You'd think he'd never considered that carriers have gone into danger since WW2. Sounds like he's never heard of things like Bears, Backfires, Oscars, Victors, Alphas, Kh-22s, P-500/700/1000, etc. etc. etc., either.
I think there are political-strategic factors at play in the China scenario that were not there either in World War II or the Cold War that may make losing the war (or not fighting it) a better option than losing carriers.
First, US domestic political support for a war against China, even in the case of an overt invasion of Taiwan, is unlikely to be as strong as support for the war effort post-Pearl Harbor or in a full-scale Article V scenario in the 1980s. Like the Tet Offensive, heavy casualties and the perception of enemy superiority could create enough domestic political pressure to threaten the war effort regardless of the actual situation, and it would only be worse if the US was legitimately losing, which is not out of the realm of possibility. In 1991, the plan for the Gulf War was carefully calibrated to give President Bush off-ramps to partial mission success in case the Iraqis managed to inflict serious casualties on US forces (probably at the level of ~500 KIA, which was very low considering how large the forces were, how heavily armed the Iraqis were, and the threat of chemical weapons). After spending six months in the desert facing the Iraqis, the Army had a good idea that resistance would be minimal, but the China scenario would basically require a full-scale war effort from Day 1, with no time actually set those kinds of expectations.
Second, even a successful operation to defeat a Chinese invasion or blockade could create serious, long-term ramifications for US power projection. Even if an invasion is defeated, neither side can seriously threaten the other's homeland with an invasion or occupation. As a result, even a successful defense of Taiwan would probably end as a rather uneasy ceasefire with the Chinese government intact and in control of the mainland, very similar to the end of the Iran - Israel War and certainly without any sort of unequal post-war arms limitations. If the Navy loses two or three carriers and a proportional number of surface combatants and submarines, replacing them could easily take 20 - 30 years. Even if the Chinese suffered relatively heavier casualties, the size of their shipbuilding and shiprepair sector would almost certainly allow them to rebuild their fleet faster than the US. If the Chinese then try again in ten years, their new fleet would be facing survivors of the last war except for a handful of new destroyers and submarines, and their numerical advantage would be even stronger than it is today. In the Cold War scenario, there was significantly more feeling that at least one bloc would not survive the war intact. Even if that happened, US shipbuilding had a significant advantage over Soviet shipbuilding in terms of volume and speed, so the US would be in position to replace lost ships faster than the Soviets, which is the opposite of the situation with regards to China.