Suez 1956 alternate

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The various threads about UK French cooperation on military projects in the 60s made me wonder whether a different outcome to the 1956 Suez crisis could have been the catalyst.
Prime Minister Eden was already crippled by illness. Had he been the vigorous Eden who had opposed apo
peasement in the 1930s and been in good health, supported by his mentor Churchill, the UK might have resisted US economic pressure and continued on to take the canal, as the French wanted.
This successful operation could have persuaded France and Britain to build a European Defence Community. German forces would have served under European rather than national command and been equipped with French and UK rather than US equipment.
The RAF V Force and the later Mirage IV squadrons would have been the beginnings of a European Deterrent.
In 1962 the European nuclear force pointedly is not put on alert as the US and Russia confront each other in Cuba. There are no US Thor missiles in the UK, while Blue Streak is replaced by a UK French joint mrbm programme of solid fuel missiles.
 
Well, it essentially boiled to "Nassau agreement" vs "De Gaulle". Interestingly enough, both were direct consequences of the Suez crisis. It is quite interesting when you think about it. "I used to be a world super power, but now I'm losing my colonial empire pretty fast. What future for me ?" exact same interrogation for both Great Britain and France. Yet completely opposed answers. What was better, playing solo on nuclear deterrent, or become the United States most loyal sidekick ? both answers had pros and cons. The British deterrent ended as a curious mix of national and foreign hardware. But the force de frappe cost France an arm and a leg, it was a burden on the economy... and on conventional forces.
 
It a proper poser of a question this.

I'm not sure about Eden's views of and relationship with France. But being Churchill's protoge, he may have shared both the hope and concerns about the UK's obvious neighbour and once rival.

One would assume a healthy Eden would press on with the defence review.
 
It is possible that an Eden Premiership buoyed by a successful Suez expedition could have gone into the early 60s,

Whether the Algerian crisis would still have led to the return of De Gaulle. would have depended on whether Nasser survived in Egypt.
Eden was bent on regime change, and it might have been possible, though Nasser survived the defeat against Israel in 56 and 67.

If Eden could have rekindled the Anglo French relationship it might have led to the UK being less Pro US. The V Force could have been upgraded with the Anglo French missiles instead of the ill fated Blue Streak, which was a UK copy of the Atlas and already obsolete by the end of the 50s.
 
No offense intended, but if we are talking about post-WW2, it is already way too late for the UK to be anything else than "the United States' most loyal sidekick". Obligatory TV posturing notwithstanding.

And on the French side, the 4th republic was a dismal failure of a régime. In all internal aspects (like being paralyzed by the effect of purely proportional representation in parliament leading to uncontrolable instability, generalized corruption), and made worse by the then-current problems of colonial wars in a context where the "old empires" faced the ideological hostility of both the East block and the eager-to-take-their-place USA.
No way a Socialist-Communist coalition could wage those wars to a win, especially with a weak constitution.

Actually, the outcome was an incredibly lucky one: all alternatives to de Gaulle were, hmm, much less attractive.
South American sort of less attractive: Junta, civil war, proxy wars, or worse.


Winning Suez and toppling Abdul Nassr wouldn't have saved the GB + FR colonial empires: USSR would still be there with their agenda. And the USA with theirs, too...
 
This isn't a thread about retention of empires.
 
I may be missing something but the only way the Suez crises goes another way is if the US takes a completely different policy position.
The UK had zero ability to resist or continue as if US couldn’t call the shots. Such a scenario would have needed a radically different pre-existing UK and US.
Scenarios where the US would have made a different (more pro France and UK) decision would appear the only way this could have happened.
 
I think my wheeze of using Eden as the catalyst for a closer UK France defence relationship does not work.
As the above points make clear Suez could not work.
Oh well, it seemed a good idea at the time.
 
Don't row back from a genuine Wiff.

Pre-Suez, 1955-56, was core to the evolution of W.Europe. UK declined involvement in "archaeological excavations" at Messina that formed The Six, but committed to France to retain vast Force in W.Germany to ensure that new Sovereign would point its Rearmament in the right (Eastward) direction. France initiated its Bomb and Bomber; UK already had its in R&D. We did Suez together as we both saw Nasser as satrap, opening the Canal to Soviet severing of our Trade. Eden invaded without telling Ike, who went incandescent (though Israel and France had been forgetful, too) and spluttered about blocking UK's International Loan (France had already banked hers).

UK stopped, so Israel/France did so. One writer has Ike meeting new UK PM Macmillan in Bermuda, 3/57 and asking why we stopped! Mac there secured the AW collaboration that would lift UK from fission to fusion and would lead on to the Key to the Cupboard scheme for deployment of "tactical" AW, to include France, 1961-66 (Honest John, howitzers, free-fall Bombs).

So far so aswas. So: what if...UK had delayed stopping for a couple of days. Well two possibilities: A: nothing much would be different - the Street would not expel/kill Nasser; Sovs. would splutter and refer to Security Council; some form of International entity would clear the Canal; Algeria would be unchanged and CDG would be called in. Or...
B. something along UK75's thoughts...which would have saved UK/France vast sums....but:

Q: Why did Ike surrogate an Independent British Deterrent. 4/8/58 US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement remains today its basis.
A: post-4/10/57 Sputnik, to share the dying. France had 200 PCF/RP seats in Parliament, Italy no more reliable, new W/Germany not yet fit to fight.

Even if an Anglo-French package, AW/aircraft, were then in R&D, UK would with alacrity have dumped it, as maybe-paper, and we would ride on USAF/SAC's actualite.

Let me offer another wifff...JFK did offer Mac's FBM/SSBN deal (Nassau, 12/62) to CDG and got another Non!. Now there's a fun thought.
 
"Mac there secured the AW collaboration that would lift UK from fission to fusion"

Not really. We had developed our fusion devices prior to the collaboration. They certainly worked, but they were not weaponised. We could, if need be, gone it entirely alone on fusion weapons, but it was cheaper and easier to collaborate.
 
Wasn't the 1957 British H-bomb test a dud ?

France was beaten by the chinese by two years (1966 to 1968), for the H-bomb. De Gaulle was incensed. Never quite understood how the chinese went so fast from A-bomb to H-bomb, even more at a time when Mao bloody lunacies were throwing China into chaos.
 
"Wasn't the 1957 British H-bomb test a dud ?"

No. The first two tests didn't give the yield that had been hoped for, and Aldermaston had to try again. Ultimately, the UK successfully exploded a 3MT device. The aim was to get a megaton yield for a ton weight. This was achieved, but further testing would have been needed to 'weaponise' an experimental design.
 
Yeap we made it thus far and the threat of going alone without the US involved meant that they realised they were better off with us inside their tent urinating out.....
Especially as it would force a much harder conventional forces cut....
 
Given a recent thread on Suez participants might like to see this old thread.
Sadly everything I have read or watched since plus the events in Iraq after 9/11 force the view that even if the military had seized the canal before Egypt was able to block the operation of it, Britain had had to withdraw one of its largest garrisons in the world a few years earlier because Egyptian resentment had made it untenable, so what would have been different in 1956. The UK military at the highest level questioned the legality and point of the operation.
Had the opposition Labour party not been as patriotic as it was anti_American sentiment in Britain could have led to a very different government in 1964 and the removal of US bases.
 
Hold on there.

The beyond the actual successful military operation, there was at this time about the pinnacle of COIN operational expertise in the UK. The men who had crushed the Communists in Malaya, and were to break the Mau Mau but a few years later.

On the basis on the theoretical understanding of populations behaviour. It's quite possible the canal zone could be secured by special status and Nasser find himself coopted by either the Anglo-French alliance or the Soviets. Ultimately a puppet used to keep up the facade of an anti-imperialist dictator. A threat to the population of the canal zone and their livelihood.

This game was not over and not likely to follow the script people imagine.

Remember we have a very scripted and curated view of events in this period. But we can say Eden was the last PM to try to hold the line against the decline of British power.
 
It's quite possible the canal zone could be secured by special status and Nasser find himself coopted by either the Anglo-French alliance or the Soviets. Ultimately a puppet used to keep up the facade of an anti-imperialist dictator. A threat to the population of the canal zone and their livelihood.
There was certainly no shortage of ambitious colonels/generals in the Nasser regime as potential replacements if he wasn't cooperative enough, and a proper facade can always be found.

Politically it would require Europe to separate itself from both US and USSR and attempt to play one against the other, probably. Indeed difficult, but maybe not completely impossible.
 
No there weren't really any alternatives to nasser in Egypt, he was so popular he survived the 6 day war, he would never have been toppled by a European government by that point.

And all the successful anti insurgency campaigns the uk handled in this period were in areas the uk could seel off from outside support (really the only way to defeat insurgency these days) there was no way the uk could fully seal off the suez zone from Egypt (even if they let isreal keep the suez im doubtful the uk could keep Egyptian infultrators from getting to the canal).
 
No there weren't really any alternatives to nasser in Egypt, he was so popular he survived the 6 day war, he would never have been toppled by a European government by that point.
Nasser has only been incharge for 2 yrs so its alot easie to change a newish remigme compared to an old one. Ive read that on other forums that there was a couple generals/minsters that could have taken over if nasser was removed
 
What is interesting about the period of the Suez crisis is the extent to which Britain was stretched too thin globally.
The Soviet intervention in Hungary underscored the primary commitment to provide forces in Europe.
Whether in Cyprus, Africa or the Far East countries were making it clear that foreign presence however benign was not welcome. A pro British monarchy in Iraq would soon be removed.
Eden's ambitious successor Macmillan had seen how vulnerable we were economically and took many of the decisions needed to reduce commitments but even then left a budget to the 1964 Labour Government in crisis.
But the bottom line was that World War 2 and the years of shortages that followed had made the British tired and fed up. There was no appetite for further sacrifices.
 
Nasser has only been incharge for 2 yrs so its alot easie to change a newish remigme compared to an old one. Ive read that on other forums that there was a couple generals/minsters that could have taken over if nasser was removed
Well you could at lest name some names, because i have also read on there forums and the 9nly name that has come up was Amer and he was a moron.
 
… and continued on to take the canal, as the French wanted.
The problem is then what? They're going to be facing low-level harassing operations by local troops and civilians, the Egyptian government having opened the local armouries, whilst facing international censure. The whole operation seems to have been carried out on a misunderstanding – that Nasser's popularity was shakier than it actually was and a quick intervention would see him overthrown. An understandable mistake since IIRC nationalisation was carried out to shore up declining domestic support and when Nasser went out the first evening after the invasion to gauge the public mood he did so in unmarked cars with tinted windows in case people reacted poorly, only to be surprised at how enthusiastic the crowds were.

If you want Nasser to be overthrown then either Naguib needs to have avoided house arrest or his supporters have played a better hand politically and not be sidelined, that at least provides a competing internal faction.


No offense intended, but if we are talking about post-WW2, it is already way too late for the UK to be anything else than "the United States' most loyal sidekick".
France decided to chart a semi-independent path, what makes it impossible for the UK to?
 
Coming back to this assume that General Naguib is still forced to resign and placed under house arrest but his supporters play the political game better and manage to avoid being sidelined, IIRC one of his main ones got moved to what was an ostensibly prestigious posting in Europe. Even more in need of shoring up his domestic support Nasser goes ahead and nationalises the Canal. If the Anglo-French forces were to go in decisively and then make a large and very public push towards Cairo, not wanting to actually go through with assaulting the city, that gives Naguib's faction an excuse to try and overthrow him. That at least gives the operation a thin chance of success.

Of course you've still got the problem of the US' reaction. Waiting until after voting in the Presidential election has finished and giving the White House a heads up as the operation starts so they aren't completely blindsided is only sensible. Likewise doing as France did and getting loans from the IMF approved beforehand. The British government held gold reserves in New York, arranging to swap this with countries that had reserves in London for a small fee to essentially repatriate it ahead of the operation would seem sensible. It's still going to be tight but these two actions might provide enough financial breathing room to see things through.
 

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