primary serves as the base for an armed UAS that works in tandem w/armed ugvs and multi=spectrum decoy technology (must be made cost effective) also emphasized in the DSB study. oh and these technologies must be reliable or they will have multiplied counter-productive effect.
3 Ellis, John, The Sharp End, New York, 1980, pp. 176-177. British medical records trace the
transformation from domination of direct-fire weapons to supremacy of indirect fire: in the first two
years of World War I, bullets caused more than three out of four wounds, but as the war continued,
fragmentation wounds became more common. In World War II, three out of four wounds among British
forces were caused by explosive munitions: grenades, mines, mortar and artillery projectiles, and aerial
bombs.
jsport
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Did not give credit to Robotic/Man teaming in this study although is it emphasized in the Defense Science Board (DSB) 1996 Summer Study Tactics and Tecniques for 21st Centurt Military Superiority
"Information Technologies
" Team/unit consciousness mechanisms and techniques
" Micro electric mechanical systems (MEMS)
" Comfortable, efficient man-worn displays
" Precision manipulation of virtual objects
" Man-worn, sense-amplifying sensors
" Very small, personal computers for data processing and image generation
• Synthetic environment for individuals, changeable in real time
" LPI personal communications
" Unit polling and monitoring protocols
" Graphic personal decision aids
" Master-slave controls for small robots
* Robotic scout/weapon designator
" Digital models of anatomy and anatomical displayz
" Embedded geopositioning
" Myoelectric sensors and controls
" Vitality monitors
" Novel tactile and kinesthetic techniques
" Engagement simulation for individual training and mission rehearsal
Tactical Technologies
• Exoskeletal strength inducer, mobility aid
" Orthopedic bracing for parachutists
" Personal micro-climactic conditioning
" New weapon system concepts
" Adaptive camouflage/ personal signature reductions
" Mine record and disserination
" Enhanced fire-maneuver coordination
" Automated casualty location/remote tdage/first aid
" Man/robot infantry teams
" Whole-body armor protection against blast, KE, and thermal threats
* Protection against Directed Energy Weapons: e.g., lasers, microwaves
"Information Technologies
" Team/unit consciousness mechanisms and techniques
" Micro electric mechanical systems (MEMS)
" Comfortable, efficient man-worn displays
" Precision manipulation of virtual objects
" Man-worn, sense-amplifying sensors
" Very small, personal computers for data processing and image generation
• Synthetic environment for individuals, changeable in real time
" LPI personal communications
" Unit polling and monitoring protocols
" Graphic personal decision aids
" Master-slave controls for small robots
* Robotic scout/weapon designator
" Digital models of anatomy and anatomical displayz
" Embedded geopositioning
" Myoelectric sensors and controls
" Vitality monitors
" Novel tactile and kinesthetic techniques
" Engagement simulation for individual training and mission rehearsal
Tactical Technologies
• Exoskeletal strength inducer, mobility aid
" Orthopedic bracing for parachutists
" Personal micro-climactic conditioning
" New weapon system concepts
" Adaptive camouflage/ personal signature reductions
" Mine record and disserination
" Enhanced fire-maneuver coordination
" Automated casualty location/remote tdage/first aid
" Man/robot infantry teams
" Whole-body armor protection against blast, KE, and thermal threats
* Protection against Directed Energy Weapons: e.g., lasers, microwaves
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I thought Marshal had largely been discredited? I'd have said most of the reason for the poor performance of US troops in Normandy was because of the inability of the US commanders to conceive of the landings as anything except a frontal assault and their refusal to utilise any technical means to overcome the German defences, preferring to throw men into a meat grinder. The lack of "funnies", particularly DD tanks meant they came ashore without any direct support weapons beyond what they could carry on their backs. The British and Canadians who did utilise the "funnies" effectively showed that there were alternative methods available to get past the beach defences.
jsport
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probably correct on all counts however, 'burdesome kit" and all ensueing prevails and was again highlighted strongly in mountainous Afgan..Kadija_Man said:
Refered to DSB paper:
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Science_and_Technology/DSB/833.pdf
At least this paper presents the arguement using the right language, as opposed to deceptive product names such "Sniper Pod' to convince folks that they can find and destroy targets in complex environments.
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