USAF/USN 6th Gen Fighters - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS News & Analysis [2008- 2025]

[Josh_TN]

If CCAs are a failure, surely the argument that China will have them too carries no weight?

 

[Forest Green]

https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/kratos-conducts-first-flight-thanatos-ucav

https://twitter.com/x/status/1866982924937203923

View: https://x.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1866982924937203923

 

[dark sidius]

Here is my beef with Kendall.
1. He has diarrhea of the mouth - throws ideas out constantly and then walks them back. Like when he said the B-21 was going to have an unmanned companion and then walked it back a year later. Wasn't that obvious from the beginning? Reminds me of what happened to NGAD.
2. Part of the talking includes taking credit for everything, like NGAD.
3. Wasted time and money on NGAD.
4. Risk of CCAs. The AF seems to have put even less thought in CCAs than NGAD. They don't have a good grasps of requirements, admit that they need to test to figure it out, but also planning a second Increment that they have no idea about. They are coming up with a lot of unproven ideas like retiring a $20-30 million CCA from front line service after 10 years. Or, maybe not. Also, the idea of using CCAs as a substitute for manned fighters, or at least a way to generate mass as a solution to inadequate defense spending. Ignoring the fact that the Chinese will also deploy CCAs in mass. Increment 1 and Increment 2 if it gets that far might become the AF's version of the LCS.

I think the same , CCA increment 1 is a bullshit and nothing to see with air dominance. I hope contract will go to Kratos this company is building more serious thing than Anduril.

 

[bring_it_on]

These are my views:

The purpose of CCA's 'seems' to be as very low cost adjunct weapon and sensors for the fighter force to allow the combination to field 'affordable mass'. To do the latter, you need to produce something from a system and concept of operations basis that has an extremely low CPTPY. I don't know what that math looks like but if you get it to something that's say under $500K / year for a useful air-vehicle and CONOPS you are probably on the right track. To do this you need to simplify AV designs and work on both autonomy and CONOPS particularly sustainment. The 'affordability' in the "affordable mass" seems to be highly sensitive to sustainment cost.

Increment 1 is an effort to validate this. This needs to be validated over the next 3-5 years.

The purpose of CCA's does not seem to be to push the envelope of VLO Unmanned system. As such the program is not mandated with creating the X-45/47 or even the next iterations of the J-UCAS. This doesn't mean that we won't work on those. We will. But outside the CCA effort IMHO.

hey are coming up with a lot of unproven ideas like retiring a $20-30 million CCA from front line service after 10 years.

There's nothing unproven about retiring something after ten years. The Navy is doing that on the LCS.

There's certainly a case to be made that we need to understand whether building something very simple and replacing it after 5-10 years with something newer is a better and more cost effective strategy. For example, Do you buy 1 $25 Million higher end CCA with a 20 year life or one that costs $10-15 Million with a sub ten year life and replace after a decade with something that is better. Ultimately, procurement cost, I don't think, makes or break the total ownership cost of fielding say 3000 of these with an ability to sustain 1-2K in combat. If you can't get an order of magnitude reduction in annual cost of ownership then it becomes really difficult to justify this as a means to field 'affordable mass'.

 

[Scott Kenny]

CCA does not have to be as stealthy as NGAD; it just needs to be able to achieve a favorable firing position. I wouldn’t read “loyal wingman “ so rigidly such as to assume the CCA is close enough to give away a position; in fact I think one of its goals will be explicitly to draw fire.

I'm apparently failing to get the idea in my head out of it.

What I mean is that the CCA will have an RCS of about the same size as the much bigger NGAD. They're both about the size of a marble or whatever the thing is.

Yes, the CCAs may have some extra bits added like small retractable reflectors so that the CCA has a larger RCS than the NGAD, when needed.

The first island chain only requires ~1000 mile combat radius, roughly what Incr1 seems capable of and less than XQ-58, which likely has performance issues meeting Incr1 requirements IMO, on top of not having landing gear.

Which still means damn near twice the overall range of an F-35.

 

[Josh_TN]

I'm apparently failing to get the idea in my head out of it.

What I mean is that the CCA will have an RCS of about the same size as the much bigger NGAD. They're both about the size of a marble or whatever the thing is.

Yes, the CCAs may have some extra bits added like small retractable reflectors so that the CCA has a larger RCS than the NGAD, when needed.




Which still means damn near twice the overall range of an F-35.

The small size of the CCAs should allow a fairly low RCS just with proper shaping without a lot exotics, I would imagine. IR same.

F-35 combat radius is usually quoted at around 700 miles, though those figures are always highly subjective. As a example of CCA range, XQ-58 is supposed to have some thing like a 3000 mile range, which would easily translate to >1000 miles combat radius given the limits of external loads and lack of afterburner reserve.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Like, given how annoying are shaheds/harpies and co, i don't think piston should be used just as a replacement for sarcasm anymore.
If you want to loiter at range, why the heck not.

Yep, diesels burn less fuel than turbines.

Turbo-compound diesels for the maximum fuel economy. Idea was proposed for a 1000hp helicopter engine a few years back.

The small size of the CCAs should allow a fairly low RCS just with proper shaping without a lot exotics, I would imagine. IR same.

Yes, probably. But there's still going to be a statement of "RCS needs to be only slightly larger than the NGAD" in the classifed addendum to the contracts.

F-35 combat radius is usually quoted at around 700 miles, though those figures are always highly subjective. As a example of CCA range, XQ-58 is supposed to have some thing like a 3000 mile range, which would easily translate to >1000 miles combat radius given the limits of external loads and lack of afterburner reserve.

I thought I'd seen a Ferry Range of 1800nmi for the F35... There must be something weird with that, if the regular combat radius is 700.

 

[B2Blain]

If CCAs are a failure, surely the argument that China will have them too carries no weight?

Saying that CCAs are a failure and the AF risks a failed program because they have failed to develop a coherent concept of operations or set of requirements are two different things.

Unmanned aircraft are not new. What is new with regard to technology, is ability to miniaturize components into smaller systems and the development of advanced software that allows unmanned aircraft to operated in network denied environments with greater independence than in the past. By removing the cockpit and systems associated with supporting a pilot you do not save that much money in terms of manufacturing cost. Until there is a paradigm shift in the engineering and manufacturing of combat aircraft the savings will be mainly in operational costs and the smaller size of the aircraft and less sophisticated mission systems, which also results in a less capable aircraft with a smaller payload.

Much of the advocacy regarding CCAs fall upon cost arguments. What about combat effectiveness? There are certainly instances where it would be beneficial to distribute a manned fighters firepower through CCAs. Or would it be better if an F-35 had another F-35 wingman with more advanced mission systems. Maybe the sweet spot is an expendable CCA with the cost of a small cruise missile? Surely they have tested this on the range? But you never know.

What about a discussion of how to you support "affordable mass" at austere or even non austere locations? Maybe a lot of this information is being held close to the vest? But the lack of certainty with regards to the requirements for Increment 1 and 2, not helped by Frank Kendall's constant spitballing about what CCAs will do or not do, indicates that they really don't have a good idea of where they are heading. If they screwed up on NGAD, should they be given the benefit of the doubt on CCAs?

Re: China. Like with the Soviet Union, we will never be able to compete with the PRC in the area of mass. Our advantage is with more advanced technology and training. Until CCAs are proven, the AF should view them as an enabler for manned platforms. Canceling or delaying NGAD is putting the cart before the horse. The priority should be with manned platforms whether it be the B-21, F-35, or NGAD.

 

[bring_it_on]

There seem to be three to four areas of focus on the CCA effort. Its the air-vehicle and associated design, requirements and cost. Then there is the sustainment enterprise and CONOPS and how we can do things differently to be both effective and keep things affordable. There's the autonomy which has its own set of funding and contract awards and finally mission systems and weapons. The disproportionate amount of media attention has been placed on the air-vehicle side of the house which might give an impression that other areas are simply not being thought through. There's been some public discussion around sustianment and CONOPS (Mitchell institute has a few podcasts dedicated to this topic) but just because there isn't more should not be reason to assume that we are not trying to understand the implications of using something like CCA's across the DOTMLPF spectrum.

 

[Josh_TN]

I think the same , CCA increment 1 is a bullshit and nothing to see with air dominance. I hope contract will go to Kratos this company is building more serious thing than Anduril.

How is Kratos’ platform any more capable? If anything, the Fury has better top speed and acceleration if the press release is believed.

 

[Josh_TN]

Saying that CCAs are a failure and the AF risks a failed program because they have failed to develop a coherent concept of operations or set of requirements are two different things.

Unmanned aircraft are not new. What is new with regard to technology, is ability to miniaturize components into smaller systems and the development of advanced software that allows unmanned aircraft to operated in network denied environments with greater independence than in the past. By removing the cockpit and systems associated with supporting a pilot you do not save that much money in terms of manufacturing cost. Until there is a paradigm shift in the engineering and manufacturing of combat aircraft the savings will be mainly in operational costs and the smaller size of the aircraft and less sophisticated mission systems, which also results in a less capable aircraft with a smaller payload.

The CCA clearly sacrifices a lot more than cockpit. It is in a much lower performance class across the board compared to F-35. But that’s the thing: it can sacrifice a lot of capabilities simply because no one is in it. The Scaled composite aircraft actually has a cockpit, and if one wanted to the T-7 could be used as a low cost attritional fighter. No one is about to do that because you cannot just throw pilots away like that. Something like CCA can engage a target and simply sacrifice itself in the attack, so long as its target is less expensive (practically any modern fighter). Also as pointed out in a previous post, flyaway costs are hardly a good metric of cost of ownership. Removing the pilot alone saves huge costs in time and money. Removing training flights likely can reduce a lot more. Major training exercises will still have to employ CCAs, but not basic flying hour requirements or simple training scenarios. High hour UCAVs can be relegated to high risk combat missions and just stored for such.

It is not clear that the whole concept will work as advertised, but I think it is clear that there is potential in a the idea and that it might be the only way the U.S. can tip numbers in its favor. The PRC seems behind in this field for a couple of reasons I’ve noted several times in this thread, and if the concept does work, being behind the technological/operational employment curve would be giving up practically the only decisive medium term advantage.

 

[Josh_TN]

Much of the advocacy regarding CCAs fall upon cost arguments. What about combat effectiveness? There are certainly instances where it would be beneficial to distribute a manned fighters firepower through CCAs. Or would it be better if an F-35 had another F-35 wingman with more advanced mission systems. Maybe the sweet spot is an expendable CCA with the cost of a small cruise missile? Surely they have tested this on the range? But you never know.

If the option is another F-35 or 3-4 CCAs, I think having the extra passive sensing, ECM, and firing platforms complicates an opponent’s tactics far more than the second fighter. Single pulse DToA fixes are possible, forward IRST sweeps can be low risk, stand in jamming coverage of the manned fighter is relatively simple, and the number of targets that require a “shoot-shoot” engagement are multiplied assuming the CCAs can sense an incoming missile and are equipped with at least basic countermeasures dispensers. It seems beneficial to have more sensors, ECM emitters, and firing platforms than a mere duplication of the manned aircraft, even if we assume equal costs, which seems unlikely (see above).

It is a paradigm shift that has risk associated with it certainly, but I think the risks of *not* perusing the technology are far higher in terms of lost opportunity.

 

[Josh_TN]

What about a discussion of how to you support "affordable mass" at austere or even non austere locations? Maybe a lot of this information is being held close to the vest? But the lack of certainty with regards to the requirements for Increment 1 and 2, not helped by Frank Kendall's constant spitballing about what CCAs will do or not do, indicates that they really don't have a good idea of where they are heading. If they screwed up on NGAD, should they be given the benefit of the doubt on CCAs?

Re: China. Like with the Soviet Union, we will never be able to compete with the PRC in the area of mass. Our advantage is with more advanced technology and training. Until CCAs are proven, the AF should view them as an enabler for manned platforms. Canceling or delaying NGAD is putting the cart before the horse. The priority should be with manned platforms whether it be the B-21, F-35, or NGAD.

I think the USAF should seriously consider the austere basing issue and I hope for CCAs to have an optional RATO launch and a drag chute recovery to reduce runway requirements. I have no idea if they are considering this at all. However, how exactly does buying more F-35s or 100,000 lb interceptors help with dispersed operations? If anything both systems seem to have rather large deployment limitations, and if that is the primary concern the obvious off the shelf buy is F-35B, not more A or “star destroyers“.

As for China’s production capacity: that is precisely what CCA is addressing. I think the U.S. has hit a wall in terms of what superior quality can deliver vs a near peer. And I personally think future networks of passive detection systems are going to make the model of superior aircraft/training much less viable. If several aircraft can triangulate your missile launch events via IRST and datalinks in real time, how long can you realistically stay hidden for? If the superior aircraft is outnumbered and its position, at least roughly, is known, how does it have ann advantage or initiative?

 

[Josh_TN]

One more point I woulike to make with regards to production: there is no way to speed F-35 production, and likely whatever form manned NGAD takes, it will still be a system slowly produced by a prime. CCAs, regardless of what you think of the concepts or costs, are a way to tap unused production in the near to medium term using resources largely not employed in fighter production. This is partially what I mean when I say costs are not just money but time: there’s basically no way the U.S. is getting a hundred fighter to ramp in 2028 above existing contracts. There is every possibility it might achieve that via CCA production, and if Incr2 uses different designs and mid tier contractors, that might create a situation where several lines could be used to produce disparate A2A platforms still running the same software and communication standards able to cooperate with each other. Again, maintenance/lifecycle costs need to be established to determine how much effort is required for sustainability of multiple platforms and if that is sustainable. But the time to figure out those operating issues is now, not when China is deploys its own CCAs.

 

[bring_it_on]

Annual fighter production rates at funded/announced rates:

F-35: 150+
F-15EX: 20?
F-16: Increased to 36-48

That's a total exceeding 200 per year. That's after we've let the SH line sunset because of lack of demand. That line is technically still there. And we have T-7 coming in and Boeing is building a factory for next gen systems. We export more than half of the fighters we produce. We don't have a fighter production problem. We run out of money long before we run out of domestic supply. CCA's are looking to provide a bigger 'bang' for the buck for the amount of funding the AF is expected to get.

 

[_Del_]

I thought I'd seen a Ferry Range of 1800nmi for the F35... There must be something weird with that, if the regular combat radius is 700

Not really. ET's and best cruise-speed and -altitude vs internal carriage and a combat flight profile with X-minutes of combat reserves.

If the option is another F-35 or 3-4 CCAs I think having the extra passive sensing, ECM, and firing platforms complicates an opponent’s tactics far more than the second fighter.

Could be even more. Taking the Valkyrie, just as an example, you're looking at ~$5m a pop. Hopefully less if you commit to a large order. So do you buy four more F-35's? Maybe a look at 2 F-35's and two dozen or more Valkyries starts looking very good?

You don't need to fly them to train, as Quellish points out. So they don't need to be built to allow 20 yrs of flight hours on the airframe, even if you keep them in inventory for 20 yrs. As you and others have pointed out, you can build them much more quickly.

You can send them places you wouldn't want to risk a pilot in an F-35. You can get up close and release a swarm of Perdix as an enabler where you wouldn't want to bring a manned platform, or engage in direct EW work from close to the emitter before the F-35's approach. Or just go through and ferret or flush game so the good guys know where the bad guy is. If you endanger two of them but save a four-flight of F-35's from getting bushwhacked, you're still coming out way ahead on the math.

 

[Ainen]

uAs for China’s production capacity: that is precisely what CCA is addressing. I think the U.S. has hit a wall in terms of what superior quality can deliver vs a near peer.

Near peer is Russia - smaller opponent with matching force composition, and structure, relying on offsets and defender's home field advantage. It works in a manner we saw realized in Ukraine against Russia herself.
Russia is going to continue to be one. it's totally viable to continue to overmatch Russian armed forces, but it'll not suddenly take less effort than now.

The problem is the other direction.
China, as of 2025, is on the edge of turning peer without any "near", even if still numerically inferior in the most capital-intensive categories.

CCAs won't offset China's potential mass; if anything they'll help PLAAF, creating new field of competition (from zero, benefitting newcomer); one that relies on pure industrial capability and automatization, benefitting stronger industrial power.
Neither dynamic is good for US. If anything, US advantage is potential of disrupting this production... against Chinese capability to defend and replicate it.

But CCAs unavoidable regardless; it's just the most reasonable way to develop air warfighting.

I.e. US simply can't think in categories of overhangs anymore; unless China will screw up, there just won't be one. And blindly pressing those will simply create a real chance to miss elsewhere, as apparently already happens.

At some point, you simply need to think, how to get a maximum achievable order of battle everywhere within available resources, and just concentrate on operational art.

 

[Josh_TN]

Near peer is Russia - smaller opponent with matching force composition, and structure, relying on offsets and defender's home field advantage. It works in a manner we saw realized in Ukraine against Russia herself.
Russia is going to continue to be one. it's totally viable to continue to overmatch Russian armed forces, but it'll not suddenly take less effort than now.

The problem is the other direction.
China, as of 2025, is on the edge of turning peer without any "near", even if still numerically inferior in the most capital-intensive categories.

CCAs won't offset China's potential mass; if anything they'll help PLAAF, creating new field of competition (from zero, benefitting newcomer); one that relies on pure industrial capability and automatization, benefitting stronger industrial power.
Neither dynamic is good for US. If anything, US advantage is potential of disrupting this production... against Chinese capability to defend and replicate it.

But CCAs unavoidable regardless; it's just the most reasonable way to develop air warfighting.

I.e. US simply can't think in categories of overhangs anymore; unless China will screw up, there just won't be one. And blindly pressing those will simply create a real chance to miss elsewhere, as apparently already happens.

At some point, you simply need to think, how to get a maximum achievable order of battle everywhere within available resources, and just concentrate on operational art.

When it comes to aviation, Russia is no longer a near peer in either production or state of the art. There are more non U.S. NATO F-35s than there are Su-57s by far, and that will likely forever be the case. Su-30/34/35 numbers are not that competitive with non U.S. forth gen fighters either. So the VKS is no longer a consideration in future U.S. air superiority decisions. The USAF can field a 5th gen fighter for every fighter in VKS service without any other organizations, US or NATO, contributing.

China is certainly the equivalent of the U.S. in many respects. F-22/35 do not seem to have such a decisive advantage technically to assume they would prevail if significantly outnumbered. Which seems highly likely if only for basing reasons. This is what I mean by diminishing returns: I cannot see how any manned fighter overcomes a 2:1 numerical inferiority, let alone greater. But that hardly incentivizes the U.S. to sit still and not develop a new paradigm when it has several obvious short-medium term advantages in this class of aircraft. And if the USAF proceeds quickly with large numbers of such aircraft to understand their advantages and limitations (and develop the software necessary for complex manned/unmanned or even full autonomous scenarios), the U.S. might well stay ahead of the curve for some time.

IMO, this the only realistic decisive A2A advantage that the U.S. can achieve, so there’s no sense in debating the initial investment and effort to see if the idea works in practice - there really is no other option outside a new technology/paradigm that creates an offset, and this appears to be the only option on the table with any promise.

 

[Scott Kenny]

IMO, this the only realistic decisive A2A advantage that the U.S. can achieve, so there’s no sense in debating the initial investment and effort to see if the idea works in practice - there really is no other option outside a new technology/paradigm that creates an offset, any this appears to be the only option on the table with any promise.

Agreed. CCAs are the new "low" for the Hi-Lo aircraft paradigm.

We know that Hi-lo works well. F15s and F16s, F14s and F18s. F22s and F35s, even.

But the costs for a minimally-capable fighter have gone up greatly. It must be LO. It must supercruise. It needs to fly a good thousand nautical miles, one way.

 

[Josh_TN]

Agreed. CCAs are the new "low" for the Hi-Lo aircraft paradigm.

We know that Hi-lo works well. F15s and F16s, F14s and F18s. F22s and F35s, even.

But the costs for a minimally-capable fighter have gone up greatly. It must be LO. It must supercruise. It needs to fly a good thousand nautical miles, one way.

A lot of costs go down if you don’t need the aircraft to return. I know the USAF has avoided the word attritable in favor of affordable mass, but realistically they would clearly sacrifice a pair of CCAs for a J-20.

Another point I forgot to raise: not every PLAAF fighter is 5th gen, and a few CCAs would likely have a huge advantage over 4th gen aircraft in terms of RCS and IR signature. And they only need to get lucky 1-2 times to offset flyaway costs, let alone total cost of ownership.

 

[Ainen]

Agreed. CCAs are the new "low" for the Hi-Lo aircraft paradigm.

We know that Hi-lo works well. F15s and F16s, F14s and F18s. F22s and F35s, even.

But the costs for a minimally-capable fighter have gone up greatly. It must be LO. It must supercruise. It needs to fly a good thousand nautical miles, one way.

CCAs are not lo!

They're something else entirely, on top of structure and replacement to part of it (in a world of finite resources; in a rosy world of rising budgets it would've been direct augmention of current force level).
Some are distributed aircraft, others are partial/new functionality. It's elements of air fighting system, but they aren't fighters in full sense.

lo were always 100% capable fighters. F-16 being lol doesn't make it incapable of any specific role. It may not fly far enough or it may not carry as many weapons, but it most certainly take all the same basic roles, has a pilot no less smart, and certainly can 1v1 an f-15. Or can control CCAs in near, provided interface the interface here.
CCA, for foreseeable future, clearly needs presence of such fighters to be effective, with varying ratios.

The question now apparently is whether f-35 still can be that lo, or not. It'll determine position of ngad-manned.

 

[quellish]

Here is my beef with Kendall.
1. He has diarrhea of the mouth - throws ideas out constantly and then walks them back. Like when he said the B-21 was going to have an unmanned companion and then walked it back a year later. Wasn't that obvious from the beginning? Reminds me of what happened to NGAD.

In December of 2021 Kendall told "Politico" and then later at an event that the Air Force in the coming year would study an unmanned aircraft with range and penetration ability like that of the B-21, which would work "in conjunction with" the B-21. Six months later in the summer of 2022 Kendall stated that the Air Force had studied it, and found that an unmanned aircraft with the range and penetration of the B-21 was not significantly cheaper than the B-21 itself. So they did not pursue it further. Kendall never said it was going to happen, only that they were starting and program and studying it.

Separately, long ago, the LRS-B was supposed to have an unmanned variant. That was dropped, though the B-21 does have enough automation that it could someday resurface.

LRS was, and has always been, a "family of systems". LRS includes unmanned platforms that work with the B-21. That has not changed.

2. Part of the talking includes taking credit for everything, like NGAD.

Kendall was instrumental in getting NGAD and the precursor programs started and kept them going. NGAD was also a reason he was appointed SECAF. He has mentioned several times that he was part of the original studies and demonstrator programs, but those mentions were within a context where it would be hard to call it "taking credit".

3. Wasted time and money on NGAD.

How has the time and money spent on NGAD been wasted?

They are coming up with a lot of unproven ideas like retiring a $20-30 million CCA from front line service after 10 years.

Yes, because they want to keep pace with changing threats. That is a major goal of the NGAD programs - to move "at the speed of relevance". They want to do most of this primarily through software, quickly, with the hardware changing every few years. They also do not want to be stuck sustaining platforms for many years because that just gets more and more expensive.

Or, maybe not. Also, the idea of using CCAs as a substitute for manned fighters, or at least a way to generate mass as a solution to inadequate defense spending. Ignoring the fact that the Chinese will also deploy CCAs in mass. Increment 1 and Increment 2 if it gets that far might become the AF's version of the LCS.

They are not a substitute for manned fighters and USAF has been very clear about that. They are an extension or complement to manned fighters.

 

[quellish]

The small size of the CCAs should allow a fairly low RCS just with proper shaping without a lot exotics, I would imagine. IR same.

A smaller aircraft does not equal a smaller RCS. In fact, the smaller something gets, the harder it is to reduce the signature across bands. Shaping is effective when the size of features/scattering sources is more than X times the wavelength where X is some number greater than 15. The lower the frequency, the longer the wavelength. A very large object can use shaping to have a low RCS across a broad range of wavelengths. A small object can use shaping effectively in a very narrow range of wavelengths.

I am not sure what is meant here by "exotics".

 

[quellish]

One more point I woulike to make with regards to production: there is no way to speed F-35 production, and likely whatever form manned NGAD takes, it will still be a system slowly produced by a prime.

The NGAD demonstrators were built using production processes, not by hand. Using "new" methods they can produce advanced aircraft quickly. That was one of the objectives of the demonstrator program. I say "new" because some of these techniques are now more than 20 years old. The demonstrators went from concept to first flight in about 2 years using the processes that would be used in production.

NGAD was intended to use new acquisition processes that basically eliminate "primes". There would be no "winner take all", no vendor lock in, and most aspects of the program would be constantly competed. One company may produce the first 20 aircraft, with a different one producing the next 20. The government owns the IP and can shop around for the best price or capability.

This is why NG dropped out of NGAD. They did not want to do business in a program like this. Some of the other contractors felt the same way but expressed it differently.

 

[quellish]

I think the USAF should seriously consider the austere basing issue

They have been for about 5 years now. It's called Agile Combat Employment:
"Agile Combat Employment (ACE): a proactive and reactive operational
scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability
while generating combat power."

This includes large investments in the ability to operate most USAF aircraft from austere bases. Northwest Field at Guam isn't being used for the "RQ-180", it's being used for ACE related training and development:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/northrop-grumman-rq-180.20900/page-14#post-624238

 

[Scott Kenny]

CCAs are not lo!

They're something else entirely, on top of structure and replacement to part of it (in a world of finite resources; in a rosy world of rising budgets it would've been direct augmention of current force level).
Some are distributed aircraft, others are partial/new functionality. It's elements of air fighting system, but they aren't fighters in full sense.

lo were always 100% capable fighters. F-16 being lol doesn't make it incapable of any specific role. It may not fly far enough or it may not carry as many weapons, but it most certainly take all the same basic roles, has a pilot no less smart, and certainly can 1v1 an f-15. Or can control CCAs in near, provided interface the interface here.
CCA, for foreseeable future, clearly needs presence of such fighters to be effective, with varying ratios.

I don't think they'll stay as less-than-fighters. Not all of them, anyways.

Yes, some will still be relatively cheap unmanned ISR bots and/or BACN comms relays. Jammers seems to be heading down towards MALDs or similar, anyways, since standoff jamming is so much less effective than stand-in...

I don't expect the "spear carriers" to stay as nothing more than an IRST with a pair of AMRAAMs. I expect them to get radar units and to creep up in cost to about half that of an F-35.

Any bomb-carriers will likely need more than an EOTS as well, because there's weather conditions that EOTS don't like.

The question now apparently is whether f-35 still can be that lo, or not. It'll determine position of ngad-manned.

It will be the manned-low. As long as that 1st Island Chain range requirement stands, NGAD-manned will have to be somewhat higher cost even if it used all F-35 systems.

 

[quellish]

I don't think they'll stay as less-than-fighters. Not all of them, anyways.

Yes, some will still be relatively cheap unmanned ISR bots and/or BACN comms relays. Jammers seems to be heading down towards MALDs or similar, anyways, since standoff jamming is so much less effective than stand-in...

I don't expect the "spear carriers" to stay as nothing more than an IRST with a pair of AMRAAMs. I expect them to get radar units and to creep up in cost to about half that of an F-35.

Any bomb-carriers will likely need more than an EOTS as well, because there's weather conditions that EOTS don't like.




It will be the manned-low. As long as that 1st Island Chain range requirement stands, NGAD-manned will have to be somewhat higher cost even if it used all F-35 systems.

If you want to see where the Air Force wants CCAs to go look at the GA Gambit product.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/ga-asi-gambit.40131/
The Gambit platform is a direct echo of the USAF requirements.

 

[Ainen]

It will be the manned-low. As long as that 1st Island Chain range requirement stands, NGAD-manned will have to be somewhat higher cost even if it used all F-35 systems.

Interesting how much range can be squeezed out of slender, efficient single engine airframe.
Also, 1st ic(verbal) gives some freedom of interpretation.

 

[Ainen]

When it comes to aviation, Russia is no longer a near peer in either production or state of the art. There are more non U.S. NATO F-35s than there are Su-57s by far, and that will likely forever be the case.

European air balance is this way for 3 decades, nothing changed.
Russia still has an AD fleet more comparable to the entire global west(not US, not NATO), and the theater still can go flashy the moment either side is unhappy with results.

Air force in Russian case is more of stand off stand off a2a/strike reserve, and after a temporary ratio change shortfall(2018-2022, single-sided f-35 deployment in Europe) due to delay with su-57, ratio is going back to where it was before and arguably worse (f-22 isn't special anymore now, too).

Both ground and air parts of VKS continue to develop; treating it as a sure afterthought is a sure way to screw up not only just China, but to lose balance in Europe, too.
Ultimately, F-35 upgrade delays matter not only in Pacific, and the opposite part of early f-35 European advantage, much like with f-16 back in 1980s, is that those are early f-35s.

The USAF can field a 5th gen fighter for every fighter in VKS service without any other organizations, US or NATO, contributing.

USAF can, as it could since 1991. It is not nearly enough to win (as Russia found itself in a recent sure thing adventure against a weak antiquated Ukraine, but Ukraine with lots of territory, brave people and AD batteries). But it's surely enough to lose remaining balance in Pacific.

F-22/35 do not seem to have such a decisive advantage technically to assume they would prevail if significantly outnumbered.

My personal position, as of 2025,I don't see any basis to plan they're going to win even if they're *insignificantly* outnumbered. F-22/F-35 superiority premise held on assumption of significant US superiority in radio/sensor/comm sector and dominance in stealth. It's gone, so the only safe planning basis is contemporary parity.
J-20a is a state of the art, heavy air superiority. F-35 is state of the art, medium, multirole. F-22 is not state of the art, heavy, air superiority.
We're on the brink of adding j-35(which is 10 years younger than f-35), which is also apparently an air superiority type.
There's a visible problem in this simple paragraph.

PLAAF is still smaller than USAF - but it is huge, it's now a more modern and younger force, and it's adding A2A capability relatively faster than US(4+ count too).
The moment relative will change into absolute(j-35) is right over the corner.

In global context, it still gives US some years to think
But in Asia, with disparity in basing and home advantage, situation for US is turning bad.

And if the USAF proceeds quickly with large numbers of such aircraft to understand their advantages and limitations (and develop the software necessary for complex manned/unmanned or even full autonomous scenarios), the U.S. might well stay ahead of the curve for some time.

In my view, your description of situation is optimistic.

You're looking here for advantage in a software- and production- defined field without early advantage.
In my opinion, the investment in this field is not to stay ahead, but to not end up behind too much.

It's a field where Chinese ecosystem recently(roughly 2019 onwards) is doing hardware/software mixes faster and better than anyone in the world, backed by extreme advantage in industrial automatization(even relative robotics are horrible; absolute numbers are...well, you should see yourself).

Given how Lockheed can't unbug a bloody patch for two years now(and we were supposed to see block 4 now, not just patch) - I am kinda losing it for f-35 in 2030s. Will next software update for 3 versions and xyz international partners take that long again?
CCA, especially in their youth, will require many agile and sometimes buggy software(speed is key). Not just for CCA, but for cooperating aircraft.

 

[bring_it_on]

Given how Lockheed can't unbug a bloody patch for two years now(and we were supposed to see block 4 now, not just patch) - I am kinda losing it for f-35 in 2030s.

I've read some reports and understand a bit of what's going on (on the F-35) and what they are behind on etc. Can you share similar official reports on the Russian and Chinese programs so I can objectively compare efforts and progress (or lack of)?

 

[Ainen]

I've read some reports and understand a bit of what's going on (on the F-35) and what they are behind on etc. Can you share similar official reports on the Russian and Chinese programs so I can objectively compare efforts and progress (or lack of)?

China - nothing, just general assessment of that China inc does in private sector.
Russia...hard to tell, but that s-70 little Friday fix didn't go well!

 

[bring_it_on]

China - nothing, just general assessment of that China inc does in private sector.
Russia...hard to tell, but that s-70 little Friday fix didn't go well!

So basically nothing concrete or objective. And here you were trying to paint someone else's assessment as 'optimistic'.

 

[Ainen]

So basically nothing concrete or objective. And here you were trying to paint someone else's assessment as 'optimistic'.

@Josh_TN wrote about a way to carve out advantage against PRC manufacturing. As I read him, automated mass-produced CCAs will neuter likely Chinese advantage in aircraft numbers.

Statistics for manufacturing and industrial automatization are heavily against US.
China is massively ahead in that metric(490 to 297/10000), despite having workforce larger than entire population of the US.

Statistics in current aircraft manufacturing (and state of aerospace industry) favour the US. Without human(pilot) element involved, expecting outproducing PRC in these conditions in drones is optimistic; China's ability to setup automated manufacturing lines, and lunes in general, is likely to be higher; whole world is flying on Chinese drones after all.
And, vice versa, current manned aircraft advantage is with US.


It's simple straightforward logic. What's the problem?

 

[Avimimus]

So where will we next go then Josh_TN? A return to speed? Especially Hypersonic speeds above Mach 10 that was considered the holly grail of military aircraft and indeed missiles a decade ago.

Higher speed cruise means massive fuel hungry platforms... which means few platforms, huge logistics dependencies, and low sustained sortie rates - good for a nuclear armageddon but not much else.

I think we need to understand the balance as being more around locatability - a combination of stealth to delay or prevent detection of precise location, with reasonable cruising speeds that can allow relocation... delaying when an opponent can engage and limiting their decision making ability, so as to allow getting off the first shot. Low observability and efficient subsonic/moderate supersonic cruise may be where optimal performance is for not just sixth generation, but seventh and eight as well.

I suppose, the ultimate question is whether there will eventually be extremely powerful radars able to blanket the entire world and detect every bird and baseball... but they would be vulnerable to ARM warfare... and it may be a matter of pocking out each-other's eyes with hypersonics, and then sending something that looks very NGAD/CCA like into the gaps produced.

 

[Josh_TN]

A smaller aircraft does not equal a smaller RCS. In fact, the smaller something gets, the harder it is to reduce the signature across bands. Shaping is effective when the size of features/scattering sources is more than X times the wavelength where X is some number greater than 15. The lower the frequency, the longer the wavelength. A very large object can use shaping to have a low RCS across a broad range of wavelengths. A small object can use shaping effectively in a very narrow range of wavelengths.

I am not sure what is meant here by "exotics".

Most airborne radars are X band, and I would assume that is the focus of any CCA RCS reduction efforts. In that frequency range I thought small physical cross section can still be helpful lowering the RCS, but perhaps I am incorrect. By exotics I mean RAM and/or composite. It looks like the two Incr1 aircraft just use mostly aluminum for ease of production.

 

[Josh_TN]

They have been for about 5 years now. It's called Agile Combat Employment:
"Agile Combat Employment (ACE): a proactive and reactive operational
scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability
while generating combat power."

This includes large investments in the ability to operate most USAF aircraft from austere bases. Northwest Field at Guam isn't being used for the "RQ-180", it's being used for ACE related training and development:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/northrop-grumman-rq-180.20900/page-14#post-624238

I am aware of ACE; I meant austere basing specifically with regards to CCA. It is rarely mentioned. I can think of one quote from the program that said something along the lines of “optimizing CCA for the distances in the pacific theater” or something like that, but there really has not been must discussion of CCA with regards to ACE or runway requirements. I assume this is being considered in the background somewhere, hopefully.

 

[_Del_]

It looks like the two Incr1 aircraft just use mostly aluminum for ease of production.

It's a lot easier to field fix or replace bent or otherwise damaged aluminum than it is to lay and cure composites. Cheap and easy to play with. I think ultimately they'd like to explore 3D printing as many parts as possible in the field, but one thing at a time.

 

[Josh_TN]

@Ainen: The PRC has production advantages in most categories, but as far as I know they do not yet produce any CCA like platforms. I assume that changes soon and work is being in the black, but I do not know along what timeframe Similarly I am unaware of Chinese progress in AI software control of aircraft, though I assume it exists in some classified form. I do not assume PRC progress is equivalent to the U.S. as you seem to, but I do not exclude the possibility. In a worst case scenario as you depict, production of CCAs still is necessary just to try to stay competitive, as you say.

As for Russia, we will agree to disagree. While penetrating their world class ground based AD systems would be problematic, engaging their aircraft does not seem difficult. If your argument is that this has been the case since 1991, ok. But Russia is no longer a peer aircraft producing nation in my mind.

 

[bring_it_on]

The Air Force asked for funding to initiate Increment 2 in its fiscal year 2025 budget request, which is still pending approval from Congress, Hunter said during a Center for Strategic and International Studies event.

Once funding is approved, the service will begin concept development, during which it will evaluate different options, he said. “Is it more capable? Is it more affordable? Where on the spectrum will Increment 2 land? Those are questions to be explored.”

Achieving affordable mass with uncrewed systems “inherently implies that there are … capabilities that would be nice to have that you choose not to pursue because they add too much cost, and we try to live within a set of parameters that we believe constitutes affordability,” he said.

Key to making the correct tradeoffs is conducting thorough data analysis and engaging with the user community to understand “what really matters to them, what makes a difference,” he said. “It's that engagement with the user community that helps us sort through if we're going to go for more capability in one area, then we're going to inherently have to accept less in another if we're going to achieve affordable mass.”

The Air Force has already made a number of “trades” regarding Collaborative Combat Aircraft capabilities, and the service has the capacity to make more — and potentially different — tradeoffs in future increments, he said.

Hunter said the service does have “some ideas of how we would see Increment 2 fitting into the broader Air Force force design, and that will help shape [the] dialogue with industry to say, ‘Based on what we think Increment 2 does as part of the force design, is it more affordable? Is it more exquisite, and where does it fall on the spectrum?’”

Different companies will likely have different concepts, and some will be more advantageous and innovative than others, he said. By initiating Increment 2 while Increment 1 is still under development, the service will allow vendors who didn’t win Increment 1 contracts to recompete for Increment 2, he added.

“This is not a high stakes, win or lose for 30 years for industry,” he said. “If they don't succeed in one competition, the next competition is right around the corner, and that's pretty fundamental to being able to sustain competition over time among multiple competitors.”

One place where Collaborative Combat Aircraft will likely save the Air Force some money is sustainment, Hunter said.

“If you think about when we fly our platforms in the Air Force, what are they mostly doing? Well, they're mostly doing training,” he said. “The training is mostly for the crew: the pilots, the maintainers and other elements of the support crew.”

With uncrewed aircraft, “you don't necessarily have to have that,” he said. “The computer is the crew in that scenario. There's going to be some ground crew as well, but it will not be the case … that every CCA has to routinely fly for training purposes as you would see with a crewed platform.”

Additionally, the early increments of Collaborative Combat Aircraft are not designed to last for 30 or 50 years and thus won’t be “going into depot every five years and getting significantly overhauled,” he said. “There's a lot of simplification, a lot of savings associated with not having to do all of those things that you would do with an F-22.”

“On the balance, my expectation is sustainment costs for CCA are likely to be lower than a crewed platform, and I would expect by a reasonable margin,” he said. “But … our costers have to really dig into that, and they're very good at doing this sort of analysis and understand those implications. So, more to come on how that plays out.”

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine...-capability-for-collaborative-combat-aircraft

 

[Ainen]

@Ainen: The PRC has production advantages in most categories, but as far as I know they do not yet produce any CCA like platforms. I assume that changes soon and work is being in the black, but I do not know along what timeframe Similarly I am unaware of Chinese progress in AI software control of aircraft, though I assume it exists in some classified form. I do not assume PRC progress is equivalent to the U.S. as you seem to, but I do not exclude the possibility. In a worst case scenario as you depict, production of CCAs still is necessary just to try to stay competitive, as you say.

Yes, that's my take.

Let's...see where it goes. I would rather we would not find out who's right; but sadly, I think we will.

As for Russia, we will agree to disagree. While penetrating their world class ground based AD systems would be problematic, engaging their aircraft does not seem difficult. If your argument is that this has been the case since 1991, ok. But Russia is no longer a peer aircraft producing nation in my mind.

My take is, nothing much changed since 1991. Without either + or -.

Spoiler: Russia as air power

Russia is no superpower (no surprise). It's still largely the same industrial and intellectual core, minus Ukraine of course. You can say it's the last great power, surviving relic of an era long gone.

Russian aircraft are more or less within the pack, when it comes to contemporary aircraft. If anything, access to world electronics market made them more even with world level than pre-1991 aircraft, for practical purposes.

Change is that VKS size matches Russian PPP economy. It isn't something especially damning; we don't blame Sweden for failing to match F-35 production?
Russia still outproduces... basically the entire West (without US) in combat aircraft, on its peacetime production tempo. Russian aircraft follow the curve better than all of those, too. Which is remarkable, because Soviet collapse destroyed their whole original evolution path, yet Russian MIC still somehow climbed out.

Russian performance in Ukraine and even Syria isn't about aircraft, more about VKS being firmly stuck in fear of NATO, and investing accordingly.

As a result, since 2000s, it almost gave up normal air force tasks.
Either high level defensive stand off, or COIN. Nothing in-between. Which was kinda sensible in the pre-2022 world.

Is Russia peer? No, and won't be.
Near peer? Yes, it isn't likely to change.

Does it matter for NGAD? Add Russian numbers on top of Chinese.
Plus, Russian development doesn't top out now; it is not a spent force.

F-35s and CCAs produced for Europe ultimately don't come from a separate production line, it's a global pool. This "side investment" will have to continue, because ETO will keep up with world standard.