Furthermore the Western Pacific is getting more and more militarized every year, with various nations building up and modernizing their navies and the USN shifting their attention from the unimpressed European theater to the crucial WESTPAC. And especially with neighbors like Japan and the ROK, which field large fleets, it makes sense to just go "fuck it we ball". I can also imagine that the Chinese are very content with this development, as it would mean that in the future there would be aa sizeable, friendly Navy in the region which could distract and deal with lesser adversaries in a potential conflict against the United States (or alternatively also be used to harass USN ships).
For China, most North Korean strengthening is trouble, not asset.

China doesn't really need help in this regard, and it can't somehow skip region right next to Beijing. For same reason, if DPRK will be seriously threatened, China will intervene even despite negative feelings towards Pyongyang.

But DPRK tricks (nuclear, missile program) bring a lot of trouble for China. China is most certainly not interested in geopolitical tension in the region...and DPRK not just brings it, it also holds keys of this instability. Not Beijing.

Last thing Beijing wants is genuine pretext for USCG presence off peninsula(or THAAD, or ROK ballistic missile program, or, or). North gives this pretexts all the time.
 
Petty politics would be best left out of the discussion, this is about DPRK ships so better stick to that.

If i'm counting correctly, apart from the 74 VLS tubes of various sizes, there are still apparently 8 inclined tubes for possibly Hwasal CMs, plus 8 tubes of the Kashtan, so this ship possibly has 90 (!) ready to fire weapons. Not to mention the gatlings. So it has practically the tube firepower of a 052D class DDG on likely a smaller displacement.
 
+
In the centre of the ship is a structure resembling that of the Amnok-class corvette from which the Hwasal-2 (2x4) cruise missiles are launched

Here on the Choi Hyun 51
2-041-2.jpg
Numbers 2 and 3 are for the venting of missile launch gases
Number 2 in ready-to-launch conditions a door slides to the side opening the vent
Number 3 is an always open arrangement

for comparison note the structure from which the cruise missile is launched from the Amnok-class corvette
22-11703037-number12-northkorea-missiles5-2.jpg

22-11703037-number11-northkorea-missiles-2.jpg
 
Torpedoes or this (Circled in Yellow)
looks like the russian anti-submarine missiles 91РЭ2 which is launched by VLS from ships
E28x-E0-RXw-Ac60-XW.jpg
 
Interesting what Kim Jong Un's speech at ceremony of launching destroyer Choi Hyun 51 weapon systems installed and what is planned for the future
The emergence of this destroyer has made a breakthrough in modernizing our naval forces.
To explain the hardware of the destroyer, an ensemble of our self-reliant defence technology, it is equipped not only with anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile capability but also with weapon systems for the most effective ground striking operations, like hypersonic strategic cruise missile, tactical ballistic missile and other means of strike. So it is capable of performing multi-mission surface operations and thus increasing the possibility of direct intervention by the Navy in the ground operations.
This is one of the things of great significance in view of the militar
This warship will be handed over to the Navy and launched into operation in early next year after going through the necessary procedures, like the assessment of its performance and capability for conducting operations and the test of operation of its integrated equipment.
We will, of course, build warships of this class next year, too. And we are planning to build in the shortest time possible a cruiser, whose operations capability is greater, as well as escort ships of various classes, and are now examining their master plans at the final stage.
We will execute this plan of building multi-mission destroyers year by year, and these ships will sail for operations in ordinary times in the coastal defensive waters and intermediate waters.
.......
Today's ceremony of launching a new-type destroyer will serve as a signal flare for strengthening the Navy of the DPRK.
And the second signal flare will be just the building of a nuclear-powered submarine.
 
And we are planning to build in the shortest time possible a cruiser,
I really wonder how big their cruiser would be... Most likely about 10.000 tons, of course (i.e. "big destroyer" grade), but what if they really would go after 15.000-20.000 battlecruiser, with enough missile capacity to challenge Japanese/South Korean SAG's?

And the second signal flare will be just the building of a nuclear-powered submarine.
Yep, they are building one. They already published photos of a very large submarine build in covered dry dock:

1745748542478.jpeg

Apparently she got a hull diameter about 12-14 meters - same as modern boomers.
 
I really wonder how big their cruiser would be... Most likely about 10.000 tons, of course (i.e. "big destroyer" grade), but what if they really would go after 15.000-20.000 battlecruiser, with enough missile capacity to challenge Japanese/South Korean SAG's?
I don't think you can anyhow challenge fleets with missile capacity alone.
Missiles in surface warfare are effectors closing kill loop. No less, no more.
 
Bmpd's article on Choi Hyun DDG-51 launch.
 
Could they have squeezed in any more unnecessary corner reflectors? (Looking at the edging around the hangar deck doors, etc).

Reloading the Pantsir is going to be a pain, there appear to be no reloading hatches, so they're left with humping 95kg launch containers up a ladder, or waiting until they're back in dock.

I'm wondering if the angled 'shed-roof' enclosure for the two smaller VLS hatch sets implies slightly inclined launch tubes?
 
I also do question the logic behind such a procurement; wouldn't it make more sense to simply build larger numbers of fast attack craft, semi-submersibles USVs, and stealth corvettes (a la Visby-class) which can make uses of the many bays and islands present in North Korea. ...
there might some operating reason tend to (relatively)larger ships:
1.They (might) have some trouble to keep high power compact engine running well
(which FAC/Corvettes relay on),
while frigates can powered by much more bulky engine.
(at least cruising,eg:FM38 8-1/8 for Hamilton class)

2.They can't get enough liquid fuel for years,and as they modernizing their army/rocket force,
much more diesel fuel needed for land vehicle.
Larger diesel engine and gas turbine can run on heavy fuel oil with some penalty,
(eg:UP railroad used #5 fuel oil both on diesel and gas turbine locos)
saving diesel fuel to other service.
and step ahead:they might use treated coal tar as ersatz fuel oil.
 
there might some operating reason tend to (relatively)larger ships:
Most likely, they just want a blue water navy, capable of protecting their maritime trade - including tankers, vital for North Korea fuel supply - from overseas harassment/attacks. Also, even for home waters they need ships capable of operating long-range multi-channel SAM, to provide anti-air protection to smaller units.
 
wouldn't it make more sense to simply build larger numbers of fast attack craft, semi-submersibles USVs, and stealth corvettes (a la Visby-class) which can make uses of the many bays and islands present in North Korea.
That would make more sense for a Western style Navy, for North Korea it means producing significantly more junior officers with the training and initiative to operate independent of higher command. They could do it if they want to, but do they want to?
 
That would make more sense for a Western style Navy, for North Korea it means producing significantly more junior officers with the training and initiative to operate independent of higher command. They could do it if they want to, but do they want to?
And why it's supposed to be a problem for North Korea? It wasn't a problem for USSR or China, you know.
 
And why it's supposed to be a problem for North Korea? It wasn't a problem for USSR or China, you know.
Like I said, it's a choice. WRT USSR, the problems reported* seemed to be in production of technically skilled junior ratings, forcing an over-reliance on junior officers for technical roles.

* During the period post Cold War when there were port visits etc happening.
 

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