A British Dassault ?

[Rule of cool]

How big was Dassault compared to HSA and BAC in 1960?

IIUC the 'encouraged' mergers were done in large part because of the 'huge' BOAC and BEA orders for 35 VC10s and 25 Tridents. It was believed by the Government in about 1957-58 that the current array of aviation companies, with the possible exception of Hawker Siddeley, lacked the market capitalisation to handle such large orders or large aircraft like the US had. If this was true, and I suspect it was, the formation of BAC and HSA by 1960 in theory creates large and powerful companies.

To make a British Dassault, the makers of the VC10 and Trident need to successfully push back against the demands of BEA and BOAC to make their airliner designs smaller. Similarly EE-BAC could work some back room magic to get the Lightning selected for the VRET in 1958 and TSR2 retained in 1965.

Edit: Hawker did intervene politically to get the Hunter onto the VRET, which it then won.

 

[alertken]

RoC: we can explore a Br AMD too far and I suggest the link to BOAC/BEAC Fleets' needs >1960 is a step too far.

Archibald has well presented why France did Nationalisation exclusive of ex-Bloch, and how that remarkable man's business continues to exert Policy influence. Very distinctive circumstances - see today's arguments over SCAF/Airbus. UK doesn't need any of that. The job of Aero, or any other Defence-led industry, is to accept gratefully what Ministers choose to spend our money on.

MInisters knew 9/45 that UK Aero had too many small firms, tried to cull, but bar Cunliffe Owen and Miles they clung to life. To Ministers' great benefit in Korea and vast dollops of $. Which dried 7/54, so, very sensibly Industry was told 9/57 only to bid for (TSR.2) in Teams.

Vickers by then had won Standard VC10 solo; DH (itself an International Team) chose to seek risk-sharing partners (as Airco) to bid to BEAC. We now know both Standard VC10 and Trident 1 proved to be the wrong size for 1970s' airline needs, but, '58-ish...we did not, so investor-owned firms built what their best Customer would pay for. There are no AMD lessons for us here. And we can't blame Ministers for market failure of VC10, Trident, because they moved large sums from our pockets into Vickers' and HS Group's.

Lady Luck prevails. EE in 1936 re-entered Aero (after WW1 Shadow production) only because (the first) G.Nelson had been a school mate of (Sir) Fred HP, who made no fuss about them becoming Hampden Shadow with no Design competence. Petter's A1, the Blind Bomber Canberra B.1, was on brink of chop to liberate avionics resources for Valiant's NBS, when Berlin Blockade focussed minds on (to be) Canberra B.2. No Canberra..no BAES Military Centre of Excellence. AMD got Mirage III very right after humdrum Ouragon, early Mysteres; Gloster squandered their good luck in being available for Whittle's Flying Test Bed, so then Meteors, by not getting their delta right.

 

[Mike Pryce]

The trouble for Britain was that Dassault could build a Mirage III for a lower cost, per pound of airframe, than Hawker could build a late Hunter. They had similar structural weight, and multiply that by the speed of the Mirage and you had unbeatable value for any air force that wanted a simple fighter.

 

[red admiral]

@Mike Pryce What drove the cost differences? Labour? Materials? Infrastructure/overheads?

 

[Archibald]

So much for France being a "socialist" state hence with high labor cost. Truth be told it was less the case in the 1960's since the economy was booming and the welfare state was smaller.
Dassault was also paternalist, in the good sense of the word. The unions were under control the clever way. Happy workers in a prosperous company = win-win. That was the idea.

 

[Rule of cool]

RoC: we can explore a Br AMD too far and I suggest the link to BOAC/BEAC Fleets' needs >1960 is a step too far.

Fair enough, but the vibe I'm getting is that Dassault knew best and the customer was wrong (how very French!), and those are British examples of where the customer wanted what the company thought wouldn't sell. A bit of political magic by the companies and eureka, double the amount of Tridents and VC10s get sold and BEA and BOAC get better aircraft, make more money etc etc etc Britain re-paves all it's streets with gold!

 

[Mike Pryce]

@Mike Pryce What drove the cost differences? Labour? Materials? Infrastructure/overheads?

Don't know. It is in a MoA chart comparing costs from, I think, the Plowden era.

 

[Hood]

How big was Dassault compared to HSA and BAC in 1960?

IIUC the 'encouraged' mergers were done in large part because of the 'huge' BOAC and BEA orders for 35 VC10s and 25 Tridents. It was believed by the Government in about 1957-58 that the current array of aviation companies, with the possible exception of Hawker Siddeley, lacked the market capitalisation to handle such large orders or large aircraft like the US had. If this was true, and I suspect it was, the formation of BAC and HSA by 1960 in theory creates large and powerful companies

HSA and BAC were larger entities in terms of factories and facilities owned and manpower employed.
I was having a similar discussion the other week, Britain seems to have excelled at contriving to build most of its aircraft in various sections around the country to assemble them at another haphazardly chosen location. HSA and BAC inherited numerous old companies and factories and had to either keep them open by parcelling out work or shutting them down and boosting local unemployment. There never really has been a productive single-site production run (other than perhaps Shorts in Belfast) since 1945.

Yes the lacked market capitalisation to launch new civil programmes themselves. Quite how the government expected HSA and BAC to expend hard cash buying up smaller competitors by acquiring shareholdings and yet have surplus to fund new large airliners is baffling.
For example, the Hawker Siddeley Group spent almost £16 million acquiring DH and Folland alone - in a addition they acquired electrical engineering and diesel engine manufacturers as well as large Canadian investments including Avro Canada and steel and coal interests.

During my Masters research I found a correlation between the biggest decline in profits and exports occurring during the rationalisation process from 1960 with only gradual recovery afterwards. The rationalisation process sucked up money in terms of buyout costs, having to run surplus sites at a loss or paying out redundancy money. Some sites lasted another 20 years before they were closed. Not until the late 1980s/early 90s did BAe make millions by selling off its surplus land holdings.

 

[Archibald]

Dassault has a few basic rules written in its DNA.
-never grow too big, or you will end eaten by EADS or Airbus
-keep leadership as a close family affair plus a few longtime thrusted employees
Small, lean and efficient.

 

[Archibald]

HSA and BAC were larger entities in terms of factories and facilities owned and manpower employed.
I was having a similar discussion the other week, Britain seems to have excelled at contriving to build most of its aircraft in various sections around the country to assemble them at another haphazardly chosen location. HSA and BAC inherited numerous old companies and factories and had to either keep them open by parcelling out work or shutting them down and boosting local unemployment. There never really has been a productive single-site production run (other than perhaps Shorts in Belfast) since 1945.

During my Masters research I found a correlation between the biggest decline in profits and exports occurring during the rationalisation process from 1960 with only gradual recovery afterwards. The rationalisation process sucked up money in terms of buyout costs, having to run surplus sites at a loss or paying out redundancy money. Some sites lasted another 20 years before they were closed. Not until the late 1980s/early 90s did BAe make millions by selling off its surplus land holdings.

Very interesting. What I bolded evenly matches SNCAs difficulties and weaknesses on the other side of the Channel, all the way from 1936 to 1971 when only SNIAS / Aérospatiale was left standing. The creation of the SNCAs in 1936, then the early mergers in the 1940's were pretty disastrous. By the 1950's however things went better : for example the SNCASO / SNCASE fusion on March 1, 1957 seems to have gone well. Same story for Nord Aviation gradual buildup.

In a sense, BAC and HSA look very much like Sud Aviation circa 1965.

 

[red admiral]

There never really has been a productive single-site production run (other than perhaps Shorts in Belfast) since 1945.

Quite. It's easier to get Eurofighter sections from Italy to the final assembly line at Warton by simply flying in than by driving large valuable loads over from the other side of Preston down narrow roads.

Or the like of making Hunters in Kingston and driving down narrow lanes to Dunsfold.

At the same point, while Shorts was consolidated it wasn't necessarily efficient either.

For example, the Hawker Siddeley Group spent almost £16 million acquiring DH and Folland alone

I'm not sure that consolidation via acquisition actually improved things in the short term. Better to let the unsuccessful companies go bust and then hire the good people who relocate - not that the UK aerospace jobs market is very dynamic anyway. Warton - the cream of engineering talent on the Fylde!

 

[galgot]

Actually, this comment part :

...

Archibald has well presented why France did Nationalisation exclusive of ex-Bloch, and how that remarkable man's business continues to exert Policy influence. Very distinctive circumstances - see today's arguments over SCAF/Airbus. UK doesn't need any of that. The job of Aero, or any other Defence-led industry, is to accept gratefully what Ministers choose to spend our money on.

...

goes very well with that comment part :

Fair enough, but the vibe I'm getting is that Dassault knew best and the customer was wrong (how very French!), and those are British examples of where the customer wanted what the company thought wouldn't sell. A bit of political magic by the companies and eureka, double the amount of Tridents and VC10s get sold and BEA and BOAC get better aircraft, make more money etc etc etc Britain re-paves all it's streets with gold!

A bit caricatural (the "how very French" being oh so how very Anglo...) , but yes, Dassault being so long in the business, and surviving through all the changes French politics went through, he obviously knew better than politicians/civil servants being in post for few years max what the country could afford and what it couldn't.

 

[Archibald]

What France couldn't afford alone
-in 1958 : a Phantom (called Mirage IVC)
-in 1968: a F-111 (called Mirage G4)
-in 1970: a Tornado (called Mirage G8 - TBH, we probably missed an opportunity with the AFVG)
-in 1974: a F-15 (called ACF)
-in 1977: a F-15 (called Mirage 4000)

What France could afford, after 1980: a scaled-down F-15 thanks to smaller turbofans, that is: a F-18 (called M88 and Rafale)

Sometimes I think Sud Aviation was right in 1965, pushing Northrop N-156 family for ECAT, that is the Jaguar program. A scaled-up N-156 with Adours or M45 turbofans would have been intriguing.

 

[Rule of cool]

A bit caricatural (the "how very French" being oh so how very Anglo...)

Aussie, but yes.

 

[Rule of cool]

HSA and BAC were larger entities in terms of factories and facilities owned and manpower employed.
I was having a similar discussion the other week, Britain seems to have excelled at contriving to build most of its aircraft in various sections around the country to assemble them at another haphazardly chosen location. HSA and BAC inherited numerous old companies and factories and had to either keep them open by parcelling out work or shutting them down and boosting local unemployment. There never really has been a productive single-site production run (other than perhaps Shorts in Belfast) since 1945.

Yes the lacked market capitalisation to launch new civil programmes themselves. Quite how the government expected HSA and BAC to expend hard cash buying up smaller competitors by acquiring shareholdings and yet have surplus to fund new large airliners is baffling.
For example, the Hawker Siddeley Group spent almost £16 million acquiring DH and Folland alone - in a addition they acquired electrical engineering and diesel engine manufacturers as well as large Canadian investments including Avro Canada and steel and coal interests.

During my Masters research I found a correlation between the biggest decline in profits and exports occurring during the rationalisation process from 1960 with only gradual recovery afterwards. The rationalisation process sucked up money in terms of buyout costs, having to run surplus sites at a loss or paying out redundancy money. Some sites lasted another 20 years before they were closed. Not until the late 1980s/early 90s did BAe make millions by selling off its surplus land holdings.

Is this what happens when Governments meddle in business and choose winners and losers? I can't help but think that if the big contracts were awarded in the late 50s the winners would rise to the top and others fail.

It's not just aviation where this appeared to happen. The construction of Britain's 2nd generation nuclear power plants seems to have been hindered by a too-active/eager Government saving a company that was about to go under only to have that decision distort the entire industry thereafter.

 

[red admiral]

Is this what happens when Governments meddle in business and choose winners and losers? I can't help but think that if the big contracts were awarded in the late 50s the winners would rise to the top and others fail.

I think that looking through a modern lens really distorts things. This wasn't some free market economy. It was all part of the "warfare state" with state intervention at all levels and greater spending than during WW2. The "workers" in the aerospace companies may not have been labelled as civil servants but were part of, and entirely dependent on, thr state.

I totally agree that some of the companies actually going bust would have been better from some perspectives

 

[Rule of cool]

I think that looking through a modern lens really distorts things. This wasn't some free market economy. It was all part of the "warfare state" with state intervention at all levels and greater spending than during WW2. The "workers" in the aerospace companies may not have been labelled as civil servants but were part of, and entirely dependent on, thr state.

I totally agree that some of the companies actually going bust would have been better from some perspectives

Yes, those postwar days are hard to comprehend these days after 40+ years of 'free trade' and 'globalisation'. However, the postwar West wasn't a communist directed economy, companies and individuals expected to make money and international trade was considerable within the East-West political blocs.

I have little problem with the British Government, taking a 'global view' and with more information than any individual company encouraging the industry to consolidate and even using it's enormous buying power to incenitivise this. What I have a problem with is the Minister of Supply saying the Airco partnership wasn't OK, but de Havilland being acquired by the Hawker Siddeley group was good.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Actually, this comment part :

goes very well with that comment part :

A bit caricatural (the "how very French" being oh so how very Anglo...) , but yes, Dassault being so long in the business, and surviving through all the changes French politics went through, he obviously knew better than politicians/civil servants being in post for few years max what the country could afford and what it couldn't.

It has struck me that nobody in the UK bothered to make a more affordable option like Dassault always did.

 

[alertken]

RoC #57, DH: not really like that. Ministers' policy was 2 each airframe, engine would be fine. then left it to senior Administrative civil servants (the Sir Humphreys of Yes, Minister) to encourage that (one of them was a Mr Havilland!).. Their guide was that D.Sandys, MoA, had extracted Treasury Approval for a neo-Brabazon subsidy regime, so they waved that as carrot. DH.121 Trident and VC10 would sup. DH came close to joining Vickers but over-egged Equity valuation just exactly as some detected the bedrock of the DH Enterprise was doomed. DH turned to HS Group, where Sir Roy Dobson might not have known that, and did a quick deal.(Prof K Hayward, several works). Expanded HS inc DH trading 5/2/60, Blue Streak MRBM chop 13/4/60.

 

[Archibald]

It has struck me that nobody in the UK bothered to make a more affordable option like Dassault always did.

While Fairey FD.2 could not be turned into an operational fighter jet, the company had a few intermediate designs smaller than the monster F.155T : and pretty close from the Mirage.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/fairey-er-103-fighters.3074/
There it is... https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/fairey-er-103-fighters.3074/#post-24908

I often say, you british at the time were better at engine, radar and AAMs. Consider : Blue Dolphin vs R530 / AIRPASS vs Cyrano II / Atar vs Avon plus half a dozen advanced engines: Sapphire, RB.106 / Gyron, Conway, Olympus, Medway.

An ER.103C airframe with a mix of AIRPASS / Red Top & Blue Dolphin would be almost perfect. The real difficulty is to pick an engine among all the options. This directly impact size, weight and cost of the aircraft.

Avon / RB.106 / Sapphire results in an ER.103C closer from a Mirage III, with 7 tons of thrust. The other, bigger engines could provide 10 tons of thrust or more, but they would push that ER.103C into the F-106 category (277 built, none exported but it was too much specialized a plane plus Phantom, F-5 and F-104G flooded US exports. Also 889 F-102s.).

IMHO, Mirage but also Draken history clearly shows which size is the right one for a Cold War medium power. Dassault built 1400+ Mirage IIIs, SAAB built 650 Drakens - and even exported some to Finland, Denmark and Austria. For the record, BAC built 337 Lightnings.

Dassault studied bigger Mirages than the IIIC : the Mirage IVC started single-engine hence in the F-106 category; then evolved into a twin-jet close from a Phantom (from which the IVA bomber was derived).
SNECMA had "Super Atar" plans for a turbojet the same class as Gyron / Olympus / Medway / Conway - but could never made it work or get it funded. So Atar 9 it was.

 

[Hood]

I'm not sure that consolidation via acquisition actually improved things in the short term. Better to let the unsuccessful companies go bust and then hire the good people who relocate - not that the UK aerospace jobs market is very dynamic anyway.

Very true. Had the old school gents running the companies been modern venture capitalists they would have let them go bust and hoovered up the assets at knock-down prices.

The only few times this happened was Miles in 1947 (due to dubious practices), leading to Handley Page picking up some bits but not actually being able to make much use of them (HPR.1 Marathon, HPR.2 trainer prototype, HPR.3 Herald lineage). Then HP itself with minnows Scottish Aviation picking up the Jetstream and Bulldog lines and making a good go of it. Then Beagle which left almost no traces at all.

 

[Archibald]

FUN WITH DELTA WING FIGHTERS

Fairey FD.2 general characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 15.74 m ( 51 ft 7.5 in )
Wingspan: 8.18 m ( 26 ft 10 in )
Height: 3.35 m (11 ft 0 in)
Wing area: 33.44 m2 ( 360 sq ft)
Empty weight: 4,990 kg (11,000 lb )
Gross weight: 6,298 kg (13,884 lb )
Powerplant: 1 × Rolls-Royce Avon RA.14R, later replaced with an RA.28 as used for speed record , 10,000 lbf (44 kN) thrust

Mirage III general characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 15.03 m (49 ft 4 in)
Wingspan: 8.22 m (27 ft 0 in)
Height: 4.5 m (14 ft 9 in)
Wing area: 34.85 m2 (375.1 sq ft)
Empty weight: 7,050 kg (15,543 lb)
Gross weight: 9,600 kg (21,164 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 13,700 kg (30,203 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × SNECMA Atar 09C afterburning turbojet engine, 41.97 kN (9,440 lbf) thrust dry, 60.8 kN (13,700 lbf) with afterburner

Draken general characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 15.35 m (50 ft 4 in)
Wingspan: 9.42 m (30 ft 11 in)
Height: 3.89 m (12 ft 9 in)
Wing area: 49.2 m2 (530 sq ft)
Empty weight: 7,865 kg (17,339 lb)
Gross weight: 11,000 kg (24,251 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 11,914 kg (26,266 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × Svenska Flygmotor RM6C turbojet engine, 56.5 kN (12,700 lbf) thrust dry, 78.4 kN (17,600 lbf) with afterburner

F-102 general characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 20.83 m (68 ft 4 in)
Wingspan: 11.61 m (38 ft 1 in)
Height: 6.464 m (21 ft 2.5 in)
Wing area: 64.6 m2 (695 sq ft)
Empty weight: 8,777 kg (19,350 lb)
Gross weight: 11,110 kg (24,494 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 14,288 kg (31,500 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt & Whitney J57-P-25 turbojet engine, 11,700 lbf (52 kN) thrust dry, 17,000 lbf (76 kN) with afterburner

F-106 general characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 21.55 m (70 ft 8 in)
Wingspan: 11.67 m (38 ft 3 in)
Height: 6.18 m (20 ft 3 in)
Wing area: 61.46 m2 (661.5 sq ft)
Empty weight: 11,077 kg (24,420 lb)
Gross weight: 15,653 kg (34,510 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt & Whitney J75-P-17 turbojet engine, 16,100 lbf (72 kN) thrust dry, 24,500 lbf (109 kN) with afterburner

 

[red admiral]

It has struck me that nobody in the UK bothered to make a more affordable option like Dassault always did.

It's not quite true e.g. Folland's push for Midge/Gnat in the 50s. Which could have been cheaper but also worse than the likes of Hunter. And then the buy foreign option was pursued multiple times if UK was too expensive or couldn't provide e.g. S.58/Wessex Or a collaborative development approach to get a better capability/cost than UK only e.g. Harrier II.

There have been a few attempts by BAE for "more affordable" options e.g. P.106 / P.110 but UK wasn't the intended customer. And they weren't sufficiently affordable for anyone else to move them beyond the paper study stage.

 

[red admiral]

What I have a problem with is the Minister of Supply saying the Airco partnership wasn't OK, but de Havilland being acquired by the Hawker Siddeley group was good.

The Gov (or people inside the state) might have said a lot of things, but Industry was largely left to consolidate itself. de Havilland was free to choose it's partners for Airco. It just might not have done a very good job, with the group being on shaky financial ground leading to it's acquisition.

 

[Hood]

Could add the Hawk as an affordable design. It came out of Hawker Siddeley's desire for a trainer that could be sold as cheap as possible for the export market and be capable of COIN and light strike to boot.
The success that the Hawk was, even with the RAF's requirements added, proves that it could be done (although by the time of the Hawk LIFT it was actually an expensive aircraft to buy, even if the running costs were not too bad).

From my researches - affordable or not the real issue is government support for credit. As long as buyers can buy on tick with good repayment then the list price is of secondary concern. MAP funds were a critical boost to US sales - especially of F-5Es. Dassault and BAe duked it out for Jaguar, Mirage, Hawk and Alpha Jet sales with the government credit agents at their side offering whatever the best terms they could (as well as buttering up the local royalty/officers/bigwigs).

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC Dassault privately funded the Atar sized F1 off the back off the government funded F2, but soon gained government support. IIUC The Miage III wasn't a cheaper alternative to something else, nor was the Mirage 2000, indeed the big and unsuccessful 4000 was privately funded

 

[red admiral]

Could add the Hawk as an affordable design. It came out of Hawker Siddeley's desire for a trainer that could be sold as cheap as possible for the export market and be capable of COIN and light strike to boot.

Hawk had a bit of strange birth given it started as an Industry / MOD informal project before getting into competition and then a formal MOD-funded project. But that informal relationship was how things used to work.

HSA's PV stretched to paper designs and some wind tunnel testing rather than building a prototype Dassault - style. Even for a much simpler and cheaper trainer rather than a combat aircraft.

With hindsight the efforts to design in the COIN and light strike didn't really seem to pay off. The market was pretty small.

 

[Hood]

True, it was a strange birth but certainly Kingston were on the right track. How far the MOD's specs were influenced by their work and vice-versa is an interesting conundrum. A lot of cross-pollination.

True HSA didn't fund its own design - but then knowing the RAF needed a Gnat trainer it perhaps had no need to and the HS.1182AJ was a much more refined design than the original SP.117 concept.
They did fund G-HAWK though, so they were not afraid to stump up some cash (they had G-VTOL too for Harrier sales). BAC never bothered about such things.

The market forecasts were wonky. HSA, BAC, Dassault, Aermacchi - all were predicting a world market for 5,000 trainers/light strike with the ability to capture at least a fifth of the that market (~1,000 each). They all over-cooked the estimates and the real market was much smaller. Hawk sales never ramped up until the late 80s, Alpha Jet arguably underperformed on the market.

The light attack/COIN was a smaller sliver of the advanced trainer market and I agree, it was not a large market. The Hawk 200 as a logical extension of that market to the low-end fighter segment did not fare that well either - though better than its potential rivals (leaving aside the AMX).

 

[Archibald]

Post 1989 Dassault efforts to sell Alphajets were crushed when Germany flooded the market with theirs: LW, second-hand... peace dividends made them redundant.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The market forecasts were wonky. HSA, BAC, Dassault, Aermacchi - all were predicting a world market for 5,000 trainers/light strike with the ability to capture at least a fifth of the that market (~1,000 each). They all over-cooked the estimates and the real market was much smaller. Hawk sales never ramped up until the late 80s, Alpha Jet arguably underperformed on the market.

I dunno, the US made ~1200 T-38 Talon trainers, not counting F-5s. Add 1200 F-5A/B/C/Ds and then another 1400 F-5E/Fs a few years later. That's ~3800 airframes across the globe.

IMO Hawk took way too long for their foreign sales to take off. UK (90ish), Canada (~20?), Finland (50), Indonesia (>40), Saudi Arabia (50 in 2 blocks of 25?), and Zimbabwe (of all places!, 12 airframes) bought their Hawks in the 1970s and 1980s, but the bigger sales didn't happen until the 2000s. Only around 150 Hawks were sold globally, then the USN bought 220 Goshawks for carrier training.

Post Y2K buys? India is building under license, and has a total of over 160. Malaysia has 18, and Saudi has bought another 44.

Anyways, I don't think they missed on the total size of the world market. They just grossly overestimated how much of the market they could grab against the US and the T-38/F-5.

Because let's be honest, the T-38 is a really good plane.

 

[Hood]

the US made ~1200 T-38 Talon trainers, not counting F-5s.

The T-38's weren't widely exported - Germany's were based in the US with US markings so de facto extra USAF airframes, while Portugal, Turkey and Taiwan took a few (Portugal being the odd one out as they never operated the F-5). South Korea got some surplus ex-USAF Talons as stand-ins until the T-50 was ready.
I wouldn't count the two-seater F-5s as trainers - conversion trainers yes but they were not designed or operated as advanced flight trainers.

Yes, Hawk sales were pretty sluggish until the 90s. But there was a lot of competition out there. More advanced nations and up and coming aviation nations could build their own trainers - Aviojets, Pampas and the like and only when the Hawk LIFT came along with more (expensive) goodies did sales rack up.

A large number of Hawks were assembled abroad - Australia, Finland, India, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, USA and South Korea built some components and there was a production agreement with IPTN in Indonesia that remained inactive. There were even stillborn plans for a factory in Iraq.
Unlike Dassault, BAe was never afraid to give local assembly as offset. It resulted in BAE Systems Australia and South African avionics and kit ended up in production Hawks as a result. It really was an international aircraft. That is the one major difference between Dassault and BAe, the international outlook and footprint. While preserving UK jobs was important, that didn't automatically mean that everything had to be screwed together in rainy northern England. The supply chain itself was a valuable commodity and sales = sweet, sweet Pound Sterling in the bank regardless of who it assembling the pack-flat kit.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The T-38's weren't widely exported - Germany's were based in the US with US markings so de facto extra USAF airframes, while Portugal, Turkey and Taiwan took a few (Portugal being the odd one out as they never operated the F-5). South Korea got some surplus ex-USAF Talons as stand-ins until the T-50 was ready.
I wouldn't count the two-seater F-5s as trainers - conversion trainers yes but they were not designed or operated as advanced flight trainers.

I'd count the F-5s as Trainer/Light Strike aircraft. Especially the later E/Fs, but the As and Cs were used quite a bit as fighter bombers. I'm pretty sure you could use an F-5B/D two seater the same way you could use a T-38. Whether anyone did or not is a separate discussion.

That is the one major difference between Dassault and BAe, the international outlook and footprint. While preserving UK jobs was important, that didn't automatically mean that everything had to be screwed together in rainy northern England. The supply chain itself was a valuable commodity and sales = sweet, sweet Pound Sterling in the bank regardless of who it assembling the pack-flat kit.

Yes, BAe recognized that sales means money in the bank, even if those benighted souls in South Africa were assembling the planes.

Dassault kept a spare design in his hip pocket, for when the goobermint finally realized that they could not afford their wishlist specification.

It's funny, the UKRN was all about trimming ships back or having a backup design when Treasury said "no", but when it came to planes the spec was never even considered to be lowered until it was time to fit for but not with.