Less money for conventional warfare on their part and the system seems built to deal with a large number. Possibly 600-1200 ICBMs/SLBMs by SBI means alone by a rough calc.
And the enemies are building more missiles anyway.
It's not built to deal with a large number.
You can saturate every layer of the system by simply launching >18 R-36 ICBMs in a single salvo.
Let's say you want to conduct a nuclear strike on the US, and that your goal is to deliver 100 warheads.
To achieve this, you simply need to fire 28 R-36 ICBMs in a single salvo.
10 of these ICBMs are intercepted and destroyed by the space based boost phase interceptor layer, which is fully saturated by the attack. The other 18 ICBMs slip through the ensuing coverage hole.
The 18 remaining ICBMs are now approaching the midcourse phase. Each ICBM ejects 10 RVs and 40 decoys. Each ICBM emits a threat cloud of 50 objects. Across all 18 ICBMs, a combined total of 900 objects are now on ballistic trajectories towards CONUS targets.
Because the US foolishly economized on the cost of the LRDR by swapping out the originally planned X band radar with an inferior (but much cheaper) S band radar, the GBI/NGI system is completely incapable of performing high-fidelity decoy discrimination. The S band radar system is sophisticated enough to detect and track each of the 900 incoming objects, but it is utterly blind to the fine details of each incoming object. All 900 tracked threats appear identically hazardous to the LRDR radars. Therefore, all 900 must be intercepted.
There are three GBI/NGI sites in the plan. Two host 60 NGI interceptors. One hosts 40 GBI interceptors and 20 NGI interceptors.
Based on public information, the 140 NGI interceptors appear to be capable of carrying three EKVs per interceptor, while the 40 GBI interceptors carry one EKV per interceptor.
This results in a total of 460 EKVs available for use.
Current doctrine for GBI requires the use of four EKVs per target to achieve a near-certain (>97%) probability of kill. Under shoot-look-shoot scenarios (which the current system is not capable of), you would only fire two EKVs per target, then re-fire a further two (or four) interceptors if the initial two fail to take out the target. Based on the CBO report, shoot-look-shoot targeting is assumed to be the default strategy, so we will assume only two EKVs are allocated per target.
180 silos across the three GBI/NGI sites open and 180 interceptor missiles roar into the air. 460 EKVs are on their way to engage 230 of the 900 incoming threats.
We will naively assume a 100% probability of kill for each pair of EKVs. This is
extremely unrealistic (the actual probability of kill would be
far lower), but it makes the math easier. Therefore, 230 of the 900 incoming threats are neutralized by the EKVs.
We have successfully eliminated 230 possible threats. However, there are still 670 threats inbound.
It's time for the four Aegis Ashore systems to earn their keep. Each system has 48 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. In total, there are 192 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors available.
SM-3 Block IIA interceptors have only a single EKV, therefore the 192 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors translate to 192 EKVs.
We will assume that SM-3 Block IIA performance is similar to NGI/GBI performance, and that similar targeting parameters are used.
192 SM-3 Block IIA missiles are fired in rapid succession from the 48 VLS cells at each of the four Aegis Ashore installations. 192 SM-3 Block IIA EKVs are on their way to target and destroy 96 of the 670 incoming threats.
We will once again naively assume impossibly perfect performance from each pair of EKVs. Therefore, 96 of the 670 incoming threats are neutralized by the EKVs.
We have successfully eliminated 96 more possible threats. However, there are still 574 threats inbound.
None of the remaining systems have the performance to engage ICBM class threats. The 574 remaining threats fall unopposed towards their targets. As the threats enter the upper atmosphere, the 459 decoys burn up, leaving 115 RVs spread across up to 115 discrete aim points. 115 nuclear warheads detonate over American soil, each with a yield of 500 kt. The nation is devastated. The military is crippled. The economy collapses. The US is no longer a superpower. We have lost the war.
For $1.1 trillion dollars, we destroyed only the equivalent of roughly 17 ICBMs. Each ICBM cost $65 billion dollars to destroy. And in the end, we still got hit by 115 warheads. What a bargain /s.
But inevitably our enemies would respond by building more missiles, leaving us no safer than we were before.
Exactly. And the cost to build and field more missiles, RVs, and decoys is far cheaper than the cost of expanding the interceptor pools to counter them. For every extra target the enemy fires at us, we must have a bare minimum of 2–4 additional EKVs (and a proportionate number of interceptors) ready to counter it. Each NGI intercept costs a minimum of >$80 million. A single superheavy ICBM with 10 RVs and 40 decoys requires >$4 billion of interceptors to counter.
It's an endless arms race.
And the enemies are building more missiles anyway.
Not at anywhere near the scale that they would be if we actually deployed Golden Dome.
Your maths is way out. KKVs on satellites put into space using RLVs are several orders of magnitude cheaper than ICBMs. I mean nuclear MIRVs are like $100m each, so a missile will 10 is ludicrously expensive before you even factor in the huge missile.
Not according to the CBO.
The orbital boost phase layer is also obscenely expensive due to the way the number of required interceptors to intercept simultaneously launched missiles scales, which is a limitation of orbital mechanics. It doesn't matter how cheap the interceptors are when you have to add 780 additional interceptors for every additional simultaneous missile interception capability you add. Then even worse, every single one of these interceptors have to be replaced every 5 years. So you have to factor in the cost of the additional replacements every 5 years until the end of time. To keep 7800 interceptors in orbit for 20 years, you will have to build and launch a total of over 30,000 interceptors.
Other countries manufacture warheads for far cheaper than the US does. Heck, we used to manufacture them for far cheaper as well. So your cost projections are useless. Just because we neglected our industry for 30+ years doesn't mean that other countries did the same. Other counties have far cheaper cost of goods and labor, way less overhead, drastically laxer safety standards, and no ability for citizens to gum up the works with endless lawsuits. They don't have anti nuclear politicians forcing them to build pit manufacturing piecemeal at multiple sites. They don't have EPA raids shutting down pit factories over environmental crimes. They don't have endless political debate over funding nuclear weapons programs, or decades-long delays in approving critically needed new nuclear weapons program facilities/capabilities/weapons/systems. They can literally dump reprocessing waste into public waterways with no fear of the EPA coming to stop them or federal lawsuits ordering them to stop, and no need to worry over the impact on affected citizens downstream consuming radionuclide-contaminated water. The US is an outlier, not the norm.
Decoys are dirt cheap and only require a tiny amount of additional throw weight and volume. The planned US system has little to no capability to discriminate decoys.
Nah, it was the technology ratio. ICBMs are just way simpler than the interceptors designed to stop them. Even 50 years ago it required a nuclear warhead to stop a nuclear warhead and that was at like 20-30km range. 20 years ago it cost ~$30k/kg to orbit (and twice than for the Space Shuttle), now it's like $500/kg with Falcon 9 (internal costs not customer prices).
And yet, as per the CBO, the overwhelming majority of the cost is the cost of the interceptor, not the cost of the launch. Therefore even if launch costs fell to $0, orbital boost phase intercept constellations would still remain unaffordable. Additionally, launch costs for interceptors are dramatically different than costs for bulk commercial launches. And even commercial launch costs alone are still drastically higher than sticker launch costs.
7,800 satellites with 10 interceptors/KKVs each
Per the CBO, each would only have one interceptor.
180 NGIs. If they are 12 MOKVs each, that's a further 2,160.
Per public reports, only three EKVs are expected to be carried aboard each NGI. There are no indications that more than three EKVs will be carried (or could even fit) aboard the NGI, and the expected price of the NGI is incompatible with having anywhere near that number of EKVs carried on each interceptor.
Golden Dome will evolve over time, SBIs using KKVs first and then lasers and/or GBI lasers with spacve mirrors.
That would cost even more money.
By China increasing nuclear warheads and refusing to join START protocols and with Russia pulling out and DPRK building up, an arms race was already started. It's not like Golden Dome started it. Golden Dome is the response not the trigger.
Why should China join START? Their arsenals are tiny. They are right to claim that they have the right to build up their arsenals to peer levels. We have absolutely no right whatsoever to demand that they limit themselves to historic arsenal sizes. Our arms control agreements with Russia targeted equal levels of strategic weapons for each party to the agreement, not massively asymmetric levels.
The DPRK is a joke. We have nothing to fear from them. Their nukes guarantee the regime's security, and they are not stupid enough to use them.
The DPRK also literally can't afford to build an arsenal large enough to truly threaten the US.
Golden Dome would be the start of an entirely new arms race, one that would quickly grow to Cold War proportions if allowed to proceed unchecked.
Don't see how GD would alienate allies. You'll have to explain that one.
Because it incentivizes us to shift money away from nuclear and conventional military spending in order to fund golden dome. Golden dome only protects the CONUS. It does nothing to protect our allies, which rely solely on US nuclear sharing agreements, US nuclear umbrella promises, and the might of US conventional forces to protect them. Golden Dome stinks of isolationism, and that is an ill omen for any nation that is currently dependent on the United States for security guarantees.
