What would aircraft design be like if assigned vastly more engineers?

shin_getter

ACCESS: Top Secret
Joined
1 June 2019
Messages
1,490
Reaction score
2,191
The employment costs of a development team is not a small sum and constrains the viable design space. Lets say the cost structure changes and engineers become very cheap to hire and you can get a 30x sized team figuring out the smallest detail in the most improbable configuration. How would that change aircraft design? What designs that would work given more effort would get revived? Can this manpower help much with certification and if so by how much?
 
It will get worse...
More manpower does not equate better solutions.
Anyone who has ever been in a meeting with project managers knows this..
Everything will be designed by committee, it will work great, but it has no soul..
Nothing that will it stand out in the crowd...
Image the SR-71(designed by a very small team), but it can also throw 40,000 pounds of bombs, fly for 40 hours, land on a dime, and transport 40 troops.... It will look nothing like we are used too. Would it be a good plane? For sure, will it be an icon as the real SR-71? No, because the next plane will be almost the same, but just a bit better, because of technological progress ( New materials, new developments in electronics, some breakthrough in science...)
There is also the law of diminish returns, at one point, putting more people on a project doesn't produce work towards the project. You get more people doing people-work than actual work towards the final goal.
So some projects might see some improvements, but in the end the technology of the time were the greatest limits ( outside of politics, bad choices, broken promises ...)

My two cents.
 
As an occasional manager of projects, there is a phrase I hear a lot:

Two women can't make a baby twice as fast.

Which is to say, not all problems can be solved by throwing more bodies at them. There are only so many people can look at a drawing of a wing spar at the same time.

That is before you even get into the logistics of managing larger teams, keeping individual groups aligned, making sure various roadmaps remain in lockstep. Sure you can have a separate team looking at a 25% lighter alloy, but it will be impossible to make sure their progress matches up with the previously mentioned 19 man wing spar working group. And there's supply chains, geo-politics, the weather. The problems are fractal.

Big aerospace companies get a lot of flak when things go sideways, get delayed, go over budget etc, but I do have a little sympathy. Development at all scales is always a lumpy process.
 
Last edited:
The best way to often get good results is start with one visionary who is on the brink of insanity leading a team of like six engineers that know their stuff in the field like nobody else does and are backed up by six to ten master craftsmen who can make chicken soup from chicken $h!+ in an instant. Give them a budget, a goal, and a timeframe to get it done or get fired, and you get amazing results. Don't for a second question how they did it or where things came from or how it got done. Accept that you got something incredible and run with it.
 
Roughly speaking, as (at least according to my personal life experience assessment) in pretty much every profession, there are truly exceptional, absolutely outstanding ground breaking aerospace engineers, there are genuinely good, creative aerospace engineers, there are solid and reliable but unremarkable average aerospace engineers, there are bad but at least marginally functional aerospace engineers, and there are absolutely abysmal degree mill graduate stinker aerospace engineers - the bell curve rules. A small but whip smart design team will run all kind of orbits around any lesser qualified/intellectually endowed but higher staffed cadre every single time - quality will beat quantity time and again.
 
Last edited:
Roughly speaking, as (at least according to my personal life experience assessment) in pretty much every profession, there are truly exceptional, absolutely outstanding ground breaking aerospace engineers, there are genuinely good, creative aerospace engineers, there are solid and reliable but unremarkable average aerospace engineers, there are bad aerospace engineers, and there are absolutely abysmal degree mill graduate loser stinker aerospace engineers - the bell curve rules. A small but whip smart design team will run all kind of orbits around any lesser qualified/intellectually endowed cadre every single time -quality will beat quantity time and again.
So will one in an organization where there isn't a deeply rooted corporate mentality that forces things to be done a certain way. Bureaucrats have a way of snuffing the life out of anyone who is creative or willing to bend the corporation's rules.
 
So will one in an organization where there isn't a deeply rooted corporate mentality that forces things to be done a certain way. Bureaucrats have a way of snuffing the life out of anyone who is creative or willing to bend the corporation's rules.
The basic optimal aerospace design management process was outlined by one of the all time supreme masters decades ago, see https://www.hotpmo.com/management-m...management-rules-everything-you-need-to-know/. But perhaps your local bureaucracy dominated/censored/limited/restricted/ideologically constrained (non) engineering experience may vary wildly, of course. I wish you all the best.
 
Last edited:
More engineers could improve testing, optimisation, and certification speed, but aircraft design is still limited by manufacturing capability and regulatory requirements. The real advantage would come from combining skilled teams with modern technology and advanced precision engineering to improve efficiency, reliability, and innovation.
 
The basic optimal aerospace design management process was outlined by one of the all time supreme masters decades ago, see https://www.hotpmo.com/management-m...management-rules-everything-you-need-to-know/. But perhaps your local bureaucracy dominated/censored/limited/restricted/ideologically constrained (non) engineering experience may vary wildly, of course. I wish you all the best.
Kelly and Lockheed are the exception, not the rule. Early start up manufacturers are often innovative and, if successful, grow over time and then become institutionalized with cumbersome bureaucracies.
 
This will be a bit of a long winded and rambling answer to the OP's original question if throwing more engineering manpower at something works.

And some good insights on organizational matters and bureaucracy have already been brought up.

But there is another thing to consider here as well: And that is that a lot of the work in aerospace is cutting edge.

And what this means in practice, is that while you may have IDEAS about how you are going to solve a particular problem in step 7 when you are in then planning stage doing the project plan, or even when you've reached steps 1 or 2 in development, you may not have anticipated ALL the PROBLEMS you are going to run into at step 7 until you have reached maybe step 5, and then in step 6 you also realize you need to scrap and redo all of the work done in steps 3 and 4.

And this may be for only ONE of multiple parallel work flows which ALL need to be correctly guesstimated and then tied together in the end, thus compounding the problem even further.

Consequently, cost overruns in aerospace work are often inevitable, irrespective of how well organized they are, and how many engineers you threw at the problem.

I've worked in the aerospace defense industry with EW and ECM equipment, and I've seen this myself many times.

Often it (cost overruns and/or slipped schedules) is blamed either on the work process or poor leadership, when in fact no amount of project planning or no new magical work process is going to fix it.

If you are working on cutting edge stuff it's simply inevitable, because you are breaking new ground.

And if you really can break down all the unknowns beforehand, and calculate all the manhours and costs reliably, then it will by definition not be cutting edge.

As I've gotten older, I've come to more and more appreciate the saying "Not young enough to know everything".

And if you've worked for a few decades, you've already seen the endless cycle of new middle managers in their early forties, fresh from some new management course, enthusiastically talking about this or that new work process, and how this will solve it all! You've just been doing it wrong!

Never fails. And when I first started in the industry, this Sword of Alexander was called "Concurrent Engineering". And now its "Agile" or something else. And tomorrow it will be some new other magical work process that will split the Gordian Knot.

There: Some wisdom for you youngsters to bite on! And do not fall for the Sirens song and become such a middle manager!

And remember: If you work hard at it, then maybe one day you too can join the illustrious cadre of grumpy old men!
 
This will be a bit of a long winded and rambling answer to the OP's original question if throwing more engineering manpower at something works.

And some good insights on organizational matters and bureaucracy have already been brought up.

But there is another thing to consider here as well: And that is that a lot of the work in aerospace is cutting edge.

And what this means in practice, is that while you may have IDEAS about how you are going to solve a particular problem in step 7 when you are in then planning stage doing the project plan, or even when you've reached steps 1 or 2 in development, you may not have anticipated ALL the PROBLEMS you are going to run into at step 7 until you have reached maybe step 5, and then in step 6 you also realize you need to scrap and redo all of the work done in steps 3 and 4.

And this may be for only ONE of multiple parallel work flows which ALL need to be correctly guesstimated and then tied together in the end, thus compounding the problem even further.

Consequently, cost overruns in aerospace work are often inevitable, irrespective of how well organized they are, and how many engineers you threw at the problem.

I've worked in the aerospace defense industry with EW and ECM equipment, and I've seen this myself many times.

Often it (cost overruns and/or slipped schedules) is blamed either on the work process or poor leadership, when in fact no amount of project planning or no new magical work process is going to fix it.

If you are working on cutting edge stuff it's simply inevitable, because you are breaking new ground.

And if you really can break down all the unknowns beforehand, and calculate all the manhours and costs reliably, then it will by definition not be cutting edge.

As I've gotten older, I've come to more and more appreciate the saying "Not young enough to know everything".

And if you've worked for a few decades, you've already seen the endless cycle of new middle managers in their early forties, fresh from some new management course, enthusiastically talking about this or that new work process, and how this will solve it all! You've just been doing it wrong!

Never fails. And when I first started in the industry, this Sword of Alexander was called "Concurrent Engineering". And now its "Agile" or something else. And tomorrow it will be some new other magical work process that will split the Gordian Knot.

There: Some wisdom for you youngsters to bite on! And do not fall for the Sirens song and become such a middle manager!

And remember: If you work hard at it, then maybe one day you too can join the illustrious cadre of grumpy old men!
And here's the best part. You can put the name of any almost every Engineering discipline and industry into this statement and its all still true!
 
And here's the best part. You can put the name of any almost every Engineering discipline and industry into this statement and its all still true!

Yes, I agree: As long as it's cutting edge technology or something you've not done before, it will be very difficult not to exceed time plans and budgets, even if you have no constraints in engineering manpower, and have a perfect work process and organization (which of course is a chimera anyway).

I think the jump in the automotive industry from combustion to electric drive probably created the same sort of problems for the big auto makers: They could probably calculate the development cost for new versions of their combustion engined cars down to the dime, but electric drive was an unknown for most. Probably a whole lot of busted time and cost plans right there! ;)
 
Due to reasons outside work (well, other than the pure evil Stasi-wannabe organization that is HR) I moved from 20 years in a small high-performing in-service support engineering organization in civil aerospace that operated with minimal bureaucracy and a "you're a grown-up, we trust you to make the right decision and manage your work as appropriate" attitude to send repairs directly to customers and be directly involved in operations, to a major defense contractor.

Now, I do nothing but make "deliverables" (i.e. documents and paperwork) and assess "similarly" of vendor products and services to commercially-available ones. Everything I do--even asking basic questions of suppliers--requires a memo with at least two levels of management approval and sign-off from project engineers and buyers, some of whom were still in diapers when I started my career. Everything I do is scripted by a dedicated team of project engineers (who outnumber the engineers actually working on the technical problems). Things my junior engineers at my last job could sign off themselves, now take approval from the Chief Engineer's office. You can't fart without a project engineer approving that your work is within contract scope and properly forecasted month-by-month, and it seems like at least 2-3x more manpower is spent on fussing over contract compliance and status report delivery than on actual technical work. And of course, the company won't do anything on its own without making sure it's on that juicy cost-plus contract.

I was told the bureaucracy was a challenge here. I did not understand how much of an understatement that was. It's like saying climbing Everest is "a challenging hike". This whole operation is frustrating beyond belief, both as an industry veteran and as a taxpayer.

You don't need more people, you need less--at least if your goal is delivering a tangible product, not maximizing billed labor hours in the "how much can we exceed budget without getting slapped for it?" game.
 
@gtg947h I've seen much the same thing:

From when I started working as an engineer in the middle 1980's, to when I retired a few years ago, HR swelled from being just a few persons you encountered when you were hired, and who helped managers hiring new recruits etc, to a major part of the organization in terms of headcount, and with an enormous clout, affecting basically all aspects of development.

They (HR) sent out "news" mails clogging up your inbox with invitations to videos of "cozy fireside chat with Dr Julia H", to obligatory videos about DEI you had to watch within a certain span of time, or they would contact your manager.

Curtailing obligatory courses and sensitivity training like this in "modern" companies would easily free up 20-30 % or more engineering time.

The price is taken by one mail HR sent out which unbelievably said that it does not matter how good a result you produced, if you did it alone and not in a group, then it was no good anyway. Which was crazy, because a lot of the tech we lived on in the mobile phone industry, was both in 3G, 4G and 5G the product of a few Finnish and Swedish super gifted engineers who definitely did not do anything as group work, and whose ideas everyone else brought into fruition.

I truly feel sorry for young guys beginning their careers now: In the old day you could work doing engineering, now a lot of time needs to be spent appeasing HR, your true boss. ;)
 
I am not from the industry but, I have seen projects with much in the way of management and they universally failed the shit test and stank like it.

Faster/more efficient movement of patients in hospital? Great but the new improved system called for more checks during each patient move at multiple locations. Cue much slower patient transfer, more delays meaning porters were never free for emergencies and much higher cost. Managers loved it though and it was staff that were blamed not the obfuscatious bleep log in at multiple points en route routine.

If you are not getting the results you expect, check your premises. Yeahbutnobut, seen that in business at all?

Realistic goals, constant referral to those goals and you might have a chance but, unlikely on a regular basis.

I was testing some software years ago now and frankly they wasted their opportunity by constantly changing project manager. One of those wanted the goals changed and I had to point out that there were several free programs doing what he wanted to charge folk in the region of $100 for.

"Really"? Yes, look at what the opposition are doing too.

Be aware of the market/competition level and do not bring a biplane to a 5th gen strike aircraft market. Being bi might mean it does not like you.
 
I found in the US Navy the best way to insulate yourself from your direct chain-of-command, was to be doing something bigger and outside that chain for another command that was more important. Think of it as I worked for officer X but the work I was doing was really for officer Y and Y had far more pull than X.

That meant Y had a vested interest in what I was doing but wasn't responsible for me, X was.

So, when X would make some inane demand that would severely impact Y's project and getting the end result, I'd say "Yes sir X, I'll let the project people know..." or something like that. I'd then call Y who would call X and say, something like "I'm 6 grades in rank above you and that project is critical. You better unscrew up whatever you did..."

That made me untouchable. All I had to do was keep X looking good and X was smart enough after one smackdown to not look too hard in my direction.
 
I found in the US Navy the best way to insulate yourself from your direct chain-of-command, was to be doing something bigger and outside that chain for another command that was more important. Think of it as I worked for officer X but the work I was doing was really for officer Y and Y had far more pull than X.

That meant Y had a vested interest in what I was doing but wasn't responsible for me, X was.

So, when X would make some inane demand that would severely impact Y's project and getting the end result, I'd say "Yes sir X, I'll let the project people know..." or something like that. I'd then call Y who would call X and say, something like "I'm 6 grades in rank above you and that project is critical. You better unscrew up whatever you did..."

That made me untouchable. All I had to do was keep X looking good and X was smart enough after one smackdown to not look too hard in my direction.

That's funny: I did exactly the same thing but in the mobile phone industry. Last job I had was as a systems engineer, responsible for one of the protocol layers in the 3G, 4G and 5G mobile phone networks.

This meant that I spread my time working in several projects, and with Ericsson Research and the 3GPP standardization people. I planned my own work and did my own priorities. And if any manager tried to tell me what do and I did not agree, then I used the same argument as you. Never fails. If you're sitting on vital competence you can do this, and no manager can tell you what to do.

So here is another bit of advice to you young guys who want to work with tech and don't want either to be bossed around by, or become a manager yourself, but to actually do technical stuff and make a decent living: Find an area of technical competence that's valuable and become and expert in it, and you'll both get a decent salary and be your own boss. ;)
 
I suspect that if vastly more engineers were used to design aircraft from the beginning of post WWII aviation, we would now be starting the initial flight testing of the F-4 Phantom.
 
On a big, really big European aeroplane, its chief engineer once said “I could have delivered the aircraft design, complete, on time, on budget and ready for production with just 200 of the 4000 they insisted on giving me, although they would have to have been the right 200”.
 
Last edited:
The employment costs of a development team is not a small sum and constrains the viable design space. Lets say the cost structure changes and engineers become very cheap to hire and you can get a 30x sized team figuring out the smallest detail in the most improbable configuration. How would that change aircraft design? What designs that would work given more effort would get revived? Can this manpower help much with certification and if so by how much?
Shin-

Howdy !

No matter how many engineers it takes to design a successful aircraft, the design won’t be brought to fruition if the production line is not manned by qualified, safety-minded
Assemblers,Technicians; and Mechanics etc.

All throughout aircraft manufacturing, engineers are often asked to develop and design
“ fixes “ for issues that crop-up during the manufacturing/assembly process. They are also asked to develop engineered fixes/repair plans for aircraft in-service.

Again, such enduring repairs and fixes cannot be successfully implemented w/o the contribution of qualified, experienced, dedicated-to-safety mechanics. For example:
chief contributing factor(s) to the Concorde crash, JAL Flight 123; Alaska Airlines B737
Max in-flight incident.

Engineering and Mechanic functions are a marriage, when it comes to aircraft manufacturing and repair operations.

It shouldn’t be “ shotgun wedding “.


With regards,
357Mag
 
No matter how many engineers it takes to design a successful aircraft, the design won’t be brought to fruition if the production line is not manned by qualified, safety-minded
Assemblers,Technicians; and Mechanics etc.

All throughout aircraft manufacturing, engineers are often asked to develop and design
“ fixes “ for issues that crop-up during the manufacturing/assembly process. They are also asked to develop engineered fixes/repair plans for aircraft in-service.

Again, such enduring repairs and fixes cannot be successfully implemented w/o the contribution of qualified, experienced, dedicated-to-safety mechanics. For example:
chief contributing factor(s) to the Concorde crash, JAL Flight 123; Alaska Airlines B737
Max in-flight incident.

Engineering and Mechanic functions are a marriage, when it comes to aircraft manufacturing and repair operations.

It shouldn’t be “ shotgun wedding “.

Absolutely. Two of my first jobs as an engineer fresh out of University was a prototype color display for the JA37 Viggen, and an IFF system that was mounted in a BV 206 tracked mobile radar system, and in which the original design suffered vibration problems.

In both cases I came up with design concepts, but on which the head of the prototype workshop department had suggestion on how to improve to make them more producible and cut down production costs. He was of course right, and back I went to my CAD and redesigned them.

And this does of course not only apply to novice engineers, but older wiser ones would do well to listen to the feedback from the shop floor. And in the end, both of the designs I mentioned did the job they were supposed to do.

So I would say that the moral of the story is that a good design will always need a happy marriage between shop floor and the engineering department.
 
Last edited:
Yes, well, I am sure that AI will sort all of this out. :rolleyes:
Puff-puff-pass, man.

On a big, really big European aeroplane, its chief engineer once said “I could have delivered the aircraft design, complete, on time, on budget and ready for production with just 200 of the 4000 they insisted on giving me, although they would have to have been the right 200”.
Funny enough, the right 200 engineers were probably in that block of 4000.


Where extra bodies really help is in QA.
 
The employment costs of a development team is not a small sum and constrains the viable design space. Lets say the cost structure changes and engineers become very cheap to hire and you can get a 30x sized team figuring out the smallest detail in the most improbable configuration. How would that change aircraft design? What designs that would work given more effort would get revived? Can this manpower help much with certification and if so by how much?

So, if given enough engineers and enough funding to develop actual prototypes... we'd probably see blended-wing body civil aircraft, we'd see truss-braced wing civil aircraft, we'd probably see hydrogen powered aircraft, and we'd also have had tailless fighters (X-44 Manta?) quite a bit sooner.

I bet we could get air travel 30% cheaper, air cargo even cheaper than that, and military aircraft quite a bit more expensive.
 
The employment costs of a development team is not a small sum and constrains the viable design space. Lets say the cost structure changes and engineers become very cheap to hire and you can get a 30x sized team figuring out the smallest detail in the most improbable configuration. How would that change aircraft design? What designs that would work given more effort would get revived? Can this manpower help much with certification and if so by how much?

Please don't give MBAs any ideas about cutting engineers' salaries. They're already treated as disposable commodities.

In my view, there are two issues: one is that (in the US DoD, at least) there don't seem to be enough engineers with sufficient authority assigned in the specification process. The other is that too many engineering managers don't take the human side of their jobs seriously (as an example: at my last employment in the aerospace industry, one of the engineering executives was reputed to have off-loaded the evaluation of his direct reports, who were middle managers, to his secretary as he couldn't be bothered)
 
While this thread is asking “What would aircraft design be like if assigned vastly more engineers?”, and seems to converge on that (not so surprisingly) it’s the quality and not quantity that counts, I think we today actually have more far reaching problems than that: Namely HR and Finance.

I’ve worked in tech companies for more than 30 years, and in the beginning of my career, Engineering dominated, while Finance and HR were more of supporting functions.

Nowadays though, instead of a company producing products, Finance has taken over, and a tech company is no longer about making products, but about making money. And for Finance, you unfortunately need a few engineers to do that. And engineers cost money, so the fewer you have the better. So if you need to lay off people, this is where you do it. Not in the overswelling bureaucracy overhead (since HR and Finance are all indispensable!), but in engineering.

AFAIK this is also what happened in the Boeing and McDonnel Douglas merger in 1996: The Finance people from MDD took over the joint company and turned engineering controlled Boeing into a money making machine with all the QC problems that followed.

Then we have HR: Who basically grew from a few people you met when you were employed, and when you left the company, to a company within the company, and something that now totally dominates company culture with mandatory “sensitivity” training courses and DEI directives etc., that while professing to do good, actually only hampers productivity.

So more engineers is not necessarily a bad thing: Sure, some of them may trip over each other if you have too many, but I hardly think too many engineers is a problem in today’s tech companies: The problem is rather too FEW engineers and too many people in HR and Finance.
 
With more engineers involved, rather than more overall programs and projects it's likely that, instead, they become more and more specialized in minutia. That is you have a whole engineering team designing landing gear assisted by a team of electrical engineers, hydraulic engineers, mechanical engineers for the brakes, chemical engineers to design the tires and create the "perfect" rubber, ad infinitum. The whole process takes a decade or more to get to a mediocre, overly complex, design that needs massive amounts of redesign and consulting to fix--for the fiftieth time.

The result is each project becomes so complex and bug ridden that eventually gets abandoned in its obsolescence before ever getting beyond--maybe--a few prototypes. It is then replaced by a far more ambitious and advanced project needing even more engineers than the last project.
 
Then we have HR: Who basically grew from a few people you met when you were employed, and when you left the company, to a company within the company, and something that now totally dominates company culture with mandatory “sensitivity” training courses and DEI directives etc., that while professing to do good, actually only hampers productivity.
Thing is, HR is also hated by finance (full disclosure, I went HR after the Navy). Because all Finance sees is people's salaries, they don't see HR preventing massive lawsuit payouts that Finance doesn't pay directly (it comes out of insurance, usually).

In fact, lawsuit prevention is one of HR's most important roles. Kinda like the safety dudes who prevent OSHA fines.
 
Sometimes heaving an incredible number of engineers seams to work, BYD has more than 200.000 engineers. The project teams are not incredible large, but they are using several competing teams for every task and choose the best result in the end. This can provide good solutions, but makes it hard to change the once choosen boundary conditions. Just imagine one engine team found a solution which overfills the torque requirement and would ask 10 gear box teams if they can tolerate it.
 
With more engineers involved, rather than more overall programs and projects it's likely that, instead, they become more and more specialized in minutia. That is you have a whole engineering team designing landing gear assisted by a team of electrical engineers, hydraulic engineers, mechanical engineers for the brakes, chemical engineers to design the tires and create the "perfect" rubber, ad infinitum. The whole process takes a decade or more to get to a mediocre, overly complex, design that needs massive amounts of redesign and consulting to fix--for the fiftieth time.

The result is each project becomes so complex and bug ridden that eventually gets abandoned in its obsolescence before ever getting beyond--maybe--a few prototypes. It is then replaced by a far more ambitious and advanced project needing even more engineers than the last project.
Sounds like a classical management rather than an engineering problem to me, i.e. the fish always stinks from the head. This planet needs plenty more rather than less technocrats...
 
Sounds like a classical management rather than an engineering problem to me, i.e. the fish always stinks from the head. This planet needs plenty more rather than less technocrats...
Read Parkinson's Law sometimes. The whole purpose of a bureaucracy is to expand. Efficiency be damned.
 
Then we have HR: Who basically grew from a few people you met when you were employed, and when you left the company, to a company within the company, and something that now totally dominates company culture with mandatory “sensitivity” training courses and DEI directives etc., that while professing to do good, actually only hampers productivity.
My problem with HR is not DEI or whatever. It's that somehow HR went from the small group of people that helped management get what was needed and make sure stuff was done right (procedurally and legally), and dealt with personnel issues, to somehow asserting for themselves absolute and unaccountable discretion over all personnel decisions.

Any and every decision not specifically delegated solely to a supervisor (essentially, approving timecards and routine time off, and shift scheduling) required HR approval. And even if every process was followed exactly, every form filled out completely and properly, every single detail taken care of in the correct order, a business case clearly and obviously presented, and every approval was obtained from every level of management up to Senior VP--anyone at any level of HR can simply say "denied", with no justification, no transparency, no appeal, no recourse, no alternative. That's how they fucked me last year.

Every decision I made as an engineer had to be backed up data and/or sound reasoning; whenever I made a decision that seemed to go against what was expected or seemed obvious, I was usually asked to provide that justification and be prepared to defend myself. HR had no such requirement; "because we said so" was the beginning and end of everything.

You didn't even know who actually made the decision. Unlike any other department, the entire HR org chart was hidden from the general employee population. You knew who your assigned representative was; beyond that it was a complete state secret. Similarly, their processes, rules, SOPs, etc. were hidden. It got so bad that HR would not even respond directly to emails or direct messages--they insisted only on phone or in-person communication (and would not leave voicemail), a practice which can only be assumed to ensure no paper trail was left that could be used against them. Not that it mattered; most inquiries simply led to long trains of word salad that said absolutely nothing of substance.

And even if you did somehow pry out of them a statement in writing, and follow everything they tell you to the letter, it apparently becomes null and void as soon as you read it, and "yes, we agreed last week that was acceptable, but now we need additional time to evaluate" or simply "haha j/k no" was how the game was played.

I can tell you exactly when it all started, too. A new CEO took over, and within a couple years a big layoff hit. After gutting much of engineering and other indirect staff over a couple days, all the HR folks who had to handle those terminations were themselves sacked on Friday. A series of punitive, counterproductive, and deeply unpopular policy changes were enacted immediately after, and then over the next year or two, lots of new HR people were brought in. The new primary focus became "enforcement of Policy no matter how detrimental it is" and the primary qualification for working in HR was unquestioning obedience to said CEO's decisions. HR basically became the CEO's Cheka that was absolutely above the law and unaccountable to anyone but him.

they become more and more specialized in minutia
I think there are two causes of this. One is the aerospace tendency at every level to focus on maximum performance--we want the lightest, most efficient, best-performing ______ and (as long as the money lasts) we will ruthlessly optimize the design to get that perfect part, then try to figure out how to make it. This generally results in complex high-cost manufacturing processes and bespoke components (valves, actuators, LRUs, etc) at almost every level. Then we try to squeeze cost out of production after the fact.

The other side is cost-plus contracts, which I have come to absolutely despise after just a few months working in defense. The administrative and paperwork-generating requirements easily suck up 30-50% or more of your average engineer's time, and also brings in a huge extra army of paper-pushers (read: overhead cost) whose sole job it is to track everything and make sure the government isn't spending extra money. Add on top the three extra levels of approval that everything requires. Of course, since the contract is billed by hours worked, and every employee adds hours to which that percentage fee applies...


I used to say I wish I'd listened to Mom and gone into civil engineering. The last 10 months have convinced me that what I should have actually done was be a plumber like my great grandfather and great uncle. You can find employment everywhere, it's clean honest money, and you won't wind up sitting at a desk in a windowless building staring at a computer screen doing pricing analysis and organizing meetings to plan your plan for providing the proposal that is your deliverable for the first phase of the the study wherein you plan to propose a project to create a proposal for the customer so you can then do a project to make more deliverables for them to implement.

I moved because I had to for my family to have access to medical care, but in the process I think I committed career suicide.
 
My problem with HR is not DEI or whatever. It's that somehow HR went from the small group of people that helped management get what was needed and make sure stuff was done right (procedurally and legally), and dealt with personnel issues, to somehow asserting for themselves absolute and unaccountable discretion over all personnel decisions.

Any and every decision not specifically delegated solely to a supervisor (essentially, approving timecards and routine time off, and shift scheduling) required HR approval. And even if every process was followed exactly, every form filled out completely and properly, every single detail taken care of in the correct order, a business case clearly and obviously presented, and every approval was obtained from every level of management up to Senior VP--anyone at any level of HR can simply say "denied", with no justification, no transparency, no appeal, no recourse, no alternative. That's how they fucked me last year.

Every decision I made as an engineer had to be backed up data and/or sound reasoning; whenever I made a decision that seemed to go against what was expected or seemed obvious, I was usually asked to provide that justification and be prepared to defend myself. HR had no such requirement; "because we said so" was the beginning and end of everything.

You didn't even know who actually made the decision. Unlike any other department, the entire HR org chart was hidden from the general employee population. You knew who your assigned representative was; beyond that it was a complete state secret. Similarly, their processes, rules, SOPs, etc. were hidden. It got so bad that HR would not even respond directly to emails or direct messages--they insisted only on phone or in-person communication (and would not leave voicemail), a practice which can only be assumed to ensure no paper trail was left that could be used against them. Not that it mattered; most inquiries simply led to long trains of word salad that said absolutely nothing of substance.

And even if you did somehow pry out of them a statement in writing, and follow everything they tell you to the letter, it apparently becomes null and void as soon as you read it, and "yes, we agreed last week that was acceptable, but now we need additional time to evaluate" or simply "haha j/k no" was how the game was played.

I can tell you exactly when it all started, too. A new CEO took over, and within a couple years a big layoff hit. After gutting much of engineering and other indirect staff over a couple days, all the HR folks who had to handle those terminations were themselves sacked on Friday. A series of punitive, counterproductive, and deeply unpopular policy changes were enacted immediately after, and then over the next year or two, lots of new HR people were brought in. The new primary focus became "enforcement of Policy no matter how detrimental it is" and the primary qualification for working in HR was unquestioning obedience to said CEO's decisions. HR basically became the CEO's Cheka that was absolutely above the law and unaccountable to anyone but him.


I think there are two causes of this. One is the aerospace tendency at every level to focus on maximum performance--we want the lightest, most efficient, best-performing ______ and (as long as the money lasts) we will ruthlessly optimize the design to get that perfect part, then try to figure out how to make it. This generally results in complex high-cost manufacturing processes and bespoke components (valves, actuators, LRUs, etc) at almost every level. Then we try to squeeze cost out of production after the fact.

The other side is cost-plus contracts, which I have come to absolutely despise after just a few months working in defense. The administrative and paperwork-generating requirements easily suck up 30-50% or more of your average engineer's time, and also brings in a huge extra army of paper-pushers (read: overhead cost) whose sole job it is to track everything and make sure the government isn't spending extra money. Add on top the three extra levels of approval that everything requires. Of course, since the contract is billed by hours worked, and every employee adds hours to which that percentage fee applies...


I used to say I wish I'd listened to Mom and gone into civil engineering. The last 10 months have convinced me that what I should have actually done was be a plumber like my great grandfather and great uncle. You can find employment everywhere, it's clean honest money, and you won't wind up sitting at a desk in a windowless building staring at a computer screen doing pricing analysis and organizing meetings to plan your plan for providing the proposal that is your deliverable for the first phase of the the study wherein you plan to propose a project to create a proposal for the customer so you can then do a project to make more deliverables for them to implement.

I moved because I had to for my family to have access to medical care, but in the process I think I committed career suicide.
I have to assume your experience is based on pure British immersion(?), but as a stranger having lived/worked for over two decades in a strange land (cough USA cough) I can somewhat commiserate...
 
Back
Top Bottom