UK Industry Rationalisation 1950

Piecemeal thoughts as they come in short posts.
Westland.....just down the road from Bristol. Thanks to Beaching no North-South tie-ups.

Saro could just fold into DH.

Just clarify Folland SAM a bit for my dodgy memory?
 
zen #39: DH. They stood to be the major winner at the opening of the 50's.

Academic Management Theory
evolves from one fad to another, enhancing faculty, giving you and I some letters after our names, maybe we join McKinsey to destroy firms not au fait with fad-of-the-month. See L Simpson presiding over the demise of GEC by accepting advice that making black boxes was sooo last year and the future was soft. So: Succession, and Core.

At 1953 Farnboro Show the DH Enterprise had the largest stand, presenting the fact of its world-class, world-scope, but not showing their Succession achievement of recruiting fresh, proven blood to turn DH Props into (eventually a chunk of) MBDA. AM Sir R Sorley, MoS Controller, R&D, 1/49 MD/Props, had captured IR/AAM and would soon capture the MRBM. So: Succession: good; Core...well,..Sir Geo.DH did not understand GW. Nor did any other Senior in UK Aero (A to zen's Q above: MoS gave the active AAM to Folland: WEWP said no).

Human interfaces at the top are Core to businesses' lifespan: C.Gardner,BAC,Batsford, 81,P.34: "It is the generally accepted view that one reason DH backed away from (BAC) was that Sir Aubrey Burke (ex-Airwork, effective successor to Sir Geo DH) might well find himself playing second fiddle to (V-A's) Sir G.Edwards who was clearly likely to head up (BAC A/c)." If that were so, DH deserved to expire: Big Men must be above such trivia. Breakdown of 1959 talks to merge DH (post Sir Geo DH) into (to be BAC) was due to valuation (later, ditto Sir Fred HP): the MRBM was the issue. L Caldecote at EE/GW knew his way around Whitehall (his father, Sir T.Inskip, had held Ministerial Office, 1932-40) and knew it was for the chop: evidently Sir R Dobson/HS Group, did not. Core confusion.

So, again, not logic but luck determines our affairs. Exactly in 1953 Boeing set off down the Conglomerate route that would cause their non-Commercial Airplane Divns. to sustain the Corp. They did small turbines, hydrofoil, choppers...and made most of them work. But they made Minutemen work very well: if 737MAX had hit a firm doing nothing but Commercial Airplanes...Boeing would not today be trading.
 
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A to zen's Q above: MoS gave the active AAM to Folland: WEWP said no
Don't do that, I have acronym overload. It's just alphabet soup inside. So the idea obscure or rarely used acronyms are going to be recognised is fundamentally false.
I can just about manage the most common or personally memorable.
 
WEW Petter, Folland's (I think) Technical Director (ex-English Electric, ex-Westland) did not wish to be diverted onto the Air-to-Air Missile, so arranged for the job to be taken back by the Ministry of Supply, who gave it as Red Dean to Vickers-Armstrongs...whose boss, George Edwards took no interest
 
DH props doing test equipment is fine and adding AAM electronics is not too far a stretch.
Even MRBM guidance is not the problem....at least in that sense. Gyro fabrication is another issue .

But MRBM fuel and propulsion isn't a good match for DH. Warhead is Aldermaston and very Government.
Frankly big tanks of solid or liquid fuel doesn't seem a DH 'core' or future. Tell me I'm wrong?

Keeping rockets RO doesn't exclude options for EE or DH or GEC for guidance systems.
 
Perhaps our MoS bureaucrat should have noticed the tendency for major British airframers to drift off into also designing/making powerplants, major systems, missiles, and such. A simpler way to rationalise the British aircraft industry might have been to financially support airframers separately from engine-makers, weapons-makers, black-boxes-that-go-fzzt, etc.

A civil example could be the Bristol Britannia. In the RW, it is perfectly understandable why Bristol Aeroplane wanted to stick with its own Bristol Aero Engines turboprop - even if Proteus' reverse-flow made anti-icing a nightmare. But the Canadair CL-44 showed that the Britannia airframe was a fine design ... once powered by Rolls-Royce Tynes. If our bureaucrat can't separate airframers from their in-house engine makers, maybe the MoS should restrict financial support to airframes with 'outside' engine back-up options?

A similar approach could be take to manufacturers of missiles and their powerplants, guidance systems, etc.
 
Well engines often came in back-ups too, which didn't always pay off but it was early days of jet technology so not unwise to do that.

If we want to delve into engines, the situation in September 1950:

Alvis
Sites: Coventry
Development Work: Leonides series, Leonides Major
Manufacturing Work: Leonides

Armstrong Siddeley
Sites: Coventry
Development Work: Adder jet, Double Mamba, Sapphire (Sa.3 to 5), early design work on Viper, Snarler (HTP rocket), Screamer (LOX rocket)
Manufacturing Work: Python, Mamba

Blackburn (Engine Dept.)
Sites: Brough
Development Work: Bombardier (I don't think Blackburn yet had any Turbomeca licences)
Manufacturing Work: Cirrus Minor

Bristol (Aero-Engine Dept.)
Development Work: Phoebus, Proteus, Olympus, Thor ramjet
Manufacturing Work: Hercules, Centaurus

de Havilland Engines
Sites: Stag Lane, Edgware; Leavesden, Watford
Development Work: Sprite (RATO), Spectre (LOX), early work on H4 Gyron, H5 developed Ghost
Manufacturing Work: Gipsy Major, Gipsy Queen, Goblin, Ghost

Napier
Development Work: Nomad, Naiad (tailing off), Eland, Halford H7/Oryx gas generator
Manufacturing Work: anything?

Rolls-Royce Ltd.
Sites: Derby; Crewe; Barnoldswick, Lancs.
Development Work: Tay (no UK use), Dart development, Avon development, Conway
Manufacturing Work: Merlin (phasing out), Griffon 57, Derwent, Nene, Avon, Dart

My thoughts are:
Alvis: Leonides is needed, maybe L Major less so but for now is doing ok and keeping pistons out of the core industry.
Armstrong Siddeley: got a lot of design work going on, inherited Sapphire is their only real turbojet work, rocket choices, once the Mamba/Adder family is in production it should be useful.
Blackburn: might be keeping Auster going but that's about it, do they really need to be spending money on the Bombardier?
Bristol: a lot on the development bench, not a whole lot on the shopfloor except for late-era radials. Proteus not essential but Olympus is for V-Force project.
DH: jets in service, rocket research, worrying lack of next gen turbojets apart from very early work on what will become Gyron
Napier: lots on the test stand, nowt on the shopfloor. Some promising concepts but is Nomad really needed?
RR: doing the best out of the lot, plenty in production and plenty of next-gen work going on.

Ignoring Alvis and Blackburn my thoughts are; Bristol and DH are lacklustre at this period but important given skills and facilities. The ideal mergers would be Bristol Siddeley in 1951 instead of waiting until 1959 or de Havilland Siddeley. Given the Halford connection a DH-Napier tieup might work, although I am more tempted to let Napier go (no more turboprop designs are needed). That would give three large companies (RR, BS and DH or RR, HS and Bristol) with the third company probably merging later into others later in the 1950s (rationalisation round 2).
 
Ok, finally putting my money where my mouth is and here the Hood Report in all its glory.

The Assessment

Notional start date of 1952, need capacity for 16 projects at any one time at any stage of development to service four Operational Requirements annually (1 project taking 5 years from ITP to start production on average), peaking at 20 projects in 4th and 5th year of cycle. This peak load equates to 2 projects per design team.

Design & Development Categories
Class A: qualified design team led by a leading designer with capacity to work on multiple projects (at least 3), able to design aircraft over 40,000lb for civil and military use or conversions of existing aircraft, experience of jet aircraft, experience of cutting-edge aerodynamics and structures, access to extensive R&D facilities without reliance on RAE, access to flight test airfield with qualified test pilots
Class B: qualified design team led by a leading designer, able to design aircraft over 15,000lb for civil and military use or conversions of existing aircraft, experience of jet aircraft, knowledge of cutting-edge aerodynamics and structures, access to adequate R&D facilities with assistance from RAE, access to flight test airfield with qualified test pilots
Class C: qualified design team with capacity to work on multiple projects (at least 2), able to design aircraft over 15,000lb for civil and military use or conversions of existing aircraft, experience of jet aircraft, access to adequate R&D facilities with assistance from RAE, access to flight test airfield with qualified test pilots
Class D: qualified design team, able to design aircraft under 15,000lb for civil and military use or conversions of existing aircraft, no experience of jet aircraft, access to some R&D facilities but reliant on assistance from other firms/RAE, access to flight test airfield with qualified test pilots
Class E: able to design conversions of existing aircraft only, no access to R&D facilities and/or flight test airfield

Results
Class A: AW, Avro, Bristol, DH, HP, VA
Class B: Gloster, Hawker, EE, Fairey, Saro, VS
Class C: Blackburn, BP, Folland Percival, Short, Westland
Class D: Auster, FG Miles, Scottish
Class E: Chrislea, Elliott, FRL, Heston, PA, R&S, Slingsby

Production Categories
Class A: large works with latest equipment with capacity to work on multiple projects (at least 3), good number of skilled workers
Class B: large works with adequate equipment with capacity to work on multiple projects (at least 2), good number of skilled workers
Class C: works with adequate equipment for full scale production of one project, good number of skilled workers
Class D: low rate production only, adequate equipment
Class E: low rate production possible but mostly repair work, adequate equipment

Results
Class A: AW, Avro, DH
Class B: Gloster, Hawker, Bristol, VA
Class C: Blackburn, BP, EE, Fairey, HP, Percival, Short, VS, Westland
Class D: Auster, Elliott, Folland, Saro, Scottish, Slingsby
Class E: Chrislea, FRL, Heston, FG Miles, PA

Overall Ranking
AW
Avro
De Havilland
Bristol
Vickers
Gloster
Handley Page
Hawker
English Electric
Fairey
Vickers-Supermarine
Blackburn
Boulton Paul
Percival
Saro
Short
Westland
Folland
Auster
Scottish Aviation
Elliotts
FG Miles
Slingsby
Chrislea
Flight Refuelling
Heston
Portsmouth Aviation

Recommendations

Hawker Siddeley Aircraft to be encouraged to consolidate into two entities with two design teams at Chadderton and Hucclecote; Avro & AW and Hawker & Gloster. Production to be shared within the group. Close Bracebridge, Langley and abort Dunsfold construction. Kingston to continue for Hunter programme only, Squires Gate to be main Hunter line. Canberra sub-contract for Avro to go ahead. Armstrong Siddeley should be divested to de Havilland Engines or Bristol Engines. Merger of de Havilland Aircraft into Hawker Siddeley is not recommended.

de Havilland to be encouraged to take on a subsidiary, would suggest Bristol. DH Engines should either be divested to Armstrong Siddeley or to Bristol Engines, potential for complete merger of Bristol in airframes and engines. One factory would have to close, most likely Christchurch.

Vickers-Armstrong Aircraft to be encouraged to fully consolidate Vickers-Supermarine within the main company and use the South Marston design team to reinforce the Weybridge design staff. Modernisation and consolidation of factories required with good flight test facilities. Would advise moving Wisley production to Chilbolton. Possibility of transferring Christchurch from de Havilland.

Bristol to be encouraged to merge with de Havilland to increase their production capacity and allow better access to R&D facilities and with or without a merger of Bristol Engines with de Havilland Engines. Should be encouraged to maintain the helicopter team at Weston-Super-Mare and missile work at Filton for the de Havilland Group.

Handley Page to be encouraged to take on a subsidiary to increase their production capacity and strengthen the design team and product lineup, would suggest English Electric or Fairey. Handley Page (Reading) should be better integrated into the main company.

English Electric to be encouraged to merge with Handley Page to increase their production capacity and allow better access to R&D facilities.

Fairey to be encouraged to merge with Handley Page to increase their production capacity and allow better access to R&D facilities. Review whether guided weapons work is appropriate for this company.

Blackburn, Boulton Paul and Percival are all doing work of importance to the Services and the industry with some design successes. All are experienced companies but have insufficient resources to develop cutting-edge aircraft in sufficient scale, but they do have good manufacturing facilities. The recommendation would be for these companies to pair or for three to merge into one larger company. Boulton Paul and Percival would complement each other and are geographically close.

Saro has many interests, probably best if this company specialises in waterborne and rotary-wing aircraft.

Short Brothers & Harland should be maintained as a production site, maintain a small design team for conversion and special work, but should not be encouraged to tender new designs.

Westland has some experience, probably too far out of the way to merge realistically with the larger companies. Sikorsky licences have some merit, encourage them to focus on rotary-wing, may be assigned sub-contract production work.

Folland should not be encouraged with invites to tender and RTV.2 work should be withdrawn. Petter should be encouraged to seek proper facilities to put his talents to fuller use.

Auster should continue as is for now, some useful capability here. A merger with a Boulton Paul-Percival group might be beneficial later for the civil private aviation market.

Scottish Aviation should remain as a repair and overhaul provided and should be supported with such contracts from the RAF, RN, BOAC and BEA as appropriate. No more airframe production after Pioneer.

FG Miles, talented team but no facilities, would be better if an established company gave them employment, see no need to tender from this company.

Slingsby, no actions proposed, preferred source for all future ATC gliders.

Chrislea, Elliott’s of Newbury, Heston Aircraft, Portsmouth Aviation; no actions proposed, not considered as viable production units.

Flight Refuelling Ltd., should only be given non-aerial tanker related work if essential, sub-contracts on a commercial basis like any other aviation repair company, e.g. Marshall, etc.

Reid & Sigrist, to receive no more airframe contracts.


What Actually Happened? (Possible AH scenario)

Hawker Siddeley Aircraft formed A.V. Roe Whitworth Aviation Ltd. alongside the existing Hawker & Gloster Aircraft Co. Ltd., Hawker refused to close its Kingston offices and Dunsfold therefore went ahead (to much criticism by the Air Ministry). Armstrong Siddeley Aero Engines was not divested.

To the astonishment of many aviation pundits and writers, de Havilland acquired Bristol lock-stock and barrel. A new company was formed at Filton, de Havilland Aviatronics Ltd. for guided weapons developments. The first step was the transfer of RTV.2 work. Another new company was de Havilland Helicopters Ltd. at Weston-super-Mare. Bristol-de Havilland Aero Engines Ltd. was formed from the merger of both aero engine divisions and de Havilland Propellers.

The name of Vickers-Supermarine vanished into the history books as Vickers-Armstrong Aircraft became the main focus of the company. The MoS transferred Christchurch from de Havilland.

Messers Handley Page and Fairey did a deal and went into partnership, although both companies would continue to trade separately for several years. In another shock, F G Miles took over as Chief Designer at Reading.

The Board of English Electric seeing the way the wind was blowing and the unlikelihood of receiving new contracts, or even production orders for its P.1, decided to exit the fixed-wing aviation business in return for a commitment to support their move into guided weapons. Canberra production continued in the meantime, but much of the design work on the newer variants was transferred to Short & Harland. The P.1 programme was taken over by Blackburn.

Boulton Paul Aircraft was acquired by the Hunting Group and merged with Percival to form Hunting Aircraft Ltd.

Saro became the only specialist in flying boats in the country and one of three rotary-wing aircraft producers.

Short Brothers & Harland continued with work for other companies.

Westland sought to develop its Sikorsky helicopters, it still dabbled in fixed-wing but was also focusing on pressure cabin work and air conditioning systems.

Folland had its RTV.2 work withdrawn and transferred to English Electric. Petter resigned in disgust and went to design aircraft in India.

Auster carried on as before but sales dwindled and fabric seemed outdated. It began looking for investment and a new partner.

Scottish Aviation was upset about not having any more orders for the Pioneer and not being able to interest the RAF in its Twin Pioneer design.
 
UK Aero-Engine Industry, 1950. We should avoid fantasy and paint AHs only with the Art of the Business Possible.

5 teams were familiar with military turbines (ASM/Bristol/DH/Napier*/RR). US had GE, recipient of W.1, and Westinghouse; Pratt had licensed Nene, the needle engine, 5/47 as J42, RR Tay, 1948 as J48; Wright in 1950 licensed Olympus as J67, Sapphire as J65. Allis-Chalmers had left the sector, its Goblin licence as J36 finding no favour. Allison learnt the trade on GE J33/J35, enhanced as J71, then to turboprops.

UK funding system for military engine R&D was Basic Research in RAE Eng. Dept (after MAP bought Power Jets: ) NGTE/Pyestock; freely distributed to all; component work/initial design recovered in production overheads until a scheme excited a User, then MoS funds to Type Test. So when you read that E.Hives decided in 1947-49 to relieve his R&D overload by dumping Eagle, Tweed &tc...well, no. MoS decided what we would fund. That is how AJ65's problems were resolved by infusion of our Sapphire compressor data.

Westinghouse -1949 had a “comprehensive {capital} arrangement” with EE 6/30-1949 (Jones/Marriott, Anatomy of a Merger,P184) They would licence Avon RA.28/49, 7/53. In 1950 Wright licenced Olympus as J67/JT38 and Sapphire as J65. Pratt licenced Nene 5/47 as J42, Tay in '48 as J48.

* EE had bought Napier 23/12/42; MoS helped fund E.131 compound by-pass, 6 in EE's 4/47 Bid to the Medium Bomber, 4 in its insurance Short Sperrin - all rejected, in part because Napier had lost the services of Design Consultant, Goblin/Ghost inventor F.Halford, to DH Eng Div as MD,1/2/44, where he was working on (to be) Gyron and Gyron Jr. EE then miser-funded Napier till 1961.

In Avon's time of troubles MoS could have put Sapphire in Canberra, like DoD did. They did put it in P.1A (but not in Lightning) and they did buy Hunter Marks with both engines. If...MoS had not made Avon well in 1950 RR would have died.

But MoS did and proceeded with the Interim Medium at Vickers with Avon, Definitives at Avro with Olympus, HP with Sapphire. Cascades of Hunters, Canberras had Avons 2nd.-sourced at Bristol (240), Napier (200), Standard (410); Sapphires at HS' Brockworth Eng'g Co Ltd.

EE's G.Nelson was disposed towards RR for Canberra and P.1, not because of superior product, but because of independent product.
Westinghouse capital to 1949 had helped EE to stay in Aero after VJ Day; Canberra, a chop candidate to release RAF budget for more Mediums, overnight 7/50 became Super-Priority, and Experimental P.1 took pole position for supersonic fighter. No way was EE to help Bristol, DH, HSA to compete with his airframes by fitting their engines. He carried that stance with MoS.
 
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Remember that you need at least two engine designs in the same size/power class to ensure that the engine maker addresses issues quickly on both. See the early F100 reliability issues until the F101DFE/F110 started showing up.
 
Canberra was designed for the AJ.65 (Avon) from the very beginning so no surprise that they stuck with it.

Interestingly, when the Korean War rearmament panic hit, Avon production contracts were placed by the MoS with Bristol and Napier, and even the Standard Motor Company was mooted as a supplier!
Presumably the EE-Napier connection made sure they got a contract.

Two Canberra B.2s were used by Armstrong Siddeley/Bristol Siddeley for Sapphire test work and one for Olympus work (Viper was tested later on one of the Sapphire aircraft) and DH used several (mostly for rocket work) but one was fitted with Gyron Juniors. Not a bad haul of engines!
 
Remember that you need at least two engine designs in the same size/power class to ensure that the engine maker addresses issues quickly on both. See the early F100 reliability issues until the F101DFE/F110 started showing up.
I have two engine manufactures (BSE and Greater Rolls-Royce) from 1948 in my scenario and I suspect that @Hood has at least two 1950-60 in his timeline. It's two in my timeline is because I think that's where what's scientifically known as the "sweet spot" between economies of scale and competition for the UK in the 1950s is.
 
Thinking on Engines 1.

The idea of focusing on Gyron is at first sight attractive until we dig into the details.

Single shaft engines suffer from problems with the compressor stages. This is solved by Metrovick and Armstrong with valve hatches to lower the pressure until engine start and until forward movement.
Such engines can be temperamental in throttle changes but are fundamentally mechanically simple.

Two shaft engines allow compressor stages to be run at different speeds. Reducing or even doing away with relief valves.
Bristol saw this as the future and correctly funded it.

Thus Hooker and Halford would be in a direct argument over funding if they were in the same company.

But there might be a compromise here....
Gyron is aiming at 48" diameter and stainless steel construction.
Olympus is in these early days 40" diameter and already using titanium.

Arguably then the company might prefer to fund a smaller Olympus to an 'in-house' rival to Sapphire and Avon....especially as Avon is favoured and Sapphire a back up....and a bit of an orphan.

Leaving Gyron as the big V-Bomber engine of the company.
This might see Metrovick Armstrong team more in favour of Gyron in applying Single Shaft technologies. Ultimately Allowing Big Engines Team to then focus on new titanium Single Shaft Successor. Pulling on Hooker to contribute. Fundamentally for supersonic bombers and transports.

While Medium Engines Team would start anew on Zeus later on as high titanium content two shaft fighter engine. Ultimately abandoned for turbofan projects.

Leaving Small Engines Team, ex-Metrovick/Armstrong working on Mamba, Viper and Successors.
Viper I note underwent a major redesign to produce the 4,000lb thrust version later on. Incorporating a lot of ideas intended for new small engines.

All three sharing on reheat efforts.

This in turn also provides a three track solution and I note that the OR.339 offerings tended to favour the new Medway or smaller Olympus.

Company could then spy high bypass turbofan development as a potential to merge teams.
Small Olympus Core, Gyron or Successor Fan...

Small Viper like core, Zeus Fan...

And later on the plunge to three shafts.
 
This is proving a very detailed overview of British industry in the 1950s. It shows how much knowledge the key contributors bring to the various threads. Thank you
 
Summer 1950 may be a little ill advised for this given the little inconvenience underway in Korea? How about Attlee delaying the 1951 election by a few months and winning the electoral along the popular vote? Would you see Labour acting on the industry's problems faster that Churchill and Eden? Say around 1953-54?
 
Summer 1950 may be a little ill advised for this given the little inconvenience underway in Korea? How about Attlee delaying the 1951 election by a few months and winning the electoral along the popular vote? Would you see Labour acting on the industry's problems faster that Churchill and Eden? Say around 1953-54?
Or maybe starting the consolidation in 1948-49 instead.
 
Summer 1950 may be a little ill advised for this given the little inconvenience underway in Korea? How about Attlee delaying the 1951 election by a few months and winning the electoral along the popular vote? Would you see Labour acting on the industry's problems faster that Churchill and Eden? Say around 1953-54?
I wouldn't say so, nothing new off the drawing board can be built in time to directly to participate in the war. So the only option is to build what is ready (Canberra, Sea Hawk, Vampires et al) and there are plenty of production sites open and wanting work anyway.

Also, any consolidation will take time, it probably won't be until 1951 or 1952 that any implementation takes effect given the need to do the report, pass it through Whitehall committees, haggle with the industry leaders, get the Treasury to agree to some cash sweeteners, the time needed for the companies to raise capital and haggle among themselves and let the runners and riders settle down.
 
1951 Hood Report into Aircraft Types

Airliners and Commercial
Commercial aircraft are examined first, because the profitability and sustainability of the industry as a whole will rely on commercial sales to an extent not apparent before the war. The Brabazon Committee sat 8 years ago and now that peacetime conditions have returned for six years, the conclusions of that committee can be better assessed and the current needs of the airline industry ascertained. BOAC will for the foreseeable future require long and medium-range aircraft for its overseas network. BEA will require medium and short-range aircraft for its European network and domestic flights, both will have a need for more specialised freight-carrying aircraft for transporting cargo. Any commercial rotary-wing activity is likely to be exclusively a BEA province.

The USA maintains a lead in airliners, the majority of sales come are for the Boeing Stratocruiser, Lockheed Constellation and Douglas DC-6, but it is notable that most of these are based on pre-war or late-war era designs and the American manufacturers seem to be content to keep developing these types with newer piston engines and modest airframe upgrades – Super Constellation and DC-7. There is no strong attempt to design successors to these types as yet and no obvious interest in turbojet or turboprop-powered aircraft. With the Viscount, Britannia and Comet, Britain probably has a lead of 4-5 years. Newer entrants into the medium market are restricted to Convair and Martin, sales success has not been large so far. The low-cost of surplus Dakotas is not likely to by any new-build aircraft that can be offered, private companies operating outside the Corporations will in time gain access to ex-BOAC and BEA stock as newer types enter service. Of European competitors, Sweden and France are the best placed to develop a commercially successful airliner in one or more of these segments before 1960.American attempts by Convair, Douglas and Lockheed at very large long-range airliners similar to the Bristol Brabazon have met with no success. No large flying boat types have appeared and international routes using them have declined to the Southwest Pacific area. The USA has a strong private aircraft market and are world leaders in this area with several large companies offering multiple types, both single and twin-engined. No assessment of Soviet aircraft is offered, they are highly unlikely to be on the open market in the West and matching them for pure prestige reasons is not a cost-effective motive given the more important commercial

The Bristol Brabazon and Saro Princess are increasingly obsolete and BOAC’s current route network shows that these types are not economical and are, at best, freakish of size for the task in hand. There may be a military transport role for the Princess but the need would be met by a comparatively small number of airframes that would be uneconomical to produce, especially due to the specialised Double-Proteus development required. It is recommended to scrap these projects immediately. BOAC’s future long-range needs can be met by the Britannia and its medium-range needs by the Comet and current American types now in service. The Comet will enter commercial service next year. An Avon-powered Comet 3 is in development and may offer Transatlantic performance. BEA will serve most of its European network with Viscounts during the 1950s. The Britannia could easily serve their longer-range routes with key flagship routes served by Comets where commercially desirable. The Brabazon Type 5 12-seat feederliner has not been a success and is too small. De Havilland Dove and Heron aircraft can serve some internal routes (for later replacement by helicopters) but it is clear that bulk intercity routes will require larger aircraft. The Bristol Freighter and Super Freighter offer good bulk load capacity and serve the new cross-Channel car ferry market, dedicated Britannia or Viscount developments will offer a better long-range cargo capability. Britain has lost its pre-war light aircraft lead and today is reliant on Auster as the main national producer. More modern construction techniques are required and new engines to avoid reliance on American imported engines. Licence-manufacturer of American engines may be acceptable. In the main, the Ministry feels this segment should be left to the industry, but some centralised assistance in market surveys and R&D would be beneficial if commercial profits are to accrue from this area.

Future development needs are foreseen for:
A1: a twin-turboprop feederliner for BEA seating at least 24 passengers and convertible for general cargo use, to enter service by 1958.
A2: a long-range four-turbojet airliner to replace BOAC’s Britannia and Comet fleets from 1960.
A3: a Viscount replacement for BEA, to be powered by turboprops or turbojets and to enter service from 1960.

Helicopters
Rotary-wing flight is in its early stages. Military use by US Forces is underway in Korea both on land and at sea. There has been little work by the RAF or Royal Navy in tactical uses for the helicopter. The RN favours use for ASW and is formulating concepts for that role to replace fixed-wing aircraft on carriers. Some commercial use is just beginning in the USA. BEA has flown some trial services. Whether light helicopters will become commonplace for private ownership is unknown, there are probably some additional servicing costs from the rotor systems, even if current lightweight piston engines would suffice for motive power. It is currently unknown whether current 4/5-seat helicopters like the Bristol 171 will prove commercially viable for airline use due to their small payload and equally may be too small for military transport and too large for military observation. The large tandem-rotor helicopter looks the most promising for all transport needs. R&D is ongoing around the world, especially on propulsion with more exotic methods like tip-pods on the rotors with rocket or ramjet propulsion. It is important that Britain keeps abreast of these developments, licence-manufacture is useful in this regard but should not crowd out our own designs. Soviet developments seem to be roughly on par with America and Britain, but no mass produced types have appeared so far in military or commercial use.

Future development needs are foreseen for:
H1: a two-seat helicopter suitable for military observation and private use, the Saro Skeeter is currently under development, a second type – perhaps with a novel propulsion concept – may be useful for introduction from 1957.
H2: a heavy-lift helicopter with tandem rotors and two engines, the Bristol 173 is currently under development and looks very promising, a successor with turboprops should be developed to enter service in 1959.
H3: a single-rotor helicopter capable of seating 6-10 passengers for commercial and military use, should enter use from 1960.

Fighters
The appearance of the MiG-15 has been a shock. Clearly the USSR is able to develop cutting-edge fighters with comparable development times to the USA. It is highly probably that transonic-swept wing developments are already in place and will enter service by 1955. It is equally likely that a supersonic fighter of similar class to the P.1 and Delta 2 is now in development and will appear in service in 1957-58.
The Hunter and Swift should continue development under top priority to enter service in 1953, current improved transonic designs of these two aircraft should proceed and enter service in 1955. The P.1 to F.23/49 should enter service in 1957, it would be unwise to leave the supersonic fighter requirement to just one design without a backup. The ER.103 Delta 2 should be upgraded to a military specification beyond its high-speed research work. Further R&D for speeds beyond Mach 2 is required and suitable testbeds will be required by 1959. The RAF has raised the need for a rocket-powered interceptor. It is unclear given the likely development time whether it will be rendered obsolete by the next generation of anti-aircraft guided weapons (GW) and whether the rate of climb of F.23/39 and ER.103 types will match the rocket and offer far superior range and re-attack options. Given the importance of existing projects this may not be a justified R&D project at the present time. The future All-Weather (AW) fighter looks set to be the Gloster Javelin for the RAF and should be in service in 1955. Current Vampire/Venom/Meteor AW variants should suffice until the end of the 1950s. A supersonic replacement will be required by the 1960s, possibly up to Mach 2.5 speed.
The Royal Navy’s current fighter plans are in a state of flux and need to be nailed down as soon as possible. Pre-war the Navy insisted on two-crew aircraft due to navigational needs, modern avionics negates that need but it’s clear that aids like radar are indispensable for future aircraft. From the appearance of the MiG-15 it is clear that the Sea Hawk just entering production is obsolete as a fighter and is probably only useful as a fighter-bomber. The Supemarine 508 and 525 look to be heavy fighters in need of a role, they offer twin-engine performance but lack radar and are not equal to the MiG-15 in agility. AW is at the moment an ongoing saga with the Navy slowly getting its plans together for a new aircraft while the Vixen and Venom vie as interims. Vixen offers superior AI.18 radar and armament (Aden vice Hispano) and should be the interim type to enter service in 1953. The new AW fighter should be supersonic (below Mach 2). A transonic swept-wing day fighter is needed and could easily be adapted from the advanced Hunter or Swift. 508 and 525 are surplus to requirements unless they can be recast as an effective strike aircraft with a heavy bomb load.
Rockets may well replace cannons, homing GW will probably become the ideal future anti-bomber weapon but their use against fighters may be problematic. R&D into next generation ground and ship-based anti-aircraft GW should continue in line with Stage Programme unless military experience dictates otherwise. It is hard to foresee which methods of guidance and effectiveness at various altitudes and ranges will be by 1960 so multiple paths are likely for research with production selected from the most promising avenues shown by prototypes.

Future development needs are foreseen for:
F1: interim transonic generation day-fighters, for 1955.
F1a: naval version of F1, for 1955.
F2: interceptors capable of Mach 2, radar-equipped, rocket-armed
F3: naval AW, supersonic, rocket/GW-armed, for 1958.
F4: AW, capable of Mach 2, rocket/GW-armed, from 1960.

Bombers
This is essential given the nuclear deterrent role. Canberra is now entering service. Nothing should be allowed to prevent three V-Bombers entering service as soon as possible. Saying that, Sperrin offers no operational capability and as a testbed for pressure cabins and avionics seems to duplicating existing Avro Ashton conversions. Recommended to cease work on this project. There may be need for a dedicated V-Bomber version for the Pathfinder role, to be developed from an existing type. A Canberra replacement is probably not required until the 1960s. A V-Bomber replacement will be likely in the 1960s, probably of supersonic performance. R&D for this project should begin around 1955. The Soviets have in service a Canberra equivalent in the Il-28, no V-Bomber equivalent has been seen but can be assumed to have entered development for introduction in the late 1950s. Rumours of very long-range turboprop-powered bombers persist, these subsonic threats should be easily countered by transonic AW and day fighters and current anti-aircraft GW. For naval strike the Canberra is too large for carriers, an enlarged two-seat twin-engine radar-equipped aircraft seems the best solution, potential future nuclear use. Research into air-dropped homing bombs of various types is ongoing. It is hard to foresee which methods of guidance and effectiveness at various altitudes and ranges will be by 1960 so multiple paths are likely for research with production selected from the most promising avenues shown by prototypes.

Future development needs are foreseen for:
B1: naval 2-seat, 2-engine, radar-equipped strike aircraft armed with bombs and guns/rockets, to enter use in 1957.
B2: supersonic Super-V bomber, for the 1960s.
B3: supersonic Canberra replacement, for the 1960s.

Flying Boats
Commercial need beyond small amphibians is not foreseen, military transport needs are uneconomical with new-build aircraft. Military maritime reconnaissance may still be required and development of OR.231 should continue for now.
 
For A1, I would strongly suggest a turboprop conversion of the Dakotas available on the export market, even if you do end up building a whole new airframe separate from the Turbo Dakota for BEA.

Kerosene is much more readily available than 100 octane avgas.
 
@Hood your post seems pretty realistic / believable to me. I still reckon there's too many new projects ongoing though. e.g. Mach 2 day fighter, Mach 2 all weather fighter, and Mach 2ish naval all weather fighter? Do you just combine into a single programme and then order a back up?
 
@Hood your post seems pretty realistic / believable to me. I still reckon there's too many new projects ongoing though. e.g. Mach 2 day fighter, Mach 2 all weather fighter, and Mach 2ish naval all weather fighter? Do you just combine into a single programme and then order a back up?
There's an argument to be made for needing a M2 day fighter designed and flown to get to a good M2 all-weather fighter design.

We can argue about combining the RAF and RN all weather fighter designs separately.
  • The big argument against combining from the RAF is reduced performance due to all the reinforcing done in both airframe and radar/FCS.
  • The big argument for combining from Treasury is bigger production run so the planes will be cheaper for each one.
 
For A1, I would strongly suggest a turboprop conversion of the Dakotas available on the export market, even if you do end up building a whole new airframe separate from the Turbo Dakota for BEA.
I have in mind ultimately something like the Avro 748 and Dart Herald but just a little earlier, but yes there were some Dak conversions for BEA with Darts and I believe there was a Mamba conversion too (testbed?) so its possible. Lack of pressurisation is a bit of a bugger though.

@Hood your post seems pretty realistic / believable to me. I still reckon there's too many new projects ongoing though. e.g. Mach 2 day fighter, Mach 2 all weather fighter, and Mach 2ish naval all weather fighter? Do you just combine into a single programme and then order a back up?
Thanks. I was aiming for something that was realistic, its probably more realistic that some of the real MoS planning of this period. There are a fair few proposals here but, there are 10 design teams and at this stage. Trimming the V-Force seems unwise given its unclear if they will all work out or not. But I hope to flesh out things more as I go forward on a year-by-year basis to make a coherent alternate history out of this.

F1 is basically the Hawker P.1083, so the Hunter F.6 will be the 50 degree swept wing version with uprated Avon. I envision this becoming a fighter-bomber to supersede the Vampire and Venom once the supersonics arrive.
F1a nearly happened in the real world, I think the Swift was preferred. Not quite sure how this will pan out yet. Maybe the P1.083 with an AI.20 radar in the nose (but probably no AAM).
F2 is the Lightning and Delta 2, so they are already in development. I allowed myself some luxury here - my logic is that most fighter developments have been pairs (Hurricane & Spitfire, Tempest & Spiteful, Vampire & Meteor, Hunter & Swift) and nobody has built a Mach 2 fighter yet and there is no telling whether either will be successful, so it makes sense to back two horses and upgrade the Delta 2 as a fighter. Now everyone is probably dreaming about British Mirages! I've not done this intentionally for that reason, but ER.103 is already underway and it saves raising a tender for new designs.
F3 is probably more important timing wise as the RAF is loaded with AW (I don't really like having Vampire and Venom AW but things are what they are) and Javelin should have some growth in it (from a 1951 perspective). The Navy probably doesn't face quite as serious bomber threat so transonic should suffice. Sea Vixen appearing in good time is less obsolete and a Mk.2 with more thrust might suffice. For the RAF its likely a Soviet supersonic bomber will appear in the early 1960s so it makes sense to leap to Mach 2 at least to offer sufficient speed advantage over the bomber and allow fast climb and intercept. So the two don't marry up really.

B1 at this moment could be an earlier NA.39 but equally it might just be a Sea Vixen with bombs or a beefed up two-seat Scimitar.

There's an argument to be made for needing a M2 day fighter designed and flown to get to a good M2 all-weather fighter design.
I would agree with that.

  • The big argument against combining from the RAF is reduced performance due to all the reinforcing done in both airframe and radar/FCS.
  • The big argument for combining from Treasury is bigger production run so the planes will be cheaper for each one.
It's not impossible, a fairly impressive list of land-based aircraft were adapted for carrier use. I just think the requirements at this point in time don't match well - but of course its early days and we'll see how things develop. I've no pre-conceived ideas at this point and I have no real idea where this might lead yet. I'm trying my best not to use too much hindsight.
 
On Fighters....

Funding alternatives to Gyron Junior, would assist this process.

By I think '55 studies did show a jet only Mach 2 fighter with collision course weapons (as opposed to stern chase), was both possible and had advantages in range at which engagement could happen.
It was noted this is easier to compute and guide the fighter from the Ground or Ship or AEW platform.

But at this time the focuse on hybrid stern chase systems was obviously uppermost and did at least have the benefit of higher altitudes.

What was missing was the 'jump up' missile.
Essentially Red Hebe had something along these lines in bring designed to gain some 5,000ft against a high speed target.

Arguably this study could have concluded similar earlier.
 
I have in mind ultimately something like the Avro 748 and Dart Herald but just a little earlier, but yes there were some Dak conversions for BEA with Darts and I believe there was a Mamba conversion too (testbed?) so its possible. Lack of pressurisation is a bit of a bugger though.
The Turbo Dakota is basically to get foreign currency inflows, IMO.


It's not impossible, a fairly impressive list of land-based aircraft were adapted for carrier use. I just think the requirements at this point in time don't match well - but of course its early days and we'll see how things develop. I've no pre-conceived ideas at this point and I have no real idea where this might lead yet. I'm trying my best not to use too much hindsight.
It's a pretty short list of successful naval fighters that were converted from land jets, however.
 
Industry Rationalisation came again to UK Cabinet, 21/11/66, after RR 7/10/66 obtained Approval to form an aero-engine monopoly.
MoA was Tasked to address the subject: it chose to encourage voluntary merger, BAC+HSAL, with a State Golden Share.
All became bogged down on Valuations: BAC was Studying AFVG, developing (to be) Jaguar; HSAL was developing (to be Harrier GR.1/T.2), snared in a pricing problem, and building RN Buccaneer S.2, RAF Nimrod MR.1; civil: BAC sought Launch Aid for 2-11; HSAL Studied Super Galion from 15/10/66 with Sud Avn. Who was to say that lot equated to 50-50, or any other number? What is Concorde worth?

Then AFVG died 29/6/67. UK flung Study dribble £ to BAC 13/11/67 to invent a UKVG (never inviting thoughts from HSAL).
18/11/67 £ Devaluation led to East of Suez departure, announced 6/2/68. Ministers lost interest to mess about with Aero equity.

That gap, 29/6/67-18/11/67 saw a flurry of Investor interest in Aero: RR argued value of HS Group's 50% BSEL (bought, 1/68); EE bought Elliott (8/67), GEC bought AEI (11/67). HSDynamics signed Sea Dart SAM production contract; HSAL won materials release for 70 Harriers;
Govts agreed 25/7/67 to Study A300, HSAL 37.5%. GEC had a cash pile and showed interest in more Aero (9/68 to buy EE Co, so 40%/BAC).
Here was a window to value BAC on terms acceptable to HS Grp, maybe even embracing some in the avionics sector: B.A.E, say Systems?

That fantasy BAES-with-a-tilt-towards (ex-HSAL) would have had no commitment to Warton-for-UKVG: Ministers put it there to prop up credibility as a going-concern, to sustain the Saudi deal.
France was ejected from NKF90 by Mirage-myopia, UK in like lightning (Ha!), MRCA Study 17/7/68, as free as 5 other Nations to place Study work wherever Ministers might choose. BAES might have moved folk up from Kingston, or over to Brough, or down from Warton.
 
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We're getting a little ahead of ourselves in discussing the 1960s, but some interesting information and thoughts there.

Pre-66, around 1963-65ish there seems to be fluctuating thoughts at the MoA about BAC and HSA. For example, HSA was cut out of ECAT/AST.362 and AFVG. HSA got very little out of the Anglo-French programmes except for Martel and its involvement in the early workings to form Airbus - with political approval being very "yes-no-yes-no". Yet at the same time the MoA thought that BAC had badly mishandled TSR.2 and were mishandling Concorde. HSA were following the V/STOL dream as they had very little else to cling to, to keep in work. Civil sales for both BAC and HSA were nothing to write home about - as you say this was the era of 2-11 as a competitor to Airbus and stretched 1-11s and Tridents.
I agree it would have been hard to assign a 50/50 value, certainly it may have made some procurement decisions easier and some harder. It wouldn't have released any more money though for the government to buy aircraft and fund R&D, it might have made the internecine site wars tougher.
BAC and HSA always seemed to see-saw between being civil heavy or military heavy, to reorient one to civil and one to military would have been painful but might have been beneficial. HSA and BAC might have continued on that basis more profitably. I don't think that BAe actually did anything well - it saw pre-merger projects through to fruition and relied on them to make profits but didn't really do anything new for itself (ATP maybe?) and instead made money from selling off surplus industrial sites and then buying up electronics and shipyards to become BAE Systems, before divesting itself of all aircraft except for Warton - on the basis that the RAF & UK government will always want a sovereign fighter so will always stump up billions in cash for the shareholders.
Now you might argue that the asset stripping was a curse caused by privitasation, but it still stands that beyond Eurofighter nothing in the BAe catelogue was new, just BAC and HSA (and Scottish Aviation) aircraft with new BAe stickers on them - ironically most of the big sellers were all HSA products, BAC actually brought very little to the table in the 1970s. When the time came to think about Jetstream, 748, 125 or 146 replacements it was just easier to flog the rights to someone else for hard cash or claim the market was too tough. It didn't even try to replicate a Hawk replacement, it tarted it up and left it at that - even letting India try to push along development off its own back rather than doing anything too proactive about it.
Harsh perhaps, but rationalisation went too far I think in stifling development.

I suspect that had BAC and HSA been kept separate, HSA might well have prospered with Hawk, 146 and 125 sales. BAC would have struggled and going down the systems route was perhaps inevitable, or becoming bought out in the 1980s.
 
@Hood a lot of that summary seems very true, even out to today

I'm not convinced on a separation between civil and military aviation companies. There are many successful examples of when a single company has done both - but this sort of gets after establishing a single company rather than separate businesses units that persist to this day.

It's easy to forget that HSA actually did pretty well out of the civil 748, 146 and 125 lines. Sure they didn't become an Airbus / Boeing giant, but that just feels like an unrealistic goal. Whereas there's still a large market for business jets and small airliners today that could support a viable company.
 
I'm not convinced on a separation between civil and military aviation companies. There are many successful examples of when a single company has done both - but this sort of gets after establishing a single company rather than separate businesses units that persist to this day.
That is true. HSA could have done both but BAC doesn't seem to have had much success with its civil efforts post 1-11 (and even before then only the Viscount was a winner).

It's easy to forget that HSA actually did pretty well out of the civil 748, 146 and 125 lines. Sure they didn't become an Airbus / Boeing giant, but that just feels like an unrealistic goal. Whereas there's still a large market for business jets and small airliners today that could support a viable company.
I think its feasible that HSA could have made all the upgrades Raytheon did to the 125 line up and might have been able to fund a successor bizjet. HSA might not have bothered with the ATP off its own bat, but I suspect they might have kept the 146 going as the RJX, probably wouldn't have been an amazing success but it would have picked up some sales. A larger bizjet might have formed the basis of a new regional jet, much like Bombardier did. Plus it was HSA that had the UK's Airbus share.
Militarily the Hawk would have continued to be a cash earner, Harrier II would have offered work and profit. Assuming BAC had survived into the late 90s its possible that BAC and HSA might have been rivals in JSF with HSA partnering with McD/NG and BAC with either Boeing or Lockheed.
 
Britain is in a difficult position trying to have a US scale aerospace industry using small companies.
No other European country develops the range of stuff that Britain does, everything from long ranged transports (VC10 and Belfast) to close air support VSTOL (P1127).
In the end we lose out not just to the US but to countries like Canada, Brazil and Sweden which focus on doing a few things very well and giving customers what they want.
No amount of tinkering with re-organising UK industry was going to change the "punch above our weight" mentality in Britain.
We have ended up being a specialist country despite this. We dont do manned space but design and build excellent unmanned stuff. We no longer build whole civil airliners but are a major supplier of components. Our military design expertise has been maintained by collaboration (Typhoon, F35, Aster).
 
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