1935-1940: alternative Luftwaffe?

tomo pauk

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A very powerful as it was in the late 1930s/early days of ww2, Luftwaffe was still with some shortcomings. So let's have another go, in making the fictional LW that can put even a better show, especially in 1940. Changes can range from subtle & easy to make (like drop tanks for the Bf 109 already in 1939) to the fundamental (4-engined bombers enter service, no dive-bombers, etc); all while respecting the zero-sum game more or less. Ie. for some big a change to be made, something else does not is cancelled. Changes can be applied from trainers and transports to fighters and bombers, as well as guns and electronics. Strategy, tactics & logistics too. Goering can stay or can be removed.

The ww2 still runs by the same time table in 1939-late 1940.
 
It's a good start, but why stop there?
 
The German Aggressor (September 1938 to February 1943)​



The Luftwaffe was originally conceived as a tactical air force to support the operations of the Wehrmacht, by acting as long-range artillery.

Its modus operandi was to destroy the enemy air force on ground, bombarding its airfields by surprise, while the Stuka dive bombers neutralized the strong points of the ground defences, previously located by reconnaissance aircraft. Then the medium bombers, escorted by Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters, attacked the capital city of the enemy, forcing its surrender.

The aerial superiority required, for this tactic to work well, was achieved by using single engine fighters which performances exceeded those of the enemy interceptors. After the failure of the Heinkel He 51 in Spain against the Soviet Polikarpov, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) requested the design of an air superiority fighter powered by the most advanced in-line engine available.

In the summer of 1936 the Messerschmitt Bf 109 won the fighter contest for the re-equipment of the Jagdflieger, becoming the spearhead of all conquests made by the Third Reich until February 1943. It was only overcome after the arrival of large quantities of North American P-51 fighters to Europe during the second half of 1943.

When the Germans tried to use the Luftwaffe for strategic purposes, without the support of the Wehrmacht, they failed in their attempts to destroy the RAF, the Soviet industry and the Allied convoys over the Atlantic Ocean. The main cause was the decision not to build heavy bombers, to increase the production of medium bombers Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17 and Junkers Ju 88, as well as the failure to use the Messerschmitt Bf 110 as an escort fighter.

Germany was not prepared for a long war and when the Blitzkrieg stalled, their industrial capacity turned out insufficient.

The Spanish Civil War served to perfect many of the technologies used during the Second World War: the monoplane fighters with retractable undercarriage, enclosed cockpit, 20 mm cannons, radio and oxygen equipment; the long range bombers, with 1,000 kg bombs or the dive bombers with 500 kg bombs were military secrets still in experimental stage. But its use in real conditions of combat was only useful for international observers to obtain the wrong lessons.

The French proved that their planes were technically inferior to their German counterparts and, despite having the opportunity to carefully study a Messerschmitt Bf 109 and a Heinkel He 111 captured by the Republicans, they refused to reform their aeronautical policy until it was too late. The Russians lost their opportunity to take advantage of the tactical experience gained by their pilots against German aircraft because of purges that eliminated a considerable number of them. Therefore, they continued building biplane fighters, along with the British and the Italians. The Czechs and Poles did not have time to apply what they had learned and the British observed, remained silent and decided that they were not prepared, starting a policy of appeasement and massive rearming.

The Germans drew the wrong conclusions that would cost them the next war: the decision not to manufacture four engine strategic bombers prevented them from destroying the Russian factories located behind the Urals in 1942. The success of the He 111 and Do 17 against the primitive interception means of the Spanish Republicans, made them believe that they could operate without fighter escort. They also did not take any actions to equip the Bf 109 that flew over London with detachable fuel tanks, even though the system had been successfully used in Spain.

The precision of the Stuka attacks led them to build the next generation of bombers to act as dive bombers, with pernicious effects in the production of the Ju 88 and devastating results in that of the He 177.
 
The Luftwaffe was originally conceived as a tactical air force to support the operations of the Wehrmacht, by acting as long-range artillery.

Luftwaffe was fielding more long-range bombers between 1938 and 1940 than RAF and FAF combined. They have also had the long range fighter high up in the priority list and in actual service by winter of 1938-39. Number of He 111s (the principle long-range bomber in LW inventory) in 1938-40 was more than twice as big as Ju 87s, eg. ~1100 vs. ~470 by August 31s.

The notion of Luftwaffe being conceived as a tactical air force is long past is use-by date.
 
If you're going to make a change 1935-40, I'd think about dramatically increasing resources/priority on engine development and production. This generates a couple intriguing "what ifs"
  1. Increased supply of DB601 enables production of the longer ranged (relatively) HE-100D-1, which helps a lot with escorts for the Battle of Britain, plus maybe there's a useful version of the FW-187 for the fighter-bomber role.

  2. This doesn't really change 1940, but if a JU-222 / DB-604 class engine is in service on time, then both the HE-177 and the Bomber B program work and the whole "no four engine bomber" issue goes away and those programs become useful, mass production aircraft instead of money pits.
 
German engine production increased dramatically as-is. The DB 600 series went from 399 pcs in 1936 to 3681 in 1939 - almost a 10-fold increase. The DB 600 series were to be installed in the most important aircraft, like He 111, Bf 109 and 110, that themselves were to be produced in great numbers. Next best engine, the Jumo 211, was lagging somewhat in numbers produced until well into 1940. There were also the 'simple' 9-cylinder radials, used on Do-17s, Ju-52s and other non-sexy aircraft.

Skip the Bf 110 (it uses, among other material, two engines), so the Bf 109 production is much increased?
 
The precision of the Stuka attacks led them to build the next generation of bombers to act as dive bombers, with pernicious effects in the production of the Ju 88 and devastating results in that of the He 177.

I understand that the reason the Luftwaffe was so obsessed with making even their largest bombers capable of dive-bombing was that they had discovered that dive-bombing was about three times as accurate as level bombing. So they could achieve the same destructive effect with only one-third of the number of planes.
 
I know it wouldn't have been nearly as simple as this, but cancel the He 177, Ju 288 and Fw 191 and put the freed-up resources into a small lightweight single-jet fighter and the Jumo T1 (004)
 
know it wouldn't have been nearly as simple as this, but cancel the He 177, Ju 288 and Fw 191 and put the freed-up resources into a small lightweight single-jet fighter and the Jumo T1 (004)
Might be too late for the 1935-40 time frame :)
Although getting rid of these 3 types is a major boon for the Luftwaffe for mid- and late-war.
 
German engine production increased dramatically as-is. The DB 600 series went from 399 pcs in 1936 to 3681 in 1939 - almost a 10-fold increase. The DB 600 series were to be installed in the most important aircraft, like He 111, Bf 109 and 110, that themselves were to be produced in great numbers. Next best engine, the Jumo 211, was lagging somewhat in numbers produced until well into 1940. There were also the 'simple' 9-cylinder radials, used on Do-17s, Ju-52s and other non-sexy aircraft.

Skip the Bf 110 (it uses, among other material, two engines), so the Bf 109 production is much increased?
Cancel Messerschmitt Bf. 110, 210 and 310 because they did not really have a role. By late war, they were pressed into service as night-fighters, but that was purely in desperation.
Work much harder on improved Me. 109 with wider landing gear, etc.
Work much harder on an improved Ju. 87 Stuka dive-bomber, faster with better armor and retractable landing gear ... er ... more like a Sturmovik.
Build more transports to compensate for losses during Fallschirmjager assaults on Holland, Denmark, Norway Crete, etc. Ju. 52-3 trimotor was obsolete by the start of WW2. The Ju. 252 and 352 were much faster, even if they only gained smooth skins. Build more transports with large tail cargo hatches like Gotha 244 and Arado 232 ... to allow rapid un-loading under fire ... eg. ... Stalingrad. Later develop Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System to allow for even more rapid un-loading without even touching-down.
Speaking of parachutes, scrap the RZ- series of static-line parachutes and adopt a harness and direct bag deployment system more like the British X-Type parachute. Go for Soviet style square parachute canopies to reduce production costs. While we are reducing production costs, develop Rayon fabrics earlier.
Many of the lessons-learned from large transports could be applied to long-range bombers.
To accelerate jet engine development, invest more money into high-temperature metals, etc. during the 1930s.
To reduce training costs, establish Luftwaffe training schools beside airplane factories in captured territories like Zlin in Czechoslovakia, Potez in France and PZL in Poland.
Build a second factory of produce wood glues.
 
Cancel Messerschmitt Bf. 110, 210 and 310 because they did not really have a role. By late war, they were pressed into service as night-fighters, but that was purely in desperation.
Work much harder on improved Me. 109 with wider landing gear, etc.

Production of Bf 110 amounted to a bit under 300 pcs in 1939 (half of which was made after the attack on Poland), and another ~1100 in 1940. Even if we settle for ~1000 pcs that were produced before the BoB, not making those frees more than enough of material to make 2000 Bf 109s. Yes, we'd need drop tanks for the 109s to cover the territory like the 110s were capable for, but still that math is a boon to the LW, even if Germany exports a few hundreds.
Shortcoming is that additional many hundreds of pilots is now needed - yes, pilot training needs a boost, even per historically.

The Bf 109E could also use cantilever (no struts) tail, and retractable U/C for lower drag and better speed.

Build more transports to compensate for losses during Fallschirmjager assaults on Holland, Denmark, Norway Crete, etc. Ju. 52-3 trimotor was obsolete by the start of WW2. The Ju. 252 and 352 were much faster, even if they only gained smooth skins. Build more transports with large tail cargo hatches like Gotha 244 and Arado 232 ... to allow rapid un-loading under fire ... eg. ... Stalingrad.

Ju-52 soldiered with total of ~2000 HP via 3 engines. Install just two 1000 HP radials = shaves 600-700 kg worth of engine+prop+anciliaries, plus reduce drag a bit for better mileage. Retractable U/C for even lower drag.
Indeed, better transports with rear ramp and lower use of light metals are a good thing; they can also work very well with engines of yesterday. The 'milipede' U/C of the Arado is good on soft terrains.

To reduce training costs, establish Luftwaffe training schools beside airplane factories in captured territories like Zlin in Czechoslovakia, Potez in France and PZL in Poland.

A better usage of captured factories was something that eluded German planers until too late. Eg. Avia (licence-builder for HS-12Y engines) started again making engines in 1944, for crying out loud.
 
Fact is that Germany rather efficiently (and massively) offloaded production of trainers / transports / support aircraft to Vichy France from 1940-41. Arado 96 series, Ju-52, Siebel 204, Fieseler Storch... the irony was some of them remained in postwar service up to Algeria or even beyond: into the 70's !

Plus the crapload of Gnome&Rhone 14 radial engines recovered and used on HS-129s and Me-323, among others.

In France fights on when Vichy never exists and the aviation plants are razed to the ground or moved to Algiers, the LW really suffers a very severe loss...
 
In France fights on when Vichy never exists and the aviation plants are razed to the ground or moved to Algiers, the LW really suffers a very severe loss...

In the case of FFO, Germany does not attack the Soviet Union? A major plus for them.
 
Another to get rid of is Udet
Like Göring, the wrong men in RLM
alone his Idea a BIG bomber must be to build as a DIVE bomber !
Let to contraption called Heinkel He 177 „Greif“ aka Reichsfeuerzeug ("Reich's lighter")
The He 177 B as four propellor bomber would be more effective !
 
I have some contrarian opinions, based on some of the points I see being made. I'll set this thread for alerts to try to remember to revisit this thread when I have more time to sit and type!
 
Couple notes ref types that aren't getting any love
  • The HE-177 prototype doesn't fly until Nov '39, so there's almost no scenario where it's meaningful in a 1935-1940 timeline. The most interesting what if for our time frame is if the Germans had gone ahead with the four engine version proposed in November '38 (long before He-277 work) and the initial production run had 4 Jumo 211.

  • The Ju-288 (and FW-191) were problems because the Jumo 222 / DB604 were failures; otherwise whichever one won the Bomber B competition would have replaced the He-111, Do-217, and Ju-188 with a far superior plane. That would have been a boon to the Luftwaffe bomber force.

  • It would take 20/20 hindsight, but looking at the long delays in turning either the Me-210 or it's competitor, the AR-240 into something useful, dramatically accelerating both the Ju-88C and the development that went from the Ju-88A/C airframe to the Ju-88G type airframe might have paid big dividends. A combination of the Ju-88C/G for night-fighting and the Fw-187 (with DB601) for day fighter-bomber work might have allowed the early phase out of the Me-110 with a more effective platform for both roles, but you need something in the Me-110/Ju-88C space to do the night fighting (starting to be a thing by winter 1940 and being a big deal by 1941)
 
The greatest mistake made by the Ludtwaffe was giving up destroying RAF airfields and bombing London instead.
Forcing the RAF to base its aircraft further North would have allowed the Luftwaffe to bomb targets like shipping round the clock.

In order to bomb the airfields (if we assume that shift to bombing London does not happen) is to have bombers being more or less unmolested. This, in return, will require that LW fighters achieve air superiority over a good chunk of England. Bf 109E1/E3/E4 was unable to do it, mostly due to not having the drop tanks installed in the timely manner, while RAF was able to mount more fighter sorties than the LW did with Bf 109s. The Bf 110 was okay, but it was a minority, and it didn't possessed the combination of speed, climb and maneuverability the 109 had. Plus, it was a bigger target to see, identify and hit.
Having LW go with drop-tank outfitted 109 only (ie. no Bf 110) might've allowed them to much increase the number of long-range fighter sorties, so they can both do the close escort and 'roaming' to visit the RAF airbases.
 
In France fights on when Vichy never exists and the aviation plants are razed to the ground or moved to Algiers, the LW really suffers a very severe loss...

In the case of FFO, Germany does not attack the Soviet Union? A major plus for them.

They attack it, but the situation in the Balkans, North Africa and the Mediterranean is going catastrophic for the Axis since France is fighting from Algiers and has salvaged a decent chunk of its strength, backed by massive American orders.
End result: Adolf has to delay Barbarossa from June 22, 1941 to May 17, 1942. Needless to say, with the Soviets being given a 11 months delay, the Germans are stopped far, far from Stalingrad or Moscow suburbs...
 
The greatest mistake made by the Ludtwaffe was giving up destroying RAF airfields and bombing London instead.
They wanted to continue bombing Airfield and radar installation
but Higher ups (Göring or Hitler ?) order to stop and bomb British Cities.

what let to one of insane Luftwaffe Bomber raids in history
bunch of He111 without weapons and support aircraft had to Bomb Scottish city
the RAF had a glorious day then...
 
End result: Adolf has to delay Barbarossa from June 22, 1941 to May 17, 1942. Needless to say, with the Soviets being given a 11 months delay, the Germans are stopped far, far from Stalingrad or Moscow suburbs...

If indeed situation is going bad for Germany in 1940/41, they don't attack Soviet Union until the 'west' is sorted out. Especially if USA enters the war.
 
A combination of the Ju-88C/G for night-fighting and the Fw-187 (with DB601) for day fighter-bomber work might have allowed the early phase out of the Me-110 with a more effective platform for both roles, but you need something in the Me-110/Ju-88C space to do the night fighting (starting to be a thing by winter 1940 and being a big deal by 1941)

The Do-17 was the least capable of the German bombers. So I'd suggest that it receives the V12 engines ASAP, so at least it can do the fast bomber role. Such an aircraft will be also useful as a night fighter provided a good radar set is installed.
Swap the engines with Ju-87s for all I care.
 
know it wouldn't have been nearly as simple as this, but cancel the He 177, Ju 288 and Fw 191 and put the freed-up resources into a small lightweight single-jet fighter and the Jumo T1 (004)
Might be too late for the 1935-40 time frame :)
Although getting rid of these 3 types is a major boon for the Luftwaffe for mid- and late-war.

The first He 177 prototype flew in November 1939 and the first Ju 288 flew in November 1940 - so all the design and initial prototype construction for those aircraft took place within the time frame. Focke-Wulf was still designing the Fw 191 within the time frame so perhaps that does make little difference. There's no way the Jumo 222 or DB 614 could've been made ready within the time frame so I think getting rid of these would be a good idea.

Another to get rid of is Udet
Like Göring, the wrong men in RLM
alone his Idea a BIG bomber must be to build as a DIVE bomber !
Let to contraption called Heinkel He 177 „Greif“ aka Reichsfeuerzeug ("Reich's lighter")
The He 177 B as four propellor bomber would be more effective !

Once Udet was dead he became an excellent scapegoat for everything that was wrong with the RLM. Everyone denounced him - citing his unsuitability for the role - and blamed him for everything that had gone wrong up to that point. However, it was the OKL that required the 177 as a dive-bomber. I have a letter from Jeschonnek defending the angle of dive he'd asked for. Udet's greatest failure was in trusting his technically qualified subordinates to make the right decisions and not micro-managing them through every project. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that every militarily successful aircraft flown by the Luftwaffe in the war was developed under his term in office. Can you name someone else who would definitely have done a better job of balancing the outlandish demands of the OKL against the self-interest of the competing aircraft manufacturers' financial backers during a period of extreme national crisis?
As much as Milch is cited as the level-heading organiser, the aircraft created under his term - such as the Do 335, Ta 152 etc. failed to reach the front line in time.
 
To reduce training costs, establish Luftwaffe training schools beside airplane factories in captured territories like Zlin in Czechoslovakia, Potez in France and PZL in Poland.

To return to the topic of better usage of captured assets, both of products and factories. In Czechia, use the Avia factory make HS 12Y engines for the Luftwaffe in 1939-40. These can be installed on the Bf 109s, or on the He 112, or on the He 100 with the normal cooling system. Addition of the fuel injection, if done, means removal of 6 (!) carburetors per each engine, with possible gain of 10% in power, ie. from 860 HP at 4000m to ~940 HP.
Even if just another 1000 engines are delivered from Avia in this time frame, that leaves a lot of elbow room for LW to work with.

(Once France is down, ship the tooling from H-S factory to the Avia factory, along with workers willing to part France; granted, this will not have too big an impact until 1941.)

For what is captured in Poland - make use of the engine & airframe factories present there. Radial engines were made there, so just continue, with Bramo and/or BMW providing updates and expertise. Have the trainers and light aircraft to be made there, as much as it can be done.
The only complete Polish aircraft comparable with German stuff was possibly the PZL.37 bomber. Seems like was much more capable than Do-17 and closer to the He 111, at least when going by data from Wikipedia.
 
A combination of the Ju-88C/G for night-fighting and the Fw-187 (with DB601) for day fighter-bomber work might have allowed the early phase out of the Me-110 with a more effective platform for both roles, but you need something in the Me-110/Ju-88C space to do the night fighting (starting to be a thing by winter 1940 and being a big deal by 1941)

The Do-17 was the least capable of the German bombers. So I'd suggest that it receives the V12 engines ASAP, so at least it can do the fast bomber role. Such an aircraft will be also useful as a night fighter provided a good radar set is installed.
Swap the engines with Ju-87s for all I care.
That's basically the Do-215, which provided some good service, but from a manufacturing strategy point of view it's hard to see putting resources into more or less a dead end platform instead of the Ju-88, except to keep Dornier busy while they ramp up the larger, and much more useful, Do-217.

Even the Do-217 would have probably only been an interim program if they had gotten Bomber-B to work, but now were back to the Jumo 222 / DB 604 discussion again . . .
 
That's basically the Do-215, which provided some good service, but from a manufacturing strategy point of view it's hard to see putting resources into more or less a dead end platform instead of the Ju-88, except to keep Dornier busy while they ramp up the larger, and much more useful, Do-217.

I'd keep the production of the Do-17 only at Dornier and jump on the V12-power ASAP. Historically several other companies were also making the Do-17, we'd probably want to cancel that?
The Do-17 RV2 lookalike is what I've had in mind, since the cockpit was the low-profile for lower drag. Especially in a 'no Bf 110' scenario, since some other platform will also be needed for a long-range recon job.

Yes, Ju 88 program lagged a bit for too long.
 
Kill Goering and Udet for starters. Then resurrect General Weaver and create a Luftwaffe strategic bomber arm with 4-engine bombers.
 
Kill Goering and Udet for starters. Then resurrect General Weaver and create a Luftwaffe strategic bomber arm with 4-engine bombers.
Then the war would not have started until 1941, the French would already have their own chain of radars and many Dewoitine and Arsenal fighters in service. In return the Germans would already have a sufficient number of Type XXI U-boats. A very interesting scenario with great development potential what if.
 
What on the fast bombers? Have the no-nonsense Ju-88 enter service (even though it's performance figures are blown out of proportinons in some non-German sources, like the claim for 560 km/h turn of speed for 1st prototype that was doing 100 km/h less in real world)? Granted, as-is the bombs were limited to 50 kg size in the bomb bay. I've already suggested the sleek-cockpit Do-17 to actually receive the V12 engine. Something else, like a German Mosquito?
 
Kill Goering and Udet for starters. Then resurrect General Weaver and create a Luftwaffe strategic bomber arm with 4-engine bombers.
Then the war would not have started until 1941, the French would already have their own chain of radars and many Dewoitine and Arsenal fighters in service. In return the Germans would already have a sufficient number of Type XXI U-boats. A very interesting scenario with great development potential what if.

That was French Generals wet dream (and indeed some of the most seniles probably wet their beds at night) - "Don't move a finger before spring 1941. No provocation".
By 1941 the AdA would have 9500 aircraft, the AdT, even more DCRs and DCMs; Jean Bart battleship would be finished, with the Joffre and Painlevé carriers and Gascogne on its heels.
Provided of course the deeply rotten house that was France (and its armies, and government, and society) don't collapse, one way or another, before that date.
 
On possible guns for Luftwaffe. The LMGs and MG FF were decent, but nothing ground-breaking. A HMG might've been useful, especially as a defensive weapon - perhaps buy the licence from Breda-Safat, or from USA, Belgium or even from Vickers? A belt-fed MG FF, or at least the big drum , like the 75 rd or 90 rd types? Perhaps step up a notch and buy licence for the more powerful Oerlikon, the FFL?
Obviously, the changes need to take place early enough so there is a meaningful number of the new fancy guns to be had by late 1938/early 1939.
 
In France fights on when Vichy never exists and the aviation plants are razed to the ground or moved to Algiers, the LW really suffers a very severe loss...

In the case of FFO, Germany does not attack the Soviet Union? A major plus for them.

They attack it, but the situation in the Balkans, North Africa and the Mediterranean is going catastrophic for the Axis since France is fighting from Algiers and has salvaged a decent chunk of its strength, backed by massive American orders.
End result: Adolf has to delay Barbarossa from June 22, 1941 to May 17, 1942. Needless to say, with the Soviets being given a 11 months delay, the Germans are stopped far, far from Stalingrad or Moscow suburbs...
Please try to remember that the invasion of the USSR was driven by multiple factors, but the most important factor was rapidly diminishing German petroleum reserves. Hitler knew that he had to conquer oil fields before September 1941 if he wanted to keep the notzi war machine fuelled. When he failed to capture the Caucasus oil fields in September 1941, Germany was doomed to lose WW2.
 
Have Messerschmitt be driven completely out of Germany by Milch in 1931. No Bf 109 and Bf 110 means the Luftwaffe ends up with the He100, FW187, and eventually the He280. Battle of Britain probably goes significantly better with the Luftwaffe having longer ranged, better escorts.
 
In France fights on when Vichy never exists and the aviation plants are razed to the ground or moved to Algiers, the LW really suffers a very severe loss...

In the case of FFO, Germany does not attack the Soviet Union? A major plus for them.

They attack it, but the situation in the Balkans, North Africa and the Mediterranean is going catastrophic for the Axis since France is fighting from Algiers and has salvaged a decent chunk of its strength, backed by massive American orders.
End result: Adolf has to delay Barbarossa from June 22, 1941 to May 17, 1942. Needless to say, with the Soviets being given a 11 months delay, the Germans are stopped far, far from Stalingrad or Moscow suburbs...
Please try to remember that the invasion of the USSR was driven by multiple factors, but the most important factor was rapidly diminishing German petroleum reserves. Hitler knew that he had to conquer oil fields before September 1941 if he wanted to keep the notzi war machine fuelled. When he failed to capture the Caucasus oil fields in September 1941, Germany was doomed to lose WW2.

Please consider the fact I'm not speaking for myself - but for a colossal project running since 2007, with experts at the controls, a project that has been wargamed ad nauseam, produced two books worth 3000 pages, a forum, and two comic books and some spinoffs.

 
Have Messerschmitt be driven completely out of Germany by Milch in 1931. No Bf 109 and Bf 110 means the Luftwaffe ends up with the He100, FW187, and eventually the He280. Battle of Britain probably goes significantly better with the Luftwaffe having longer ranged, better escorts.

No Bf 109 means that He 112 is Luftwaffe's fighter, that again means Heinkel does not try with He 100.
He 112A was size of Hurricane (so it under-performed and Willy gotten the contract).
 
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