The Empires Post War Fleet

Pirate Pete

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I have been flicking through my copy of Building for Victory by George Moore, partly to find hints on what Admiralty construction programmes were towards the end of WW2 and the then thoughts of looking forwards…
there is reference to a paper dated 28th April 1944 entitled “The Empires Post War Fleet”, but regrettably I have not been able to find any details….
Have any Forum Members access to or sighted this document? I would be VERY interested in reading it.

Thank you to anyone who can either point me towards source material - regrettably I am unable to get to the National Archives or National Maritime Museum and am therefore restricted to either on-line sources or publications produced by Authors.
 
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I have been flicking through my copy of Building for Victory by George Moore, partly to find hints on what Admiralty construction programmes were towards the end of WW2 and the then thoughts of looking forwards…
there is reference to a paper dated 28th April 1944 entitled “The Empires Post War Fleet”, but regrettably I have not been able to find any details….
Have any Forum Members access to or sighted this document? I would be VERY interested in reading it.

Thank you to anyone who can either point me towards source material - regrettably I am unable to get to the National Archives or National Maritime Museum and are therefore restricted to either on-line sources or publications produced by Authors.

Friedman's Postwar Naval Revolution has a brief description

I've paraphrased this below:

circa March 1944

-1 Main Fleet in Home Waters and another divided between the Mediterranean and Far East, each consisting of:
-4 Aircraft Carriers
-2 Battleships
-2 Heavy Cruisers (accompanying the battleships)
-4 Light Cruisers (directly supporting the carriers)
-1 Destroyer Screen consisting of 2 flotillas (16 ships, increased in April 1944 to 18 ships, including 2 destroyer leaders, the distinction between cruiser types was also removed at the sane time)

-This fleet unit would be supported by a destroyer tender, a heavy repair ship, an aircraft repair ship, and fast tanker.

-Home and Far East Station Forces each consisting of:
-2 Aircraft Carriers
-2 Light Cruisers
-8 Destroyers

-2 Battleships (1 each) would supplement the local battle squadrons in the Mediterranean and Far East, with 6 Heavy Cruisers in the Home Station, and 12 in the Far East.

- The active fleet would consist of:
- 6 Battleships
- 12 Aircraft Carriers
- 22 Heavy Cruisers
- 12 Light Cruisers
- 56 Destroyers
- 32 Frigates (4 squadrons of 8 each, on the stations)
- 36 Submarines
- 24 Minesweepers (one flotilla per station)
- 32 Coastal Craft.

-Projected reserve force consisting of
-6 Battleships
-10 Aircraft Carriers
-8 Large Cruisers
-8 Light Cruisers
-60 Destroyers
-158 Escorts
-50 Submarines
-100 Minesweepers

-Amphibious Forces would consist of a full divisional lift (2 brigade assault basis) in Home Waters, with brigade lifts in India and Australia for Dominion training. When this plan was reviewed in April 1944, this amphibious force was parked to a nucleus of landing craft based in Home Waters.
 
Friedman's Postwar Naval Revolution has a brief description

I've paraphrased this below:

circa March 1944

-1 Main Fleet in Home Waters and another divided between the Mediterranean and Far East, each consisting of:
-4 Aircraft Carriers
-2 Battleships
-2 Heavy Cruisers (accompanying the battleships)
-4 Light Cruisers (directly supporting the carriers)
-1 Destroyer Screen consisting of 2 flotillas (16 ships, increased in April 1944 to 18 ships, including 2 destroyer leaders, the distinction between cruiser types was also removed at the sane time)

-This fleet unit would be supported by a destroyer tender, a heavy repair ship, an aircraft repair ship, and fast tanker.

-Home and Far East Station Forces each consisting of:
-2 Aircraft Carriers
-2 Light Cruisers
-8 Destroyers

-2 Battleships (1 each) would supplement the local battle squadrons in the Mediterranean and Far East, with 6 Heavy Cruisers in the Home Station, and 12 in the Far East.

- The active fleet would consist of:
- 6 Battleships
- 12 Aircraft Carriers
- 22 Heavy Cruisers
- 12 Light Cruisers
- 56 Destroyers
- 32 Frigates (4 squadrons of 8 each, on the stations)
- 36 Submarines
- 24 Minesweepers (one flotilla per station)
- 32 Coastal Craft.

-Projected reserve force consisting of
-6 Battleships
-10 Aircraft Carriers
-8 Large Cruisers
-8 Light Cruisers
-60 Destroyers
-158 Escorts
-50 Submarines
-100 Minesweepers

-Amphibious Forces would consist of a full divisional lift (2 brigade assault basis) in Home Waters, with brigade lifts in India and Australia for Dominion training. When this plan was reviewed in April 1944, this amphibious force was parked to a nucleus of landing craft based in Home Waters.
Doh!
I have Friedman’s Postwar Naval Revolution!
Forgot to check there- thanks.
 
Seen from the present day such numbers seem insanely optimistic given the UK's circumstances post 1945.
But to the men planning in 1944 Empire was still something to strengthen the "mother country" once the war against Germany and Japan had been won. Washington and HM Treasury knew differently that such illusions had died with two global wars.
The ratio of battleships to aircraft carriers also belongs to a world where Taranto and Pearl Harbour had never happened.
The US lead in cruisers after the war allowed it to deploy guided missiles in quantity before the UK.
Perhaps the strangest thing is that the unravelling of the Empire in the postwar years could not have been prevented by the pipedream fleet.
 
The ratio of battleships to aircraft carriers also belongs to a world where Taranto and Pearl Harbour had never happened.

The ratio of Battleships to Carriers is reasonable when you consider British war experience of fighting in very bad weather. Aircraft Carriers were not yet capable of all-weather operations, Battleships still being the best means of bad-weather anti-ship capability, and Aircraft Carriers and would have been no less vulnerable to surprise attacks when moored in harbour than a Battleship.
 
The ratio of battleships to aircraft carriers also belongs to a world where Taranto and Pearl Harbour had never happened.
Fast Battleships make excellent carrier escorts, and the US was running roughly one heavy escort per two carriers at the time.

Also, as @A Tentative Fleet Plan says, carriers were not all-weather fighters yet, so having a battleship to fight in bad weather is more or less a requirement.

And finally, you are forgetting the use of battleships for shore bombardment.

So no, I don't think it's unreasonable to have 6x battleships in the active fleet and 6 more in reserve.
 
The ratio of Battleships to Carriers is reasonable when you consider British war experience of fighting in very bad weather. Aircraft Carriers were not yet capable of all-weather operations, Battleships still being the best means of bad-weather anti-ship capability, and Aircraft Carriers and would have been no less vulnerable to surprise attacks when moored in harbour than a Battleship.
Not only bad weather - but small theaters (like North Sea or Mediterranean) too. Carriers were still quite influenced by wind gauge - if the wind was from the enemy's direction, this means that carriers must run toward enemy to launch or receive planes. In narrow threaters of operations it did not combine well with the desire to stay away from enemy. So battleships were nessecary to protect carriers from potential attack of enemy surface units.
 
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