V-bombers - reason of three different types

[Silencer1]

Hello!


There have been 3 very different types built, known as a V-bombers: Vulcan, Victor, Valiant.
As they are designed and produced by different companies and have very a number of very distinctive features in configuration - I presume, that UK officials (as well as RAF and designers) were a lot of reason to put all them in simultaneous production.


Is there were any most "common" explanation of this, most frequently contains in the books or articles?
If someone could citied it here, I'll be very appreciated!


My two guesses:
high technical risk to choose only one type for further service
spreading the production of aircraft to different contractors in case of wartime destruction.


Thanks in advance

 

[Bill Walker]

My understanding was that is was a combination of spreading technical risk, and the limited production capabilities of the companies involved.

The Valiant, in particular, was considered low technical risk, with a relatively short development time, but low performance. The Vulcan was the other extreme, high risk but potential big pay off in performance.

Since all three aircraft were in effect hand built (at least compared to Second World War efforts) the predicted maximum production rate of any one, or maybe even two, types was not good enough.

 

[starviking]

We also had the Short Sperrin too...

 

[Silencer1]

Thank you, Bill Walker and starviking!

After reading your' posts I refresh my knowledge of V-bombers and was surprised: Valiant appears to be constructed with a wrong material - that seriously decrease it's service capabilities and term of service, Victor and Vulcan served well for few decades.
So, after all changes of concepts and service requirements this trio became a high mark in British indigenous aircraft production.


By the way, did you think, that a preliminary experimental prototypes have allow designers to speed up development of large bombers?




Cheers!

 

[CJGibson]

How would all this have played out if the Vulcan and Victor had been cancelled before first flight and the Valiant had been adopted as Bomber Command's 'standard' bomber?

Chris

 

[Mike Pryce]

At an RAeS lecture on Monday:

http://aerosociety.com/Events/Event-List/1919/The-1955-Supply-of-Military-Aircraft-White-Paper-The-First-Post-1945-Procurement-Crisis

it was said that the RAF's concern was to get several hundred aircraft as quickly as possible. This was the strategic deterrent, so had top priority. Once it was clear that Avro and HP could not build each other's designs, and that each on their own lacked capacity, the easiest way to get to that situation was for both to build their own designs and fill their factories with them.

That was the plan. Economic realities and ballistic missiles etc. hobbled it.

 

[Michel Van]

How would all this have played out if the Vulcan and Victor had been cancelled before first flight and the Valiant had been adopted as Bomber Command's 'standard' bomber?

Chris

simple, the moment they Valiant Fatigue failures are discover, The BAC TRS.2 project will have bright future
RAF retire the Vickers Valiant and replace them with the TRS.2 so soon as possible.

 

[kaiserd]

How would all this have played out if the Vulcan and Victor had been cancelled before first flight and the Valiant had been adopted as Bomber Command's 'standard' bomber?

Chris

simple, the moment they Valiant Fatigue failures are discover, The BAC TRS.2 project will have bright future
RAF retire the Vickers Valiant and replace them with the TRS.2 so soon as possible.

Doubt it would be that simple.
Valiant replacement (and no Vulcans and Victors) may have pushed the TSR2 further in terms of size and complexity (which drove costs that killed the TSR2) while greater urgency may have pushed for more rapid development which may have enforced greater realism re: requirements and costs.

An earlier less ambitious TSR2, perhaps closer in timing and role to the low level bomber meant to supplement the v-bombers rather than the v-bombers themselves?

 

[JFC Fuller]

The Valiant fatigue problems would have had no material impact on TSR-2, the Valiant fleet was grounded just three and a bit months before TSR-2 was cancelled when its basic size, weight and systems fit was settled.

 

[CJGibson]

Multi-role VC10 anyone?

Chris

 

[kaiserd]

The Valiant fatigue problems would have had no material impact on TSR-2, the Valiant fleet was grounded just three and a bit months before TSR-2 was cancelled when its basic size, weight and systems fit was settled.

Taking your comments as gospel that would suggest a need for an emergency interim type to replace the Valiant if/when it was grounded (assuming no Vulcans or Victors), with the TSR2 well down the road.

Would the Buccaneer have emerged as the winner even earlier?

 

[CiTrus90]

How would all this have played out if the Vulcan and Victor had been cancelled before first flight and the Valiant had been adopted as Bomber Command's 'standard' bomber?

Chris

Valiant goes out in 1964/65 and this happens:

Regards.

 

[Stargazer]

Valiant goes out in 1964/65 and this happens

Not with squadrons of Sikorsky S-57 single-blade rotor fighters as bomber escorts I hope!!!

 

[Michel Van]

simple, the moment they Valiant Fatigue failures are discover, The BAC TRS.2 project will have bright future
RAF retire the Vickers Valiant and replace them with the TRS.2 so soon as possible.

Doubt it would be that simple.
Valiant replacement (and no Vulcans and Victors) may have pushed the TSR2 further in terms of size and complexity (which drove costs that killed the TSR2) while greater urgency may have pushed for more rapid development which may have enforced greater realism re: requirements and costs.

An earlier less ambitious TSR2, perhaps closer in timing and role to the low level bomber meant to supplement the v-bombers rather than the v-bombers themselves?

in that case the BAC/Dassault Mirage IV-K would fast and cheap alternative

 

[alertken]

S, #3, proof-of-concept vehicles. Both big delta and crescent wings had proof vehicles (Avro 707s, HP.88). To explore real Supers UK also flew AW.52 all-wing, Short Sherpa (1st, not the SD.330/US Army C-23A) aero-isoclinic wing, and Jet-Tudor 8/Avro Ashton/Avro C.102 Jetliner and Short Sperrin as lower risk, lower capability vehicles. In 1946/47 it was Dreamworks: how to reach Moscow, high, with a 10 ton load? US and UK had tried simpler, piston big-Bombers (B-32 Dominator, Vickers Windsor) and failed. RAE Farnborough rejected RAF's 1st. draft Requirement, as sci-fi fantasy.

Ministers chose, late-47, to start R&D on (to be Vulcan+Victor) in expectation that at least one would fail during the try-before-buy phase. Then...Truman's Marshall Aid came through, 3/4/48; Ministers 14/4/48 gave Chiefs the Task of slowing a Red armour incursion into N Germany; and Vickers-Armstrongs' GRE Edwards resubmitted his dull, boring losing bid, but with a "Guarantee" (utterly meaningless) of time/cost/Spec compliance, accepted at face value by Ministers for R&D funding 16/4/48, to be Valiant: all prescient, as Stalin blockaded Berlin, 24/6/48, seen as opening scene in that armoured incursion.

There was no intent to deploy 3, even 2 types, nor to deploy the UK copy of Fat Man that was under laborious evolution from mid-1947. Ministers hoped to revive Lend/Lease and operate B-29, then B-47 with US Bombs. Thwarted by Fuchs and other spy scandals. So all 3 (to be) V-Bombers' funding extended to prototypes, all still assuming that not less than 1 would fail. Then 6/50, we saw Stalin as doing in Korea what Musso/Hitler had done in Spain, 1936: dress rehearsal of kit and doctrine, for the Euro-incursion. UK Defence spend went to 10% of GDP, US helped fund Valiant production (not widely publicised) and ensured Super Priority access to strategic materials to build them NOW! A series of UK/US data exchange Memoranda of Understanding aided UK GW, Bomb, clever kit...and the Cold War was on.

The industrial strain on UK was heavy, to build and deploy 3 Big Bombers, multiple fighters, SAMs, radars, engines...By late-1956 we all assessed the risk, of early armoured mass into N. Germany, had been defused; most of our Aero schemes had worked (pace Swift), so for the Canberra replacement only 1 type was funded, while Macmillan's Cabinet tried to make Defence "affordable".

 

[kaiserd]

S, #3, proof-of-concept vehicles. Both big delta and crescent wings had proof vehicles (Avro 707s, HP.88). To explore real Supers UK also flew AW.52 all-wing, Short Sherpa (1st, not the SD.330/US Army C-23A) aero-isoclinic wing, and Jet-Tudor 8/Avro Ashton/Avro C.102 Jetliner and Short Sperrin as lower risk, lower capability vehicles. In 1946/47 it was Dreamworks: how to reach Moscow, high, with a 10 ton load? US and UK had tried simpler, piston big-Bombers (B-32 Dominator, Vickers Windsor) and failed. RAE Farnborough rejected RAF's 1st. draft Requirement, as sci-fi fantasy.

Ministers chose, late-47, to start R&D on (to be Vulcan+Victor) in expectation that at least one would fail during the try-before-buy phase. Then...Truman's Marshall Aid came through, 3/4/48; Ministers 14/4/48 gave Chiefs the Task of slowing a Red armour incursion into N Germany; and Vickers-Armstrongs' GRE Edwards resubmitted his dull, boring losing bid, but with a "Guarantee" (utterly meaningless) of time/cost/Spec compliance, accepted at face value by Ministers for R&D funding 16/4/48, to be Valiant: all prescient, as Stalin blockaded Berlin, 24/6/48, seen as opening scene in that armoured incursion.

There was no intent to deploy 3, even 2 types, nor to deploy the UK copy of Fat Man that was under laborious evolution from mid-1947. Ministers hoped to revive Lend/Lease and operate B-29, then B-47 with US Bombs. Thwarted by Fuchs and other spy scandals. So all 3 (to be) V-Bombers' funding extended to prototypes, all still assuming that not less than 1 would fail. Then 6/50, we saw Stalin as doing in Korea what Musso/Hitler had done in Spain, 1936: dress rehearsal of kit and doctrine, for the Euro-incursion. UK Defence spend went to 10% of GDP, US helped fund Valiant production (not widely publicised) and ensured Super Priority access to strategic materials to build them NOW! A series of UK/US data exchange Memoranda of Understanding aided UK GW, Bomb, clever kit...and the Cold War was on.

The industrial strain on UK was heavy, to build and deploy 3 Big Bombers, multiple fighters, SAMs, radars, engines...By late-1956 we all assessed the risk, of early armoured mass into N. Germany, had been defused; most of our Aero schemes had worked (pace Swift), so for the Canberra replacement only 1 type was funded, while Macmillan's Cabinet tried to make Defence "affordable".

Nice summary. Do you have any more details/links on the RAF's interest in the B-47?
My recollection is that Chris Gibson's Vulcan's Hammer didn't mention this interest in the B-47 so any more details would be greatly appreciated .

 

[CJGibson]

It doesn't mention the Valiant carrying Rascal either. Found that a week after it went to press.

Ken, if both B.35/46 had been cancelled would the low-level OR.324 have been feasible had the technical effort potentially freed up by B.35/46 cancellation been available?

Chris

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Valiant fatigue problems were repairable but they became a major issue in 1964/5 by which time the type had little strategic role left (due to Vulcan and Victor deliveries) and the deterrent was already scheduled to pass to something else (Polaris). In fact the Valiant fatigue problems were actually used as an opportunity to permanently reduce the UK's commitment to SACEUR by removing three nuclear armed theater bomber squadrons.

Thus options would have been:

1) Most likely, expensive repair program me of the Valiant fleet
2) Crash buy of something off-the-shelf, perhaps a US IRBM to cover the gap prior to Polaris

Years ago I worked with a ex Weighbridge guy who was involved in the Valiant fatigue issue. He told me that the fatigue fix for the majority of the fleet was not difficult or expensive. Indeed one aircraft was fully repaired and modified to a standard which would have seen it easily completing a further 10 years of service (this A/C continued to fly regularly until the late sixties). The real problem was the Valiant was technically obsolete, a draw on scarce skilled RAF resources, without a role and more trouble than it was worth for Vickers. So between HMG, RAF and Vickers(BAC) it was decided that it was time to let it go and move on.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Zootycoon,

Certainly sounds likely. In 1964/5 there were six remaining Valiant squadrons in total:

Three SACEUR assigned Valiant squadrons in a tactical bomber role (this whole part of the force structure was deleted along with the Valiant)

Two Tanker squadrons

One Strategic Reconnaissance squadron

There were plenty of Vulcan and Victor B.1 aircraft becoming available as the B.2s were delivered, the former was considered to reequip the tactical bomber squadrons (but it was decided to permanently stand them down instead) and the latter did reequip the tanker squadrons. The SR role was filled by converted Victor B.2s. Thus, in reality there was little need to keep the Valiants.

 

[CNH]

Ministers hoped to revive Lend/Lease and operate B-29, then B-47 with US Bombs.

Fairly unlikely, given the MacMahon Act. And Penney began work on what would become the physics package for Blue Danube in Jan 1947.

 

[alertken]

k #16, RAF B-47: K Harris,Attlee,Weidenfeld,1982 P.290 has the offer of loan Bombs for porterage by RAF (he does not address platform) being made after Joe 1 A-test, 29/8/49. (I think one of Prof.Hennessy's books) has Foreign Secretary Bevin opposing that 1/11/49, and it lapsed with 2/50 exposure of Klaus Fuchs (core to UK participation in Manhattan). The proposal was resurrected in 1954: J Engel,Cold War at 30,000ft., Harvard UP,2007,P.185: (UK/US) "policymakers actively discussed RAF taking control of whole squadrons of American-built B-47s (Cabinet) ultimately determined that the costs involved would be too great" (Sandys, then at Supply: ) "accepting (them) instead of developing homegrown machines would have the most serious effects" on (UK Aero, which was then) "making such an important contribution to our export trade" (Churchill's Govt) rejected (US') offer not because they did not want the planes, but rather because they feared that acceptance of (US) technology would hinder (UK's) subsequent ability to produce similar machines and an autonomous nuclear deterrent in the future". (His source is (now TNA)/FO371/109146/June 18 and 21, 1954).

CNH #21: all UK commentators write of the McMahon Act as theft of our Bomb. Well, if theft, it was also of Canada's and the Joliot-Curies' Bomb...but it was not: it was transfer of USAAF's weapon to civilian control in Congress' AEC. Dr.Strangelove LeMay's armourers did not lay their hands on any nuclear weapon until 6/50 (90 Mk.4 to USAF/USN "for training". http//ww2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/04.htm pp.8/10/15-17/B-2 accessed 22/12/13). UK Ministers hoped for part-repeal consistently: it was eroded from 6/12/50 and repealed-re-UK 2/7/58.

CJG #17: www.fas.org/ sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.html accessed 30/10/12 has GAM-63 Rascal planned to be held at Greenham for USAF (and SM-62A Snark SSM based at Lakenheath): both devices failed (Florida's waters becoming Snark-infested sea).
So: what if either Attlee or Churchill takes the cost saving and limits deployment of a UK-built Medium Bomber Force? My view:
other claimants would get the money...for example, UK taxpayers wondering why W.Germany, Italy and Japan were not enduring rationing.

 

[CJGibson]

Ah, yes, proper austerity back in 1951.

Ken, not sure I agree that Rascal and Snark failed, would overtaken by the state of the art perhaps be a better description. Like political careers, perhaps all early guided weapons ended in failure.

Chris

 

[kaiserd]

Ah, yes, proper austerity back in 1951.

Ken, not sure I agree that Rascal and Snark failed, would overtaken by the state of the art perhaps be a better description. Like political careers, perhaps all early guided weapons ended in failure.

Chris

Thanks everybody, all this extra information very fascinating, a great example of positive contributions to a discussion topic

 

[Pioneer]

Thanks everybody, all this extra information very fascinating, a great example of positive contributions to a discussion topic

Agree kaiserd!!
I for one appreciate and learnt much!

Thanks all

Regards
Pioneer

 

[PMN1]

What kind of performance would you get with a Vulcan or Valiant fuselage with a Victor style crescent wing (and tail) or a Victor fuselage with a Vulcan style delta wing.

 

[uk 75]

I have always thought it ironic that after having turned the TSR2 into nearly the 4th V Bomber, the RAF meets the requirement for 50 theatre nuclear strike aircraft in the UK and Cyprus by keeping 48 Vulcan B2s in service into the 1980s. Think how much money could have been saved on TSR2 and F111K if the RAF had decided to do this in 1960.
By the same token, the 2 Buccaneer sqns in Germany did what 2 sqns of P1154 were originally designed to do.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Also consider that the three V bombers had their own fall back, the Short Sperrin which worked on for quite a while as a research aircraft for various engine projects. The Sperrin was a much more familiar construction style to those folk building them at the time. A real pity none were preserved.

 

[FighterJock]

Also consider that the three V bombers had their own fall back, the Short Sperrin which worked on for quite a while as a research aircraft for various engine projects. The Sperrin was a much more familiar construction style to those folk building them at the time. A real pity none were preserved.

I thought that the Short Sperin was only supposed to be an experimental prototype for the V-Force? I did not know that it was also considered for operational use in case the other three bombers failed.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Military factory put it in shorter terms than most (https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=2147) but the Sperrin was there as a traditional construction type as the three V types were quite advanced for the day and delays were factored in. 500mph from a type like that is not too shabby though. Failure to retain at least one is imho, a crying shame.

 

[nuuumannn]

Think how much money could have been saved on TSR2 and F111K if the RAF had decided to do this in 1960.

Think how much money could have been saved if the original Canberra replacement spec GOR.339 had been proceded with and GOR.343, which produced the TSR.2 was not produced, therefore unable to balloon out of control into the mess it became. If GOR.339 was proceded with and the EE/Vickers hybrid entered service the RAF would have had a good low level penetration strike aircraft without the political baggage of the TSR.2 and probably wouldn't have needed the Buccaneer.

 

[setter]

For the 3 V-bombers, each was designed for high level operation with a fixed airframe life. The flight environment at 56,000 feet is very different from the flight environment at 300 feet. At low level you have a number of problems; firstly, a reduction in range; secondly, a poor performance from the engines (turbo jets do not like hot air, they like cold air); thirdly, the airframe fatigue life shoots up (fortunately the Vulcan airframe had been strengthened to carry Skybolt that never was); fourthly, speed was reduced (350 kts with a burst to 415 knots TAS). At low level the baddy's radar has only horizon detection (plus a bit) so a relatively short detection and acquisition range at 300 feet; radio is line of sight; most of the V-bomber anti-SAM electronic countermeasures were merely warming up the grass, added to which an increased threat from anti-aircraft artillery 57mm and 30mm. One could argue that Low Level is a totally different combat environment. The V-bomber electronic countermeasures did not keep pace with the Soviet introduction of new weapons. I might add here that B-52G aircraft are shortly to be re-engined for continuing operation in the 21st century.