https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Lombardo
Lombardo’s Puerto Belgrano
team sent their final invasion
proposal to the junta on
February 15. The assault would
be three-pronged: one unit
heading for the British marine
barracks and another for the
town and radio station. A third,
under
Gilobert, would earlier have
staged an emergency landing
with a group of airforce staff
and have calmly checked into
the Upland Goose hotel.
On D-day, they would make
their way to the airport and
greet troops landing later by-
Hercules transport. Most of the
invasion force would be removed in a matter of hours,
with the army providing a
small garrison pending negotiations with the British.
The plan suggested a D-day
of July 9, Argentina’s independence day, to the delight of the
anniversary-minded junta. May 15 was the earliest offered,
giving the three transports a
month for rest and recondition
ing after their tour ended in
April. Either way, the invasion
force would require 15 days’
notice to go.
In response to the perceived British abandonment of their claims to the Falklands and
South Georgia, the Argentinean junta initiated planning for two operations to occupy, and if
necessary, seize control of those islands. Project Alpha focused on “the clandestine establishment
of an Argentinean presence on South Georgia” while Operation Azul centered upon the overt
“full-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands.”
However, these two planning efforts—developed
in isolation—lacked the required coordination to ensure either complementary or reinforcing
effects from each operation. Operation Azul based its operating concept on the departure of the
Endurance from the South Atlantic in May 1982 and the arrival of a new 30-man Royal Marine
detachment at Port Stanley. Additionally, Operation Azul’s initial invasion date of 9 July 1982 set
it during the middle of the southern winter season, when weather conditions would constrain
large-scale naval movements and military operations.
Working Commission and Joint Staff
On January 5th, 1982, after a meeting to designate governors, the Military Junta decided,
by mutual agreement, to initiate planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands in ut-
most secrecy, since it was based on the scenario that the operation would only be feasible
if the United Kingdom did not increase its military strength. The involvement of the Joint
Staff and the Armed Forces Staffs was primarily ruled out. Instead, a Working Commis-
sion was set up with deeply trusted personnel: Vicealmirante Juan J. Lombardo, General
de División Osvaldo J. García and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl.
When the joint Working Commission met on January 15th to plan the Malvinas recap-
ture, planning only existed for the Chilean scenario. Each Force appointed their
respective Commission assistants: the operation Commanders representing the Navy
—Contraalmirante Walter Allara, Commander of the Naval Fleet; Contraalmirante Carlos
García Boll, Commander of the Naval Aviation; and, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser,
Commander of the Marine Infantry—, General de Brigada Julio Ruiz, representing the
Army; and Comodoro Knud Erik Andreasen, representing the Air Force.
In the notes sent to the commanders drafting the Outline Plan called «for Recapturing the
Malvinas Islands,» Brigadier Lami Dozo requested the preparation of a National Strategic
Directive (DENAC 1/82), a document that must be drawn up for each conflict hypothesis.
A Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) is then developed based on the DENAC, and it is
completed with the necessary military plans.
The COMIL briefing indicated that the operation should be unexpected and bloodless,
since the sole purpose was to negotiate sovereignty from a more favorable position. The
Working Commission met at Puerto Belgrano and would complete the Campaign Outline
Plan, using the one already prepared by the Navy as a reference and adding the actions to
be executed by the Army and the Air Force.
The plan considered the only opposing forces would be the ones existing in the Malvinas,
and anticipated the temporary creation of a theater of operations that would encompass
the Malvinas archipelago and the South Georgia Islands. Secondly, it called for the esta-
blishment of a joint command that would exercise operational leadership, as well as a
joint task force (Task Force 40, TF-40) as the higher tactical element that would simulta-
neously conquer the insular objectives. In practice, this implied a coordinated landing of
a helicopter assault force combined with an air assault; the participating ships would be
the ARA Almirante Irízar, ARA Bahía Paraíso, and ARA Bahía Buen Suceso. Finally, it
expressly specified that the operation would not be executed before May 15, 1982, as long
as the element of surprise remained. The plan did not include any military response from
the United Kingdom, nor did it consider a possible subsequent defense of the islands. It is
important to highlight that at no time did the COMIL impose a probable execution date for
the Plan on the members of the Working Commission.
The latter discussed the readiness of assets and personnel training, which was particularly
critical for the Army, as it was in the process of incorporating the 1963-Class conscripts.
An initial deadline of July 9 was set, but it was objected by the Argentine Air Force, which
advised a date later than September, given that most combat aircraft lacked night offensive
capabilities.
After recapturing the islands, an Argentine Army garrison of around 500 men would remain
on the Malvinas. Their aim was not to provide defense against any reconquest attempt, but
rather to maintain local control and collaborate with the government. The Navy and the Air
Force would leave a minimum number of personnel for specific task
Argentina’s War Plan
The sources indicate that the planning for the Argentine operation in the
Falklands/Malvinas began on the December 22, 1981, one day before
Galtieri’s inauguration as president, when Admiral Anaya instructed the
chief of the Navy Staff, Vice-admiral Alberto Gabriel Vigo, to formulate
a detailed plan for the deployment of special forces for reconnaissance,
and information gathering about the necessary number of troops to
occupy Port Stanley with supporting units and with the logistics for its
defense. Although not mentioned a deadline for execution, the instruc-
tion detailed that the Super Étendard and P-2 aircraft preparation should
occur before July 1982. He retransmitted this instruction to Vice-admiral
Juan José Lombardo to proceed with the preparation measures alongside
the ‘Departamento de Material Naval.’ From then on, Lombardo became
the main official in charge of designing the original Argentine plans.
However, Galtieri’s authorization for the beginning of the planning
occurred a week later, on December 29, at the first meeting of the military
cabinet (or junta)—between Galtieri and Anaya, and Brigadier Basilio
Lami Dozo. At this meeting, Galtieri and Anaya mentioned that the 150-
year milestone of the British occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas would
take place in one year and introduced the idea of an Argentine action that
could take place by that date.
Without any unequivocal planning schedule, the junta continued to
meet regularly to discuss the Falklands/Malvinas, among other issues.
Meanwhile, the Navy developed its operational planning alone without
consulting its peers. Remarkably, the Army Staff were not included in
it, although Lombardo complained to Anaya of its importance when he
anticipated that the new conscripts would be unready to deploy before
April.
On January 5th, 1982, the junta agreed that they should proceed with
negotiations round with the UK in New York, between February 27th
and 28th, stressing they would only proceed with the military planning in
the case those negotiations failed.
On January 12th, the junta defined the
Malvinas’ planning group, composed of General Osvaldo Jorge Garcia,
Brigadier Sigfrido Martín Plessl, and Vice-admiral Lombardo. However,
this was not a real joint planning command, since the Army and Air
Force Staffs were not included, and the drafts and plans were classified
as ultra-secret and restricted. Not even the composition and activation of
the group, on January 26th, was documented.
The planning group elaborated on three work plans.
The National Strategic Directive (DENAC 1/82) defined military deployment’s
strategic parameters to solve the Falklands/Malvinas issue. It assumed
that the UK would not react with military operations, that the United
States would remain neutral, and that the operation’s logic would be to
occupy the islands to set negotiations.
The Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL 1/82) had to consider the most favorable circumstances in its
proposal to execute the operation. It proposed July 9th as the date for
the operation’s execution, and the Argentine forces should be instructed,
including of their logistical details, by May 20th. Afterward, this date was changed to May 15th.
Finally, the Campaign Schematic Plan expected
the employment of a considerable amphibious force, without British casualties, to be finished within five days of the commencement of operations.
The Malvinas’ planning group had to present the final operational plans
in mid-March.
Curiously, on January 12th, the same planning group pointed out to
the junta that Operation Alfa should not be executed before the February
negotiations. The operation involved infiltrating a military detachment in
the South Georgia Islands. Versions of this plan had been considered since
Perón’s times. However, initially, Operation Alpha did not aim to create
an international incident, neither its occupation.
Vice-admiral Lombardo was also responsible for updating this oper-
ational plan, before Galtieri’s inauguration and the emergence of the
islands issue in the junta’s meetings, since its execution had been consid-
ered in the South Atlantic summer of 1982. Consequently, when he
also received the task to plan Falklands/Malvinas’ operations, Lombardo
mentioned the incongruence between these two operations to Anaya,
since the first would compromise the second. Anaya gave into Lombardo
and canceled Operation Alpha. Chancellor Costa Mendez and the Argen-
tine ambassador at the UN had access to this operation plan and requested
its cancellation, too. However, seemingly, Anaya secretly proceeded with
the planning, shared only with his right-arm, Vice-Admiral Vigo.
At the junta’s first meeting after the failure of the negotiations
with the British at the end of February, on March 2nd, there was no
definition about the date for Operation Azul, the occupation of the
Falklands/Malvinas, but the date and the procedures for the review
of the Malvinas group’s plan were defined.
On March 16th, the first meeting between the Military Committee and the Malvinas’ planning
group occurred. Therefore, for the first time, the Argentine Joint Staff
was involved aiming to broaden the DEMIL 1/82. At this meeting, they
also decided that would put Operation Alpha on hold, and it would
only be executed alongside Operation Azul, the occupation of the Falk-
lands/Malvinas.
At last, on March 23rd, the military junta determined
that the operation would be executed in the first days of April.
With the developments of the incident in South Georgia, and after
the original Argentine’s dispatch contingent to the Falklands/Malvinas,
on March 26th, the junta and the Malvinas’ planning group conjectured
that the UK could react militarily. They considered two options: either
suspension of the landing or going ahead, considering the possibility of
engagement with casualties. The decision made by Anaya was to deploy
the corvettes Granville and Drumond to the conflict zone. Only on the
night of the same day, Galtieri decided on the deployment.
On April 7th, Galtieri decided on the expansion of the operation
to start in two days. Consequently, the operation was not a resource
of coercive diplomacy anymore and opened the path to war. However,
in addition to the marines’ detachment, they decided by deploying
three mechanized infantry regiments without their armored vehicles and
organic artillery groups, which was not reported to General Menendez,
the senior commander of the operation’s land forces.
The Argentine Strategic Possibilities
Most of the British literature points out that Argentina’s political reasons
to take the Falklands/Malvinas were based on an attempt to give survival
to the military regime, which was in disarray due to economic and
social deterioration conditions. With access to unpublished documents
and interviews with the key figures, recent Argentine academic scholarship
draws a more complex and idiosyncratic narrative.
Archives about the government of General Leopoldo Galtieri show
that a resolution of the Falklands/Malvinas issue was the Navy’s price
to support his ascension to the presidency in place of Roberto Viola.
However, although Galtieri manifested an inclination to deal with it, he,
the Argentine Army, and the Air Force never developed previous plans or
elaborated discussions.
Galtieri had as master plan in his first months as president to neutralize
the Navy’s influence and centralize the military and civil ministries under
his authority. The chronology of the military junta’s meetings allows for
questioning whether Galtieri really would opt for an invasion at some
point, under the influence of the Argentine Navy, and not as a resource
to unite and deceive the military high command. At the same time, he
drove the reorganization of political forces and loyalties both inside and
outside the military government.
The minutes make evident how those meetings dealt with the islands
erratically, with revised schedules at each meeting and no preparatory
measures relating to joint planning. On the one hand, he had much more
energy and urgency in replacing provincial governments with the focus
of reviewing the political loyalties of the armed forces to the presidency,
and he even began to work out the conditions for his candidacy for pres-
ident after a democratic transition. On the other hand, he accelerated
Argentine alignment to the United States to support his regime. Even
by British intelligence, something identified later was that an attempt at
retaking the islands could occur within the first two years of his presi-
dency. However, the crisis came only three months after the transition
of the new military regime and would not have occurred so early were it
not for Anaya’s performance and the incident of South Georgia.
Thus, where the Falklands/Malvinas issue was most pressing was in
the Navy, which had updated operational plans since 1955. Admiral
Jorge Isaac Anaya last accessed these on December 22nd, 1981, just
two months after his promotion to Commander of the Navy. In addi-
tion to a personal obsession with the issue, Anaya justified that the
action in the islands was necessary to win the necessary diplomatic pres-
tige and so providing the foundations for civil-military reconciliation.
By the end of 1981, Anaya and the Navy recognized that the military
regime was unsustainable and needed a transition process. However, this
would not be possible, and without vindictiveness against the military
establishment, without conditions that, in some way, would celebrate
or recover its credibility. It was assumed that a military operation’s
in the Falklands/Malvinas was symbolic and an expected short-term
effect. Therefore, it would be no more than a low-risk and low-cost
demonstration of force with limited gains.
Given the correlation of forces and the military junta’s political goals,
it can be pointed out that there were only two viable courses of action.
The first was creating an international crisis from which Argentina could
withdraw concessions from the UK. In this case, it should avoid any possi-
bility of confrontation with British forces, and the development of the
crisis should be maintained mainly in diplomatic terms. Accordingly, the
military footprint in the islands should be minimal and symbolic. On the
one hand, the positive side of this course of action was keeping military
risks and potential losses to a minimum. On the other hand, the gains
would also be limited and symbolic, as well as the development of this
course would not necessarily be under the military junta’s control. While
the dispute had become an international crisis, with possible involvement
and arbitration of the United Nations and the United States, Argentina
would have to wait and accept sub-optimal gains.
The second course of action would involve proper and detailed military
preparation and a plan of action that involved taking and retaining the
Falklands/Malvinas, with a substantive concentration of naval, air, and
land resources to make the British intervention very costly. As discussed
in the previous section, Argentina had the means to do so, whether the
course of political decisions and logistical preparation had been different.
Below, we propose in detail the viability and operational prerequisites of
both alternatives.
Coercive Diplomacy
From a theoretical point of view, Argentina’s strategic alternative of
compelling the British to resume diplomatic conversations in a more reli-
able way to be more susceptible to their plea would be not a course of
action of limited wars. However, it is considered here given that it was
a viable option and a plausible counterfactual for contrasting the second
strategic option.
The junta’s original plan of action involved three steps:
(1) a new round of bilateral negotiations;
(2) the conduct of the operations in the Falklands/Malvinas and perhaps also in South Georgia;
(3) the return to bilateral negotiations with the UK.
Moreover, the original plan for Operation Azul of January 12th forecasted a military incursion of only five
days.
[The] Military Strategic Directive “(DEMIL) prepared by the junta initially
established an operation limited in time by the withdrawal of Argentine
troops from the Malvinas.
The initial provisions provided that the “D” day would be set for the
second half of May and would end five days later.
This symbolic force would have a composition of 600 men, who
would bring bilateral negotiations through a fait accompli, in which the
British would be indemnified and compensated. It also included the
United States and consultations with the European Common Market and
contacts with socialist bloc countries.
However, the Argentine diplomatic service was isolated from the
junta and the Malvinas’ planning group’s considerations and planning.
Evidence of that was the request by Admiral Anaya for the replacement
of the Argentine Ambassador in the UK by a naval officer, arguing that
this would give better conditions to report the events to his peers.
In this sense, if the junta’s main political goal was to create an inter-
national situation that would confer diplomatic prestige, this coercive
diplomatic action had to conduct a military operation synchronously with
actions by the diplomatic representatives in United Nations, where the
talks about sovereignty and decolonization of the Falklands/Malvinas
Islands were treated since 1965 and resumed in 1982. Diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States had to be considered, especially in a period of
rapprochement with Argentina for its support in counterinsurgency oper-
ations in Central America and a peace operation in Sinai. Thirdly, there
should have been better coordination in the consultations and discussions
with potential supporters and allies in Latin America and the Non-Aligned
Movement Bloc.
This operation of coercive diplomacy had two essential prerequisites.
Firstly, from the beginning, it should have been designed and planned
with the participation of diplomats regularly in the junta’s weekly meet-
ings, from December of 1981, and principally in the Malvinas’ planning
group—formed by Admiral Lombardo, General García, and Brigadier
Plessl—responsible for the detailing of the military operation.
Second, in addition to the logistical considerations of the landing and extraction of
military detachment, the composition, and the operation’s timing had to
be subordinated to a plan of diplomatic movements in Washington, New
York, and London.
Nonetheless, as far as is known, the Argentine foreign service had
only consultative and limited participation in the junta deliberations
and was informal in the case of the Malvinas’ planning group. In the
latter case, the most striking was the erratic assessment of the mili-
tary actions of Operation Alpha on South Georgia by the Argentine
Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, and the chief of the Naval General
Staff, Admiral Lombardo, and the recommendation for its cancellation.
Furthermore, the junta’ s understanding was that the diplomatic negotiations and military actions existed in the absence of, or as a result, of the
other.
There was an evident lack of synchronization between military opera-
tions and diplomatic actions. In the first instance, the Falklands/Malvinas
dispute had never been presented to the Latin American countries and the
Non-Aligned Bloc, which was not even aware of the resumption of nego-
tiations with the United Kingdom since the beginning of 1982. They
were never consulted on the possibility of forming a support group in
the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. In the
same vein, the Argentine representative at the United Nations, Eduardo
Roca, took his position on March 31st, 1982, too late to play any role,
and there are still no records to indicate that he had been charged with
any such task.
Furthermore, because of the gravity of the issue, Costa
Mendez, should have consulted the block of supporter countries directly
and outside of the United Nations and been present at the United
Nations before the military operation. Costa Mendez was present in New
York only on April 3rd: after the invasion order was given. Francis Toase
points out that the Argentine landing in the Falklands took place too
late because, after the US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick’s replacement
as president of the UN Security Council. He was a prominent figure in
the endorsement that US foreign policy should give more support to the
Argentine military regime in exchange for its anti-communist activity in
Latin America. Likewise, Argentina made little use of the support it
enjoyed by the Latin American block within the Organization American
States.
Nevertheless, even considering the actual events, between April 6th
and 27th, Argentina had an international stage at its disposal and the artic-
ulation of the two major Western powers seeking its reconciliation. The
Argentine should have seen the US diplomatic intervention led by State
Secretary Alexander Haig as incredibly positive and should have accepted
some of his proposals, especially the second one.
Haig conceived three proposals.
On April 6th, he proposed the British
task force’s diversion and the Argentine forces’ withdrawn and replace-
ment by a peacekeeping force composed of Canada, the United States,
and two Latin American countries, which would give the conditions
to resume negotiations.
On April 12th, this proposal was updated by
a second suggesting that would serve most of the Argentine interests
since it recommended the suspension of economic sanctions, and that the
United Nations, the United States, the UK, and Argentina would consti-
tute an interim authority to celebrate an agreement. Argentina would
have participated in the island’s administration, controlling the police, and
appointing the governor.
Haig’s third and last proposal was presented on
April 27th and tended to favor the UK, whose task force was ready and
waiting for the command to proceed: either give a demonstration of force
or perform a recovery operation for the islands. According to it, both
belligerent countries and the United States would name representatives
to compose an interim administration, and a definitive way of govern-
ment for the islands would be decided by consulting the local population
and preserving the continuity of the local administration traditions, where
Argentina would be able to name two representatives to compose the
executive council of this administration.
Any scenario accepted by Argentina regarding the first two proposals
would place the UK in an uncomfortable situation and under pressure
from the international community. Regardless of the amount of time and
whether the islands would continue under total Argentine sovereignty or
not, these would be small drawbacks if compared with the international
prestige acquired for defeating, diplomatically and publicly, a great power
and with United States’ endorsement.
---------------
The Argentine Military Junta originally planned to invade
the Falklands on the 15th of September 1982 under the name
Operation Azul (or Operation Blue). This date was chosen for
a number of reasons. September would mean all 14 Super
Etendard aircraft and 14 AM-39 Exocet anti-ship missiles on
order from France would be delivered; the fierce South
Atlantic winter would have passed; their conscript army would
have had another six months of training (as it was many
conscripts deployed to face the professional NATO standard
forces of the British Army after only 45 days of training given
the conscript training cycle begins in February); and finally,
by September, Argentine diplomatic efforts to find a solution
would have been seen by the world to be exhausted – thus
gaining Argentina the moral high ground. The date’s other
significance was to allow an Argentine Governor to be in
power in time for the 150th anniversary of the last Spanish
Governor’s expulsion from the islands by the British.
As an aside, by September the new Super Etendards may
also have been carrier qualified on Argentina’s aircraft carrier,
VEINTECINCO DE MAYO (25th of May); they may have
also been far more proficient in the offensive use of this anti-
ship capability.
However, an incident involving Argentine scrap iron
merchants on the nearby island of South Georgia made the
Argentine’s believe they had to move sooner rather than later.
Operation Azul was changed to Operation Rosario and executed
on 2 April 1982.
Had the Argentines stuck with the original plan
then the outcome of the war may have been very different.
As mentioned Argentina believed that Britain would not
fight for the Falklands. Argentina’s Dictator General Galtieri
was actually reported to have said that he believed an “English
reaction was scarcely possible and totally improbable”. A fact
they still believed in two weeks before the British arrived in
Theatre. Only when one of its 707 transport aircraft found the
RN Task Force south of Ascension Island in the mid-Atlantic
did it really start preparations to defend the islands.
The basis for this Argentine assumption came from a
number of policy decisions taken by the UK Government, the
FCO and the MoD (Ministry of Defence).
With the Empire’s retreat still in progress and the Falklands
costing the British Tax Payer money the UK’s Cabinet Defence
committee decided in 1980 to reach a solution to the
sovereignty dispute with Argentina on the basis of a leaseback
arrangement. This was acceptable to the Argentines but not to
the islanders. The second policy issue regarded the proposed
British Nationality Bill which threatened to exclude Falkland
Islanders from British citizenship.
Added to this display of indifference by London to the
Islanders was the 1981 UK Defence White Paper entitled ‘The
Defence Programme: The Way Forward’, or sometimes referred
to as the Nott Review after the then Minister for Defence Sir
John Nott. The White Paper articulated a refocussing on NATO
defence through nuclear forces and land based airpower, at the
expense of distant British territories and drastic cuts to the
Royal Navy.
The aircraft carrier INVINCIBLE was to be sold
to Australia, the other carrier, HERMES, was to be
decommissioned early. The large landing ships FEARLESS
and INTREPID, ships that would make a long range
expeditionary operation possible, were also to be
decommissioned. Apart from other cuts to the numbers of
destroyers, frigates, support ships and personnel, it was
announced the Ice Patrol and Falklands guard ship
ENDURANCE would be decommissioned.
As one can imagine, had the Argentine’s 15 September
plan occurred the UK would have potentially been without
aircraft carriers, no landing ships with HQ capabilities and no
ship on the spot to provide local knowledge and intelligence.
By that stage the RAF’s long range Vulcan Bomber fleet
would have also been withdrawn due to age. The ‘Forward’ in
the 1983-84 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, the first edition
after the war, said:
“…the entire operation (to recover the Falklands) could
have been nullified had the requirements of the cuts proposed
in June 1981 taken place, including, as they did, the first of the
Royal Navy’s two assault ships.”
