X-16 spy flights over Eastern Europe and the USSR

Vahe Demirjian

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We know that General Curtis Lemay tried to keep justifying the X-16 by rejecting the U-2 design as not meeting the definition of a "classic military aircraft" due to lack of defensive armament. Given that the U-2 wasn't as invincible to Soviet radar systems as Lockheed had hoped, would the X-16 have stood a chance of surviving interception by SA-2s and Su-9/11 interceptors on overflights of the USSR, given its design altitude of 70,000 feet?
 
Probably no more than the U-2. What got Francis Gary Power shot down was over-confidence at many levels. For example, they knew since 1957-58 than the Soviets tracked U-2s on radar, they tried "to stealth the U-2" and miserably failed... and yet the overflights continued.

Except by Einsenhower, who was trapped. He NEEDED the data on the Soviet Union but already guessed that flying U-2s was russian roulette (lame pun intended). He was actually rather unlucky, Ike. He had resisted his military and put the brakes on U-2 flights as much as he could not to irritate the Soviets. Few flights happened in 1959 and early 1960 and then he barely allowed Powers mission - just to get a little data before that infamous Paris conference of May 1960... and Powers was shot down at the worst possible moment. Once again, the Murphy Law hit severely.
 
The U-2 was a joke. "The moment you went over the horizon, you would be tracked." Francis Gary Powers was not shot down as reported. He suffered a power failure that brought him down to a lower altitude and his glider, glided to a crash landing. I have seen the propaganda photo published at the time. And I have seen a number of crashed glider photos. The Powers U-2 was shown broken up on the ground just as one would expect to see in a controlled crash. President Eisenhower had ordered no U-2 flights in anticipation of such an incident occurring before the Paris conference.
 
Maybe the X-16 would have some more chance to survive only for the fact to be twin-engined rather than the single-engine U-2.
In case of power failure of one engine, at least it could keep up the plane with the other one.
 
The X-16 for those who (like me) weren't sure :)

We know that General Curtis Lemay tried to keep justifying the X-16 by rejecting the U-2 design as not meeting the definition of a "classic military aircraft" due to lack of defensive armament. Given that the U-2 wasn't as invincible to Soviet radar systems as Lockheed had hoped, would the X-16 have stood a chance of surviving interception by SA-2s and Su-9/11 interceptors on overflights of the USSR, given its design altitude of 70,000 feet?

I'm not sure that Lemay had a leg to stand on since the X-16 didn't meet those conditions either. I'm actually kind of surprised he would have said something so stupid since by design almost no reconnissence aircraft EVERY carried any armament. And being 'invisible' to radar was never a consideration either as it was the operations altitude which was assumed to be above any Soviet defensive system that was the entire point. Given the U2 was designed to cruise over 70,000ft initially and eventually cruised over 80,000ft OTHER than having two engines it didn't have a lot over the U2 design.

Probably no more than the U-2. What got Francis Gary Power shot down was over-confidence at many levels. For example, they knew since 1957-58 than the Soviets tracked U-2s on radar, they tried "to stealth the U-2" and miserably failed... and yet the overflights continued.

Except by Einsenhower, who was trapped. He NEEDED the data on the Soviet Union but already guessed that flying U-2s was russian roulette (lame pun intended). He was actually rather unlucky, Ike. He had resisted his military and put the brakes on U-2 flights as much as he could not to irritate the Soviets. Few flights happened in 1959 and early 1960 and then he barely allowed Powers mission - just to get a little data before that infamous Paris conference of May 1960... and Powers was shot down at the worst possible moment. Once again, the Murphy Law hit severely.

Actually it's likely Powers was shot down BECAUASE of the Paris conference...

The U-2 was a joke. "The moment you went over the horizon, you would be tracked."

There was no real 'stealth' at that time and I kinda wondering where the idea that being 'high' avoided radar came from. No one at the time even considered it because it was well understood that the higher you were the more visible you were to radar but it was thought that flying high enough you would be above anti-aircraft defenses.

Francis Gary Powers was not shot down as reported. He suffered a power failure that brought him down to a lower altitude and his glider, glided to a crash landing. I have seen the propaganda photo published at the time. And I have seen a number of crashed glider photos. The Powers U-2 was shown broken up on the ground just as one would expect to see in a controlled crash. President Eisenhower had ordered no U-2 flights in anticipation of such an incident occurring before the Paris conference.

I'd heard of the power failure but understood it was this which actually brought Powers down into range of the ground based missiles. The Russians even officially state he was targeted and shot down as all U2 overflights were targeted. But it was only because he came down to a lower altitude that a shoot down was ordered and likely done so in order to derail the upcoming Paris conference since the Soviets were looking for a way to back out.

Maybe the X-16 would have some more chance to survive only for the fact to be twin-engined rather than the single-engine U-2.
In case of power failure of one engine, at least it could keep up the plane with the other one.

Maybe but it would have lost altitude in either case but it would have maintained a higher altitude with only one engine.

Randy
 
My point is this: Powers survived. The U-2 was quite fragile. Even a near miss by a missile would have caused the aircraft to break up. It did not. I'm sure the Russians enjoyed examining the camera.
 
There was no real 'stealth' at that time and I kinda wondering where the idea that being 'high' avoided radar came from. No one at the time even considered it because it was well understood that the higher you were the more visible you were to radar but it was thought that flying high enough you would be above anti-aircraft defenses.

It's perfectly well documented that with the X-16 and U-2 it was hoped to fly above Soviet radar capabilities. The US were assuming that the late 1950s Soviet radars were straight copies of WW2 vintage US early warning radars, which typically had a radiation emission pattern optimised for detecting piston engined bombers and therefore wouldn't detect an aircraft flying at 70,000ft. In fact, the P-35 (BAR LOCK) radar which entered service in 1958 had an operational detection ceiling of 25,000 m (82,021 ft) and was able to detect the U-2 quite successfully. The U-2 could not be reliably engaged at that time, so flights could continue, but the Soviets were able to track them pretty well.

Similarly, the reduced RCS and speed of the A-12 were hoped to make tracking difficult for Soviet radars, but once again, it turned out they were more capable than expected.
 
The Soviets had captured German radars as well. Although attempts were made to reduce the RCS of the U-2, they were not successful. The technical people knew this but President Eisenhower was kept in the dark and lied to. Could the U-2 be tracked? he asked. The answer he got was not truthful. The CIA had operational control. The US had bounced a radar signal off the moon in 1946. That was how they could determine the operating frequencies of Soviet radars like Tall King. I read an account of an agent in Eastern Europe during the early days of U-2 operations. They were monitoring Soviet military radio frequencies. "I could hear the Russians talking about spotting an aircraft but they were surprised by its altitude. Of course, I could tell no one what it was."
 
There was no real 'stealth' at that time and I kinda wondering where the idea that being 'high' avoided radar came from. No one at the time even considered it because it was well understood that the higher you were the more visible you were to radar but it was thought that flying high enough you would be above anti-aircraft defenses.

It's perfectly well documented that with the X-16 and U-2 it was hoped to fly above Soviet radar capabilities. The US were assuming that the late 1950s Soviet radars were straight copies of WW2 vintage US early warning radars, which typically had a radiation emission pattern optimised for detecting piston engined bombers and therefore wouldn't detect an aircraft flying at 70,000ft. In fact, the P-35 (BAR LOCK) radar which entered service in 1958 had an operational detection ceiling of 25,000 m (82,021 ft) and was able to detect the U-2 quite successfully. The U-2 could not be reliably engaged at that time, so flights could continue, but the Soviets were able to track them pretty well.

Similarly, the reduced RCS and speed of the A-12 were hoped to make tracking difficult for Soviet radars, but once again, it turned out they were more capable than expected.

The work I've seen pointed that was true right up until the mid-50s when it was obvious from ELInt observation that Soviet radar was proceeding at a pace similar to US and European development. My read is the "hope" was not to fly above the radar coverage but it was assumed that the Soviets could not cover ALL their territory and so by flying high and trying to stick to known 'dead-zones' in coverage the U2/X-16 would be constantly lost and require being re-aquired which would preclude activer tracking.

It seemed to be a matter of operational knowledge being filtered for others, (in this case actual US radar technology and how it worked in the real word versus what aircraft and anti-air designers thought it did) more than anything else. Operators and radar designers knew that the listed 'detection ceiling' wasn't a hard number and tracking above that depnded more on processing power at the ground station. On the other hand there was a wide spread "common knowledge" that radar, being "radio" after all, didn't work well beyond it's known range. Not at all sure how this got to be a "known" fact when those who worked on radar were well aware that this was false but that's what got into the thinking and design considerations.

At the operational and tactical level, (specifically for something like the U2/X-16) it was less a worry that the Soviets could TRACK them but that they would not be able to engage them by means of a radar guided system. That should have been corrected by those who knew better but it wasn't for some reason.

Randy
 
Radar needed power but the Americans soon discovered that the existing Russian radars of the 1950s offered thorough coverage. They were able to identify their operating frequencies. It is puzzling that anyone "thought" otherwise. On the other hand, this would be secret, compartmentalized information. During World War II, radar operated at 9-10 centimeters. Could you explain "processing power"? The Germans had radar-AAA linked systems during the war.
 
My point is this: Powers survived. The U-2 was quite fragile. Even a near miss by a missile would have caused the aircraft to break up. It did not. I'm sure the Russians enjoyed examining the camera.

He didn't glide it down and the pictures show significant damage to the aft section of the aircraft which was likely where it took most of the damage. Keep very much in mind that 99% of all aircraft "kills" by a missile are NOT a direct hit but damage by shrapnel fragments which is what killed Power's U2. According to both Powers and Soviet records the missile warhead in fact exploded beneath the U2 with the "jolt" Powers felt being the blast wave not a direct impact. He did however lose the engine entirely and his controls to the tail then failed to respond and he began to lose control of the aircraft and realized he could not recover so he bailed out.

Everyone considered the U2 to be a 'fragile' aircraft compared to say a standard fighter of the day but Kelly Johnson and Lockheed had both briefed the users that while the aircraft was going to operated at the very edge of it's envelope and could easly lose control it was also a pretty robust design that could be recovered with proper handling. It could also take some pretty significant damge and still fly as long as that damge was limited to the more robust sections of the aircraft. For example wing damage was fatal but damage to the fuselage or engine were survivable. The missile damage as noted was to the aft fuselage and engine which was the most robust part of the aircraft, had the damage been done to either wing in a similar manner it would have been likely the wing would have collapsed and/or broken off causing the aircrat to fall out of control and likely break up before Powers could escape.

The Soviets didn't get a look at either the camera or film as far as I know since the destruct charges operated as designed which is what finally finished off the falling U2 before it hit the ground. When Powers bailed out the U2 was said to have been nosing down and begining what was assumed to be a fatal side-slip which was expected to devolve into a tumble and spin combination which would destroy the aircraft but it seems to have stablized once Powers was out into a turning descent.

The Soviets had captured German radars as well. Although attempts were made to reduce the RCS of the U-2, they were not successful. The technical people knew this but President Eisenhower was kept in the dark and lied to. Could the U-2 be tracked? he asked. The answer he got was not truthful. The CIA had operational control. The US had bounced a radar signal off the moon in 1946. That was how they could determine the operating frequencies of Soviet radars like Tall King. I read an account of an agent in Eastern Europe during the early days of U-2 operations. They were monitoring Soviet military radio frequencies. "I could hear the Russians talking about spotting an aircraft but they were surprised by its altitude. Of course, I could tell no one what it was."

Well to be honest he was told what everyone knew lumped in with informed guess' on capability which as I noted above assumed that the U2 could exploit known gaps in the Soviet radar coverage. While the radars the Soviets had could likely 'see' the U2 the assumption was that the computing power and resolution was judged to be inferior to western capablity so while the thinking was they couldn't 'track' the U2 if it stayed mostly outside of the known radar coverage areas. The agent probably told his superiors but at first it wouldn't have been belived since everyone "knew" the Soviets weren't that advanced but by 1960 it was operationally clear that they COULD easily track the U2 over the whole flight, but the evidence suggested they could not actually intercept them due to their operations altitude.

NATO assests and Soviet records clearly show that there was a large effort to attack and destroy the U2 over the flight but it was only when Powers had to descend to a lower flight level that it was successful. Oddly enough the U2 flight before Powers, (the name and link I had to the incident are currently missing from my mind and computer) had a similar issue which caused the pilot to descend into possible attack range but was resolved and the U2 climbed back out of effective range before it could be fired up. (I recall the pilot was actaully British on that one which would have been an "interesting" event to say the least :) )

As for bouncing signals off the Moon, while that gives you thing like frequency and nominal power of the beam the one thing it does not give you, (and frankly you can only get it for SURE by examining the equipment) is the resolution and actual tracking and engagment range. So while you can be 'painted' by radar at great range the only indicator of it being a threat or actually being able to 'track' you is if the pulse rate changes to higher frequency and since one way to 'spoof' ElInt gathering is to switch to high PRF's even if you're not actually tracking the target with any accuracy or NOT do so when the target is actually in range.

Randy
 
I have been reading with some interest the discussions here in this thread. I am going to add my own 2 cents.

a)--RE Ed West's contention that the U-2 may have crash landed. There is an article that appeared in the July 1983 issue of Air Power magazine. An article in there, titled "High Flight" by Orin Humphries, does explore this notion. Apparently a photo or two of the Powers wreckage appeared in Aviation Week. At least one photo (with the caption hidden) was shown to a Pratt & Whitney tech rep. The rep was asked what happened to the bird. "It looks like it was in an airplane that bounced along the ground, like the airplane crash landed." When asked whether the engine could have been of a plane that fell out of the sky and had gone into a flat spin, the rep said "No, the whole thing would have split apart. The casing would split at the seams." Then the rep was shown the actual caption of the photo. "Well, don't use my name." But the rep was asked again if he stood by his assessment. "Yep, that's what it looks like."

b)--According to the US State Dept. Office of the Historian, apparently the US lost a plane over the Soviet Union in 1959. I am not aware of this. Can anyone expound? URL link:


c)--I have read in several places (but I can't currently provide the references) that the photography that was shown by the Soviets and claimed was from Gary Powers' U-2 reconnaissance cache was actually true. Perhaps someone else can track those sources down.
 
My point is this: Powers survived. The U-2 was quite fragile. Even a near miss by a missile would have caused the aircraft to break up. It did not. I'm sure the Russians enjoyed examining the camera.

He didn't glide it down and the pictures show significant damage to the aft section of the aircraft which was likely where it took most of the damage. Keep very much in mind that 99% of all aircraft "kills" by a missile are NOT a direct hit but damage by shrapnel fragments which is what killed Power's U2. According to both Powers and Soviet records the missile warhead in fact exploded beneath the U2 with the "jolt" Powers felt being the blast wave not a direct impact. He did however lose the engine entirely and his controls to the tail then failed to respond and he began to lose control of the aircraft and realized he could not recover so he bailed out.

Everyone considered the U2 to be a 'fragile' aircraft compared to say a standard fighter of the day but Kelly Johnson and Lockheed had both briefed the users that while the aircraft was going to operated at the very edge of it's envelope and could easly lose control it was also a pretty robust design that could be recovered with proper handling. It could also take some pretty significant damge and still fly as long as that damge was limited to the more robust sections of the aircraft. For example wing damage was fatal but damage to the fuselage or engine were survivable. The missile damage as noted was to the aft fuselage and engine which was the most robust part of the aircraft, had the damage been done to either wing in a similar manner it would have been likely the wing would have collapsed and/or broken off causing the aircrat to fall out of control and likely break up before Powers could escape.

The Soviets didn't get a look at either the camera or film as far as I know since the destruct charges operated as designed which is what finally finished off the falling U2 before it hit the ground. When Powers bailed out the U2 was said to have been nosing down and begining what was assumed to be a fatal side-slip which was expected to devolve into a tumble and spin combination which would destroy the aircraft but it seems to have stablized once Powers was out into a turning descent.

The Soviets had captured German radars as well. Although attempts were made to reduce the RCS of the U-2, they were not successful. The technical people knew this but President Eisenhower was kept in the dark and lied to. Could the U-2 be tracked? he asked. The answer he got was not truthful. The CIA had operational control. The US had bounced a radar signal off the moon in 1946. That was how they could determine the operating frequencies of Soviet radars like Tall King. I read an account of an agent in Eastern Europe during the early days of U-2 operations. They were monitoring Soviet military radio frequencies. "I could hear the Russians talking about spotting an aircraft but they were surprised by its altitude. Of course, I could tell no one what it was."

Well to be honest he was told what everyone knew lumped in with informed guess' on capability which as I noted above assumed that the U2 could exploit known gaps in the Soviet radar coverage. While the radars the Soviets had could likely 'see' the U2 the assumption was that the computing power and resolution was judged to be inferior to western capablity so while the thinking was they couldn't 'track' the U2 if it stayed mostly outside of the known radar coverage areas. The agent probably told his superiors but at first it wouldn't have been belived since everyone "knew" the Soviets weren't that advanced but by 1960 it was operationally clear that they COULD easily track the U2 over the whole flight, but the evidence suggested they could not actually intercept them due to their operations altitude.

NATO assests and Soviet records clearly show that there was a large effort to attack and destroy the U2 over the flight but it was only when Powers had to descend to a lower flight level that it was successful. Oddly enough the U2 flight before Powers, (the name and link I had to the incident are currently missing from my mind and computer) had a similar issue which caused the pilot to descend into possible attack range but was resolved and the U2 climbed back out of effective range before it could be fired up. (I recall the pilot was actaully British on that one which would have been an "interesting" event to say the least :) )

As for bouncing signals off the Moon, while that gives you thing like frequency and nominal power of the beam the one thing it does not give you, (and frankly you can only get it for SURE by examining the equipment) is the resolution and actual tracking and engagment range. So while you can be 'painted' by radar at great range the only indicator of it being a threat or actually being able to 'track' you is if the pulse rate changes to higher frequency and since one way to 'spoof' ElInt gathering is to switch to high PRF's even if you're not actually tracking the target with any accuracy or NOT do so when the target is actually in range.

Randy


With all due respect, you think I know none of this? I've been studying the open literature for decades. And recent works have filled in a lot of formerly classified blanks.
 
Radar needed power but the Americans soon discovered that the existing Russian radars of the 1950s offered thorough coverage. They were able to identify their operating frequencies. It is puzzling that anyone "thought" otherwise. On the other hand, this would be secret, compartmentalized information. During World War II, radar operated at 9-10 centimeters. Could you explain "processing power"? The Germans had radar-AAA linked systems during the war.

Well no the American's had found early on that there were 'gaps' in the coverage where they could penetrate the overall coverage. They also found that the Russian's had a systematic schedule where they would shut down sections for various reasons. The main idea was that while the Russians might be able to "see" the U2 it was thought they could not so easily 'track' it over long distances due to power requirments and the aforementioned 'gaps' in overall coverage.

Let me go into a bit of detail over the gaps because this is kind of iimportant. While both the Soviets and US had by the late 50s a theoretical 'wall' of radar coverage the various radars and instillations were a mixed bunch and quite often didn't complement or even integrate with each other. For example the American DEW line had radars that could 'see' very far but they couldn't reliable track low-angle (altitude) targets and at maximum range the computers and electronics used to process and 'read' the signal returns, (the "processing power" I mentioned) could often be confused by clutter and false returns generated within the system itself. As an example of this in one case a flock of Canadian Geese flying past a Pine Tree line radar was flagged by the system as a squadron of supersonic contacts flying high over the Arctic Circle, and then a possible subsonic single large air target less than 100 miles away.

"Processing power" is very important in radar tracking and targeting because in each case you need to do more than illuminate, (get radar returns) off the target. In early AAA applications you only needed enough power to read the radar returns from a 'hard' locked target for altitude and speed so that the AAA system could compute a simple intercept for the shells or unguided rockets fired. Early tracking radar simply told you there was "something" in "that" direction, at aproximatly "this" altitude and distance. In most WWII systems you had to be a good operator with a lot of experiance to translate what the signal, (which was usually just a vertical 'line' on the screen) might really be. Was it a single large aircraft? Several smaller ones? Was the range reducing, (signal return getting stronger, ie the line getting higher) or opening? Is the target coming straight on or angling away from you? (Was the line moving right or left of the center-line)

By the late 40s this data was being fed into both mechancal and early electronic computers where the 'data' was refined and translated into more human friendly terms. This would then be passed on to a central point where the output would be plotted on a map and assets assigned to deal with the target. But this data would be passed on by human voice or telegraph and then more human would have to interpret and act upon the data to then alert other humans to actually do something.

By the early 50s advances in electronics have now reduced a lot of this into easier to understand data that can be displayed on cathode ray tube at the actual radar station. Instead of vertical lines you had a 'sweep' which would place a 'dot' where the radar return was showing in close to real time what direction and distance the target was at from the 360 degree rotating radar antena. Most systems used a seperate antenna specifically for finding the altitude of the target showing this at first as a line at 90 degrees from a calibrated "altitude" bar. Again all this data was combined and passed on to a central command center where the informatin would be collected and anylized. Now understand that the further from the radar the signal has to come back from the more chance there is of interfence (both natural and man-made), signal degredation and deflection. So even with an electronic computer helping clean up the data what you end up with is a point where the radar can actually "see" quite a bit further, (it's a radio beam after all) but the returned signal is unable to be effectivly interpreted usefully.

At this point there is another radar system coming into use based on the early AAA radar 'guided' weapons. As I said above the initial systems just used the radar return to provide angle and speed from a fixed point to compute the intercept of a flying object with a ground launched shell or rocket. This was a very simple steady-state radar beam that was quite easy to use but by now more sophisticated weapons systems are coming into use and as you get into actual guided weapons there needs to be two different modes that the radar operates in. The first is logically called "search" mode where the beam and system is simply look to spot the target and this still uses the 'steady' (or in modern terms low pulse frequency) mode. Again as processing power goes up so too does the effective 'range' of the radar even though in theory it has unlimited range due to being a light-speed radio pulse. Now once the "search" mode finds a target the operator can then move to a more active mode which we call "locked" mode where both the pulse rate frequency and power are increased to allow faster positional information updating and a better and more clear 'return' from the target. (And it's this switch from 'search' to 'lock' that allows that wonderful "got tone!" scene in the movies btw :) )

Now if the system is tied into something like an AAA missile system of the earlier "beam-rider" missiles it is at this point the radar seeker of the missile is turned on and directed to aquire the specifica pulse frequency train of the locked radar signal. Once the missle 'aquires' the targeting beam it's launched and follows the radar returns to the target. If the missile has a semi-active or active seeker then it pretty much has its own radar system on-board and uses the locked beam to search and then aquire the target with its own radar system and once its confirmed it has the target it is launched to make its own intercept and the system radar goes looking for another target.

And from here processing power begins to reign supreme in determining what you can do with a radar return signal more than anything else. See while it might seem counterintuatie the truth is that "seeing" an over 1,000km diameter object at at over 340,000km distance is extremely easy. You can do it with powerful enough radar system and pointing the transmitter by litterally "eyeballing-it". Almost as easy to simply spot and track a U2 at 80,000ft, now when we start talking about tracking and targeting that same U2...

It's not that the attack radar can't "see" the U2 because it likely can but for the most part (at the time) it was felt that the processing power in the Russian systems lacked the ability accuratly guide a missile to successful intercept and further it wasn't clear that the missile could reach or manuever at that altitude. Here again Power's flight was likely pretty easy to track and lock onto due to his power failure in flight, further even if he'd known he'd been shot at he couldn't manuever much under the circumstances.

Now to bring it around with a more personal example, the E3 Sentry which was introduced in 1977 has a radar range of between 250 and 400 miles for airborne targets. Does that mean the radar waves stop and turn around at 400 miles? Of course not but due to its onboard processing power it could only resolve and accurate track targets at that range. And it's gotten better over time as upgrades to it's processing power now can resolve Beyond-The-Horizon as well as near and far ground and sea targets. The better processing power of the incoming return signals means that the radar can now be used to accuratly track sea and ground targets whereas previously those were 'lost in the clutter' of the incoming ground returns. Similarly the new upgrades can clean up radar returns from further out AND higher up.

And finally going back to the U2 situation did Eisenhower's advisers "lie" to him when he asked if the Russian's could track the U2? Not activly but likely they chose to interpret his question to what they considered more relevent in that he wanted to know could they shoot one down and that answer was no, not under normal circumstances. And bringing this back even more with the question would the X-16 been "better" than the U2 in this case the answer if very much yes it would have because with an operating engine and assuming the U2 or X-16 had a warning system which is likely then it could have manuevered and quite possibly generated a 'miss' from the missile whereas Power's U2 could not.

Randy
 
Thank you Randy for that detailed response. I am aware of the limitations of ground to air missiles of the period. I am also aware of the limitations of radars during the 1950s in North America. The United States had to reactivate its civilian ground observers program, as did Canada. I have read about a number of false alarms but the system in place called for rapid reporting if anything was spotted. So aside from radar issues, there was human error by civilians. Aerial reconnaissance was given high priority as well.

Back to the U-2, I am aware of how difficult it was to fly, much less to maneuver, but the incident was distorted. There were elements in the US intelligence community that did not want to see a peace conference. In 1959, the ICBMs were being deployed and better to prepare for war. There's money in that. As opposed to peace - "There's no money in peace."

The X-16 was a beautiful and functional aircraft but the decision had to be made and it's now a 'what if.'
 
I kinda wondering where the idea that being 'high' avoided radar came from.

The radar range equation. Still works, too.

Yep know it quite well and how it applies and they were still wrong on the capability to track a high flying object versus what radar engineers knew to be true :) With the equipment at the time you litterally could NOT fly high enough to NOT be tracked by radar. Possibly it came from assuming late 40s radar systems not much advanced since the middile of WWII but it was well known the Soviet systems were far closer to Western systems than that.

With all due respect, you think I know none of this? I've been studying the open literature for decades. And recent works have filled in a lot of formerly classified blanks.

Sorry no disrepect meant or intended but I wanted to be clear on what we knew and how. Your noting he 'glided into a crash landing' has been coming up a lot in some places recently and been refuted by most sources so I wasn't sure you'd seen the other data. Powers bailed out prior to landing and at high altitude sustaining injuries consistint with his stated issues with his oxygen hose and tumbling before he could stablize his fall. The U2 had evidence of missile damge but it wasn't sufficient to destroy the aircraft so it was clear it wasn't a direct hit but a 'near-miss' and the aircraft didn't 'land' intact and the camera and fllm compartments were destroyed with evidence that the scuttling charges had been blown. This alone would have broken up the fuselage in flight so the condition of the fuselage indicates the charges went off automatically at low altitude which was they were set to do.

Further the arguments over where (altitude) the shoot-down took place have been coming up. (And getting rather heated in some cases due to certain TBO fans :) ) While the SA-2 could in theory have hit Powers aircraft at altitiude (80,000ft) it was unlikley due to the missile being ballistic at that point and difficult to manuver.

Thank you Randy for that detailed response. I am aware of the limitations of ground to air missiles of the period. I am also aware of the limitations of radars during the 1950s in North America. The United States had to reactivate its civilian ground observers program, as did Canada. I have read about a number of false alarms but the system in place called for rapid reporting if anything was spotted. So aside from radar issues, there was human error by civilians. Aerial reconnaissance was given high priority as well.

People in general tend to, (for some reason :) ) assume that "radar detection" has pretty much been the same since the start when it was no where near either as accurate or as reliable as it currenlty is even a full decade after it was deployed in general. Having worked them for a while, (and having the unique experiance of having taken my training with Dutch Senior NCO with over 20 years in ground radar experiance which meant he would NOT let our instructor "dumb-down" anything :) ) I love talking about the systems capabilites, limitations, and history. Having seen someone operate a P-61 and F-94 radar set to 'target' a moving object I'm amazed they managed to find anything let alone acutally hit it? Genie makes SO much more sense now :)

Back to the U-2, I am aware of how difficult it was to fly, much less to maneuver, but the incident was distorted.

Oh very much so and for a lot of reasons both good and bad. The fact that it is STILL being done is annoying to say the least :p

There were elements in the US intelligence community that did not want to see a peace conference. In 1959, the ICBMs were being deployed and better to prepare for war. There's money in that. As opposed to peace - "There's no money in peace."

Eh, it's more complicated than that really and there was almost no chance that the defensive spending drive was going to dry up that much in any case. Yes Ike wanted a more balanced budget and lower defense spending but he already had that in the works. Evidence suggests it was the Russian's more than anyone in the US that wanted to scuttle the Paris conference which is why they were being hyper-aggressive over the U2 flights. Since they had started shortly after the Soviets had rejected Eisenhower's "Open Skies" program, (and to be honest even Ike was sure that they would not agree and probably would have back-peddled if they had) in 1955 such overflights were in fact the only effective way to gain information from inside the USSR until spy satellites came along. And the Soviets wanted a hard reason to shove in Eisenhower's face to get him to officially and publicly stop them and were willing to do whatever it took.

On the other hand they'd alreay shot themselves in the foot on the subject with Sputnik in 1957 as it could no longer be argued that 'air-space' extended past the astmosphere in any legal or supportable basis so they were even more determined to stop the over-flights by any means neccessary.

Soveringty issues aside the main point of contention was the simple fact the Soviet's could not 'recipricate' by overflying the US and being surrounded by "enimies" was far to familar a feeling to the Russians and they understandably didn't like it at all. And here let me point out that when you consider that it was fairly "routine" for British pilots in reconnaissance Canberra's to overfly downtown Moscow in broad daylight in the early 50s I can really understand why they were a bit salty about the whole issue :)

The X-16 was a beautiful and functional aircraft but the decision had to be made and it's now a 'what if.'

Yes it is and oddly enough the aircraft that was actually deployed (RB-57D https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_RB-57D_Canberra) was actually in some ways less capable but likely more 'near-term'.

Randy
 
My (hopefully) last post about the U-2 incident. Allen Dulles testified at a closed door session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U-2 had not been shot down. That statement can be found on page 287 of the Report of the Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee, volume 12. The Russians did no foot shooting with Sputnik. Like their first atom bomb test which was estimated to occur in the early 1950s, the Russians spurred the US to accelerate the development of similar satellites. Also see Spyflights and Overflights: US Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance 1945-1960 by Robert Hopkins III.
 
My (hopefully) last post about the U-2 incident.

Really? I though we were having fun :)

Allen Dulles testified at a closed door session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U-2 had not been shot down. That statement can be found on page 287 of the Report of the Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee, volume 12.

Yes he did and at the time that was the thinking because it was assumed the plane had been at operating altitude and therefore above the missiles powered intercept atltitude. He suggested that it was a mechanical malfunction or sabatoge that had brough the plane down and that the Russian's had taken the opprtunity to claim to have shot the plane down. And in fact that's what he told the President and maintained had happened. He in fact later insisted that it had to be sabatoge of the plane that had brought it down. He was wrong.

The Soviets provided documentation of the actual flight of the U2 which showed a drop in altitude and the radar data from the shoot down which clearly shows the missile merging with the U2 track at speed and altitude. The damage to the aircraft was consistant with damage from, (and the Soviets displayed pieces of shrapnel recovered from the fuselage) a nearby explosion of an anti-aircraft warhead and subsequent uncontrolled crash. This has all been confirmed from Russian/Soviet archive material. Dulles was wrong.

[quoteThe Russians did no foot shooting with Sputnik.[/quote]

Sputnik (the subject of satellites specifically) was on both sides minds due to the nature of obital flight. Because a nation could not legally or actually physically prevent or forbid over-flights by orbiting satellites it became much more important to prove that you COULD activily defend your national air-space below that. It was serioulsy being considered, (and discussed the diplomatic level) that like a satellite an aircraft that could not be engaged ground or air based defensive systems should be legall allowed to overfly a nations airspace BECAUSE it could not be engaged. Now mind you no one was taking this really seriously as a talking point but it was being discussed. So the Soviets were particularly eager to show they COULD and WOULD engage such overflights.

Like their first atom bomb test which was estimated to occur in the early 1950s,

1949, and know when, where and how big a blast to the letter. The US and allies had detected and recorded it.

the Russians spurred the US to accelerate the development of similar satellites.

No "proof" of course but it seems likely Eisenhower had aimed for the Soviets to loft a satellite first to give them no room to argue orbital overflights. As it was he was woefully unprepared for the public and political reaction to the deed. The US spy satellite effort was already well underway by the time Sputnik went up, our major problem was we didn't have an adequate launch vehicle to use and frankly wouldn't have for several more years which kept the burden of intelligence gather on aircraft. The other major problem was that the Air Force, (which was publically and in its mind "in charge" of the effort) was both inconsistant in what it wanted for a spy satellite and incredibly resistant to suggestions and advice from either industrial or other military sources on satellite design. Meanwhile the US intelligince community which were actually working on actual spy satellites was busy building them. They just needed the Air Force to get over itself enough to provide the launchers :)

Hence "Discovery" flies while "SAMOS" is cancled... eventually. The Soviets meanwhile had their own problmes but at least they didn't have THAT one :)

Also see Spyflights and Overflights: US Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance 1945-1960 by Robert Hopkins III.

I'll check it out, thanks.

Randy
 
Your reading of history diverges from mine. I trust my sources for accuracy. There was infighting among the services. Von Braun thought he could move things along a bit faster but the fight over who could do what or build what got in the way. Politics is a waste of time when national security is on the line. It is clear from my reading of the record that Presidents come and go but the OSS/CIA is forever. I suggest you look into that. Throughout the 1950s, the CIA supervised all of the latest developments. They had to. They were Top Secret. And who knows better? The spooks or any administration?

Your comments about Eisenhower appear unsupported. Reconnaissance was the key issue. If we knew what the Russians were up to in key areas, then we wouldn't build too many bombers or deploy too many missiles or build too many fighters. And I know when the Russians tested their first atom bomb. The estimate before 1949 was sometime in the early 1950s.
 
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Yep know it quite well and how it applies and they were still wrong on the capability to track a high flying object versus what radar engineers knew to be true :) With the equipment at the time you litterally could NOT fly high enough to NOT be tracked by radar. Possibly it came from assuming late 40s radar systems not much advanced since the middile of WWII but it was well known the Soviet systems were far closer to Western systems than that.

At the time the best information available about the threats indicated that specific types of radar would be used in specific ways. Not until the U-2 was flying were those assumptions shown to be invalid, prompting the development of the A-12. This also resulted in a coordinated intelligence program to measure those threat systems (PALLADIUM).

The higher an aircraft flies the further it is from the radar. An object CAN fly high enough to avoid detection and tracking. Some radars also look "out" rather than up. A high flying object may only spend a brief period within radar coverage at the extremes of its range.
 

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