U.S. Navy Identifies Network Invasion Tool

[seruriermarshal]

Jan 7, 2011



By David A. Fulghum


A top U.S. Navy official acknowledges that the service’s Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) — designed for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and F-35 — will feature a network invasion capability.

Such a capability was demonstrated a few years ago by the U.S. Air Force, which created a focused datastream with its EC-130 Compass Call aircraft that could be filled with invasive algorithms and fired into the antenna of an integrated air defense system and its wirelessly connected missile launching vehicles. The effects on the enemy network were monitored by an RC-135 Rivet Joint. This network invasion effort was known as “Suter.”

Now the Navy is putting the capability on fighter-size tactical aircraft through NGJ.

“I think [Suter] is a good description of NGJ [capability],” says Vice Adm. David Dorsett, deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance and director of naval intelligence. “Next Generation Jammer is a focus for that type of capability.”

NGJ is part of a Navy effort from 2010 to 2020 to refocus research and development on non-kinetic capabilities like information operations, network invasion and electronic attack. “We have been out of balance” because of the necessary focus on kinetic weapons needed to fight limited wars in the 2000-2010 period, Dorsett says.

Photo: US Navy


http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/01/07/09.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%20Identifies%20Network%20Invasion%20Tool

 

[seruriermarshal]

Navy Confirms That New Jammer Will Be Cyber-Invasion Device
Posted by David A. Fulghum at 1/7/2011 8:30 AM CST

The EA-18G Growler and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will both carry an airborne network invasion weapon, says U.S. Navy’s top intelligence official.

A few years ago, the U.S. Air Force first demonstrated the ability to create a focused datastream with its EC-130 Compass Call aircraft that could be filled with invasive algorithms and fired into the antenna of an integrated air defense system and its wirelessly-connected missile launching vehicles. The capability was exercised in a progressive series of “Suter programs”. The effects on the enemy network were monitored by an RC-135 Rivet Joint. Now the Navy will install the capability on fighter-size tactical aircraft.

“I think [Suter] is a good description of NGJ [capability],” says Vice Adm. David J. Dorsett, deputy Chif of Naval Operations for information dominance and director of naval intelligence (N2/N6).

“Yes, correct,” he says, the Navy is planning to put the capability on tactical aircraft. “Next Generation Jammer is a focus for that type of capability.”

NGJ is part of a Navy effort from 2010 to 2020 to refocus research and development on non-kinetic capabilities like information operations, network invasion and electronic attack. “We have been out of balance” because of the necessary focus on kinetic (explosive and penetrating) weapons needed to fight limited wars in the 2000-2010 period, Dorsett says.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3aa2d11ad1-c7d4-403c-ad62-2fb21c53bb9d&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

 

[seruriermarshal]

Old news :

Report: IAF knocked out Syria radar during Sept. 6 strike
Aviation Week: IAF hit radar post en route to striking alleged nuclear facility, U.S. provided data during operation.
By Yossi Melman and Haaretz Service

The Israel Air Force hit a Syrian radar post near the country's northern border with Turkey on September 6, knocking out Syria's entire radar system as a prelude to striking a suspected nuclear reactor, Aviation Week & Space Technology is reporting in its November 26 edition.

The radar site was hit with a combination of electronic attack and precision bombs to allow the IAF to enter and exit Syrian airspace unobserved, the report said.

Subsequently all of Syria's air-defense radar system went off the air for a period of time that encompassed the raid, U.S. intelligence analysts told Aviation Week

According to the report, the United States provided Israel with information about Syrian air defenses as Israel carried out the strike.

The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming from Syria during the air strike, and while there was no active American engagement in the operation, there was advice provided, military and aerospace industry officials told the magazine.

However, there was "no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities," a U.S. electronic warfare specialist says.

Syria has confirmed the air strike, but has vehemently denied reports that it targeted and destroyed an apparent nuclear facility built with North Korean assistance. North Korea has also denied any nuclear cooperation with Syria.

For their part, Israeli officials have maintained silence and refused to comment on the air strike.

Israeli nuclear expert: Syria site was facility for assembling nukesTel Aviv University Professor Uzi Even, a former Meretz MK and a chemist who until 1968 worked at the Dimona nuclear reactor, told Haaretz in an interview published Thursday that he believes the evidence suggests that the Syrian site was not in fact a nuclear reactor - but rather a facility for assembling nuclear bombs.

Even, who has been keeping track of nuclear issues for years, bases his analysis in large part on satellite photos widely published recently in the media and on internet Web sites.

The images show that the facility lacked a chimney - which is necessary for the emission of the radioactive gases - despite the fact that evidence suggests that construction began on the facility at least four years ago. In contrast, a chimney is clearly visible in images of the reactor in Yongbyon, North Korea.

"We can assume that construction began even before 2003," says Even. "In all those years, five years or even more, a chimney had still not been built? Very strange."

In addition, Even contends, the facility did not have cooling towers. The pumping station seen in the photos, 5 kilometers from the site, cannot, according to him, be a substitute for such towers. "A structure without cooling towers cannot be a reactor," he says, pointing to the satellite photo from Yongbyon, in which one can clearly see the cooling tower, with steam rising from it.

Another structure essential for a reactor is missing from the Syrian photos: a plutonium separation facility, which processes enriched uranium in order to turn them into plutonium.

"In my estimation this was something very nasty and vicious, and even more dangerous than a reactor," says Even. "I have no information, only an assessment, but I suspect that it was a plant for processing plutonium, namely a factory for assembling the bomb."

Should his assessment be true, it would mean that Syria was in a far more advanced stage in its attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, in that it likely would already have the necessary plutonium, and was involved in building a bomb factory.

Even's assessment is reinforced by the fact that satellite photos taken after the bombing clearly show that the Syrians made an effort to bury the entire site under piles of earth. "They did so because of the lethal nature of the material that was in the structure, and that can be plutonium," he said. That may also be the reason they refused to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the site and take samples of the earth, which would expose the nature of the site.

http://www.haaretz.com/news/report-iaf-knocked-out-syria-radar-during-sept-6-strike-1.233801

 

[seruriermarshal]

Report: IAF strike in Syria also targeted radar station


Aviation Week reports Israel's September strike on Syria targeted radar station near Syrian-Turkish border. US supplied strategic information but was not actively involved, says magazine

News agencies Published: 11.22.07, 15:36 / Israel News
share




The United States provided Israel with strategic information about the Syrian air defense systems prior to the Israeli Air Force strike on a suspected nuclear site in Syria, the US based Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported Thursday.




According to aerospace industry officials quoted in the report, the US was monitoring the electronic emissions coming from Syria during the IAF strike.

The strike, said Aviation Week, targeted not only the suspected nuclear reactor being developed at Dayr az-Zawr, but also a Syrian radar station located at Tall al-Abuad, near the Syrian-Turkish border.



The Israeli fighter jets, reported the magazine, flew over Syria without alerting Syrian air defenses.



The radar site was apparently hit with both precision bombs and an electronic signal, which allowed IAF jets to fly through Syrian airspace undetected.



The report stressed that there was "no active US engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities."



The analysts quoted in the magazine said they didn't believe that any part of Syria's electrical grid was shut down, but did contend that network penetration involved both remote air-to-ground electronic attack as well as penetration through computer-to-computer links.




"Offensive and defensive network warfare is one of the most interesting new areas," said Pinchas Buchris, director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry. "I can only say we're following this technology closely. I doubted this field five years ago, but we did it. Now everything's changed.



"You need this kind of capability," added Buchris. "You're not being responsible if you're not dealing with it; and if you can have this kind of capability, than the sky's the limit."

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3474556,00.html