Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis (Mitchell Institute paper)

[joshjosh]

The Mitchell Institute finally published their paper on USAF readiness, capacity, and capability.

Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis

Arlington, VA | September 5, 2025 — The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies is pleased to announce a new entry...

www.mitchellaerospacepower.org

They have released a number of articles and podcasts in recent weeks and months in relation to this paper:

Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis

The Air Force faces a readiness and capacity crisis. The Mitchell Institute and Gen. Mark D. Kelly, USAF (Ret.) discuss how the Air Force and Congress can rebuild the service to confront today

www.mitchellaerospacepower.org

Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis | The Mitchell Institute’s Aerospace Nation Podcast

The Air Force’s commitment to generating a highly lethal force that is technologically superior, numerically sufficient, and flown by the most well-trained airmen in the world is the bedrock of deterring aggression in times of peace and prevailing in war. However, today’s United States Air Force...

aerospacenation.podbean.com

Want to Prevail Against China? It’s Time to Reinvest in Air Force Capacity, Capabilities, and Readiness

America’s ability to secure its interests demands a robust Air Force. The current security environment will tolerate nothing less. The service has traditionally measured its prowess via capacity, capabilities, and its readiness. The Air Force currently lags in each of these three areas. Lt Gen...

www.mitchellaerospacepower.org

USAF’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis | Air & Space Forces Magazine

Because today’s Air Force is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history, it is becoming unable to simultaneously fight a peer adversary and fend off threats elsewhere around the globe.

www.airandspaceforces.com

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfYwxOo-pmY

Air Force Readiness Crisis: It’s Time for a Reset

Without effective and reliable airpower, no modern combat operation can succeed. Our guests define the scale and scope of the challenge, leading to a robust discussion of solutions.

www.mitchellaerospacepower.org

I'd recommend reading the paper as it provides a good overview of the issues (that's an understatement) the USAF faces in comparison to the PLAAF for a Pacific war, and compares that with the USAF's capabilities versus the Soviets in the latter part of the Cold War.

Here are my notes from the paper:

Findings​

Cold War (1980s)​

Fighters​

• Inventory (active):
  • 732 × F-15 (air superiority)
  • 2,135 × multirole (F-16, A-10, F-4, F-111)
• Combat-coded: ~588 F-15, ~1,847 multirole
• Mission capable rate: ~81%
• Effective CC aircraft: ~482 air superiority + ~1,459 multi-role = ~1,941
• Training/readiness: ~3-4 sorties per week; ~200 hrs/yr per pilot

Bombers​

• Inventory: 263 × B-52; 62 × FB-111
• Average age: 21 years
• Aggregate MC rate: 77%
• Available for long-range strike (after nuclear alert sequestration + MC rates):
  • 145 × B-52
  • 30 × FB-111
    = 175 bombers available

ISR (air-breathing)​

• Inventory: 54 × RF-4; 22 × U-2; 21 × SR-71; 34 × E-3; ~25 × RC-135 (+153 RF-4 in ANG)
• Average MC rates:
  • RF-4: 74%
  • U-2: ~>62% (est.)
  • SR-71: (unknown, low ops tempo)
  • E-3: 87%
  • RC-135: ~>79% (est.)
• Effective MC aircraft (approx.): 154 RF-4; 16 U-2; 3 SR-71; 30 E-3; 18 RC-135

Allies (NATO, 1987)​

• Inventory: 1,220 × fighters; 154 × recce; 18 × E-3
• Assumed MC rate: 70% → ~854 fighters, 120 recce jets available
• Training standard: ~200 hrs/yr; frequent live-force package exercises

Sortie Generation (Cold War vs Soviets)​

• US & NATO day-one potential:
  • Fighters: up to ~11,442 sorties/day (after reinforcements)
  • Bombers: up to ~219/day (from UK staging, rising with B-1/B-2)
  • ISR (RF-4 in Europe): ~78/day (before reinforcements)
• Soviet sortie potential:
  • Fighters: ~16,000/day
  • Bombers: ~578/day
• Comparison: USAF/NATO relied on high readiness + quality + forward posture to offset Soviet mass

​

Present Day​

US Fighters​

• Inventory (total): 2,026 fighters (↓ from 4,253 in 1987) (not all would be available for the Pacific)
• Combat-coded (CC): ~750
• Stealth share: ~28%
• Average age: 26 years
• Average MC rate: 59%
• Effective CC fighters (MC-adjusted): ~410
• Force structure: 31 active CC squadrons; 55 total including ARC
• Training: ~1.2 sorties/week; ~9 hrs/month (Q1 2023)

Bombers​

• Inventory (total): 140 (↓ from 393 in 1987)
• Average age: 46 years
• Stealth share: 14%
• MC rates: B-1: 47%; B-52: 54%; B-2: 56%
• Effective bombers (MC-adjusted, conventional tasking): ~51 total

ISR​

• Inventory (long-range ISR): 22 × RC-135; 16 × E-3G; 9 × RQ-4; 27 × U-2; ~10 × RQ-170
• MQ-9: 292 combat-coded
• MC rates: RC-135: 79%; E-3G: 56%; RQ-4: 65%; U-2: 62%; MQ-9: 86%; RQ-170: est. 50%
• My note: RQ-180 (stealth ISR) not mentioned in paper
• My note: MQ-9 is highly vulnerable; recent Houthi ops suggest it would be quickly attritted in PLA conflict.

Allies (Indo-Pacific, today)​

• Inventory: 1,221 combat-coded fighters (Australia, Japan, ROK, Taiwan, India)
• Hold-back for homeland defense: ~50%
• Usable for ATO (after range/weapons filters): ~114 jets
• MC rate (assumed): ~70% → ~80 available
• Sortie potential (day one): ~399 sorties
• Critical limit: munition ("long range missiles" referring to AMRAAM, cruise missiles, etc.") stocks would be expended day one

Sortie Generation (US + Allies vs PLA, today)​

• From second island chain:
  • Fighters: ~617/day (with reinforcements)
  • Bombers: ~77-102/day
  • ISR: ~27 long-range + ~181 MQ-9/day
    = ~825 total sorties/day (best case)
• From first island chain:
  • Fighters: ~1,543/day
  • Bombers: same limit as above (~77-102/day)
  • ISR: same as above
    = ~1,750+ sorties/day (higher, but under PLA missile threat)

PLA Today​

Fighters​

• Inventory: ~2,225 (1,311 × 4th-gen; 320 × 5th-gen)
• Production rate: ~120 J-20s/yr (≈3× USAF’s 5th-gen buys) ~144 4th-gen (note: I'm not sure how accurate this is)
• MC-adjusted availability: ~799/day

Bombers​

• Inventory: ~197 H-6 (12 nuclear-capable sequestered)
• MC-adjusted availability: ~130/day
• Capability: land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles

Readiness​

• Pilot training: ~200 hrs/yr; 3–4 sorties/week (now exceeds USAF rates)
• Sortie generation advantage: short distances (150 NM to Taiwan); internal LOCs; ~5 sorties/day feasible

Sortie Generation (PLA vs US/allies, today)​

• PLA daily potential:
  • Fighters: ~3,997/day
  • Bombers: ~648/day
    = ~4,645/day
• US + Allies daily potential (first island chain): ~1,750/day
• US + Allies daily potential (second island chain): ~825/day
• Ratio: PLA can generate ~3–5× more sorties than combined US/allies.

​

Recommendations​

1. Face the reality.
   • Admit the USAF lacks the fighters, bombers, and readiness needed for peer war
   • Tie force sizing to national defense strategy, not budgets
2. Grow the force.
   • Stop “divest to invest.” Keep serviceable aircraft until replacements arrive.
   • Increase buys:
     • F-35: ramp to 72/year (target ~1,250 total).
     • B-21: ramp to 21/year (target ~300 total). (note: no justification is provided for this procurement target of 300)
     • F-15EX: 24/year.
   • Protect critical programs: E-7, CCA, EA-37B, MQ-9 (with attrition backfill).
3. Fix readiness.
   • Fund spares + flying hours fully.
   • Raise pilot training to 3 sorties/week, 200 hrs/year (vs ~1 sortie/week now).
   • Restore independent inspections (ORIs) to test deploy-and-fight capability.
4. Balance the budget.
   • Shift $6-9B/yr from long-horizon R&D into procurement and sustainment.
   • Keep funding for near-to-mid term systems (F-35 Block 4, B-21, Sentinel, etc.) until operational.
   • $30B in additional funding needed in total, starting in FY30 (ramp up gradually towards that). This is after moving some funds from RDT&E to procurement and O&M. This $30B might have to be taken from the Army. Excludes Sentinel efforts.