Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

What should be attempted is perhaps, an arms control treaty. Arms race is a big waste of money but especially bad for the side with the weaker economy in this case, the United States with lower GDP(PPP) and poor ship building capability. New technology does not look like the solution, the tech on the table does not seem to change the numbers game like new fighter aircraft generations that cleanly invalids previous aircraft, nor does there appears to be sustained technological barriers left to keep the Chinese behind.

Heritage Foundation’s take on getting to a bigger navy

Impressions: can one be pitching for spending money any more than this o_O:mad: Add active ships in every theater (wow, Russian navy~~~ Also Caribbean task force) when a economic superior opponent demands focus and sound strategy.....

First, the Navy has only limited assets available for convoy escort duty. The Navy does not intend to use battle force ships for convoy duty. There simply are not enough ships available....

the MQ-9B, could operate more easily at lower altitudes and be modified for anti-submarine warfare (ASW)... It also has a potential role in convoy protection, using radar and sensors optimized for ASW such as miniature sonobuoys, currently being developed, to localize hostile submarines....

....Navy today will not be able to provide convoy escorts to military sealift.
Navies just have to go full IJN~

The PLAN surface fleet could be fought by air and space based kill chain with help from land/submarine launchers. A pile of DF-21/17 equivalents scattered around the pacific can shut PLAN in.

Escorting convoys is a role that surface combatants can do better than all other platforms. We should expect XLUUV with missile launchers to be available soon, and the lack of crew means the side with sheer industrial strength can ramp up production like nothing else. (PLAN busy expanding submarine production too) MQ-9 isn't shooting down anti-ship missiles and the low capability means "anti-air loitering munitions" can possibly counter defeat it: not a sound strategy.

Dispersal is a method of defense against the large number of Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles targeting the Western Pacific.
Operations research have shown the dispersion makes submarine attacks easier even without escorts by concentrating ships and thus lowering sensor foot print. Firepower limits of submarines means that only a fraction of a detected convoy can be sunk. But lets look it the other way: with MQ-9 as escort, sub-launched UAV can likely run ISR uncontested, if modern sonars against civilian grade propulsion wasn't enough.

Look at the entire history of submarine warfare on dispersion based defenses....

coherent task-focused force
Never divide the battle fleet.

With long range aircraft and in flight refueling, the potential for mass is beyond past campaigns. Being anywhere near the first island chain isn't a matter of task forces, it is matter of "THE battle fleet" as maximum mass as the entire inventory of available aircraft and missiles may descent in one massive pulse. Division is deadly in missile salvo contests.
 
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Although I dont normally quote the lessons of the Falklands War I think they do come in here.
The SSN is the most effective shipkiller.
Escort vessels are going to suffer in any encounter with enemy subs, missiles and aircraft. They have to pay a high price to buy time for carriers to achieve air superiority and amphibious assets to reach their destination.
As long as you have SSNs and CVs escorts should not need to fire their anti ship missiles. There has been no surface to surface missile engagement apart from missile boats in Israel/Egypt and Iran.
 

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Skipped this post by mistake, when it has quite a few ideas worth discussing.

Looking at the document, one can say "Surface ships need less offensive punch"!!1!1111

A quick summary looks like:
1. LPI Multistatic sensors
2. Sensor shooter separation: Munition vehicles that cycle independent of sensors
3. More Short range AD

The first two in some sense comes standard with reliable communications.
 
The main wartime role of escorts is to provide a screen against hostile subs and airpower. Enemy surface units are targets for your own subs and airpower.
However, as there has been no surface naval combat between major navies since WW2 we dont know what would happen.
The Falklands showed what we already knew from WW2 that effective use of submarines and airpower would take a high toll of escorts.
But they could buy time for amphibious landings or convoys to get to their targets and for carriers to launch aircraft.
Surface to Surface missiles were added by NATO when large numbers of Soviet surface units joined the Bears, Backfires and subs. The Mediterranean in particular seemed likely to see Soviet shadowing ships despatched by Harpoons and Otomats (or Talos in the 60s).
In the present day the Russians have far fewer effective surface shadowers. China has developed a significant number of surface units but I would argue that SSNs are the best counter to these.
 
In the present day the Russians have far fewer effective surface shadowers. China has developed a significant number of surface units but I would argue that SSNs are the best counter to these.

The PRC also have a massive coast guard and maritime militia that is employed to intimidate in peace time and likely would be used for intelligence gathering in war time. The surface force will need to be able to have an ability to engage a lot of local targets in the opening stages of any conflict, though the all the various USN SAMs also have this capability.
 

We really need a facepalm smiley.
I never understood the point of having CVs operate in a bath tub next to several existing US air bases where they can't possibly avoid detection and draw too much draft to enter half of the body of water.
I've pondered on this as well. The Carriers can sustain an impressive op-tempo but is it needed to bomb terrorists? The Carriers have impressive C2 capabilities, but their orders come straight from CENTCOM. How much money and maintenance hours could be saved by using National Guard A-10s and F-16s?
 
Thought they put in some underground ones during the 1980s?
 
Thought they put in some underground ones during the 1980s?
Apparently not. (Or at least they don't have them anymore). From 2009:


In this scenario, one of the main difficulties facing the Air Force would be the shortage of suitable bases in the Western Pacific. Only four of the eight US bases there have hardened aircraft shelters.

Already, three of those four (Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base in South Korea and Kadena Air Base in Japan) are well within reach of hundreds of Chinese People’s Liberation Army missiles. Currently, China has fielded about 400 conventional ballistic missiles and 250 cruise missiles that could reach bases in Japan and South Korea. Beijing also boasts a large fleet of advanced fighter-bombers.

The fourth hardened base (Misawa AB, Japan) lies just outside this threat ring. However, that puts Misawa about 1,850 miles from the Taiwan Strait, roughly the same distance from the strait as Andersen AFB, Guam, far to the south.
 
Thought they put in some underground ones during the 1980s?
Apparently not. (Or at least they don't have them anymore). From 2009:

The US currently operates from only two bases—both on Okinawa—that lie within 500 miles of the strait. Requirements of tanking, sortie rates, and infrastructure availability make Kadena the best theater base for a large fighter contingent....

In a crisis, one could find roughly 190 aircraft on the ground at Kadena. Virtually all of these would be parked in the open, as Kadena has only 15 hardened aircraft shelters.
Man, I really wonder if the US militaries are at all serious about conflict as opposed to finding a excuse to steal money from taxpayers. With the kind of force posture one would think spending billions on hardening would make sense.

With the kind of planning I'm seeing, the question isn't whether China can take Taiwan but whether they could knock Japan out of alignment with the US in the medium term. o_O
 
Thought they put in some underground ones during the 1980s?
Apparently not. (Or at least they don't have them anymore). From 2009:

The US currently operates from only two bases—both on Okinawa—that lie within 500 miles of the strait. Requirements of tanking, sortie rates, and infrastructure availability make Kadena the best theater base for a large fighter contingent....

In a crisis, one could find roughly 190 aircraft on the ground at Kadena. Virtually all of these would be parked in the open, as Kadena has only 15 hardened aircraft shelters.
Man, I really wonder if the US militaries are at all serious about conflict as opposed to finding a excuse to steal money from taxpayers. With the kind of force posture one would think spending billions on hardening would make sense.

With the kind of planning I'm seeing, the question isn't whether China can take Taiwan but whether they could knock Japan out of alignment with the US in the medium term. o_O
Simple answer to that, one let Japan have Trident missile submarines. After all we Brits built them to decapitate Moscow for London. Eliminating Beijing for Tokyo should keep Xi at bay.
 
If Japan wants to go nuclear it is perfectly capable of doing so itself without US help. The US would likely be unable to furnish Japan with submarines at any price considering how hard it will be to produce Columbia and Virginia side by side.
 
I know I'm going to catch a lot of flak for this, but I don't think its unreasonable to chop a carrier, reduce deployments, and divy up the extra aircraft from the orphanned CVW to the other wings to beef them up. IMO US CVBGs/CSG (depending on your vintage) should not be operating in areas with ample allied bases. There is no shortage of land based air in the Med or Gulf, and most of the time the latter has a CSG in it despite being ringed by allied bases. IMO, CV deployments should be cut back to preserve cost, equipment, and enlistment and focused squarely on the WestPac, a theater where there would rapidly be a lack of land based tac air in any major conflict.

If you want to beef up hull numbers, something is going to half to give. Its not going to be Columbia or new CVNs. You're going have to start chopping MEUs or something if you want DDGs, FFGs, and a future large combatant. Never mind the new LSTs for the USMC and the robot fleet they want to build...
 
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I know I'm going to catch a lot of flak for this, but I don't think its unreasonable to chop a carrier, reduce deployments, and divy up the extra aircraft from the orphanned CVW to the other wings to beef them up. IMO US CVBGs/CSG (depending on your vintage) should not be operating in areas with ample allied bases. There is no shortage of land based air in the Med or Gulf, and most of the time the latter has a CSG in it despite being ringed by allied bases. IMO, CV deployments should be cut back to preserve cost, equipment, and enlistment and focused squarely on the WestPac, a theater where there would rapidly be a lack of land based tac air in any major conflict.

If you want to beef up hull numbers, something is going to half to give. Its not going to be Columbia or new CVNs. You're going have to start chopping MEUs or something if you want DDGs, FFGs, and a future large combatant. Never mind the new LSTs for the USMC and the robot fleet they want to build...
You're not wrong and it's maddening to watch.

But once the cutting starts, can it be stopped? The Carriers are the Navy's golden goose and a major sink for funding; if Carriers were cut from 11 to 10, would there be another Revolt of the Admirals?
I think as seen with the Ford the Navy would not slow deployments, but increase these "double-pumps" with more frequency.
 
I know I'm going to catch a lot of flak for this, but I don't think its unreasonable to chop a carrier, reduce deployments, and divy up the extra aircraft from the orphanned CVW to the other wings to beef them up. IMO US CVBGs/CSG (depending on your vintage) should not be operating in areas with ample allied bases. There is no shortage of land based air in the Med or Gulf, and most of the time the latter has a CSG in it despite being ringed by allied bases. IMO, CV deployments should be cut back to preserve cost, equipment, and enlistment and focused squarely on the WestPac, a theater where there would rapidly be a lack of land based tac air in any major conflict.

If you want to beef up hull numbers, something is going to half to give. Its not going to be Columbia or new CVNs. You're going have to start chopping MEUs or something if you want DDGs, FFGs, and a future large combatant. Never mind the new LSTs for the USMC and the robot fleet they want to build...
You're not wrong and it's maddening to watch.

But once the cutting starts, can it be stopped? The Carriers are the Navy's golden goose and a major sink for funding; if Carriers were cut from 11 to 10, would there be another Revolt of the Admirals?
I think as seen with the Ford the Navy would not slow deployments, but increase these "double-pumps" with more frequency.
Does the navy needs carriers anywhere else but the Pacific now? Yes this is a strategic oversimplification but I would trade a couple of carriers for a dozen or more SSNs/SSGNs given they were married to the right - 5500km+ ranged - precision strike hypersonic missiles.
 
The UK faced this problem in the 1960s and sensibly chose SSNs over Carriers. Today we have got both again but at the cost of decimating our other ships.
The Trident tubes on older boats might possibly be used for larger hypersonic missiles to get them into service faster?
 
Is there any inclination towards marrying the SLRC to a ship?
By whom? I'm sure some of the people working on it would love to, but so far we can't even get the Navy to commit to putting its own railgun on a ship. Let's see if it actually moves forward, then we can take the temperature of the maritime services.
 
Is there any inclination towards marrying the SLRC to a ship?
By whom? I'm sure some of the people working on it would love to, but so far we can't even get the Navy to commit to putting its own railgun on a ship. Let's see if it actually moves forward, then we can take the temperature of the maritime services.
Whats unclear is why the railgun fell out of favour.(tech issues or high cost due to lower scale of production?)

In either case, it would make sense to have a multi service weapon that can take care of both Army and Navy needs without having the axe of cancellation hanging right over its head, when either of the services try to back out.

Such a situation will create enough inertia to atleast help it make way to initial applications.

The requirement from both services are kind of similar (long range fires), so it could be the equivalent of C-HGB/IR-CPS duo, just a lot cheaper.

Bdw, how is the SLRC supposed to work? Nammo like ramjet powered projectile or something else?
 
Welp the MK48 ADCAP torpedo and MK41 VLS system factories are being shuttered, again for the MK41...

 
Welp the MK48 ADCAP torpedo and MK41 VLS system factories are being shuttered, again for the MK41...


Sounds like a real estate issue, primarily. Mk 41 obviously has extensive orders booked and in the pipeline, between continuing DDG-51 production, FFG-62, and overseas buyers. But LM are looking to move the line to another facility elsewhere that presumably has unused floor space, so they can sell the Middle River plant. And they are talking about relocating staff who want to move, which means they aren't eliminating the Mk 41 production capacity.

Same for the Mk 48.
 
mk48 production was already stopped and restarted once before. Honestly I'm not remotely worried about the USN having enough of those; the PLAN would run out of ships and subs long before the US ran out of Mk48s with the current inventory. I'm hoping that a follow on is in the works; it seems to me the USN could benefit from something quieter.
 

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