To try to bring this back to bombers while I believe Germany did get its bomber strategy wrong once the war started by trying to make a heavy bomber do medium bomber stuff and building obsolete models long after they should have been displaced by a newer, better model following a better strategy in this regard is only putting lipstick on a pig. Nazi Germany's fundamental 'problem' is that their war aim of total conquest of the Soviet Union, genociding 20-30 million people and enslaving the rest is psychotic on the face of it. There is no negotiated settlement/territorial concession/reparations combination compatible with this war aim and therefore no zig or zag or better bomber production or jet fighter strategy will yield an acceptable result to either side.
Germany in ww2 zigged into Poland with their military, and then zagged into the North and West. Unlike the Imperial Germany, they made peace, and the peace they wanted, in the East and in the West, bar with UK.
As for the bombers, indeed the, nominally, second generation of the German bombers ranged between god-awful and useful. Too much depended on one type of engine (Jumo 222 for the Ju 288, the W24 engines for the He 177), and when these engines flopped or went into host of problems, the respective bombers' designs were in deep problems.
"Second generation" of the German bombers, if it featured the Do 217 being designed as a 4-engined bomber from the get-go, and the Ju 288 as a twin around the most powerful engines (BMW 801; if/when something better arrives - okay) would've probably gave them better bang for buck. The He 111 get phased off. Ju 88 also after a couple of years. If/when the next gen can be made - again, okay.
What will the LW also need is a proper escort fighter - German bombers were rangy even during the BoB, the lack of good escort was a problem.
To revert to the zig-zag - a ww2 that has UK in good shape, Germany is still in war with Soviet Union, and USA is more or less helping the two German adversaroies will still go badly for Germany.
By the spring of 1915 if there was still somewhere on the Western Front where the Germans could maneuver and outflank the French I'm sure the general staff would have been delighted to hear it. The best they could really do was hold ground in the west while focusing on what could be done with the situation in the east.
By the end of 1940 the Germans are in a much more advantageous position having defeated Poland and France and possessing Czechoslovakia, but there are still great risks. What to do and how much time do they have to do it? The UK is stubbornly still in the war and the idea the Luftwaffe would knock them out of it (or enable a successful Operation Sealion) had fallen apart. The big question is what to do about the Soviet Union? War with them is certainly evitable at some point, the more time passes the more their military is strengthened and recovering from the worst effects of Stalin's purges.
To revert to the zig-zag - a ww2 that has UK in good shape, Germany is still in war with Soviet Union, and USA is more or less helping the two German adversaroies will still go badly for Germany.
Capturing Malta or Stalingrad in 1942 isn't going to get the British or Soviets to surrender at all, but capturing Pas De Calais in 1914 and/or Riga in 1915 would materially change the strategic situation in Germany's favour in the long term. Even as late as 1918 going with Operation George instead of Micheal could have drastically changed the war in Germany's favour.
This is why, as much as WW2 jet fighters, aircraft carriers, heavy bombers, tank guns etc fascinate me they're the sauce on cheap, crappy meat. WW2 is awesome at the technological level but boring strategically.
(while apologizing for a comment that is off-topic, so it will be the last of this kind here)
Germany tried to do that in 1914. They failed. Germany in ww2 actually had a much greater success in capturing of the foreign caountries than the ww1 Germany.
Come 1915, Entente is entrenched in the West, Russia is on the war footing, and war has started vs. Italy. The opportunities for zig-zagging and win the war are fleeting. In the same time, Central powers have lost the access to the foreign supplies, the zero math of whom to feed and who to work on the fields is bad anyway we cut it.
In WW1, the German leadership had two problems, one of which they refused to solve and the other of which the refused to account for. The first was severe decreases in agricultural production due to the loss of imported nitrates, which couldhave been replace by nitrates produced from ammonia produced by the Haber process; the German government refused to do this, prioritizing ammunition production. This may have avoided several hundred thousand deaths due to malnutrition. Their second problem was that they were very optimistic in the assumption that Ukrainian (especially) food production would solve all their domestic food problems. They underestimated the damage to agricultural production in the countries newly [re]formed from the Russian Empire due to there having been a war fought in one very productive country (Ukraine), where much of the agricultural workforce either left due to conscription (where did the Russian Empire get all those soldiers?) or left because no one in their right mind will stay where there are armies fighting*. The loss due to conscription is something the Germans should have expected; they were having (and apparently ignoring) it domestically, with it being part of the reason Germany wasn't producing enough food to feed its populace.
Germany had a "strategic vision" in both world wars. It's just that its vision in both cases was blinkered by ideology, more so in WW2 (where racial extermination was a war aim) than in WW1 (where they ignored their dependence on overseas supplies).
It's hard to maintain an army in the field when your people at home are literally starving.
Germany in ww2 zigged into Poland with their military, and then zagged into the North and West. Unlike the Imperial Germany, they made peace, and the peace they wanted, in the East and in the West, bar with UK.
As for the bombers, indeed the, nominally, second generation of the German bombers ranged between god-awful and useful. Too much depended on one type of engine (Jumo 222 for the Ju 288, the W24 engines for the He 177), and when these engines flopped or went into host of problems, the respective bombers' designs were in deep problems.
"Second generation" of the German bombers, if it featured the Do 217 being designed as a 4-engined bomber from the get-go, and the Ju 288 as a twin around the most powerful engines (BMW 801; if/when something better arrives - okay) would've probably gave them better bang for buck. The He 111 get phased off. Ju 88 also after a couple of years. If/when the next gen can be made - again, okay.
What will the LW also need is a proper escort fighter - German bombers were rangy even during the BoB, the lack of good escort was a problem.
To revert to the zig-zag - a ww2 that has UK in good shape, Germany is still in war with Soviet Union, and USA is more or less helping the two German adversaroies will still go badly for Germany.
Well, a big part of the problem for the Luftwaffe was they fixated on certain aspects of technology and aerial warfare ignoring others. For example, their fixation on dive bombing as a means to accurately deliver payloads. The assumption that long-range aircraft really weren't necessary as the wars they planned to fight were all 'next door' is another.
With technology it was the same way. Jets were largely ignored early in the war as was radar. Yes, the Germans had the latter but really hadn't figured out a good use for it beyond gun laying. They wanted cutting edge, and beyond, systems on aircraft even as most of this stuff failed to materialize and was beyond their capacity to get it to work as advertised.
Wanting twin engine heavy bombers and refusing to go to a four-engine design early on was a mistake.
Sure, the Allies made mistakes too, but they had more room for error than the Germans did.
In WW1, the German leadership had two problems, one of which they refused to solve and the other of which the refused to account for. The first was severe decreases in agricultural production due to the loss of imported nitrates, which couldhave been replace by nitrates produced from ammonia produced by the Haber process; the German government refused to do this, prioritizing ammunition production. This may have avoided several hundred thousand deaths due to malnutrition. Their second problem was that they were very optimistic in the assumption that Ukrainian (especially) food production would solve all their domestic food problems. They underestimated the damage to agricultural production in the countries newly [re]formed from the Russian Empire due to there having been a war fought in one very productive country (Ukraine), where much of the agricultural workforce either left due to conscription (where did the Russian Empire get all those soldiers?) or left because no one in their right mind will stay where there are armies fighting*. The loss due to conscription is something the Germans should have expected; they were having (and apparently ignoring) it domestically, with it being part of the reason Germany wasn't producing enough food to feed its populace.
Germany had a "strategic vision" in both world wars. It's just that its vision in both cases was blinkered by ideology, more so in WW2 (where racial extermination was a war aim) than in WW1 (where they ignored their dependence on overseas supplies).
It's hard to maintain an army in the field when your people at home are literally starving.
The German army in WW1 operated to a great degree independently & had no understanding of economics at all, e.g. it conscripted men who were needed to produce the food, weapons etc. the army needed to function. It assumed the war would be short & victorious, as in 1870, & didn't really have a Plan B. That came back to bite them later.
In 1939 neither the Wehrmacht nor the Nazis had moved on very far from that. Hjalmar Schacht, who engineered Germany's 1930s economic revival, told Hitler in 1938 that his military spending plans were insupportable & the economy would crash without a change in policy. Hitler sacked him, & he ended up in a concentration camp (he survived). He didn't expect Hitler to pay for a war by fighting it, i.e. looting conquered territories. The WW2 German economy largely depended on transferring productive resources from conquests to Germany, e.g. millions of workers.
Well, a big part of the problem for the Luftwaffe was they fixated on certain aspects of technology and aerial warfare ignoring others. For example, their fixation on dive bombing as a means to accurately deliver payloads. The assumption that long-range aircraft really weren't necessary as the wars they planned to fight were all 'next door' is another.
I mean, WW2 German vehicles, ground and air, were more or less designed around the idea of ~6 months of offensives and then ~6 months of relative lull to send everything back to the factory to be refurbished. And they never asked "what happens if we don't get the 6 month lulls to refurbish?"
I mean, WW2 German vehicles, ground and air, were more or less designed around the idea of ~6 months of offensives and then ~6 months of relative lull to send everything back to the factory to be refurbished. And they never asked "what happens if we don't get the 6 month lulls to refurbish?"
More importantly, they were never designed around simplification and mass production--well until it was too late. The maintenance system of sending anything needing heavy maintenance back to the factory was based on a number of false premises:
* There would be rail capacity to do this
* Units would be willing to part with vehicles and that there would be timely replacements sent to them
* The factory(s) would have the spare capacity to do the repairs
This worked sort of reasonably well with the campaigns in Poland, France, and the Balkans, and then totally fell apart in N. Africa and Russia.
Even when the Germans tried to standardize things to some extent they still let manufacturers each do their own thing within the program. Toss in the widespread use of captured and foreign equipment and the whole system was unable to function in a prolonged war.
I'd like to see someone do this with some WW 2 German military truck:
A few posts basically saying a similar thing, the Germany was bad at the political and strategic levels of warfare. In WW1 Britain developed the War council as early as late 1914 which evolved in fits and starts into the War Cabinet to guide both the political side such as alliance and domestic politics and military strategy which in Britain manifested in the Easterners vs the Westerners. In contrast in Germany the so called Silent Dictatorship gained power and control, which was worse the Germany's starting position and vastly worse than the British organisation.
WW2 basically repeated these themes, although they manifested in different ways.
Capturing Malta or Stalingrad in 1942 isn't going to get the British or Soviets to surrender at all, but capturing Pas De Calais in 1914 and/or Riga in 1915 would materially change the strategic situation in Germany's favour in the long term. Even as late as 1918 going with Operation George instead of Micheal could have drastically changed the war in Germany's favour.
The equivalent of 1914 of the ww1 was 1940 of the ww2, not 1942.
If Germans captured most of the soldiers of the BEF, say 200K, that would've materially changed the startegic situation in Germany's favour in the long term.
By 1918, Germany was up against the British Empire, the French Empire, USA, and Italy, with dire domestic situation and with A-H in shambles.
This is why, as much as WW2 jet fighters, aircraft carriers, heavy bombers, tank guns etc fascinate me they're the sauce on cheap, crappy meat. WW2 is awesome at the technological level but boring strategically.
Well, a big part of the problem for the Luftwaffe was they fixated on certain aspects of technology and aerial warfare ignoring others. For example, their fixation on dive bombing as a means to accurately deliver payloads.
What might one suggest to be done on technology of the day, in order to accurately deliver payloads both just across the hill and 300 miles away, instead of dive bombing?
He 111 in early 1940, carrying two 1000 kg bombs under the fuselage and a lot of fuel, was capable for the range of more than 2500 km. Seems pretty long range to me.
With technology it was the same way. Jets were largely ignored early in the war as was radar. Yes, the Germans had the latter but really hadn't figured out a good use for it beyond gun laying. They wanted cutting edge, and beyond, systems on aircraft even as most of this stuff failed to materialize and was beyond their capacity to get it to work as advertised.
Everyone wanted the cutting edge stuff. Americans wanted P-47 and other aircraft with turboes when possible - even two per engine on the B-29, the B-29 itself, atomic bomb, aircraft carriers and big battleships... British wanted radars on anything and everything, including on the artillery shells, ASDIC, sleeve valves on their engines, 2-stage superchargers, also jets, plus whatnot for the RN; they were into heavier tanks before Germans did it. Soviets also wanted a lot of sophisticated stuff, but were forced to make simpler things due to their lack of abilities to make it, like the turboed engines and 4-engined bombers past the Pe-8. Their tanks were on aggregate heavier than the German stuff.
Most of the German stuff was simple, easy to make in series, and was useful both during the war and post-war.
Their ground-based radars from the late 1930s were for early warning, the gun-laying radars were introudced form 1942 (KM did that earlier).
Yes, not going relatively early with 4-engined bombers was a mistake.
Everyone was making 2-engined heavy bombers in the 1930s, though, and some remained in production until 1945, by what time they were called medium bombers.
I mean, WW2 German vehicles, ground and air, were more or less designed around the idea of ~6 months of offensives and then ~6 months of relative lull to send everything back to the factory to be refurbished.
What might one suggest to be done on technology of the day, in order to accurately deliver payloads both just across the hill and 300 miles away, instead of dive bombing?
The British and the US following their lead, devised better and better technologies to do just that. The British started with OBOE. This was range limited to radar LOS and about 300 miles. It was very difficult to detect and jam if you weren't specifically looking for it. It allowed specialized pathfinder aircraft to target mark on something like a factory in a city, say in the Ruhr, with pinpoint accuracy. But it was range limited and required aircraft that could fly at very high altitudes. Wind could affect the target markers as well.
This was followed by H2S and X radar. These allowed bombers to see the ground below with increasing accuracy. The US took that basic idea and developed EHIB (Every House In Berlin) as a better bombing radar. This would become the APQ 7 Eagle radar. Allied bombers using this set could pick out individual buildings, roads, etc. on the ground with map-like accuracy.
To go with these, the Allies developed a long-range navigation system that used generalized, and nearly impossible to jam because of their dispersion, navigation aids like LORAN and TACAN. These allowed aircraft to navigate accurately anywhere the system's transmitter signals could be received.
Another system the Allies used widely was Rebecca / Eureka. This was a system originally developed to allow accurate supply drops to partisans in France and elsewhere that was developed into a guidance system for supply drops in general. It consisted of a portable, large but portable, radio transmitter and battery pack, Rebecca, that was placed at the site of the drop. Eureka was the detection system mounted on the drop aircraft. You see the latter on C 47 quite a bit.
You can see the antenna on one side of this plane right below the cockpit. There's a second on the other side. The operator balanced the signal from the Rebecca to point the plane at the drop site. When the signal became strong enough, the drop was signaled. This was an important system for use in paradrops as it allowed the paratroopers to mark supply sites accurately. At Bastogne, this system meant that over 90% of the supplies dropped into the encirclement were received. At Arnheim 5 out of 6 of these systems failed or were captured leading to the loss of almost all supplies.
He 111 in early 1940, carrying two 1000 kg bombs under the fuselage and a lot of fuel, was capable for the range of more than 2500 km. Seems pretty long range to me.
It was also by 1940 relatively slow and vulnerable doing that. Since Germany had no really effective escort fighter, sending He 111's to a defended target was going to result in excessively high losses.
Everyone wanted the cutting edge stuff. Americans wanted P-47 and other aircraft with turboes when possible - even two per engine on the B-29, the B-29 itself, atomic bomb, aircraft carriers and big battleships... British wanted radars on anything and everything, including on the artillery shells, ASDIC, sleeve valves on their engines, 2-stage superchargers, also jets, plus whatnot for the RN; they were into heavier tanks before Germans did it. Soviets also wanted a lot of sophisticated stuff, but were forced to make simpler things due to their lack of abilities to make it, like the turboed engines and 4-engined bombers past the Pe-8. Their tanks were on aggregate heavier than the German stuff.
Most of the German stuff was simple, easy to make in series, and was useful both during the war and post-war.
Their ground-based radars from the late 1930s were for early warning, the gun-laying radars were introudced form 1942 (KM did that earlier).
The German "stuff" was generally well made but often complex and difficult to maintain. There was no general assumption in the design of anything that anyone other than an expert technician would be working on the system. While the US--I don't know if the British did this or not--would send technical experts from companies to the field, the Germans made this a general practice with Beamen. These were non-military men sent from various companies, usually with vehicles with specialized tooling, to assist the military in repairing and maintaining equipment in the field.
One of my favorites for complexity were German halftracks. These had incredibly complex track systems. Very good, and long-lived ones, but very complex. The tracks were lubricated needle bearing pin links. These froze in place in very cold weather. The grease became solid. The replaceable rubber pads meant that the track life was that of the vehicle itself with good maintenance. Those overlapped / interleaved suspensions using torsion bars were excellent but maintenance nightmares with lots of need for greasing things and the difficulty of replacing a wheel if it failed. They also had very complex steering systems and transmissions. All that complexity made them expensive and slow to produce.
But the general rule with the US was the equipment was designed to be maintained by troops who had had a short course in that sort of maintenance, possibly some civilian experience, but were by no means experts. The equipment was simple enough to be dealt with by someone with just basic skills and knowledge.
Russian gear was much the same way. Stuff that could be maintained by someone with rudimentary skills.
Yes, not going relatively early with 4-engined bombers was a mistake.
Everyone was making 2-engined heavy bombers in the 1930s, though, and some remained in production until 1945, by what time they were called medium bombers.
Part of the problem for the Germans was that going to 4-engine bombers meant a significant reduction in production numbers. This was unacceptable to the top Luftwaffe commanders who wanted quantity in service. Realistically, based on German production, any particular manufacturer might build 2 to 5 4-engine bombers a day. That leaves you with a pretty small force when you start accounting for operational and combat losses.
The British and the US following their lead, devised better and better technologies to do just that. The British started with OBOE. This was range limited to radar LOS and about 300 miles. It was very difficult to detect and jam if you weren't specifically looking for it. It allowed specialized pathfinder aircraft to target mark on something like a factory in a city, say in the Ruhr, with pinpoint accuracy. But it was range limited and required aircraft that could fly at very high altitudes. Wind could affect the target markers as well.
Thank you for the effort to list out the tech.
When the Germans - and some other people - went for dive bombing, these devices didn't exist. Faulting the Germans for not using tech from future when making specs for a bomber today is kinda knocking on the wrong doors.
Further, we can see that Allies were also trying to make very high-tech stuff; singling-out the Germans for going high-tech is ... funny.
It was also by 1940 relatively slow and vulnerable doing that. Since Germany had no really effective escort fighter, sending He 111's to a defended target was going to result in excessively high losses.
Every big bomber in 1940 was slow and vulnerable. Ditto for the small bombers in the day.
I agree that Germany did not have the effective escort fighter.
The German "stuff" was generally well made but often complex and difficult to maintain. There was no general assumption in the design of anything that anyone other than an expert technician would be working on the system.
Part of the problem for the Germans was that going to 4-engine bombers meant a significant reduction in production numbers. This was unacceptable to the top Luftwaffe commanders who wanted quantity in service. Realistically, based on German production, any particular manufacturer might build 2 to 5 4-engine bombers a day. That leaves you with a pretty small force when you start accounting for operational and combat losses.
What probably mattered more was the return of investment: how many tons of bombs can the bomber force deliver on the specified distance, with the investment of so many hundreds/thousands of engines (and other material), fuel and hundreds of pilots. A 4-engined bomber, even something unspectacular like the early Halifaxes, was carrying almost 3 times the bomb load of a good 2-engined bomber of the day (Wellington, He 111). Without spares, 600 engines will be enough for 150 of 4-engined bombers, or 300 of 2-engined types. The 4-engined force will be able to deliver ~45% more bombs than the 2-engined force. It will do that with half the pilot pool - another thing that Luftwaffe might've found interesting, just like Bomber Harris found.
A 4-engined bomber can also have a meaningful defensive armament installed because of it's bigger volume & weight allowance, and there is no need for the crewmen to run to the different MG posts like it was the case with He 111. The engine-out situation on a 4-engined A/C is far less of a problem than on the 2-engined type.
Shortcoming is indeed that less bombers will be made, and that individual loss is more expensive.
Thank you for the effort to list out the tech.
When the Germans - and some other people - went for dive bombing, these devices didn't exist. Faulting the Germans for not using tech from future when making specs for a bomber today is kinda knocking on the wrong doors.
Further, we can see that Allies were also trying to make very high-tech stuff; singling-out the Germans for going high-tech is ... funny.
Actually, the Luftwaffe had navigation aids like Lorentz and X-Gerät in service prior to the war starting. But like other electronics, they were largely misunderstood and ignored by the Luftwaffe's leadership. Göring himself was both a technological illiterate and something of a Luddite. He regularly dismissed "boxes with wires" as irrelevant or unnecessary.
That meant that many good initial inventions and introduction into service items never got pushed forward to better technologies. Instead, they were usually deemed 'good enough' and languished instead.
The Germans went "high tech" in a kind of erratic pattern. They would hit a wall in some technology and simply stop trying while pushing past in other areas.
Every big bomber in 1940 was slow and vulnerable. Ditto for the small bombers in the day.
I agree that Germany did not have the effective escort fighter.
These statements will be needed to be supported by the plethora of primary sources in order to be believed.
What probably mattered more was the return of investment: how many tons of bombs can the bomber force deliver on the specified distance, with the investment of so many hundreds/thousands of engines (and other material), fuel and hundreds of pilots. A 4-engined bomber, even something unspectacular like the early Halifaxes, was carrying almost 3 times the bomb load of a good 2-engined bomber of the day (Wellington, He 111). Without spares, 600 engines will be enough for 150 of 4-engined bombers, or 300 of 2-engined types. The 4-engined force will be able to deliver ~45% more bombs than the 2-engined force. It will do that with half the pilot pool - another thing that Luftwaffe might've found interesting, just like Bomber Harris found.
A 4-engined bomber can also have a meaningful defensive armament installed because of it's bigger volume & weight allowance, and there is no need for the crewmen to run to the different MG posts like it was the case with He 111. The engine-out situation on a 4-engined A/C is far less of a problem than on the 2-engined type.
Shortcoming is indeed that less bombers will be made, and that individual loss is more expensive.
4-engine bombers also required exponentially more parts and labor. That is the growth rate in complexity was not linear. So, a single seat fighter might require say 5,000 parts. A twin-engine bomber, 15,000. A 4-engine bomber, 80,000. You get the idea. This is why the production rate of the later would be so low.
Actually, the Luftwaffe had navigation aids like Lorentz and X-Gerät in service prior to the war starting. But like other electronics, they were largely misunderstood and ignored by the Luftwaffe's leadership. Göring himself was both a technological illiterate and something of a Luddite. He regularly dismissed "boxes with wires" as irrelevant or unnecessary.
At least in 20th century, technological advances need to happen and to be applied in reasonable amount if a belligerent wants to one-up the enemy. Both of these devices gave a good account of themselves, and were not ignored. That Goering was who he was does not mean we can wide-brush whatever the Germans made (or did not).
That meant that many good initial inventions and introduction into service items never got pushed forward to better technologies. Instead, they were usually deemed 'good enough' and languished instead.
The Germans went "high tech" in a kind of erratic pattern. They would hit a wall in some technology and simply stop trying while pushing past in other areas.
Germans definitely erred with their electronics.
Allies (basically British in the lead and with Americans following suit) invested a lot more, and were not afraid to make ever better devices as the war progressed. For example, the work on the proximity fuse was years ahead in the Allied camp vs. what the Germans did. Ditto for the newer radars, much enabled by the application of magnetron technology.
4-engine bombers also required exponentially more parts and labor. That is the growth rate in complexity was not linear. So, a single seat fighter might require say 5,000 parts. A twin-engine bomber, 15,000. A 4-engine bomber, 80,000. You get the idea. This is why the production rate of the later would be so low.
That would depend on the specific A/C types, so I'd disagree with the scale you are suggesting. Even the nominally same class of aircraft differed a lot. A P-47 will require perhaps twice the number of parts than a P-40 or the Fw 190, and the B-29 might be in the similar ballpark as the B-17, IOW 2:1. The individual parts count on the Spitfire was perhaps twice that of the Bf 109 (just for airframe), MTT using a lot more of big stamped parts than the British, especially in the wing.
The equivalent of 1914 of the ww1 was 1940 of the ww2, not 1942.
If Germans captured most of the soldiers of the BEF, say 200K, that would've materially changed the startegic situation in Germany's favour in the long term. By 1918, Germany was up against the British Empire, the French Empire, USA, and Italy, with dire domestic situation and with A-H in shambles.
Sure, but if the biggest 1918 operation was a zig Operation George instead of a zag of the shrunken Georgette and big Michael the Germans could have pushed the BEF either into the sea or at least off the Pas De Calais and directly threatened Britain. If this was the result after 4 years of war the negotiating position would be very different given Germany wasn't trying to conquer France and Britain.
Sure, but if the biggest 1918 operation was a zig Operation George instead of a zag of the shrunken Georgette and big Michael the Germans could have pushed the BEF either into the sea or at least off the Pas De Calais and directly threatened Britain.
German threat to Britain with their Army arriving at the continental side of Pas De Calais in 1918 would've been between slim and none. Especially since now the Home Fleet has something to do.
If this was the result after 4 years of war the negotiating position would be very different given Germany wasn't trying to conquer France and Britain.
It takes two to tango. Neither British nor the French will be willing to accommodate Germany in 1918 with the US now in full support, and with German overseas territories being captured. While neither the British nor French were in the bed of roses by 1918, their position was far better than what Germans had.
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