Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

Something I feel gets losses a lot in this conversation.

We need to understand that American shipbuilding is fundamentally uncompetitive. South Korea and the PRC can build ships at twice the speed for half the price. And this isn’t a coincidence.

Shipbuilding is not cheap, especially for the yard. Labor is expensive. OSHA lawsuits are expensive. Compliance with environmental laws is expensive. Developing new infrastructure is expensive. Being forced to eat the loss from fixed price contracts is expensive. If the yards want to maintain any sort of profit margin, operating costs must be kept to the bare minimum. This is the reason McDonald’s pays more than entry level positions at HII.

But those are American yards. South Korea has less strict OSHA laws, less strict environmental regulations, and their people will work 60 hours a week for mere pennies. For the lack of better phrasing, white people are expensive, as the cost of living here is more expensive. Doing virtually everything in America is expensive. And regardless of who is in the White House, that trend won’t reverse.

Simply put, there is no scenario where the free market will allow domestic shipbuilding to regenerate to historical levels. The mere “survival” of the domestic shipbuilding industry is solely because of protectionist economic policies that mandate domestic construction of American-flagged vessels.

If the Jones Act dies, or we start building ships in Korea, the U.S. will permanent stop building ships. And there will be no recovery. The fact of the matter is American shipbuilding will never be competitive. It will never be able to stand on its own in the free market. There’s a reason why nearly all domestic orders from the federal government.
There would be no need to repeal the entire law (The Jones act). There are exceptions, however. The first step would be for non-contiguous US states and territories to be able to get waivers from the president. Why not do that is ridiculous, because it is only a small change that could make a big difference. You don't want Chinese ships to do interstate cabotage? No problem, they can be banned from the coasts for national security reasons.
 
I think the other thing we have to come to grips with is that the nature of naval warfare *might* be changing and that large surface ships may no longer be competitive in peer warfare. Currently the trend is for ever decreasing costs and abilities for anti ship platforms and ISR, while the complete opposite for modern DDG types. Barring a major technological change that pushes the cost effectiveness ratio in favor of the defense, we may be seeing the end of surface ships based sea control as we know it.

Now of course we have seen technological scares like this before - the torpedo boat, the submarine, the anti ship missile, etc. in the end surface navies adapted to meet the threat. But generally what came out of each technological revolution was a new type of ship to address the threat, with the older types sometimes facing total obsolescence.

I wonder if there is not a technological sea change in naval affairs that occurs long before the U.S. could re-establish any kind of significant industrial increase.
 
We need to understand that American shipbuilding is fundamentally uncompetitive.

Yes, to a degree. But US naval shipbuilding is even worse than US commercial shipbuilding, mainly because the US Navy appears to have absolutely no idea how to properly supervise ship construction. In specific, they simply cannot leave well enough alone. Even deep in a ship production run, every new build ship has a never-ending stream of ShipAlts, change orders, and visits from the good ideas fairy. I doubt that any two DDG-51s have come out of the yard the same in 35 years.

Now, sometimes those changes are necessary, or at least beneficial, but the impact on being able to actually build multiple ships with economies of scale is significant. Sure, follow ships are cheaper than lead ships, but not as much cheaper as they should be.
 
There would be no need to repeal the entire law (The Jones act). There are exceptions, however. The first step would be for non-contiguous US states and territories to be able to get waivers from the president. Why not do that is ridiculous, because it is only a small change that could make a big difference. You don't want Chinese ships to do interstate cabotage? No problem, they can be banned from the coasts for national security reasons.
There are waivers for specific circumstances already, but ultimately even a complete exception wouldn't solve the problem that islands are islands and it's more expensive to ship to a bunch of islands than to a continent. So hinging the Jones Act and national maritime strategy around reducing the cost of shipping to islands is always a dumb idea.
 
But US naval shipbuilding is even worse than US commercial shipbuilding
Well that’s just the thing, there is virtually no commercial shipbuilding.

Between 2015-2025, Philly Shipyard built ~12 commercial vessels before transitioning to NMSV production.
As I understand, Bollinger mainly built inland barges before transitioning to Cutter production.
Sturgeon Bay built exactly 1 ship in the past 40 years.
And NASSCO builds auxiliaries now.

There is absolutely no commercial interest in American-built ships, and unless the production cost is cut in half, that is unlikely to change. No amount of protectionist policies will revive the industry. Neither will corporate buyouts.

Frankly, I’m not convinced there is need for domestically-produced commercial ships. If our goal is to rebuild the Merchant Marine, it doesn’t matter where the ships come from, provided we can mobilize them on demand. And it’s not like they can be built quick enough in a national emergency to have an effect on the conflict. In 1978, MARAD estimated that PD-214 could be built in a maximum of 17 months.

If we want to revive the merchant marine, we must do away with the notion they have to be Made in America, there’s simply not enough money to do that cost-effectively. When we go to war with China, what will be more useful, 40 ships launched from Philly, or 200 ships launched from Hyundai?

Naval shipbuilding is different though. That’s the one thing we have to do domestically. It’s too much of a security risk not too.
 
There are waivers for specific circumstances already, but ultimately even a complete exception wouldn't solve the problem that islands are islands and it's more expensive to ship to a bunch of islands than to a continent. So hinging the Jones Act and national maritime strategy around reducing the cost of shipping to islands is always a dumb idea.
A Hawaiian rum producer is challenging the law in court. https://gcaptain.com/hawaiian-rum-c...e-jones-act-citing-constitutional-violations/
 
Well that’s just the thing, there is virtually no commercial shipbuilding.

Between 2015-2025, Philly Shipyard built ~12 commercial vessels before transitioning to NMSV production.
As I understand, Bollinger mainly built inland barges before transitioning to Cutter production.
Sturgeon Bay built exactly 1 ship in the past 40 years.
And NASSCO builds auxiliaries now.

There is absolutely no commercial interest in American-built ships, and unless the production cost is cut in half, that is unlikely to change. No amount of protectionist policies will revive the industry. Neither will corporate buyouts.

Frankly, I’m not convinced there is need for domestically-produced commercial ships. If our goal is to rebuild the Merchant Marine, it doesn’t matter where the ships come from, provided we can mobilize them on demand. And it’s not like they can be built quick enough in a national emergency to have an effect on the conflict. In 1978, MARAD estimated that PD-214 could be built in a maximum of 17 months.

If we want to revive the merchant marine, we must do away with the notion they have to be Made in America, there’s simply not enough money to do that cost-effectively. When we go to war with China, what will be more useful, 40 ships launched from Philly, or 200 ships launched from Hyundai?

Naval shipbuilding is different though. That’s the one thing we have to do domestically. It’s too much of a security risk not too.
The solution should be to focus on expanding capability in a friendly, neighboring, cheaper country for commercial and low end military stuff. Mexico comes to mind. While at the same time consolidating and expanding US shipbuilding on stuff that can't be built abroad, ie carriers, submarines, and high end warships (Connies and larger).

Outsource what you can and use the savings to expand what you can't. If there is only so many expert welders you can afford, make sure they are working on a Columbia class and not on a generic merchant.
 
The solution should be to focus on expanding capability in a friendly, neighboring, cheaper country for commercial and low end military stuff. Mexico comes to mind. While at the same time consolidating and expanding US shipbuilding on stuff that can't be built abroad, ie carriers, submarines, and high end warships (Connies and larger).

Outsource what you can and use the savings to expand what you can't. If there is only so many expert welders you can afford, make sure they are working on a Columbia class and not on a generic merchant.
Kind of along those lines, another hybrid option is to build hull blocks in Mexico, Japan or Korea, but then outfit them in US yards.

This would be similar to European yards which outsource the most labor intensive steel bashing and sometimes complete hull blocks to Romania, Poland or the Baltics. But they keep the specialist work and most complex hull modules in house, invest in tools to reduce labor man hours etc. They also bring in cheap foreign labor on-site to fill gaps in trades or handle the less pleasant grunt work.

Do all that and US yards might become significantly more competitive.
 
Kind of along those lines, another hybrid option is to build hull blocks in Mexico, Japan or Korea, but then outfit them in US yards.

This would be similar to European yards which outsource the most labor intensive steel bashing and sometimes complete hull blocks to Romania, Poland or the Baltics. But they keep the specialist work and most complex hull modules in house, invest in tools to reduce labor man hours etc. They also bring in cheap foreign labor on-site to fill gaps in trades or handle the less pleasant grunt work.

Do all that and US yards might become significantly more competitive.
Hi,
I believe that this has been done to some extent in the past. Specifically I remember back when I was working in support of the transfer of some Ammunition ships from the USN to the Military Sealift Command that the yard involved in converting at least one of the ships had some deckhouse extension blocks built in Mexico and barged up to San Diego, if I am recalling correctly.

Regards

Pat
 
The major place that US shipbuilding is still competitive is the Great Lakes. But most of those shipyards are pissed off at the USN's inability to stop fucking with a design and have refused to contract with the USN since like the 1970s.

I think the other thing we have to come to grips with is that the nature of naval warfare *might* be changing and that large surface ships may no longer be competitive in peer warfare. Currently the trend is for ever decreasing costs and abilities for anti ship platforms and ISR, while the complete opposite for modern DDG types. Barring a major technological change that pushes the cost effectiveness ratio in favor of the defense, we may be seeing the end of surface ships based sea control as we know it.

Now of course we have seen technological scares like this before - the torpedo boat, the submarine, the anti ship missile, etc. in the end surface navies adapted to meet the threat. But generally what came out of each technological revolution was a new type of ship to address the threat, with the older types sometimes facing total obsolescence.

I wonder if there is not a technological sea change in naval affairs that occurs long before the U.S. could re-establish any kind of significant industrial increase.
Firmly disagree here, as carriers have shown that bigger is exponentially better.

And while we may need to give carriers some more defensive measures so they can handle AShBMs, at present they still need a "goalkeeper" and "plane guard" DDG or CG. Same applies to LPHs/mini carriers.

So until you come up with a way to make carriers obsolete, we're still going to need carriers and their escorts. Plus the gator freighters need their escorts as well.



Kind of along those lines, another hybrid option is to build hull blocks in Mexico, Japan or Korea, but then outfit them in US yards.

This would be similar to European yards which outsource the most labor intensive steel bashing and sometimes complete hull blocks to Romania, Poland or the Baltics. But they keep the specialist work and most complex hull modules in house, invest in tools to reduce labor man hours etc. They also bring in cheap foreign labor on-site to fill gaps in trades or handle the less pleasant grunt work.

Do all that and US yards might become significantly more competitive.
There's US legal restrictions about certain jobs must be completed by American workers, and/or cleared American workers.

IIRC, there was some motor-generator shop that is straddling the US-Mexico border. They provide ship-service generators and 400hz motor-generators, ~70kw units. The ones destined for submarines are made on the American side of the line and never cross a red line on the floor of the ship, while all their other units are made by Mexican nationals. I believe at a different pay rate than the American workers in the same factory.
 
Am I wrong in thinking that there is no way for the US to win a naval war with China? The only competitive advantage the US has is in tech, battle management, missiles. China builds half the world's ships and has a population several times larger. I can't imagine a grand strategy that would give the US a chance to win a protracted naval war.
 
Am I wrong in thinking that there is no way for the US to win a naval war with China? The only competitive advantage the US has is in tech, battle management, missiles. China builds half the world's ships and has a population several times larger. I can't imagine a grand strategy that would give the US a chance to win a protracted naval war.

There is no way that the U.S. can equal PRC ship production. But it is a lot easier to sink a ship with aircraft and submarines than with another ship. A 2021 CSIS wargame, probably the most extensive and recent that was run publicly, found that in their 2026 Taiwan invasion scenario the red team almost always failed within three weeks (given their very specific assumptions with a number of variations). The catch: the 7th fleet almost universally lost a pair of carriers and depending on conditions (there were two dozen games) took a vast number of other serious losses as well. Lots of dead USAF aircraft as welll depending on variables and blue team actions (attacking the mainland with tactical fighters was found to be ineffective and expensive). They found that given their assumptions, the most effective anti ship platforms were the strategic bombers - they could routinely deliver high volumes of long range missile fire. However the problem was that in pretty much every scenario the blue team expended every stand off weapon of most every type (AGM-158, available tomahawk, JSOW, SLAM, etc) in roughly three weeks. That was usually enough to destroy the amphibious fleet (and most of PLAN east of Taiwan defending it), but obviously left the U.S. in an incredibly tenuous situation even had the war ended at that point.

The U.S. can win a campaign of sea denial, but ships are required to exert sea control.

Interesting read if you have the time:

 
Important addendum to the above post: wargames are not predictive; they are used to test assumptions and trial specific variables. So the above should not interpreted as assuming any specific outcome, and in particular the baseline line scenario involved a full fledged PRC invasion with no deviations. It is hard to imagine a Sino-American conflict is that straightforward or that the PRC would attempt the most simplistic method of annexation. I use it only to point out that the U.S. does have a lot of sea denial/anti ship options in its tool box, and there are huge efforts by every service to expand those capabilities and their resilience.
 
If they were predictive we could just send the results to our adversaries and have real peace from virtual war.

Hey “insert enemy here” we beat your attempted “war/incursion/invasion/blockade/etc.” in our war game so don’t try it in real life or you will see the full power of our war gaming community. ;)
 
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If they were predictive we could just sent the results to our adversaries and have real peace from virtual war.

Hey “insert enemy here” we beat your attempted “war/incursion/invasion/blockade/etc.” in our war game so don’t try it in real life or you will see the full power of our war gaming community. ;)
 
The U.S. can win a campaign of sea denial, but ships are required to exert sea control.
SUBPAC would cheer so loud you'd hear it in Beijing. Sea Denial is what subs do.

Choke the life out of any nation that requires materials brought to it by sea.
 
SUBPAC would cheer so loud you'd hear it in Beijing. Sea Denial is what subs do.

Choke the life out of any nation that requires materials brought to it by sea.

There is probably almost nothing the PRC could do against a far blockade or worse, open attack on all of its commercial shipping globally. That might not be enough to deter Xi by itself, so fighting in their back yard is something the U.S. has to plan for.

Honestly I do not like the idea of SSNs operating anywhere inside the first island chain, maybe with the exception of the SCS. It’s all too shallow and likely all red air in any conflict. I would outsource this work to UUVs if possible and focus nuke boats on closing the first island chain from inside the deep water east of it and engaging any units already east of Taiwan. There would be no shortage of targets. The Taiwan strait and Yellow Sea are so shallow you could lay bottom mines anywhere, and if I were the PLAN, I would just make a massive barrier thousands of mines deep from my coast to the northern and southern tip of the island. I’d probably thousands more in the Yellow Sea to protect my bases and shipping there.
 
Something I feel gets losses a lot in this conversation.

We need to understand that American shipbuilding is fundamentally uncompetitive. South Korea and the PRC can build ships at twice the speed for half the price. And this isn’t a coincidence.

Shipbuilding is not cheap, especially for the yard. Labor is expensive. OSHA lawsuits are expensive. Compliance with environmental laws is expensive. Developing new infrastructure is expensive. Being forced to eat the loss from fixed price contracts is expensive. If the yards want to maintain any sort of profit margin, operating costs must be kept to the bare minimum. This is the reason McDonald’s pays more than entry level positions at HII.

But those are American yards. South Korea has less strict OSHA laws, less strict environmental regulations, and their people will work 60 hours a week for mere pennies. For the lack of better phrasing, white people are expensive, as the cost of living here is more expensive. Doing virtually everything in America is expensive. And regardless of who is in the White House, that trend won’t reverse.

Simply put, there is no scenario where the free market will allow domestic shipbuilding to regenerate to historical levels. The mere “survival” of the domestic shipbuilding industry is solely because of protectionist economic policies that mandate domestic construction of American-flagged vessels.

If the Jones Act dies, or we start building ships in Korea, the U.S. will permanent stop building ships. And there will be no recovery. The fact of the matter is American shipbuilding will never be competitive. It will never be able to stand on its own in the free market. There’s a reason why nearly all domestic orders from the federal government.
And there were a number of US politicians who were in favor of ending US domestic shipbuilding, except of course, US NAVY warships.
 
There is probably almost nothing the PRC could do against a far blockade or worse, open attack on all of its commercial shipping globally. That might not be enough to deter Xi by itself, so fighting in their back yard is something the U.S. has to plan for.
Sad but true.


Honestly I do not like the idea of SSNs operating anywhere inside the first island chain, maybe with the exception of the SCS. It’s all too shallow and likely all red air in any conflict. I would outsource this work to UUVs if possible and focus nuke boats on closing the first island chain from inside the deep water east of it and engaging any units already east of Taiwan. There would be no shortage of targets. The Taiwan strait and Yellow Sea are so shallow you could lay bottom mines anywhere, and if I were the PLAN, I would just make a massive barrier thousands of mines deep from my coast to the northern and southern tip of the island. I’d probably thousands more in the Yellow Sea to protect my bases and shipping there.
It wouldn't be pretty.

In WW2, the USN lost 1 in 6 subs it sent to sea. Pretty much all SUBPAC were operating in what we call the first island chain today. Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, ECS, SCS.

So I would expect similar outcomes in a Sino-American War.
 
and if I were the PLAN, I would just make a massive barrier thousands of mines deep from my coast to the northern and southern tip of the island.
(1)Bluefor may disagree with your mind laying ops right off its coast.
(2)Mines are certainly used in such a way(normal world war practice, see, say Dunkerk evacuation), the problem is currents and effectiveness of particular mines. Bottom mines are not a single stop solution against smaller subs (Taiwan focusing on large ones makes me chuckle tbh), and all others tend to suffer from currents.
It wouldn't be pretty.

In WW2, the USN lost 1 in 6 subs it sent to sea. Pretty much all SUBPAC were operating in what we call the first island chain today. Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, ECS, SCS.

So I would expect similar outcomes in a Sino-American War.
Prewar IJN didn't care about underwater campaign above reasonable minimum: they were either to win before it mattered, or it was hopeless.
Proven themselves wrong, but whatever.

For PLAN/China strategic outlook, submarines are second primary threat, right after airpower.
Scale of preparation of PLAN for this particular threat is immense.
It's hard to give navy a crown without some verifying practice, but judging by that they've done in last 15 years, they may very well be within years(if still) from comprehensively world leading asw capability.
 
Prewar IJN didn't care about underwater campaign above reasonable minimum: they were either to win before it mattered, or it was hopeless.
Proven themselves wrong, but whatever.
They also completely failed to follow the example of the UK in WW1, with convoys etc. You'd have thought that they would have said "England is an island at the center of an empire, what happened to them could be done to us."


For PLAN/China strategic outlook, submarines are second primary threat, right after airpower.
Scale of preparation of PLAN for this particular threat is immense.
It's hard to give navy a crown without some verifying practice, but judging by that they've done in last 15 years, they may very well be within years(if still) from comprehensively world leading asw capability.
It's not clear how good their training is.

I suspect that their submarine captains are not selected for Perisher attitude like the RN does. US PCO school is different and not as intensely focused on hunting surface ships as Perisher is, but still selects for a rather independent attitude. Plus, if you've ever watched the comedy movie Down Periscope, that is 100% accurate about the different crew.

And if the subs aren't trying to get kills on the skimmers, the skimmer ASW training is not going to go anywhere near as well as it could.
 

For the first time in decades, a new bulk freighter has been built on and launched on the Great Lakes.

The Fincantieri Bay Shipbuilding Company in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin unveiled the Mark W. Barker earlier this year after spending nearly three years constructing it. The vessel was commissioned by Cleveland-based Interlake Steamship Company which currently operates about a dozen ships.

“This is the first (new) ship in more than 35 years,” said Jim Weakley, president of the Lake Carriers Association, a trade group that represents American Great Lakes shipping fleets. “We’ve had a couple tug barges built in the past decade, but this is the first ship in a long time. The beauty of our environment is these are freshwater ships, and they last a long time. They don’t corrode like saltwater ships do and we maintain them.”

Weakley said that in just the past decade Interlake has invested more than $100 million into its existing fleet including engines, hull fabrications and updated electronics.

Notable exception for the Great Lakes, but yes.

That’s simply not true. There’s been 1 new ship in 35 years. The Great Lakes shipping companies use bulk carriers built before 1981. Hell, they still have a few WW2 ships running around up there. The freshwater greatly reduces hull corrosion. The yards have survived off maintenance contracts during the winter, when the lakes freeze up.
 
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(1)Bluefor may disagree with your mind laying ops right off its coast.
(2)Mines are certainly used in such a way(normal world war practice, see, say Dunkerk evacuation), the problem is currents and effectiveness of particular mines. Bottom mines are not a single stop solution against smaller subs (Taiwan focusing on large ones makes me chuckle tbh), and all others tend to suffer from currents.

Bottom mines would be effective against submarines at much greater depths than surface ships. Most any part of straight or Yellow Sea could be mined as such. Bottom mines remove the drift problem. As for emplacement, I believe all the militia boats train for this, and since China would be picking the time of attack, it could easily start deploying mines well before the conflict with activation delays.
 
I don't think it's possible to rapidly lay a mine barrier from small boats.
Only large surface minelayers can lay WW style fields while keeping at least some secrecy...
 
I don't think it's possible to rapidly lay a mine barrier from small boats.
Only large surface minelayers can lay WW style fields while keeping at least some secrecy...

Why would secrecy be a requirement? It’s not like other invasion preparations for a Normandy sized landing would go unnoticed.
 
And easer option is get a few C130s...

And load, anywhere from 20 to 120 mines in the back. (Model depending)

Make them Captor mines base on a MK50/54? Roughly fifty of those in the back each able to cover a 4 square mile zone?

A few planes be able to lock down a massive area in HOurs.
 
Why would secrecy be a requirement? It’s not like other invasion preparations for a Normandy sized landing would go unnoticed.
Normandy preparations were done in utmost secrecy, because exposing the actual date and place of landings would've almost endured their bloody failure.
Germans weren't stupid to not know landings are coming. But that's the extent of it.
 
Normandy preparations were done in utmost secrecy, because exposing the actual date and place of landings would've almost endured their bloody failure.
Germans weren't stupid to not know landings are coming. But that's the extent of it.

How laying mines give away dates or places?
 
Those preaching the Rules-Based Order are required to play by the rules.

In practice, neither the west nor its block of competitors play by any rules. The idea that if China decided to invade it would suddenly get cold feet over the concept of dropping tens of thousands mines into international waters is laughable. It has the mines, it has the capacity to deliver them from a vast number of small craft. If they were so inclined to drop influence moored mines into the straight, you could probably walk to Taiwan on them without getting your hat wet.
 
In practice, neither the west nor its block of competitors play by any rules.
China has signed certain treaties and then outright ignored them, all while claiming to be in favor of rules-based order. Rules for thee and not for me, more like. Which also means that the word of the Chinese Government is not good.



The idea that if China decided to invade it would suddenly get cold feet over the concept of dropping tens of thousands mines into international waters is laughable.
Dropping mines into someone's national waters means you have declared war on them.

Dropping a bajilliion naval mines into international waters means that they are now at war with anyone whose ships travel through there.

1200 ships travel through the Taiwan Straits every week, it is one of the busiest chunks of water on earth.

It would not be hard to drag Europe into a war with China if China mined the Taiwan Strait.



It has the mines, it has the capacity to deliver them from a vast number of small craft. If they were so inclined to drop influence moored mines into the straight, you could probably walk to Taiwan on them without getting your hat wet.
Crud, Taiwan probably has enough mines stockpiled to do the same...
 
Dropping mines into someone's national waters means you have declared war on them.

Dropping a bajilliion naval mines into international waters means that they are now at war with anyone whose ships travel through there.

1200 ships travel through the Taiwan Straits every week, it is one of the busiest chunks of water on earth.

It would not be hard to drag Europe into a war with China if China mined the Taiwan Strait.

Crud, Taiwan probably has enough mines stockpiled to do the same...

Mining Taiwanese waters is probably something that can only occur once the shooting starts; mining international waters* with a time delay could happen whenever, so long as you were fine with committing to a schedule. International opinion is likely going to be negative with regards to an invasion anyway; mining on top of that hardly matters. And a global recession is built into most any Taiwan conflict.

*and of course one of the conflicts between China and the RoW is that it claims the entire 9 dashed line as sovereign waters anyway.
 
Smart mines can target specific ships based on acoustic signature. Stealing islands also means you have declared war on someone.
 

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