Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

We're seeing a LOT of both companies' work, whichever yard is doing final assembly.

As an example: all the pressure hull ring sections come from EB's Quonset Point facility regardless of "whose" module it is inside the hull. Both from a material performance and cost perspective, using a single source to produce the hull rings makes a ton of sense...
... On the opposite side of the spectrum, Australia could stand up its own SSN hull ring production and not use the US-made hull rings at all, but that's probably the most expensive and slowest option.

If you're going to assume all the hull ring production for a 2040's boat why not build off Columbia-class tech and spec's using Virginia Payload Tubes and just call it Virginia Block VIII? The US has already bought down development costs for the drive system. Perhaps the Virginia-class replacement authorized in 2034 will be a Columbia varient.

Would it place too much risk on the Columbia deployment timeline? Hard to say. The US plans to have half its SSBN's ordered by 2030 and receiving them one per year by mid 2030's.
 
Speaking of SSNs in Australia:


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Video
 
 
This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean. But certainly all of the internals from the reactor compartment back would have to be made in the US, possibly this is the 'half' they're referring to.

Please elaborate.

Sadly, no can do. I've been looking around for where I heard this and I haven't been able to find a thing. I'm certain I didn't make it up but I'll be buggered if a can track down a reference now. My bad. I'll stop referring to it.
 
One of the little surprises about change is exemplified by the TSR.2, as costs spiralled up, they had a meeting about a reduced specification version.....only the changes from then development actually increased the cost.

Something similar happened over the Eurofighter Typhoon, as Germany tried to force a reduced cost version. It only kept increasing the costs.

This is why Australia getting in on next generation SSNs now mitigates a lot of future costs by redesign for RAN requirements.
 
Little dated but still useful:

 
One of the little surprises about change is exemplified by the TSR.2, as costs spiralled up, they had a meeting about a reduced specification version.....only the changes from then development actually increased the cost.

Something similar happened over the Eurofighter Typhoon, as Germany tried to force a reduced cost version. It only kept increasing the costs.

This is why Australia getting in on next generation SSNs now mitigates a lot of future costs by redesign for RAN requirements.

Best change is no change. Saw a big boat once named "Change Request".

Australia's requirement is a nuclear boat they can purchase quickly that launches missiles, torpedoes, and with room for Special Operators. Any deviation from what is already available is never going to be worth the cost, in time or treasure.
 
This would have been my guess, they certainly have experience with building hull ring sections for the Collins' and are keen to use their own steel spec due to considerations arising from operating in the Southern Ocean. But certainly all of the internals from the reactor compartment back would have to be made in the US, possibly this is the 'half' they're referring to.

Please elaborate.

Sadly, no can do. I've been looking around for where I heard this and I haven't been able to find a thing. I'm certain I didn't make it up but I'll be buggered if a can track down a reference now. My bad. I'll stop referring to it.
Did they use the same steel spec as the British?
 
Did they use the same steel spec as the British?

Difficult to say, I don't think so. According to a (singular) BAE source I found, HMS Astute uses a combination of a HY80 'derivative' and HSLA 80 (High Strength Low Alloy or micro-alloyed steel). The Collins class hull's are constructed from a high-tensile micro-alloy steel (So something like HY80 and/or HSLA80). But of course, both the UK and Australia are very coy when it comes to exact specifications of the steel used in their hulls.
 

Difficult to say, I don't think so. According to a (singular) BAE source I found, HMS Astute uses a combination of a HY80 'derivative' and HSLA 80 (High Strength Low Alloy or micro-alloyed steel). The Collins class hull's are constructed from a high-tensile micro-alloy steel (So something like HY80 and/or HSLA80). But of course, both the UK and Australia are very coy when it comes to exact specifications of the steel used in their hulls.


Interesting as I understood Virginia-class uses HY100. Am I correct in assuming HY100 offers advantages in operating depth? If you're romping around the Pacific would the additional cruising depth be handy?
 

Interesting as I understood Virginia-class uses HY100. Am I correct in assuming HY100 offers advantages in operating depth? If you're romping around the Pacific would the additional cruising depth be handy?

The advantages don't appear to be huge ones just looking at the theoretical limits, but the USN obviously thought they were worthwhile for the Seawolf programme and now the Virginia class boats. They had a fair bit of trouble getting the HY-100 to weld right initially, lost a couple of years work in the process.

Of course, diving deeper just means you're closer to the bottom:

Although the operating depths of submarines are highly secret, their crush depth limits can be calculated approximately, solely from knowledge of the steel strength. With the stronger HY-80 steel, this depth increased to 1,800 feet (550 m) and with HY-100 a depth of 2,250 feet (690 m).

The "HY" steels are designed to possess a high yield strength (strength in resisting permanent plastic deformation). HY-80 is accompanied by HY-100 and HY-130 with each of the 80, 100 and 130 referring to their yield strength in ksi (80,000 psi, 100,000 psi and 130,000 psi). HY-80 and HY-100 are both weldable grades; whereas, the HY-130 is generally considered unweldable.

In terms of performance and cost, microalloyed steels are between a carbon steel and a low alloy steel. Their yield strength is between 275 and 750 MPa (40 and 110 ksi) (40,000 psi and 110,000 psi) without heat treatment. Weldability is good. Fatigue life and wear resistance are superior to similar heat-treated steels. The disadvantages are that ductility and toughness are not as good as quenched and tempered (Q&T) steels.

Because microalloyed steels are not quenched and tempered, they are not susceptible to quench cracking, nor do they need to be straightened or stress relieved. However, because of this, they are through-hardened and do not have a softer and tougher core like quench and tempered steels.
 


No drydock in Guam. You can't make this shit up.

When is someone going to tell these folks that the military, like all government agencies, is never, ever, efficient. There is a "carrying cost" to having a military. If you're going to make Guam a big petrol station, you not only need to maintain facilities to repair things, you must make use of them regularly to maintain competency.

I can think of several areas that would make important intermediate yards w dry docks to service submarines and other Naval vessels.

Guam
Subic
Osborne
Lombrum

But it will never happen. Everyone st DoD is trying to get the first 5 things on their lists completed. This is item 12.

Well... Osborne may happen. But only because DoD wouldn't be doing it.
 
Seems logical, but take it with a grain of salt. Tony Abbott is not a member of the current Australian government and is not speaking for it. He's regarded as something of a loose cannon.

 
I do not believe this would make sense. They would costa del fortuna to put back into service. I believe basing US and UK subs in the region while preparing facilities and training crews in the UK and the US and deploying them on the boats of those navies while getting in at the ground level for the next class of boat to come into service is better financially and practically. much easier than scrambling to put retired boats back into service with prep and refueling expenses.
 
Reactivating a decommissioned Los Angeles or Trafalgar Class sub doesn't really make much sense and would be a very expensive exercise. They've all been selected for decommissioning for good reason, probably several of them. Many of them would need refueling to boot. And these are largely obsolete, worn out boats too. Not sure exactly what Australian crews would be learning on them.
 
It would also be politically stupid since the media, opposition and armchair admirals would give them hell over buying clapped out second hand subs...
 
Seems logical, but take it with a grain of salt. Tony Abbott is not a member of the current Australian government and is not speaking for it. He's regarded as something of a loose cannon.



If I'm not mistaken, is there not a finite number of times these boats can operate at depth? I'm referring to metal fatigue related issues, not fuel.
 
Yes. That can be extended by not taking them deep but there is a finite amount of dive stress the hull can take. For this and all the other reasons stated using an old hull is a non starter.
 
Seems logical, but take it with a grain of salt. Tony Abbott is not a member of the current Australian government and is not speaking for it. He's regarded as something of a loose cannon.



If I'm not mistaken, is there not a finite number of times these boats can operate at depth? I'm referring to metal fatigue related issues, not fuel.
"Finite number" is perhaps a little misleading or incomplete. There's a point past which the hull's ability to operate at depth falls off, traditionally US SSNs aren't allowed to operate past that point. However, it's not necessarily correct that every boat currently scheduled to be retired is useless. The 688i service life extension study that's gone on has been a surveying the hulls to find exactly where they are in relation to that point, and whether it's possible or advisable to operate them in a "depth limited" manner to extend their useful lives even further as construction on new boats continues. If the hull survey has found that a handful of boats could do another 10 years after an additional refueling, they might make an enticing "intro to SSNs" option for Australia.
 
I doubt refueling would be cost effective, even with depth limiting. At a minimum the boats would have short operational lives, assuming there was meaningful operational life left.
 
Seems logical, but take it with a grain of salt. Tony Abbott is not a member of the current Australian government and is not speaking for it. He's regarded as something of a loose cannon.



If I'm not mistaken, is there not a finite number of times these boats can operate at depth? I'm referring to metal fatigue related issues, not fuel.
"Finite number" is perhaps a little misleading or incomplete. There's a point past which the hull's ability to operate at depth falls off, traditionally US SSNs aren't allowed to operate past that point. However, it's not necessarily correct that every boat currently scheduled to be retired is useless. The 688i service life extension study that's gone on has been a surveying the hulls to find exactly where they are in relation to that point, and whether it's possible or advisable to operate them in a "depth limited" manner to extend their useful lives even further as construction on new boats continues. If the hull survey has found that a handful of boats could do another 10 years after an additional refueling, they might make an enticing "intro to SSNs" option for Australia.
Keep one tied to the pier for training purposes only. As you get your crews trained up, start putting RAN sailors on US and UK boats. Learn as much as you can from both. No one knows when you will get a new sub. I would also recommend sending your Reactor sailors to in the USA Nuclear Power School, The UK has a similar program. I am sure this is already happening. I think its a crawl, walk and run situation. When I heard AUKUS announced, I thought that the US or UK should send a soon to be decommissioned sub down to Australia to start training crews. I really think spreading RAN sailors out in the the US and UK fleets to observe/train whatever you want to call it would be essential for a top notch RAN SSN program. Then getting cutting away from the pier doing training missions for each crew 2-4 week training missions. That would have you off at flank speed. Once the new boats start rolling in. You may have to find a way to retain the sailors, training them up will be expensive. Keeping experienced crew is always a brilliant idea for the next generation.
 
I think training should happen but I don’t think dragging a clapped out boat to Aus is the way to do it.
 
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No drydock in Guam. You can't make this shit up.

When is someone going to tell these folks that the military, like all government agencies, is never, ever, efficient. There is a "carrying cost" to having a military. If you're going to make Guam a big petrol station, you not only need to maintain facilities to repair things, you must make use of them regularly to maintain competency.

I can think of several areas that would make important intermediate yards w dry docks to service submarines and other Naval vessels.

Guam
Subic
Osborne
Lombrum

But it will never happen. Everyone st DoD is trying to get the first 5 things on their lists completed. This is item 12.

Well... Osborne may happen. But only because DoD wouldn't be doing it.
Yes, the US Navy really dropped the ball on that one. We need floating drydocks at all naval facilities and not just overseas.
 
I think training should happen but I think dragging a clapped out boat to Aus is the way to do it
I think sending Aussie reactor people to school and then have them work on one in port. Unless the US/UK set up a school for the sub. With nuclear things I would double the learning time! I agree a boat in Australia is the way to go, on the job training is the best training.
 
Macron blows a fuse after a leaked SMS, related to the submarine quagmire.


 
Seems logical, but take it with a grain of salt. Tony Abbott is not a member of the current Australian government and is not speaking for it. He's regarded as something of a loose cannon.



If I'm not mistaken, is there not a finite number of times these boats can operate at depth? I'm referring to metal fatigue related issues, not fuel.
"Finite number" is perhaps a little misleading or incomplete. There's a point past which the hull's ability to operate at depth falls off, traditionally US SSNs aren't allowed to operate past that point. However, it's not necessarily correct that every boat currently scheduled to be retired is useless. The 688i service life extension study that's gone on has been a surveying the hulls to find exactly where they are in relation to that point, and whether it's possible or advisable to operate them in a "depth limited" manner to extend their useful lives even further as construction on new boats continues. If the hull survey has found that a handful of boats could do another 10 years after an additional refueling, they might make an enticing "intro to SSNs" option for Australia.
Keep one tied to the pier for training purposes only. As you get your crews trained up, start putting RAN sailors on US and UK boats. Learn as much as you can from both. No one knows when you will get a new sub. I would also recommend sending your Reactor sailors to in the USA Nuclear Power School, The UK has a similar program. I am sure this is already happening. I think its a crawl, walk and run situation. When I heard AUKUS announced, I thought that the US or UK should send a soon to be decommissioned sub down to Australia to start training crews. I really think spreading RAN sailors out in the the US and UK fleets to observe/train whatever you want to call it would be essential for a top notch RAN SSN program. Then getting cutting away from the pier doing training missions for each crew 2-4 week training missions. That would have you off at flank speed. Once the new boats start rolling in. You may have to find a way to retain the sailors, training them up will be expensive. Keeping experienced crew is always a brilliant idea for the next generation.

A mix of Los Angeles and upgraded Collins wouldn't be too bad...
 
I still think sending an RN Astute to Australia kills two birds with one stone..
It gives the UK a Tomahawk capable SSN permanently East of Suez and would allow a Port Starboard crews arrangement with RAN and set up an RAN Perisher course.
 
Interesting talk here about the steps in USN crew training. A point that hasn't really come up yet is that the RN and RAN have quite different approaches to crew duties and training compared to the USN, at least so I've been told. It's usually referred to in terms of cultural differences, but boils down to quite different approaches to crew training and individual crew members areas of responsibility.

As I said though, that was how it was described to me several years ago. The philosophy and the approach to crew training may well have changed now. It would certainly be interesting to hear from any former RN, RAN or USN folk with exchange experience who could shed some light.

Also, excellent point at the end there about Australia having zero nuclear infrastructure. This infrastructure isn't going to appear out of thin air either. It's going to take a number of years and probably more than a decade to stand up properly. And when it does, it will need to do so in a regulatory, legislative and political environment that's still actively hostile to nuclear technology.
 
Interesting talk here about the steps in USN crew training. A point that hasn't really come up yet is that the RN and RAN have quite different approaches to crew duties and training compared to the USN, at least so I've been told. It's usually referred to in terms of cultural differences, but boils down to quite different approaches to crew training and individual crew members areas of responsibility.

As I said though, that was how it was described to me several years ago. The philosophy and the approach to crew training may well have changed now. It would certainly be interesting to hear from any former RN, RAN or USN folk with exchange experience who could shed some light.

Also, excellent point at the end there about Australia having zero nuclear infrastructure. This infrastructure isn't going to appear out of thin air either. It's going to take a number of years and probably more than a decade to stand up properly. And when it does, it will need to do so in a regulatory, legislative and political environment that's still actively hostile to nuclear technology.
I agree with no nuclear infrastructure. Australia has a lot of Uranium. Its up to the Australian population to decide what to do. I guess they would have to have a national referendum. Not sure about Aussie politics. US/UK training for RAN forces allows them to see the best of both US/UK submarines. This could also help the RAN decide on what type of submarine they want to produce. It will give them a chance to see the best attack submarines in operation (Astute class) <coming from a US citizen. It will also give them the chance to operate on the Virginia class and hopefully Seawolf class. The Aussies might end up with the best sub crews!
 
I suspect there's going to be special legislation brought forward in Australia carving out special circumstances for military nuclear technology. Neither of the major political parties is interested in a fight with the public over civilian nuclear technology, but then both parties seem keen for the nuclear subs deal to go forward.
 
Australia is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Pact and the Pacific Nuclear Free zone. As such it cannot have nuclear weapons. It is also limited as to nuclear power sources and Uranium enrichment facilities it can host and nuclear weapons it can host for other nations.
 
If we are going to base strategic bombers in Australia they will need nuclear bombs and missiles. Port calls from US/UK SSN/SSGN/SSBNs and CVNs, are going to happen. Repair facilities in Australia would be key in any future war. That is a project AUKUS should shoulder together. Dry docks 1CVN size, 1 LHD size. 3 DDG, 3-5 frigate, 3 SSN these could be floating dry docks.
 
Australia is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Pact and the Pacific Nuclear Free zone. As such it cannot have nuclear weapons. It is also limited as to nuclear power sources and Uranium enrichment facilities it can host and nuclear weapons it can host for other nations.
 
If we are going to base strategic bombers in Australia they will need nuclear bombs and missiles. Port calls from US/UK SSN/SSGN/SSBNs and CVNs, are going to happen. Repair facilities in Australia would be key in any future war. That is a project AUKUS should shoulder together. Dry docks 1CVN size, 1 LHD size. 3 DDG, 3-5 frigate, 3 SSN these could be floating dry docks.
Who says we are going to allow the US to base bombers/subs/ships downunder? It would counter over 50 years of policy. We are no longer a "suitable piece of real estate" for the US or anybody to plumb down military hardware on.
 
Also, excellent point at the end there about Australia having zero nuclear infrastructure. This infrastructure isn't going to appear out of thin air either. It's going to take a number of years and probably more than a decade to stand up properly. And when it does, it will need to do so in a regulatory, legislative and political environment that's still actively hostile to nuclear technology.
If, as likely, the subs Australia selects have lifetime cores provided, then sub production and operation could be done with no nuclear infrastructure.
 

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