Theoretical countermeasures and policies to protect strategic assets from drones

[EmoBirb]

Given that in the wake of Ukraines attack on Russian strategic bombers the topic came up several times in other threads, I figured it may be appropriate to dedicate a specific thread to the topic.

The topic being the implications of widespread availability of drones and how they can be utilized to disrupt or target operations of strategic assets like bombers, silos or submarines around the world. What countermeasures could be taken, what's the current threat level, how is legislation trying to deal with this emerging threat and how do specific locations provide safer circumstances than others.

If this is somewhat redundant or out of place, I'd encourage the staff to move or delete this of course. Otherwise I think it's the appropriate place for many posts made over the last couple weeks that deal with any strategic matter to be honest. As there are threads about drone warfare in general, in my eyes it's appropriate to have a dedicated one for this very distinct but also very important facette of it.

 

[Antonio]

how is legislation trying to deal with this emerging threat

That's an interesting thought.
A few military innovations have been considered too disruptive or even "uncontrollable" enough to force the develop a regulation.
That happened with chemical (pesticides) and biological based weapons but I think that's not the case with drones, at least for the moment. Counter measures would eventually developed against them.

 

[publiusr]

Stage ground-based attacks during gales.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The simple answer is heavy GPS and control signal jammers at the base perimeter (or set back from the base perimeter so that their "loss of comms" range is 500-1000ft beyond the base perimeter). All civilian drones have a "return to launch location in case of loss of comms" buried in their OS. And just leave the jammers blaring 24/7.

Then you have base cops or whoever show up at the launch site to "have words with" whatever idiots are operating drones around an airfield.

That eliminates anyone who is using civilian grade drones from flying over your base.

Then we add Iron Dome/Iron Beam defenses to every military base to deal with any drones that keep coming after crossing the perimeter.

Not cheap, but saves legislation from trying to ban drones.

 

[EmoBirb]

That's an interesting thought.
A few military innovations have been considered too disruptive or even "uncontrollable" enough to force the develop a regulation.
That happened with chemical (pesticides) and biological based weapons but I think that's not the case with drones, at least for the moment. Counter measures would eventually developed against them.

I think eventually certain types of drones could become subject to legislation, like certain battery capacities or weight classes.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think eventually certain types of drones could become subject to legislation, like certain battery capacities or weight classes.

Problem is, most of the drones that are commercially useful (big lenses on cameras are heavy) are also militarily useful.

 

[lastdingo]

1) Be able to cope with hits, firefight, repair, minimise seconary fires/explosions potential damage
2) jam SatNav
3) multispectral smoke
4) chaff
5) jam radar
6) concealment against satellites, aircraft and agents
7) nets
8) harden (hesco and similar)
9) disperse new facilities
10) laser detectors
11) hard kill defence comes last, for they are expensive, should not be in civilian hands and are prone to be saturated

 

[spikedpsycho]

If you begin a widespread implementation of GPS jamming if essentially rendered military back dark ages of WWI. Naval assets would have resurrect time tested albeit laborious maritime navigation systems of solar/stellar observation, radio pulse timing and buoys and inertial navigation.

Bombs, missiles, ships and planes would require complete retro retro fit. Target illuminators, or TV, laser guided.

Years ago affect GPS sabotage was highlighted in paper by former Naval analyst. A rogue nation or terrorist state gain access common ballistic missile ir cheap rocket. The payload is simply a small bomb filled pellets/ball bearings and signal to detonate. In a dead man's switch configuration a constant signal onset off without signal relay. This "suicide satellite" would need update every few to 24 hours, if nation in question is attacked the signal loss means detonation sending fragments at orbital speed to neighboring satellites.

 

[Scott Kenny]

If you begin a widespread implementation of GPS jamming if essentially rendered military back dark ages of WWI. Naval assets would have resurrect time tested albeit laborious maritime navigation systems of solar/stellar observation, radio pulse timing and buoys and inertial navigation.

Bombs, missiles, ships and planes would require complete retro retro fit. Target illuminators, or TV, laser guided.

You have a bomb-grade inertial measurement unit in your phone, tablet, and Kindle Fire. Each one.

My phone cost all of $150US, and includes 3 camera CCDs and that IMU.

Years ago affect GPS sabotage was highlighted in paper by former Naval analyst. A rogue nation or terrorist state gain access common ballistic missile ir cheap rocket. The payload is simply a small bomb filled pellets/ball bearings and signal to detonate. In a dead man's switch configuration a constant signal onset off without signal relay. This "suicide satellite" would need update every few to 24 hours, if nation in question is attacked the signal loss means detonation sending fragments at orbital speed to neighboring satellites.

You do realize that the GPS constellation orbits at 20,000km altitude, right?

That is a big rocket to reach that high. Titan IIIC or larger.

 

[357Mag]

Given that in the wake of Ukraines attack on Russian strategic bombers the topic came up several times in other threads, I figured it may be appropriate to dedicate a specific thread to the topic.

The topic being the implications of widespread availability of drones and how they can be utilized to disrupt or target operations of strategic assets like bombers, silos or submarines around the world. What countermeasures could be taken, what's the current threat level, how is legislation trying to deal with this emerging threat and how do specific locations provide safer circumstances than others.

If this is somewhat redundant or out of place, I'd encourage the staff to move or delete this of course. Otherwise I think it's the appropriate place for many posts made over the last couple weeks that deal with any strategic matter to be honest. As there are threads about drone warfare in general, in my eyes it's appropriate to have a dedicated one for this very distinct but also very important facette of it.

All -

Ok… so what constitutes a drone ?


If you are talking about protecting “ strategic “ assets, you are likely talking about the potential for attacks being executed on MIL “ targets “ such as : ICBM fields, U.S. Navy ships @ port or in dry dock, U.S. Air Force Strategic bombers and their bases/facilities, NORAD cites, the “ DEW “, the Ft. Greely Ground Based Mid-Course Defense interceptor base, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense assets; and so forth.

If these assets were attacked from significant distances, why would any such attacks be
prosecuted using a notional “ drone “, when there are already weapons at hand like long range cruise missiles and more recently… hypersonic glide vehicles available to cover great distances. When is a “ drone “ not a cruise missile, or…vice versa ? Not all drones are “ first person view “, and… cruise missiles make one-way attacks. And, ICBMs could be utilized for strategic attacks, in the most extreme example.

If you are talking about attacks being made by hostile forces located fairly close to their intended targets, why would it have to include use of an explosive-laden drone(s) ?
Certainly, some things that historically worked for performing closer range attacks; would still work today; for some of the imagined targets. Is the definition of “drone “ going to be refined down to…the ability of the drone operator to watch and direct the drone’s actions ? Or… refined/better defined at all ? If so, then what about
pre-programmed independent “ free flyers “ ? Or, drones that ID and/or pick their target(s) out on their own ? Their are some other non-drone assets that do those things.

What happens to the definition of “drone“ when they are recoverable and/or re-useable?
Is the X-37 or similar a “ drone “ ? Yes…. unless it’s manned ?

“ Drone “ definition(s) aside…. Defense of ( as a minimum ) strategic military assets should/would require more than just anti-drone defense; in-order to be truely successful; N’ Est-ce pas ?


With regards,
357Mag

 

[EmoBirb]

If these assets were attacked from significant distances, why would any such attacks be
prosecuted using a notional “ drone “

Because not every adversary of a given nuclear power has the means to deploy cruise missiles, let alone ICBMs. And that scenario, as has been observed, is far more likely than one nuclear power messing directly with another (because that would create reasoning for an exchange). Furthermore, depending on the type, drones are significantly harder to intercept than cruise missiles could be. Because current military infrastructure is not meant to deal with such threats. Small, highly maneuverable and present in large volume. Have you slept through the Ukrainian attack on Russian bombers, or the Iranian attacks on American bases?

If you are talking about attacks being made by hostile forces located fairly close to their intended targets, why would it have to include use of an explosive-laden drone(s)

Because drones don't require immediate proximity, they can be controlled kilometers away through fiber-optic cables or even further through wireless means of guidance, they can in theory also fly fully autonomous with algorithms doing the targeting. And the explosive drone has the advantage of being small in their profile, flying extremely low, being extremely nimble and able to be precisely guided at the weakest points of any given structure.

 

[357Mag]

" Have you slept through the Ukrainian attack on Russian bombers, or the Iranian attacks on American bases ? "

Emo -

Howdy !

In answer to your question above... No. Have I paid attention, yes.

I was @ the Balad airbase in Iraq during 2 seperate deployments, when it came under attack. I missed a " dud " from a Katusha, that landed not too far out from our revetment, and near our non-fortified administrative area.

They once found unexploded ordnance under a truck, during a post-attack " UXO " sweep.

A third country nationalmhad a leg blown off, while laying on his bunk inside a
" temper' tent ". He died from his injury.

An Army dude was passing through Balad, on his way to R & R in Qatar. The attack warning siren went off for the sector he was located in, while he was standing in line @ the chow hall. While everyone else took cover, he remained outside; and not inside a
shelter of any sort. He was killed outright by an exploding mortar round.

ABC news anchor Bob Woodruff sustained a critical injury from a roadside IED while covering U.S. fighting in Iraq. They flew him to the helipad @ Balad, and then took him to the base Hospital. With time, he recovered remarkably well. I walked across that helipad area every day, to make it to my asigned work area. Did it the same day they flew the injured newsman in.

The closest I myself got to injury from enemy fire while I was in Iraq.....
was when a local directed some random AK-47 rounds @ the airbase, from an orchard just outside the wire. One FMJ bullet made it through the two roof layers of the tent,
bounced off a metal locker; then impacted and came to rest upon my matress' sheet.
It happened to land right between my ankles. Now, for THAT one; I was asleep !

None of those type of attacks required/requires a "drone ", or a level of guidance to target a specific individual. Yet, unfortunately.... the old " classics " still can do today; what they did back then.


With regards,
357Mag