Although it's much less likely because unlike the US the Chinese have invested their resources into what matters, which isn't obsolete bombers and maintaining forever platforms of questionable viability.
I don't consider stealth bombers as obsolete.
Like current J-36 itself is kinda a stealth fighter-bomber.
Xi'an H-20 program still going on.
Recently flown large chinese stealth bomber drone.
Russia which has invested highly on offensive missiles of all kinds , IADS etc. Is still working on PAK-DA, still adding more su57's, Su35's, Su-34's.
B52 is a long range standoff strike platform, its not a high-end platform, but it does its role, especially when America's wars are halfway around the world, even long range weapons need a platform that can bring them within striking range.
They invested into drones, missiles, IADS that includes short, medium, long range and ballistic missile defense (as compared to the US basically having near zero SHORAD, because 'muh Air superiority' will 110% prevent anyone from shooting at you...)
Though late but U.S. is also doing it.
Drones: LUCAS,
Switchblade,Textron Damocles,Anduril Altius-600 etc.
Missiles: JASSM, tomahawk, dark eagle, PrSM, scramjet projects still on, etc.
U.S. Navy has one of the most capable and complete IADS system in the world.
RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile is a SHORAD.
Next Generation Short Range Interceptor (NGSRI): The U.S. Army is currently testing this as a direct replacement for the aging Stinger.
The US is looking like clowns because they brought a conventional fighting force to an unconventional theater. They drop bombs and bombs and bombs and somehow all they end up doing is killing schoolgirls.
The United States' inability to fully achieve its desired strategic and geopolitical objectives in this conflict is not the same as saying its armed forces have been ineffective in their operational role.
If the U.S. had shifted its doctrine to emphasize missiles and integrated air defense systems (IADS) over air power, it might have developed stronger defenses, but it would likely have sacrificed significant offensive capability. The sheer number of Iranian targets destroyed in such a short period stands as clear evidence of the effectiveness of the current air-power doctrine. Yet, despite this demonstrated effectiveness, it has still proven insufficient to deliver the broader strategic and geopolitical outcomes that U.S. leadership seeks.
It is difficult to see how a doctrine that prioritizes IADS and ground-launched missiles at the expense of air power would have improved the U.S. position in this specific scenario.
Consider the counterfactual: if Iran possessed a capable air force that could have survived and contested the skies for even a single week, it would have enjoyed far greater freedom to launch its large ballistic missile arsenal. With hostile aircraft not dominating its airspace and actively hunting launchers near tunnel entrances, Iran’s missile campaign could have been significantly more intense and sustained.
That said, air power doctrine by itself is not sufficient — just as Iran’s ballistic missile-focused approach has its own clear limitations. A balanced force structure is necessary.
This is precisely why the United States is now investing more in offensive missiles and drones, while Russia and China are developing advanced bombers and related capabilities.
In this conflict, both sides have demonstrated their respective strengths and limitations. Iran continues to hold out, retaliate, and maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz, but is very heavily degraded — to a level that would likely have caused a more conventional Gulf state like the UAE or Saudi Arabia to collapse many times over.
That one of their carriers almost burned down or that their AWACS and tankers are just parked in the open to get blown to bits is just the cherry on top born out of a weird sense of invincibility (drinking their own kool aid
That's a tactical on ground mistake, a very significant one.
Though not a doctrinal deficiency.
..............
In a potential Taiwan conflict—where China would be the offensive party—China would likely have a significantly lower threshold for sustaining inflicted damage before deciding to pull back, compared to Iran, which views the fight as an existential crisis.
Setting aside questions of military effectiveness and doctrine for a moment:
Even in the current Middle East tensions, we can observe how much lower the U.S. threshold is for accepting losses and enduring pain compared to Iran. In contrast, Russia has demonstrated a high tolerance for damage in Ukraine, shifting to a full war economy to pursue its objectives.
Based on this pattern, I assess that the United States would have an even lower threshold than China for absorbing damage in a Taiwan conflict. A powerful and effective military is one factor, but the willingness to sustain heavy losses against a capable adversary—in order to impose even greater costs on the enemy and raise the price of their goals—is quite another.
Russia has shown this kind of resolve in Ukraine. The United States, by comparison, has not displayed the same level of willingness in its confrontations involving Iran.
So in the larger scheme of things, with both having very power militaries in their own right, and china reaching more and more Parity with the U.S.,its more of a question of how far either U.S. & China are willing to go to achieve their objectives.