Alternate Canadian Armed Forces procurement 1970s

GK. Dundas

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Canada begins to look beyond the Central European plain, a pure ASW navy and peacekeeping.
Bonaventure is kept on but now she's to be used as LPH /Commando Carrier. With several improved Ouragan class .
They will be used as a cross between a LSD and the old American APD concept.
Do we purchase or build a new larger carrier along with the Brits and Australians ?
Tanks , aircraft still working on that but Im considering rebuilding the Centurions possibly a small purchase of of F4Es.
Well have fun !
 
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Canada begins to look beyond the Central European plain, a pure ASW navy and peacekeeping.
In the Trudeau years? Not sure how you manage that.

PET might have been willing to diverge from historical assumptions about following the US lead but his aim was generally rationalization, not more flexible missions. That costs money and doesn’t play as well with the Quebec or lower Ontario vote.
 
Depending how much RW stuff you are including, for armour the '70s say AVGP contest. Originally, there were supposed to be 4 x AVGP variants - the Cougar DFS/tank trainer, Grizzly Infantry Section Carrier/APC, Husky ARV, and an unnamed ATGM launcher vehicle.

In part, the Piranha 6x6 was chosen because MOWAG offered local production. Had Giat offered the same licensing option for their Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé, AVGPs might have been VAB-based. Building those licensed VABs in Québec would have also made the pill slightly easier to swallow for PET, et al.

A second PET-friendly 'internationalist' option - ie: alternative to the US and les Anglais - would have been developing more military and industrial connections with Sweden (sounds like now, right?). For vehicles, details on Swedish Centurion improvement programmes would be helpful (if you go that Cent route) - eg: Armén's strv 104 upgrade and the planned strv 105 Centurion.

Another Swedish vehicle that I always liked was Hägglund & Söner's pbv 302 APC. The main draw is amphibiousness through double-layer steel plate rather than the M113's aluminum armour. (In my notion a pbv 302 purchase would obviate M113A1 upgrades). The pbv 302 was also powered by a flat-6 Volvo bus engine (freeing up a lot of interior real estate) so the GoC might have been able to negotiate a package deal of licensed APC and Volvo transit buses.

Perhaps rather blatantly, my pbv 302 scenario also puts the Canadian Army in line for a fairly early CV90 purchase ;)
 
I feel as though the 1970s is too late for any changes for Canada, the 60s is where the POD needs to happen.
For example
  • in 1959 the RCN recommended the purchase of 5 Skipjack Class SSNs with up to 12 to be procured.
  • The 8 Tribal Class GPF/DDG proposal to replace WW2 Tribal Class DDs
  • A-4E Skyhawks to replace F2H-3 Banshees on HMCS Bonaventure and keep Bonnie in commission for longer
  • A-4E Skyhawks instead of F-5A/B Freedom Fighter Buy
  • The Proposed Joint Production of the UK F-4 Phantom II Variant for RCAF
 
The Problem with using Swedish equipment in those days was that it effectively gave the Swedes a veto over using it at all.
We had some issues with Carl G ammo during the 91 War OP Friction.
I actually like the PBV 302 idea but I still personally prefer the M113 especially the Lynx recce variant.
Origiinally the Army was looking at a Centurion rebuild using a Dutch company to do the work and using the Israeli's work on their Centurions. In point of fact ,Israel Tal was involved in the project as an consultant.
As well I'd make an offer to both the Swedes and the Dutch for their Centurion fleets.
I want to expand our war reserve stocks and reintroduce tanks back into the Milita/ reserve force.
 
On a 1960s POD, maybe start a different thread? (Preferably one which explains why Staff have changed their minds about an RCN focus on ASW.)

Back on subject, I zeroed in on the Armoured Vehicle, General Purpose programme because it was the opportune moment to diverge from US suppliers at a time when Canada was transitioning to metric measures. Instead, the desire to upgrade US-made M113A1s to M113A2 standards skewed the Piranha purchase back towards GM engines and Allison gearboxes.

On foreign interference, all 'outside' arms purchases come with limitations. A potential solution is licensed production. If Stockholm (or Bonn, or DC) get too tetchy about the use of 'their' stuff, that licensed vehicle or weapon can then be evolved into a distinctly Canadian variant. (And, no, that would not be as easy - or even legal - as I am making it sound ... but it would be do-able in most cases.)

As for the M113, plenty of commonality-with-Allies arguments are made in its favour. But, by the start of the AVGP programme, the 'Icebox' had been in CA service for over a decade (M113 since 1960, M113A1 since 1964). Perhaps time to change to a better-protected APC? (A question on the Lynx: Do you see a need for direct Ferret replacements? Ie: the 'stealth' side of Armored Recce vs the 'sabre' of Lynx?)

As a final pitch for pbv 302s, the Swedish vehicle's superior situational awareness for crews and heavier defensive armament speak for themselves. The steel plate also made up-armouring simpler and more effective ... and, for a risk-averse PET-led GoC, 'safer'. (My non-military angle was to break GM's dominance in the Canadian bus market, whereas OTL AVGP and M113 procurements pushed in the other direction.)

On procuring additional Centurion hulls, the RTR retired its Cents in 1973. So, depending upon timing, Britain was another potential source of surplus hulls. I was imagining re-engining of CA Cents but the Sho’t Kal's AVDS-1790 diesel engine brings up those same Imperial/Metric issues. For an upgraded Centurion meant to fight in Central Europe, the Leopard 1's MTU power pack (adjusted for the 12 cm narrower Centurion hull) makes the most sense to me.
 
Canada didn't have a nearby shooting war during the Cold War that would motivate significant defence purchases, unlike Australia which had a prolonged period of low and medium level conflict in South East Asia to deal with. Canada's position in WW3 would be very different than Australia's, which warrants a different level of preparation for it, but that's still not enough to do much more than smooth out some procurement decisions.
 
True. For Canada in the 1970s, that means armour and strike aircraft were focused on the Fulda Gap (with sufficient in Canada for training purposes). But those roles were also in flux (which further confused procurement decisions). Maritime Command as-was had long since focused on ASW in the North Atlantic.

So, there is room for debate on ideal New Fighter Aircraft and Long Range Patrol Aircraft types for Air Command. But the sole combatant type for Maritime Command planners in the 1970s was always going to be the Canadian Patrol Frigate project. Armour procurement was a bit muddled and, thus, seems to offer more alternatives.

My already-belaboured AVGP programme was something of an exception - with the Cougar earmarked as a tank-trainer and the Grizzly primarily intended for use by reserve units as an M113 alternative. The latter seemed practical ... at least by comparison with 'tank-trainer' based on a wheeled-LAV armed with a low-velocity 'pumpkin launcher'! I'd say there was room for a dedicated, tracked tank-trainer.

On tanks, themselves, @GK. Dundas has already identified a Centurion upgrade and modernisation project as the only real option to OTL's Leopard 1A3 purchase. A rebuilt Cent would be better-protected than the RW Leopard C1 but the latter had a significant speed advantage. And, since 4 CMBG was meant to fill gaps as a quick-response force, maybe the Leopard C1 was the right choice all along?
 
On tanks, themselves, @GK. Dundas has already identified a Centurion upgrade and modernisation project as the only real option to OTL's Leopard 1A3 purchase. A rebuilt Cent would be better-protected than the RW Leopard C1 but the latter had a significant speed advantage.

Why isn't the Chieftain acceptable? The later versions with more power and reliability, not the early gutless and unreliable ones.
 
Why isn't the Chieftain acceptable? The later versions with more power and reliability, not the early gutless and unreliable ones.

The short answer is the then-growing trade imbalance between the UK and Canada. Traditional Canadian exports to Britain were crimped by the UK's co-founding of the European Free Trade Association back in 1960. But the real impact came with the UK’s entry into the EEC in 1973. The UK had long been Canada's second biggest partner in merchandise trade ... but, in common with other former Dominions, that percentage was already in a steady decline. [1]

But the UK's entry into the EEC precipitated a very steep drop in the share of Canadian exports to Britain (which has continued to this day). Since Whitehall no longer favoured Canadian exports, it made sense for Ottawa to shift its trade efforts to stronger EEC economies like that of West Germany.

A purely practical reasons for ignoring the Chieftain was its production schedule. IIRC, even for export, Chieftain production had ended by 1973 (the later versions all being upgrades of existing hulls). Current experience is reminding us that paying a defence contractor to turn the lights back on is a poor deployment of the procurement budget.
_____________________________________

[1] In the 1950s, the share of total Canadian exports to the UK sat at about 85%. By the mid-1990s, the UK share of Canadian exports to the EU had dropped to 23%.
 
What about submarines?

IIUC, like Australia, Canada had an RN flotilla of subs stationed there to train the surface navy in ASW and the initial batch of 3 x Oberons was to replace these RN subs. Unlike Australia, Canada did not get an extra batch of subs to turn this ASW training arm into an offensive force. What are the chances of Canada getting an extra batch of Oberons, or indeed any extra submarines after the initial batch of Oberons to create an offensive submarine arm?
 
As best I can work out the Canadian submarine story started in the late 50s.
  • The initial 1959-60 recommendation was a choice between SSN (5 Skipjacks) and diesel subs.
    • Cabinet chose diesel subs due to cost.
  • The next was between Barbel class and (6?) Oberon class.
    • Again, Cabinet chose Oberon's due to cost.
    • This decision done and dusted by late 1960, but delivery was delayed.
  • P23 of the 1964 Defence White Paper stated careful study was being given to the acquisition or 2 or 3 SSNs.
    • this appeared to go nowhere
  • 3 Oberons entered service 1965, 67 & 68.
I don't know what happened to the other 3 recommended Oberons, or the 1964 SSN consideration, but 3 Oberons was all Cabada got and not much else seems to have happened until the mid 80s.

FWIW I don't think a country's first foray into submarines should be state of the art SSNs, they should start with diesels first. Perhaps the best thing for Canada would have been to get the first batch of diesel subs as Barbels then get maybe 2 SSNs from the late 60s for a mixed force.
 
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Do we purchase or build a new larger carrier along with the Brits and Australians ?
The optimal solution for Canada seems to be to order an Invincible-class ship with Sea Harriers and helicopters as air wing. It would fulfill both the convoy escort, submarine hunting & limited force projection functions.
 
Canada was more advanced than I expected from the 50s. The 3 RN subs had 1/2 Canadian crews and the RCN leased ex USN subs on the west coast. However I wouldn't consider this enough basis for going with Skipjack SSNs in the 60s.
Barbels would be my first choice followed by Oberons . SSNs require far more investment in both infrastructure and manpower then most nations can really afford.
 
Barbels would be my first choice followed by Oberons . SSNs require far more investment in both infrastructure and manpower then most nations can really afford.

The article in the link above shows that Canada was 1/2 crewing 3 RN subs and fully crewing a leased ex-USN sub, so at the very least needs to buy 4 subs to maintain capability and realistically needs the 6 recommended, whatever type they are.
 
On a 1960s POD, maybe start a different thread? (Preferably one which explains why Staff have changed their minds about an RCN focus on ASW.)
It should be noted that if canada had gotten ssn's then that would imply a far greater focus on asw, because ssn were considered far better asw platforms then any surface ships at the time (and even today?) The surface ships were actually chosen because of the smaller wars angle (as in they could hold 100 troops for UN deployments).

so if canada had gotten sikpjacks then they would have probably gotten rid of most of the surface fleet because canada could only afford one or the other (so the 8 tribals were directly competing with the 12 skipjacks as far as the Canadian navy was concerned)
 
It should be noted that if canada had gotten ssn's then that would imply a far greater focus on asw, because ssn were considered far better asw platforms then any surface ships at the time (and even today?) The surface ships were actually chosen because of the smaller wars angle (as in they could hold 100 troops for UN deployments).

so if canada had gotten sikpjacks then they would have probably gotten rid of most of the surface fleet because canada could only afford one or the other (so the 8 tribals were directly competing with the 12 skipjacks as far as the Canadian navy was concerned)

IIUC the ~1960 recommendation was for 6 diesel subs for 5 Skipjack SSNs. Thought bubbles for up to 12 SSNs didn't appear until the mid-late 80s IIUC.

One factor I have only thought of is that Canada had a highly advanced nuclear industry stemming from WW2 and immediately after. This would help with adopting SSNs if Canada went that route from 1960.
 
IIUC the ~1960 recommendation was for 6 diesel subs for 5 Skipjack SSNs. Thought bubbles for up to 12 SSNs didn't appear until the mid-late 80s IIUC.

One factor I have only thought of is that Canada had a highly advanced nuclear industry stemming from WW2 and immediately after. This would help with adopting SSNs if Canada went that route from 1960.
The recommendation of 5 skipjacks and 6 desal was because that was thought to be what they could get the government to agree to the report itself mentions that 12 skipjacks was what the navy actually wanted.
 
The recommendation of 5 skipjacks and 6 desal was because that was thought to be what they could get the government to agree to the report itself mentions that 12 skipjacks was what the navy actually wanted.

The Navy asked for 5 SSNs or 6 diesels and got 3 diesels, at that rate if they asked for 12 SSNs they likely would have got nothing!

BTW all think militaries regularly shoot for the moon knowing full well they aren't going to get it. In ~1960 when the RCN was 'wanting' 12 SSNs the USN only had about 13 in commission and the RN didn't have any!
 
The Navy asked for 5 SSNs or 6 diesels and got 3 diesels, at that rate if they asked for 12 SSNs they likely would have got nothing!

BTW all think militaries regularly shoot for the moon knowing full well they aren't going to get it. In ~1960 when the RCN was 'wanting' 12 SSNs the USN only had about 13 in commission and the RN didn't have any!
Probably, but 12 was really what the Canadian navy felt was needed. The 6 diesels were more so that they could be replaced in the future for a new (hopefully canadian built) ssn class.

What canadian navy really wanted was 12 ssn's 8 general purpose frigates and 2 new carriers but everyone knew that was never going to happen, leading to a lot of in fighting between surface warfare officers vs submarine officers vs naval air officers that ended up with nobody getting anything. If the canadian navy had been unified on one then they may have actually gotten it but that never happened.
 
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Probably, but 12 was really what the Canadian navy felt was needed.

IIUC the RCN recommended 5 Skipjack class SSNs to the Cabinet in ~1960. The expansion of this recommendation to 12 SSN was more of an internal RCN wish list as part of a broader expansion plan, rather than something put to Cabinet to make a decision on. In any case it didn't go very far because the 1964 DWP, published while the 3 Oberons were on order, stated that consideration was being given to 2-3 SSNs, a long way from the 12 SSNs.

To be fair, I'm sure the number 12 for SSNs didn't fall from the sky. I suspect the RCN looked at what the Government said Canada's obligations were, worked out what was required to meet all of them (using worst case assumptions) and came up with 12 SSNs. The 10-12 SSN number came up again in the late 80s, so I confident it had considerable validity.

Personally, I find it sort of amazing that a middle power like Canada was talking SSNs way back in 1960!
 
And, since 4 CMBG was meant to fill gaps as a quick-response force, maybe the Leopard C1 was the right choice all along?
I would argue that Leo C1s would be the right answer for the Canadians. Big gun, fast. Conceptually it's closer to being an M18 Hellcat or M24 Chaffee "light tank" than an MBT like Centurion or M48/M60.



Canada was more advanced than I expected from the 50s. The 3 RN subs had 1/2 Canadian crews and the RCN leased ex USN subs on the west coast. However I wouldn't consider this enough basis for going with Skipjack SSNs in the 60s.
They were looking at Barbels, and as I understand it Barbels had all the same sonars and weapons systems as Skipjacks. So the only difference is back aft (diesels or nuke).

And Canada had a pretty solid nuclear research industry in the 1950s, so nuclear subs would not be impossible. Especially since the US was actively offering Skipjacks.



Personally, I find it sort of amazing that a middle power like Canada was talking SSNs way back in 1960!
Dude, Sweden was talking SSNs in the 1950s and 1960s!
 
How many medium powers put SSN acquisition to the Cabinet (or equivalent) for decision, and how many played with the idea and it never left the service? Militaries investigate new technology wish list items all the time, that doesn't mean their governments will acquire them, or even have the option put to them.
 
If the canadian navy had been unified on one then they may have actually gotten it but that never happened.
When the Canadian Military approaches cabinet with divided visions between internal groups the government solves the issue by buying almost none of anything. When the Canadian Military comes to cabinet with a singular developed mission Cabinet uses the lack of alternatives and possible tunnel vision as an excuse to buy almost nothing.

I am not sure that a unified vision would have changed anything.
 
How many medium powers put SSN acquisition to the Cabinet (or equivalent) for decision, and how many played with the idea and it never left the service? Militaries investigate new technology wish list items all the time, that doesn't mean their governments will acquire them, or even have the option put to them.
Technically speaking, a nuclear powerplant isn't complicated. Pretty much any country should be able to make one. Crud, even North Korea managed to make one while under serious sanctions!

The hard part is compacting the design enough to fit into a submarine. That takes some creativity.
 
Technically speaking, a nuclear powerplant isn't complicated. Pretty much any country should be able to make one. Crud, even North Korea managed to make one while under serious sanctions!

The hard part is compacting the design enough to fit into a submarine. That takes some creativity.

It isn't now but in 1960 it most certainly was. Nuclear reactors were only about 15 years old in 1959, and submarine nuclear power was very new, the Skipjack was the first 'series l' production SSN and Canada wanted in on that.
 
It isn't now but in 1960 it most certainly was. Nuclear reactors were only about 15 years old in 1959, and submarine nuclear power was very new, the Skipjack was the first 'series l' production SSN and Canada wanted in on that.
IIRC you'd be looking at a ~25MWe total production reactor (S5W sized), which is pretty small and may require some development work. The rest is just packaging everything to fit into a 32ft diameter tube.
 
IIRC you'd be looking at a ~25MWe total production reactor (S5W sized), which is pretty small and may require some development work. The rest is just packaging everything to fit into a 32ft diameter tube.

If it was easy everyone would have done it, but even Britain with it's advanced nuclear and submarine building capabilities used a US submarine reactor for the HMS Dreadnought and modeled the RR PWR on this.
 
I was imagining re-engining of CA Cents but the Sho’t Kal's AVDS-1790 diesel engine brings up those same Imperial/Metric issues.
Umm, neither the Centurion or AVDS- 1790 were metric .
I don't see a conflict.
 
Canada is a wealthy, secure country. It should buy new tanks, not rebuild old ones under normal peacetime conditions. Keep them in storage and have a rebuild option available, but Canada should be moving forward with defence procurements.
 
Canada is a wealthy, secure country. It should buy new tanks, not rebuild old ones under normal peacetime conditions. Keep them in storage and have a rebuild option available, but Canada should be moving forward with defence procurements.
Arguably, Canada's treaty obligations require enough tanks that buying new would be painfully expensive.
 
Umm, neither the Centurion or AVDS- 1790 were metric .
I don't see a conflict.

None for the wrench-benders.

Arguably, Canada's treaty obligations require enough tanks that buying new would be painfully expensive.

Does that mean that Canada's RW purchase of Leopard 1A3s failed to meet some specific NATO obligation(s)? If so, which one(s)?
 
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