Choosing One V Bomber

[uk 75]

As we all know the RAF brought three V Bombers into service in the 1950s

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/v-bombers-reason-of-three-different-types.25334/

Some books suggest that the Valiant B2 black bomber was the design that should have been built.

With the benefit of hindsight the Vulcan B2 was the variant with the most scope for in service modifications. A Vulcan B6 might still be in limited service today.

In the early 60s the big bomb bay of the Victor B2 was expected to keep a squadron going in the 1970s.

 

[zen]

Oh....

Capacity =
No firm can deliver in time.
Confidence =
No design is certain to achieve requirements.
Solution?
Multiple designs from multiple firms may achieve sufficient scale in the timescale desired.

Alternative1 ?
Multiple firms could potentially build a successful design.
Problem? Each design is the product of a specific firm and they may take more time rejiging everything to build someone else's design.

Alternative 2?
Successful firm bolstered by raiding Capacity from other firms.
Problem depletes competition of ability to compete. Results in single supplier monopoly.

Alternative 3?
Import someone elses design?
Problem, not likely allowed.
Problem not designed to accommodate UK AW
Problem source of maintenance?
Import of parts = exposure to foreign attempt to stop operations by stopping supply.

Conclusion
Domestic Solution and support is the only way forward for UK Deterrent. UK AW fitting UK bomber.
Only Alternative 1 has logical merit.

 

[robunos]

some books suggest that the Valiant B2 black bomber was the design that should have been built.

AIUI, the Valiant (original version) wasn't meant to enter production and service, but when both the Vulcan and Victor hit development problems and were thus delayed, it was realised that the Valiant, though not meeting the full requirements, could be in service sooner than the other two aircraft . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[red admiral]

I'd think Alternative 2 has merit as well. Just starting the consolidation process earlier, which was a natural consequence of the WW2 drawdown.

The UK ended up with a monopoly supplier for fighters in the same time frame...

 

[uk 75]

The RAF had done the same thing with its heavy bomber force in World War Two.
The Lancaster and Lincoln were developed from the Manchester.
By 1945 Avro was the supplier of the main heavy bomber.
By contrast the US had the luxury of getting Convair and Boeing to build prototypes for its four engined heavy jet bomber.
The V Bomber successor designs were the Avro 730 and (I argue) TSR2. Both were subjected to paper competitions with only the winning design being built.
This happened in the US too with B1 and B2.

 

[royabulgaf]

Capacity =
No firm can deliver in time.
Confidence =
No design is certain to achieve requirements.
Solution?
Multiple designs from multiple firms may achieve sufficient scale in the timescale desired.

This is called a "crash program" A crash program is analagous to impregnating ninw women in order to have a baby in one month.

 

[zen]

I'd think Alternative 2 has merit as well. Just starting the consolidation process earlier, which was a natural consequence of the WW2 drawdown.

The UK ended up with a monopoly supplier for fighters in the same time frame...

It's an argument that ought to have been had at the time and there is merit in it.
Arguably doing this across the board, would alleviate capacity issues associated with the situation of multiple firms of more modest staff numbers.
Well known example here is DH.116 couldn't proceed for lack of drawing office staff.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to the Opening Post.

More or less what @zen wrote in Post 2

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/a-different-v-force-in-the-1960s.36779/

Why three types of V-bomber were put into production instead of one was discussed as part of the above thread. In particular, see Post 22 by me and Post 24 by @Hood.

This is the link in the Opening Post.
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/v-bombers-reason-of-three-different-types.25334/

I wrote this reply before reading the above thread. Post 15 by @alertken says some of what @Hood and I wrote in the Different V-Force thread plus a lot of additional information which is relevant.

 

[Hood]

The Valiant B.2 was not a bomber - it was a pathfinder. The original aim was that 1 in 10 V-Bombers built would be a pathfinder.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I'd think Alternative 2 has merit as well. Just starting the consolidation process earlier, which was a natural consequence of the WW2 drawdown.

It's not even that novel: the Canberra was built by Avro, Handley Page, and Short Brothers, as well as by English Electric. Choosing a single winning design would likely have led to a similar pattern of production.

The Valiant, of course, was built to a less onerous specification (B.9/48) in order to get any kind of jet bomber in service sooner - although it perhaps wasn't as much earlier as hoped. The definitive type was always intended to be one compliant with B.35/46 - which is to say, the Victor or Vulcan. I suspect that, if the Air Ministry had to choose, the Vulcan would have been given the win.

I'm not sure where the idea that the Valiant B.2 was a brilliant solution to all the V-Force's problems came from. Not only was it a pathfinder, rather than a Main Force bomber, it shared the fundamental design flaw that led to the wings falling off Valiants. It was also a significantly later design than either of the B.35/46 types.

 

[Hood]

It is curious that the V-Bomber programme wasn't distributed but then perhaps the resources were just not available to make it feasible?

Avro and HP have competing projects, EE are building Canberras and ramping up for Lightning. Bristol are doing Britannia but I can't imagine that filling Filton to the brim and likewise Britannia parts are probably not maxing out Shorts either. DH are busy with Comet 4s and Sea Vixen and Vickers have a competing product and chokka with Viscounts. Gloster are building Javelins but I would think that Gloster and Armstrong Whitworth would have some capacity.
The rest of the pack are probably too small to handle V-Bombers.

But then with a force of 200-250 V-bombers it doesn't take long to build up once you get going, a pretty small order when you consider most firms would have wanted to build more than that on a decent airliner programme.
And when you look at the Canberra batches the orders are borderline penny packets, for example, B.2 production: English Electric 208, Avro 75, Handley Page 75 and Shorts 60. Was that really worth the expense of four sets of jigs? Shorts went on to build later variants , but the Avro and HP orders look like 'make work' orders to give them some jet construction experience more than anything.

 

[Yellow Palace]

But then with a force of 200-250 V-bombers it doesn't take long to build up once you get going, a pretty small order when you consider most firms would have wanted to build more than that on a decent airliner programme.

The way I see it as plausible is if the RAF sticks with the 30-squadron plan, plus strategic recon, plus training, maintenance and attrition allowances, which probably puts you up to 370ish aircraft needed. Still not a huge number, but could be 180-200 at each of two firms.

In that case, a second line might be worthwhile. That could be achieved by having two lines for two types, of course - but if you really want the numbers of one type quickly, a line at Filton or Belfast might be thought worthwhile. Offhand, second-sourcing Vulcans from Shorts might make sense, letting Bristol concentrate on the Britannia.

It may not be coincidence that Avro and HP went from building penny packets of Canberras to building their own jet bombers...

 

[pathology_doc]

I'm not sure where the idea that the Valiant B.2 was a brilliant solution to all the V-Force's problems came from. Not only was it a pathfinder, rather than a Main Force bomber, it shared the fundamental design flaw that led to the wings falling off Valiants.

What flaw was that? I seem to recall that the B.2 was a significantly stronger design, built for the job the B.1 shook itself to pieces performing.

 

[zen]

Certainly there is an argument that EE ought to have eaten other firms to gain the resources for larger scale Canberra production.

DH ought to have lost out to Fairey or Blackburn or Westland or Hawkers on the FAW and stuck with Comet.

Glosters.....not worth survival.

HP found the finance to build an end-to-end factory and ought have just been running off Victors by the bucket load.

Avro did very well with the Vulcan. But was it sound industrial policy?
I'd rather see the Atlantic funded.

As to the Valiant B2. Pathfinder.
If....if production had been sufficient, it could have served as a basis for the shift to all low level penetration and a better testbed for crew reduction through superior avionics.

But it seems just a penny packet of them was envisioned and it's just too few and too late.

But the shift to stand off ballistic missiles like Skybolt favoured the Poffler VC10.

 

[Yellow Palace]

What flaw was that? I seem to recall that the B.2 was a significantly stronger design, built for the job the B.1 shook itself to pieces performing.

The structural concept relied on having a single massive spar that would last the life of the aircraft. To get the strength required at acceptable weight, an alloy (DTD 683) was chosen that had truly appalling fatigue behaviour.

As in, totally unused structural spares were inspected and found to have developed cracks so severe they couldn't be used on an aircraft. As early as 1956 - when the unacceptable behaviour of DTD 683 was understood - it was determined that the Valiant fleet only had an average of 70 flying hours left per aircraft. The Shackleton and Argosy were redesigned after 1956 to use better materials. The Valiant wasn't, kept being built, and the aircraft kept going in service until 1965.

More information on this on PPRUNE here: https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/502446-valiant-tankers-2.html#post7668312

I've never seen any evidence that the B.2 moved away from this material choice and structural concept, so it would also have been affected.

Interestingly, in 1968 it was found that not only will DTD 683 quite merrily destroy itself without any help from external loads, having water or water vapour anywhere nearby will accelerate the process.

In the case of the low-level B.2, I'd expect higher rates of fatigue, plus more exposure to moisture. Putting the thing in service could very likely have seen several crews have the main spar suddenly fail in flight at high speed and low altitude.

 

[pathology_doc]

What flaw was that? I seem to recall that the B.2 was a significantly stronger design, built for the job the B.1 shook itself to pieces performing.

The structural concept relied on having a single massive spar that would last the life of the aircraft. To get the strength required at acceptable weight, an alloy (DTD 683) was chosen that had truly appalling fatigue behaviour.

As in, totally unused structural spares were inspected and found to have developed cracks so severe they couldn't be used on an aircraft. As early as 1956 - when the unacceptable behaviour of DTD 683 was understood - it was determined that the Valiant fleet only had an average of 70 flying hours left per aircraft. The Shackleton and Argosy were redesigned after 1956 to use better materials. The Valiant wasn't, kept being built, and the aircraft kept going in service until 1965.

More information on this on PPRUNE here: https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/502446-valiant-tankers-2.html#post7668312

I've never seen any evidence that the B.2 moved away from this material choice and structural concept, so it would also have been affected.

Interestingly, in 1968 it was found that not only will DTD 683 quite merrily destroy itself without any help from external loads, having water or water vapour anywhere nearby will accelerate the process.

In the case of the low-level B.2, I'd expect higher rates of fatigue, plus more exposure to moisture. Putting the thing in service could very likely have seen several crews have the main spar suddenly fail in flight at high speed and low altitude.

Ouch!
Talk about materials research failure!!!! I'm not sure whether to be pleased that I now know or horrified by the explanation!

 

[alertken]

The daring young man in his flying machine...he goes up, diddly umpum, he goes down...

Performance was all. WW2: “55,878 Br.Forces bomber crew died - 8,090 in accidents” D.Richards, Hardest Victory,Hodder,94,P363, to which might we add UNK in corkscrew evasions causing catastrophic structural failure. (Have I seen grotesque numbers for WW1 non-combat aircrew losses?)

Nimrod H-C Enquiry suggests an embedded cavalier attitude, still in recent times. Military airframes were not designed for longevity.

 

[kitnut617]

I realize this might be splitting hairs, but I've read the Valiant B.2 was to be a 'target marker'. The 'marker' being a nuclear weapon --

 

[robunos]

What flaw was that? I seem to recall that the B.2 was a significantly stronger design, built for the job the B.1 shook itself to pieces performing.

The structural concept relied on having a single massive spar that would last the life of the aircraft. To get the strength required at acceptable weight, an alloy (DTD 683) was chosen that had truly appalling fatigue behaviour.

As in, totally unused structural spares were inspected and found to have developed cracks so severe they couldn't be used on an aircraft. As early as 1956 - when the unacceptable behaviour of DTD 683 was understood - it was determined that the Valiant fleet only had an average of 70 flying hours left per aircraft. The Shackleton and Argosy were redesigned after 1956 to use better materials. The Valiant wasn't, kept being built, and the aircraft kept going in service until 1965.

More information on this on PPRUNE here: https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/502446-valiant-tankers-2.html#post7668312

I've never seen any evidence that the B.2 moved away from this material choice and structural concept, so it would also have been affected.

Interestingly, in 1968 it was found that not only will DTD 683 quite merrily destroy itself without any help from external loads, having water or water vapour anywhere nearby will accelerate the process.

In the case of the low-level B.2, I'd expect higher rates of fatigue, plus more exposure to moisture. Putting the thing in service could very likely have seen several crews have the main spar suddenly fail in flight at high speed and low altitude.

Again, AIUI, the spar structure of the B.2 was redesigned and reinforced to cope with the low-level mission, although if the DTD 683 material was retained, the fatigue problem would remain.
This included using the space formerly occupied by the main undercarriage bays for the reinforced spar structure, which is why the main undercarriage was moved into Tupolev-style 'Carrots'. These would probably help to reduce drag somewhat, in addition . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Again, AIUI, the spar structure of the B.2 was redesigned and reinforced to cope with the low-level mission, although if the DTD 683 material was retained, the fatigue problem would remain.

It was certainly stronger, but very likely used the same 'safe life' structural design concept. That was pretty much universal across the UK aircraft industry at the time, so it would be odd for them to change.

This meant that there was no redundancy in the main spar, so catastrophic failure meant guaranteed loss of the aircraft. When combined with a material choice that made catastrophic failure highly likely, the Valiant wasn't airworthy from the day it left the drawing board.

If the B.2 used a more stable alloy (and, while I doubt it, I don't know that it didn't) it might have been better - but no amount of strengthening would do anything to solve the Valiant's fatigue problems.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth my father's National Service was as an electrician in the RAF from 1956 to 1958 and after completing his training he was posted to 138 Squadron the RAF's first Valiant bomber squadron. According to him the Valiants in his squadron were suffering from metal fatigue and if I remember correctly (and I'm not sure that I do) he said they were riveting the cracks together.

 

[Hood]

I realize this might be splitting hairs, but I've read the Valiant B.2 was to be a 'target marker'. The 'marker' being a nuclear weapon --

No euphemisms this time... it really was a target marker. To find and mark the targets for the incoming bomber stream using traditional-style Target Indicators or Blue Sugar homing beacons. They did retain the full weapons capability (Blue Boar, Blue Danube, 1,000lb HE) but had different radars, actually the H2S Mk.9 was crap for the kind of diving/low-level marking profile, so they would probably have had a different radar for their NBC/NBS system though that side of things is kind of hazy. But then Blue Sugar was kind of hazy too...

The low-attack profile was felt to be an advantage in splitting up Soviet air defences but given there would be so few markers a penny packet of 20 or so probably wouldn't be decisive.

You have to remember when the V-Force was formed there were no reliable small-scale maps or reliable ground radar images for navigators to fix their plots over the USSR. Too far for Gee type beam systems to work. Following the railway tracks worked as a concept in 1928 or 1938 but not something to be attempted in 1958! Even getting the Pathfinders in the right place was a challenge - talk of getting secret agents to plant Blue Sugars to home the pathfinders to drop more Blue Sugars to home the bombers to drop the Blue Danubes...
The ultimate pathfinder was OR.330 of course, Mach 3 SLAR mapping of vast swathes of the USSR so the humble nav/radar knew the fuzzy blobs on his H2S screen were the right fuzzy blobs. But then that too proved too ambitious and SA-2 ruined the party so not a massive surprise that ultimately lobbing a Blue Streak seemed so much easier than all that palava.

 

[kitnut617]

Thanks Hood

 

[pathology_doc]

talk of getting secret agents to plant Blue Sugars

This is actually mentioned in the original novel version of Moonraker, although the beacon isn't named. In the novel, Moonraker was an ICBM and in the opening lecture Bond is told that it will be up to "chaps like him" to plant homing beacons in the right place if push came to shove.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Moonraker was an ICBM

Interestingly, one with a hydrogen-fluorine motor. Which tells you that Ian Fleming, whatever his talents may have been in espionage and fiction writing, knew just enough rocket science to be dangerous.

 

[Hood]

From the files you can tell the Air Staff brushed over the whole idea quickly as a non-starter every time the MoS mentioned it.
Parachuting an agent with two or three 300lb beacons (16.5in diameter, 90in long - 0.4m x 2.2m) sounds laughable. Even if no-one spots the insertion (a Hastings flying over Minsk wouldn't be obvious at all...), good luck lugging those around the countryside or within 500ft of high value targets (maybe cover as a potato merchant?). And no doubt the RAF hadn't forgotten Englandspiel...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From the files you can tell the Air Staff brushed over the whole idea quickly as a non-starter every time the MoS mentioned it.
Parachuting an agent with two or three 300lb beacons (16.5in diameter, 90in long - 0.4m x 2.2m) sounds laughable. Even if no-one spots the insertion (a Hastings flying over Minsk wouldn't be obvious at all...), good luck lugging those around the countryside or within 500ft of high value targets (maybe cover as a potato merchant?). And no doubt the RAF hadn't forgotten Englandspiel...

While I agree completely it's more likely that the RAF would use a Dakota disguised as a Li-2.

It also reminds me of Episode 3 of Private Schultz. From Wikipedia.

After landing in Britain, Schulz buries most of the money, using a milestone as a landmark. While trying to blend in among the populace, his behaviour arouses suspicion amongst the villagers, and he escapes to make contact with the Nazi agent Melfort. He discovers Melfort is controlled by the British and runs to the coast, crossing the Channel to arrive at the Dunkirk evacuation. He eventually enters a deserted Chateau, where he is double-crossed by a countess, then captured by the German army.

In Part 6 the final episode...

Once again, Schulz is penniless and a released convict. He accidentally discovers he still has the map showing the location of the buried money in Britain. He travels back and recruits Stan, a local criminal, to help him dig for it beneath the public lavatory built over the spot. They recover the money, but Stan and his gang try to double-cross Schulz. He manages to escape with the canister of money and is pursued by Stan, only to have the booby-trapped canister to explode and destroy all the money. He later meets Bertha and after they realize they are both poor and homeless, they agree to settle down together.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As Moonraker has been mentioned...

If anyone's interested BBC Radio has been producing James Bond radio plays since 2008 at a rate of roughly one a year. The ones made so far (which include Moonraker) are reasonably accurate adaptations of the books. They're all on Internet Archive and Youtube.

As an aside Joanna Lumley who was one of the patients at Piz Gloria in the film of OHMSS played Irma Bunt in the radio version. Which I though was a nice touch. They did the same thing in BBC Radio's 1990 adaptation of You Only Live Twice because Burt Kwok (who had been in the film) was in it. However, he wasn't playing the same part because it was based on the book and not the film.

 

[pathology_doc]

Moonraker was an ICBM

Interestingly, one with a hydrogen-fluorine motor. Which tells you that Ian Fleming, whatever his talents may have been in espionage and fiction writing, knew just enough rocket science to be dangerous.

To be fair to Fleming, he was writing a 1950s spy thriller in which the rocket was more or less peripheral (until the climax) and the precise details of its inner workings unimportant. Science and Industry can in that setting and at the time of writing be handwaved as having sorted out the major issues, especially when a mad scientist with a secret plot is involved.

If the story were being written today, I agree that the intended readership would have significantly higher expectations of the science.

 

[Yellow Palace]

To be fair to Fleming, he was writing a 1950s spy thriller in which the rocket was more or less peripheral (until the climax) and the precise details of its inner workings unimportant.

Oh absolutely - it would have been perfectly viable from a story perspective to have had it use Compound NZ17 as fuel. I suppose it's a little like more recent stories using 'quantum entanglement' or 'gene editing' to do exactly what the plot required, and no more, regardless of the actual science.

From the files you can tell the Air Staff brushed over the whole idea quickly as a non-starter every time the MoS mentioned it.

Even with air dropped beacons, I'm curious how they were supposed to work. Dropping one in the target city feels inadvisable, it's a dead giveaway of where you're going to bomb and presumably you need a Pathfinder for each bomber.... at which point, why not have the Pathfinder drop the bomb?

It seems to make more sense to have the Pathfinders lay beacons at known locations relative to a group of targets, establishing some sort of radio-navigation grid in hostile territory. In that case, you have to do it pretty soon before the attack, because otherwise the dastardly Commies will move them, but not too soon, since you need to check that they've all landed and are working before giving the bomber crews navigational information based on them.

 

[zen]

I thought the beacon system was for the deep targets beyond the Urals?
Hence the modest numbers.

 

[Hood]

It seems to make more sense to have the Pathfinders lay beacons at known locations relative to a group of targets, establishing some sort of radio-navigation grid in hostile territory. In that case, you have to do it pretty soon before the attack, because otherwise the dastardly Commies will move them, but not too soon, since you need to check that they've all landed and are working before giving the bomber crews navigational information based on them.

I am working up an article on this topic area, so will give a more detailed writeup this weekend of some of the more technical aspects of the dropping techniques.

The beacons themselves would only operate for 2 hours or so and then self-destruct, they would have anti-tamper devices too. A 2m tall cylinder with a radio aerial poking out of it would be pretty obvious though plus being parachute retarded it wouldn't be hard for visual observation to pinpoint their landing position.
So unlike WW2 the pathfinders would be an hour or so ahead of the main force, though its likely that where radar maps/visual maps of sufficient quality existed it would be a more traditional lead-in using TI flares.

It's quite amazing how for all its supposed high-tech wizardry the early V-Force really was a rerun of the WW2 bombing campaign, indeed issues with TI marking hampered the efforts at Suez in 1956.

 

[red admiral]

It's quite amazing how for all its supposed high-tech wizardry the early V-Force really was a rerun of the WW2 bombing campaign, indeed issues with TI marking hampered the efforts at Suez in 1956.

The WW2 effort was effective though?

When you think about it, the avionics technology hadn't massively moved on in this period. It was about advances in propulsion, airframes and weapons.

 

[Hood]

In 1950 three possible scenarios for the Blue Sugar beacons were considered:
1) beacons laid 50 miles apart and some 30 miles from target with accuracy of 150yd, dropped at night at low level with a well defined landmark in the vicinity, the main force being some 10 minutes behind for quick follow up.
2) beacons laid for photo-reconnaissance which would provide an accurate map for a superimposed lattice grid to plan a bombing attack 24 hours later
3) one beacon laid close to target which missile could home onto.

2 was seen to have obvious drawbacks and 3 was tricky without knowing more about beam patterns in built up areas and providing sufficient power for a missile (presumably the Red Rapier unmanned bomber) to acquire and lock onto the signal.

By 1951 studies were underway about how to actually drop them accurately, the requirement was to drop the beacon within 100yd of the targer. Several options were looked at;

1) accurate dropping of beacons at pre-chosen points: required accurate 1 in 50,000 scale maps which largely did not exist. The best scale available was 1 in 20,000 which was too large (100yds = 1/50in).
Using photography was difficult. Using two beacons as the basis of a survey by recording ranges would be slow and dangerous given the required flight patterns.
Low level drops gave the required accuracy, minimum drop height of 500ft, it was thought this could be achieved using Canberras.
Dropping by night in open country was deemed best but would need artificial illumination, a minimum of 2 flares per beacon position. Plus a duplicate beacon dropping aircraft was needed due to possible losses from ground defences and the likely technical failure rate of the beacons. A supporting flare force dropping force required additional coordination.

2) assessment of beacon positions after dropping: would determine the beacon-target triangle by beacon range measurements at known positions relative to the target or the location of beacon positions by homing onto the beacon's transmissions.
Beacon range measured was vertically over the target with beacon base line, accuracy to 40yd was possible. In daylight a visual sight could bring the aircraft onto the track with beacon range recordings for the range to release point. Minimum height for reliable reception was 7,000ft at 30 miles - this altitude was poor for observing the ground though and vulnerable to AA defences. By night illumination would be required for visual sighting. A better method at night would be comparison against a vertical photograph following release of photoflash. Could be automatic using a photoelectric cell alongside simultaneous range recordings. But that would mean having to obtain photo coverage of target before the raid which might not be possible.
Assuming H2S was used to drop beacon within 1 mile, vertical definition of photographs would provide an overall error of 100-150yd from 10,000ft. All computation could be done in the air, so there no need to return to base and the target coordinate information could be transmitted by secure radio to the main force following.
The same technique could be performed at points more remote from the targets, but again accurate maps were needed and any mapping error added to other errors in the calculations.

3) assessment of correct release coordinates by homing: would home onto the beacon, take a vertical photograph, use this to establish an 50yd accuracy (possible at slow speeds) but still required accurate scale maps.

4) assessment of correct release coordinates by fall of shot observations: the beacon drop could be marked with a vertical photograph with a TI of known ballistics. There was no vertical definition error and could be done from any height. Gave more tactical freedom and was less hazardous. Accuracy depended on the bombing system though.
Dropping 4 TIs from different aircraft at 25,000ft would give an error of about 130yd. Would need 4 aircraft dropping TIs as well as the beacon dropping aircraft. It required a large scale map of target area.

It must be stressed that it was not a blind bombing system, fixing the location of the beacon and therefore the target required sight of the ground or flying at a calibrating height. If beacon dropping or accuracy assessment was performed a few hours before bombing then opportunity for operations was limited, but possibility of aborted sorties due to false meteorological forecasts would be eliminated. In any case it was best to do all the calculations in the air integral to the raid to prevent or limit enemy countermeasures.
But all these methods demanded accurate maps, which would need to be made by photographic reconnaissance aided by two beacons beforehand. A difficult task and impossible to achieve at the outbreak of war.
Most of these operations, if performed at night would seem to require 2-5 aircraft, which obviously would not be sustainable for a multi target strike force. 20 or so pathfinders against the 40-city target list shows the obvious shortfall unless V-bombers were taken off the bomb dropping task.

I think this partially answers some of the criticisms of the RN's planning in the early 1950s - unlike the MAD world of the 1960s of ICBMs and standing air patrols using H-Bombs, in the early 1950s its clear any bombing campaign was planned as a campaign. It wasn't a one-day war but a slogging match over days, perhaps weeks as both sides attempted to penetrate air defences on both sides and inflict knock-out blows. Broken-backed would be once both sides had damaged the other over the course of several waves of attacks, perhaps to stalemate but without inflicting knock-out destruction, or until one air defence system collapsed entirely.
Only missiles/guided weapons could really provide a 1 bomber = 1 target hit capability. Early 50s V-Force feels more like 7 bombers = 1 target capability.

It would be interesting to know how the other side viewed their task? Presumably Bull and Bear crews heading West had similar problems to find their targets? Access to reliable maps was probably much easier but weapon aiming would still face problems, as would the use of stand-off missiles which still need accurate coordinates.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And when you look at the Canberra batches the orders are borderline penny packets, for example, B.2 production: English Electric 208, Avro 75, Handley Page 75 and Shorts 60. Was that really worth the expense of four sets of jigs? Shorts went on to build later variants, but the Avro and HP orders look like 'make work' orders to give them some jet construction experience more than anything.

This started as an objection to the phrase "borderline penny packets" but evolved into an analysis of the Canberra's contract history.

Notes.

1. It does not include the following prototypes: 4 B.1s; 2 B.2s; one PR.3; one T.4 and one B.5.
2. The sources are the appendicies of English Electric Aircraft and their predecessors by Stephen Ransom & Robert Fairclough.

Canberras Ordered to April 1951

985 Canberras (811 B.2, 109 PR.3 and 65 T4s) were ordered by the British Government in nine "borderline penny packets" between March 1949 and April 1951.

535 from English Electric (361 B.2, 109 PR.3 and 65 T.2) in three "borderline penny packet" contracts as follows:

• 130 in March 1949 (88 B.2s, 34 PR.3s and 8 T.4s). However, due to diversions, replacements and additions a total of 132 Canberras was built to this contract: 90 B.2s, 34 PR.3s and 8 T.4s.
• 215 November 1950 (143 B.2s, 35 PR.3s and 37 T.4s). All 215 aircraft were built but, but only 106 B.2s were built because the other 31 were completed as B.6s and only one PR.3 was built because the other 34 were completed as PR.7s.
• 190 in April 1951 (130 B.2s, 40 PR.3s and 20 T.4s). However, amendments, cancellations, diversions, transfers and replacements meant that only 106 of the aircraft ordered to this contract were built: 18 T.4s; 3 B.6s; 22 B(I).6s; 40 PR.7s and 23 B(I).8s.

450 from other firms in six "borderline penny packet" contracts as follows:

• 150 B.2 Avro (100 in November 1950 and 50 in April 1951).
• 150 B.2 Handley Page (100 in November 1950 and 50 in April 1951).
• 150 B.2 Short Brothers (100 in November 1950 and 50 in April 1951).

Or put another way:

• 130 March 1949 (all from English Electric).
• 535 November 1950 (215 from English Electric, 100 Avro, 100 Handley Page and 100 Shorts).
• 340 April 1951 (190 English Electric, 50 Avro, 50 Handley Page and 50 Shorts).

Amendments to Contracts Let to April 1951

English Electric's Canberra B.2 contracts were reduced from 361 to 350 as follows:

• 18 were diverted to export contracts, but 18 replacements were ordered so the net total was zero.
• 9 were transferred from the 3rd contract to the 2nd contract as replacements for diverted aircraft.
• 7 were transferred to Short Brothers on a direct subcontract in April 1955.
• 5 were added.

This reduced the number of B.2s on order from 811 to 800 and another 260 were cancelled between the end of the Korean War (July 1953) and when the fourth English Electric contract was let (which was sometime in 1954) as follows:

• 75 Avro out of 150 ordered and the remaining 75 were built as B.2s.
• 69 English Electric out of 350 ordered and of the 281 that were completed comprised 196 B.2s, 40 B.6s, 22 B(I).6s and 23 B(I).8s
• 75 Handley Page out of 150 ordered and the remaining 75 were built as B.2s
• 41 Short Brothers out of 150 ordered and of the 109 built 60 were B.2s and 49 were B.6s.

Only 35 PR.3s were built out of 119 ordered because the other 74 were completed as PR.7s. 63 out of 65 T.4s were ordered because 2 were cancelled.

These changes meant that English Electric built 453 out of 535 Canberras ordered. That is 196 B.2s, 35 PR.3s, 63 T.4s, 40 B.6s, 22 B(I).6s, 74 PR.7s and 23 B(I) 8s.

The changes also meant that a grand total of 712 aircraft were built by four firms out of 985 ordered. That is 406 B.2s, 35 PR.3, 63 T.4, 89 B.6, 22 B(I).6, 74 PR.7 and 23 B(I).8) instead of 711 B.2s, 109 PR.3s and 65 T.4s.

Subsequent Contracts

English Electric

The British Government let a further five contracts to the Firm as follows:

• 1954 - 57 aircraft (25 B(I).8s and 32 PR.9s). However, the firm only built 20 B(I).8s.
  • English Electric subcontracted 5 B(I).8s to Short Brothers in April 1955.
  • The Ministry of Supply transferred all 32 PR.9s to Short Brothers in November 1956.
• 1954 - 6 aircraft (2 T.4 and 4 B.6). All 6 aircraft were built.
• 1955 - 11 aircraft (all PR.9s) which the Ministry of Supply transferred all 11 aircraft in November 1956.
• 1955 - 3 aircraft (2 T.4s and one B.6) but the RAF only received the B.6 because both T.4s were diverted to an Indian contract and no replacements were ordered.
• 1958 - One aircraft. It was a B(I).8 ordered to replace an aircraft from the third English Electric contract that was sold to New Zealand.

So 78 were ordered (4 T.4s, 5 B.6s, 26 B(I).8s and 43 PR.9s) but only 28 were actually built (2 T.4s, 5 B.6s and 21 B(I).8s).

These orders increased the number of Canberras that the Firm built to British contracts from 453 to 481. That is 196 B.2s, 35 PR.3s, 65 T.4s, 45 B.2s, 22 B(I).6s, 74 PR.7s and 44 B(I).8s.

Short Brothers

Two further contracts for a total of 55 Canberras were let to Short Brothers. However, 35 actually built because 20 were cancelled in March 1958. This increased their total to 144 Canberras.

• 12 B(I).8s in April 1955 on direct subcontract from English Electric. 7 were from the Firms third contract and 5 were from its fourth contract.
• 43 PR.9s in November 1956 when the Ministry of Supply transferred them from English Electric to the Firm. 20 were cancelled in March 1958 which reduced the total built to 23. This might have been done to avoid congestion at English Electric because the Firm received an order for 50 Lightnings the same month.

Conclusion

A grand total of 775 Canberras was built to British contracts: 481 by English Electric; 144 by Short Brothers; 75 by Avro and 75 by Handley Page. The breakdown by mark was: 406 B.2s; 35 PR.3s; 65 T.4s; 94 B.6s; 22 B(I).6; 74 PR.7s; 56 B(I).8s and 23 PR.9s.

Why were 46% of the 985 Canberras ordered between 1949 and 1951 not ordered from English Electric?

The Putnams book says that the demand for Canberras for RAF re-equipment was too great to be met by any one firm and that's why 450 were ordered from other firms.

It continued by saying that subcontracting was also introduced into Avon engine manufacture also in order to meet the demand for Avons to power the Canberra and other aircraft. The book said that one of the companies receiving subcontracts was D. Napier & Son and I think the authors mentioned it because the Firm was a subsidiary of English Electric.

My guess is that the cost accountants' sums showed that it was more expensive to pay English Electric to expand its factories than to subcontract the production of 450 aircraft amongst Avro, Handley Page and Short Brothers. The 259 Canberras actually built by these firms to these contracts were delivered between December 1952 and October 1955.

 

[Hood]

That is a very good analysis of the production plans.

The common thread is the Korean War, whether it was Canberras, Hunters, Swifts or Balliols the panic buying meant spreading orders around to anyone who had capacity (space and manpower). In some cases, like the Hunter, it meant taking over factories from other companies and retooling (Squires Gate).
But the post-war cancellations do distort the picture, the companies had already retooled and begun production so all of them had to produce something. As you say the bulk of their output was between December 1952 and October 1955 which shows how long the preparation period was from the placement of the orders in November 1950 and April 1951.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The common thread is the Korean War, whether it was Canberras, Hunters, Swifts or Balliols the panic buying meant spreading orders around to anyone who had capacity (space and manpower). In some cases, like the Hunter, it meant taking over factories from other companies and retooling (Squires Gate).

As you've mentioned the Hunter and Swift. For what its worth.

Hunters were also built by Armstrong Whitworth. Serial numbers were reserved for 150 Hunters to be built by Gloster, but they weren't ordered. Both firms were members of the Hawker Siddeley group of companies.

146 or the 526 Swifts ordered (including prototypes) were to have been built by Short Brothers.

As you say the bulk of their output was between December 1952 and October 1955 which shows how long the preparation period was from the placement of the orders in November 1950 and April 1951.

For what it's worth the Putnams book says that the subcontracts required that deliveries would begin about two years from the placing of the contract.

• The first Short's built Canberra flew on 30.10.52. The 60 B.2s were delivered from December 1952 to August 1954 and the 49 B.6s were delivered from November 1954 to October 1955.
• The first Avro built Canberra flew on 25.11.52. The 75 aircraft were delivered between March 1953 and March 1955.
• The first Handley Page built Canberra flew on 05.01.53. The 75 aircraft were delivered between March 1953 and May 1955.

 

[zen]

It's increasingly looking like Korea induced such a panic that decisions across the board utterly messed up the longer term strategy.

 

[alertken]

zen #14: Certainly there is an argument that EE ought to have eaten other firms to gain the resources for larger scale Canberra production.

They did try, not for Canberra/Korea, but in 1959, the process creating BAC+HSGrp. This is forensically dissected by Prof K.Hayward in RAeS Jnl.Aeronautical History,2012/1. (Makes today's back-stabbing for UK PM look like an amateur performance of Julius Caesar).
Sir Aubrey Burke, Chairman, DH, walked away from EE/V-A by refusing to put Props (GW, so Blue Streak) into the valuation. Some folk clearly thought, 10/59, that the MRBM had some value.

EE Co Chairman, the senior Nelson, had been at school with Fred. HP. There is no anecdote that (10/59) they discussed HP into (to be) BAC.

 

[Hood]

It's increasingly looking like Korea induced such a panic that decisions across the board utterly messed up the longer term strategy.

Yes. Agree 110%.
I think this dislocation of MoS planning led to some of the debacles of the late-third of the 1950s.
It was unavoidable - but like rearmament in 1938, it takes time to get a juggernaut rolling again. Say what you like about the US MIC, they never stopped rolling post-1941.