Winning the Next War: Overcoming the U.S. Air Force’s Capacity, Capability, and Readiness Crisis (Mitchell Institute paper)

[joshjosh]

The Mitchell Institute finally published their paper on USAF readiness, capacity, and capability.

https://www.mitchellaerospacepower....ces-capacity-capability-and-readiness-crisis/
They have released a number of articles and podcasts in recent weeks and months in relation to this paper:
https://www.mitchellaerospacepower....ces-capacity-capability-and-readiness-crisis/https://aerospacenation.podbean.com...e-s-capacity-capability-and-readiness-crisis/https://www.mitchellaerospacepower....ir-force-capacity-capabilities-and-readiness/https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/usafs-capacity-capability-and-readiness-crisis/

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfYwxOo-pmY

https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/podcast/episode-218-air-force-readiness-crisis/
I'd recommend reading the paper as it provides a good overview of the issues (that's an understatement) the USAF faces in comparison to the PLAAF for a Pacific war, and compares that with the USAF's capabilities versus the Soviets in the latter part of the Cold War.

Here are my notes from the paper:

Findings​

Cold War (1980s)​

Fighters​

• Inventory (active):
  • 732 × F-15 (air superiority)
  • 2,135 × multirole (F-16, A-10, F-4, F-111)
• Combat-coded: ~588 F-15, ~1,847 multirole
• Mission capable rate: ~81%
• Effective CC aircraft: ~482 air superiority + ~1,459 multi-role = ~1,941
• Training/readiness: ~3-4 sorties per week; ~200 hrs/yr per pilot

Bombers​

• Inventory: 263 × B-52; 62 × FB-111
• Average age: 21 years
• Aggregate MC rate: 77%
• Available for long-range strike (after nuclear alert sequestration + MC rates):
  • 145 × B-52
  • 30 × FB-111
    = 175 bombers available

ISR (air-breathing)​

• Inventory: 54 × RF-4; 22 × U-2; 21 × SR-71; 34 × E-3; ~25 × RC-135 (+153 RF-4 in ANG)
• Average MC rates:
  • RF-4: 74%
  • U-2: ~>62% (est.)
  • SR-71: (unknown, low ops tempo)
  • E-3: 87%
  • RC-135: ~>79% (est.)
• Effective MC aircraft (approx.): 154 RF-4; 16 U-2; 3 SR-71; 30 E-3; 18 RC-135

Allies (NATO, 1987)​

• Inventory: 1,220 × fighters; 154 × recce; 18 × E-3
• Assumed MC rate: 70% → ~854 fighters, 120 recce jets available
• Training standard: ~200 hrs/yr; frequent live-force package exercises

Sortie Generation (Cold War vs Soviets)​

• US & NATO day-one potential:
  • Fighters: up to ~11,442 sorties/day (after reinforcements)
  • Bombers: up to ~219/day (from UK staging, rising with B-1/B-2)
  • ISR (RF-4 in Europe): ~78/day (before reinforcements)
• Soviet sortie potential:
  • Fighters: ~16,000/day
  • Bombers: ~578/day
• Comparison: USAF/NATO relied on high readiness + quality + forward posture to offset Soviet mass

​

Present Day​

US Fighters​

• Inventory (total): 2,026 fighters (↓ from 4,253 in 1987) (not all would be available for the Pacific)
• Combat-coded (CC): ~750
• Stealth share: ~28%
• Average age: 26 years
• Average MC rate: 59%
• Effective CC fighters (MC-adjusted): ~410
• Force structure: 31 active CC squadrons; 55 total including ARC
• Training: ~1.2 sorties/week; ~9 hrs/month (Q1 2023)

Bombers​

• Inventory (total): 140 (↓ from 393 in 1987)
• Average age: 46 years
• Stealth share: 14%
• MC rates: B-1: 47%; B-52: 54%; B-2: 56%
• Effective bombers (MC-adjusted, conventional tasking): ~51 total

ISR​

• Inventory (long-range ISR): 22 × RC-135; 16 × E-3G; 9 × RQ-4; 27 × U-2; ~10 × RQ-170
• MQ-9: 292 combat-coded
• MC rates: RC-135: 79%; E-3G: 56%; RQ-4: 65%; U-2: 62%; MQ-9: 86%; RQ-170: est. 50%
• My note: RQ-180 (stealth ISR) not mentioned in paper
• My note: MQ-9 is highly vulnerable; recent Houthi ops suggest it would be quickly attritted in PLA conflict.

Allies (Indo-Pacific, today)​

• Inventory: 1,221 combat-coded fighters (Australia, Japan, ROK, Taiwan, India)
• Hold-back for homeland defense: ~50%
• Usable for ATO (after range/weapons filters): ~114 jets
• MC rate (assumed): ~70% → ~80 available
• Sortie potential (day one): ~399 sorties
• Critical limit: munition ("long range missiles" referring to AMRAAM, cruise missiles, etc.") stocks would be expended day one

Sortie Generation (US + Allies vs PLA, today)​

• From second island chain:
  • Fighters: ~617/day (with reinforcements)
  • Bombers: ~77-102/day
  • ISR: ~27 long-range + ~181 MQ-9/day
    = ~825 total sorties/day (best case)
• From first island chain:
  • Fighters: ~1,543/day
  • Bombers: same limit as above (~77-102/day)
  • ISR: same as above
    = ~1,750+ sorties/day (higher, but under PLA missile threat)

PLA Today​

Fighters​

• Inventory: ~2,225 (1,311 × 4th-gen; 320 × 5th-gen)
• Production rate: ~120 J-20s/yr (≈3× USAF’s 5th-gen buys) ~144 4th-gen (note: I'm not sure how accurate this is)
• MC-adjusted availability: ~799/day

Bombers​

• Inventory: ~197 H-6 (12 nuclear-capable sequestered)
• MC-adjusted availability: ~130/day
• Capability: land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles

Readiness​

• Pilot training: ~200 hrs/yr; 3–4 sorties/week (now exceeds USAF rates)
• Sortie generation advantage: short distances (150 NM to Taiwan); internal LOCs; ~5 sorties/day feasible

Sortie Generation (PLA vs US/allies, today)​

• PLA daily potential:
  • Fighters: ~3,997/day
  • Bombers: ~648/day
    = ~4,645/day
• US + Allies daily potential (first island chain): ~1,750/day
• US + Allies daily potential (second island chain): ~825/day
• Ratio: PLA can generate ~3–5× more sorties than combined US/allies.

​

Recommendations​

1. Face the reality.
   • Admit the USAF lacks the fighters, bombers, and readiness needed for peer war
   • Tie force sizing to national defense strategy, not budgets
2. Grow the force.
   • Stop “divest to invest.” Keep serviceable aircraft until replacements arrive.
   • Increase buys:
     • F-35: ramp to 72/year (target ~1,250 total).
     • B-21: ramp to 21/year (target ~300 total). (note: no justification is provided for this procurement target of 300)
     • F-15EX: 24/year.
   • Protect critical programs: E-7, CCA, EA-37B, MQ-9 (with attrition backfill).
3. Fix readiness.
   • Fund spares + flying hours fully.
   • Raise pilot training to 3 sorties/week, 200 hrs/year (vs ~1 sortie/week now).
   • Restore independent inspections (ORIs) to test deploy-and-fight capability.
4. Balance the budget.
   • Shift $6-9B/yr from long-horizon R&D into procurement and sustainment.
   • Keep funding for near-to-mid term systems (F-35 Block 4, B-21, Sentinel, etc.) until operational.
   • $30B in additional funding needed in total, starting in FY30 (ramp up gradually towards that). This is after moving some funds from RDT&E to procurement and O&M. This $30B might have to be taken from the Army. Excludes Sentinel efforts.