Soviet/Russian IFF

overscan (PaulMM)

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SRO = IFF transponder
SRZ = IFF interrogator
SRZO = IFF interrogator/transponder

1940s
1st Generation IFF system

SCh-1
SCh-2

Mid/late 1950s 2nd Generation IFF system

Kremniy-1 (Silicon)

SRO-1 “Bariy” (Barium?) transponder (MiG-19, early MiG-21)
“Magniy” (Magnesium?) interrogator

Early/mid 1960s
Kremniy-2 (Silicon)

SRO-2 “Khrom” (Chrome) transponder
SRZO-2 “Khrom-Nikyel” (Chrome-Nickel) (later MiG-21, MiG-23MF)

Late 1960s/early 1970s
Kremniy-2M (Silicon)

SRO-2M transponder
SRZO-2M interrogator/transponder (MiG-23M, ML)

Late 1970s
3rd Generation IFF system (Parol, Parol-2D)

SRO-1P (Izdeliye 6201) transponder - MiG-29 (Soviet/Warpac 9.12/12A)
SRO-1P (Izdeliye 6201R) transponder - offered for MiG-29SE/SD export
SRO-1P (Izdeliye 6202R-1) transponder - Export Su-27SK)
SRZ-1P (Izdeliyie 6231) interrogator - MiG-29 (9.12/12A), early Su-27
SRZ-1P (Izdeliye 6231R-9) interrogator - Su-27SK export

SRO-2P (Izdeliye 6202) transponder - MiG-31, Su-27
SRZ-2P (Izdeliyie 6232) interrogator - early MiG-31
SRZ-2P3 (?) interrogator - later MiG-31
SRZ-035M (Izdeliye 035M) interrogator - MiG-31, 1991 onwards
Izdeliye 035MR interrogator - offered for export on MiG-29SE/SD

ATC/SIF transponders (in order of use)

SOD
SOD-57
SOD-57M - MiG-21PF, MiG-23MF
SO-63 - MiG-25P
SO-69 - MiG-23M
SO-69M Su-27, MiG-29
SO-72 (A-511) later Su-27

Soviet IFF systems were compromised from 1967 or so- they did not use encryption, and so were vulnerable to spoofing. QRC-248 and "Combat Tree" systems (APX-80/81) were able to trigger responses from the IFF transponders. SRO-2 was the first one cracked, subsequently SRO-1 and SOD-57 were also broken. SOD-57 ATC/SIF transponders replied with detail including speed, height, and even remaining fuel.

From about 1969, it was clear that Kremniy was compromised due to US "Combat Tree" equipment. A crash upgrade of the Kremniy-2 system was put into place. Kremniy-2M had two operating modes, peacetime and wartime, and forbidden to use except in war. It was apparently just as hardwired, and vulnerable to spoofing, as the exported systems. At the same time, a longer term program was initiated, Parol, which used encryption to prevent spoofing.
 
SRO-1P, SRZ-1P from Su-27 technical manual.
 

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The "Kremnij-2" was the 2nd generation of soviet military identification and recognition system "системa радиолокационного опознавания" which became operational in late fifties. The SRZO-2 and SRO-2 interrogator/transponders were parts of the "Kremnij-2" installed on aircrafts, communicating also with other naval and ground equipment working within the IFF system. The "Kremnij-2" was using a set of codes(amplitude-modulated frequencies) during a peacetime and a set of "forbiden" codes reserved in case of war. The export versions(WP countries) of the SRZO-2/SRO-2 interrogator/transponders were fully compatible with soviet ones, nevertheless the original soviet SRZO/SRO variants might have a wider variety of codes (additional frequencies). Generally, the non-WP countries excluded from the "Kremnij-2" IFF system were getting none or older variants of the SRZO/SRO suites(Kremnij-1).
The SRZO-2 interrogator/transponder installed on the Mig-21MF(CzechoslovakAF) was working with onboard radar station the RP-21MA and had two main operating modes:
1. interrogate "ZAPROS"
2. respond "OTVET"
special mode: emergency call "BEDSTVIE"

The SRZO-2 interrogator/transponder suit included:
-transmitter-receiver block
-decoder block
-code switch selector the "block 8BK" containing 12 codes and the control lights "OTVET","KOD VKL.PER" and "KOD VKL.ShD" in the cockpit.
-switch ZAPROS-VYKLUC. on the front panel
-safety switch "VZRYV"
-antenna III.band, 2pcs, nose, tail.
-antenna II.band, 2pcs, left, right wing
-antenna I.band, 2pcs, lef,right wing
-antenna I.band, 2pcs, tail
other stuff such as cabling,..etc
weight of the SRZO-2 set without cabling 38kg

The SRZO-2 interrogator/transponder is put into operation with the main switch "KHROM-NICKEL" on the right cockpit panel. The pilots were informed via radio what code has to be selected on the "block 8BK" before flight, but usually codes were changing during flights as well. The SRZO-2 performs a query by sending a specific combination of RF pulses (amplitude modulated) via the III. band antenna time-synchronized with the RP-21 radar pulses. If the unknown aicraft has been equiped with same IFF system and it posses the same code set, then the SRZO-2/SRO-2 transponders are triggered to respond automatically after receiving the specific combination of pulses though antennas of I, II, III band. For identifying an aircraft showing up on RP-21 screen, pilot had to switch the ZAPROS-VYKL to ZAPROS position only for time necessary to obtain the identification. When a friendly aircraft was identified, the marks "below/above" disappeared from the radar screen. The ground radar stations were equiped with secondary radiolocation systems to be able to work under the Kremnij-2 IFF system. Here is something about it.
http://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/karte302.de.html
The PAROL-2D equipment installed on the Czechoslovakian Mig-29 has never been put into operation. The reason for is that the necessary ground equipment was not delivered because of politic changes in year 1989. As I heard the PAROL-2D IFF system was ment for war usage only during that time.
http://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/karte305.de.html
 

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According to the literature the Mig-23MF does have exact the same SRZO-2 interrogator/transponder as the Fishbed has got. Only changes visible are a bit different SRZO control panel in the cockpit and modyfied external antennas. Opposite to the Mig-23MF the SRZO-2M has been installed on the Mig-23ML, that`s what the N-003E manual is saying. The SRZO-2/SRO-2 interrogator/transponder went through three modifications in the airforce since sixties. Do not know details about those changes, but I`ll try to get more in the future.

1.the Mig-23MF cockpit SRZO-2 panel
2.the Mig-23MF SRZO-2 installation scheme
3.the Mig-23ML cockpit SRZO-2M panel
 

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Please be aware that I`m talking Czechoslovak examples only, no guarantee what Soviets might have on the Mig-23M operated somewhere in the 16th Air Army in late seventies.
 
Well, the IFF was always slightly downgraded on WarPac machines. Yefim Gordon is hopelessly confused on IFF designations, and so can't really be relied on, as I've found when trying to make sense of it. He doesn't understand th difference between SRO, SRZ, SRZO. Also the IFF was frequently upgraded as you mention, so what an aircraft started with is no guarantee of what ended up on it.
 
When Warsaw pact countries received the Kremnij-2 system in the sixties, Soviets already had used the Kremnij-2M. In late seventies, when they started to export the Mig-23ML equipped with the SRZO-2M(Kremnij-2M), they had the PAROL-2D installed on machines. It makes sense then that the PAROL-2D being ready for export ten to fifteen years later. I doubt there were other downgraded subvariants of the IFF system for Warpact machines, also the systems have been downward compatible. This is how the Soviets were staying a step ahead of their closest allies.
I agree about Yefim Gordon, but remember he is gathering a large amount of informations, then it is tough to make it in-depth, particularly when researching soviet aviation history.
 
Well, I imagine the Parol IFF of the Su-27SK is both modified and 1st generation. The ECM is similarly downgraded.
 
overscan said:
Well, I imagine the Parol IFF of the Su-27SK is both modified and 1st generation. The ECM is similarly downgraded.
Yes, even worse for Chinese. Here is an article about the PAROL system. At the end they mentioned new advanced IFF system called the "СТРАЖ". Have you ever heard about it?
http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/armament/2000-12-15/6_parol.html
BTW: the full designation of the PAROL IFF system is "Засекречивающая аппаратура опознавания-Пароль" or "ЗАО-П".
 
Excellent find Martin.

Mikhail khodarenok
"Parol" (Password) barely is audible

The situation, arising with the system of state radar identification, suggests the anxiety

Only two states in the world have systems of the state radar identification: Russia (in the united system "Parol" with the states - participants IN THE CIS) and THE USA (in the united system MK-12 with the NATO alliance countries). Presence of the system of this type and its maintenance in the operational state - task at least state. Actually, the presence (on the level with THE USA) of the unique united system of the state radar identification of air, above-water and ground-based objects speaks about the prestige of our state.

Hardly it is worthwhile to explain the importance of existence in the country of the reliable state radar identification system of air, above-water and ground targets. Omissions and underestimation of a similar system very dearly bypass in the combat situation. For example, during October 1973 in the Near East of the loss of national VVS from their air defense weapons they reached: Egypt - to 46%; Syria - to 14%; Libya and Iraq - to 30%. In 1991 during the war in the bay the shooting at friendly troops was reason 15% for all human losses from the side of allies on the anti-Iraqi coalition (forces). On 14 April, 1994, in the zone, forbidden for the flights of Iraqi aircraft, two American helicopters were destroyed by their own destroyers. Pilots two F -15 erroneously identified the pair of army helicopters "Black Hawk" as Iraqi Mi-24. As a result of incident perished 26 English, French and Turkish soldiers.

AS EVERYTHING BEGAN

The first system of state radar identification, put into use in the territory OF THE USSR and its allies, was called "Kremniy-2(2M)". Together with many positive characteristics it possessed two fundamental deficiencies. Most important of them - unsatisfactory spoofing resistance. The identification codes of "Kremniy" were determined within a few seconds (in "Kremniy-2" these they were code filters in a quantity of 12 pieces). By simple the countershaft of switches or containers (precisely thus they appeared the "codes") it was possible to find the desired combination and to counterfeit identification signal "IFF". Furthermore, system functioned in that forbidden ICAO decimeter range and held in control at these frequencies the development of the television, provided by international agreements. In 1995 was accepted the solution about the curtailment of the combat employment of an identification system "Kremniy-2(2M)" by the territory of Russian Federation, since it decreased the effectiveness of the use of a new united system of state radar identification "Parol". However, at the same time it was decided to preserve the use of ground-based and onboard technical equipment of this system (in the limits of the resource/lifetime of operation established/installed for them) for purposes of the solution of the problems of control for the observance of the order of the use of airspace by aviation.

To this moment beginning with 70- X of years in THE USSR it functioned immediately two systems of the radar identification - "Kremniy-2" and "Parol". In formation and development of the new system of state radar identification "Parol" large personal contribution introduced the Air Marshal Yevgeny Savitskiy. In the beginning of the formation of "Parol" difficult it was to represent situation that in the near future the ground-based radar responder beams will install on the combat vehicles of battalion commanders and they will answer the appropriate demand the signal of state radar identification, moreover - and this basic - in the resistant to spoofing conditions.

However, the complete re-equipment of all air, above-water and ground-based objects to the new system of state radar identification "Parol" so remained unfinished. If military targets were re-equipped practically completely, then this did not touch the significant part of the civil/civilian air objects.

"AEROFLOT" I others

In 1997 entered the force the position about the equipment of civilian aircraft with onboard responders of the identification of system "Parol", affirmed by the director of the federal aviation service of Russia, coordinated with the department head of aerospace industry and shipbuilding industry of Russia and the chairman of the aviation register of intergovermental aviation committee.

Civilian aircraft must be equipped with onboard responders for the purpose of an increase in the effectiveness of making decisions about identification of objects by the organs of control of the use of airspace and elimination of the erroneous fire defeat of our aircraft by their fire means, especially in the near-boundary regions and in the zones of the local armed conflicts.

Furthermore, as specialists assumed, the equipment of civilian aircraft with onboard responders of system "Parol" would make it possible in the threatened period to ensure operational finishing to the necessary degree of the readiness of those flight vehicles, which will be drawn according to the mobilization plan, and also determine the aircraft, signalling "calamity", and thus in proper time render them aid.

OAO "Aeroflot", as another ekspluatanty and developers of the civilian aircraft of Russia independent of the forms of property, had to ensure the equipment of the operable airships with the responders of system "Parol" for determining the state belonging of objects in the territory of Russian federation. This is established by "position about the equipment of civil/civilian airships with the responders of the identification of system "Parol", by the developed and affirmed in 1997 director of the federal aviation service of Russia and by chief of the General Staff VS RF.

Position has as a goal to bind all developers and ekspluatantov of airships independent of the forms of property to ensure the equipment of the operable, serially produced and developed/processed airships with the responders of system "Parol" for determining the state belonging of these objects in the territory of Russian federation. It determines also requirements for the aircraft in the equipment component by their equipment of national recognition. In accordance with these requirements all civilian aircraft, intended for the operation in airspace of Russia (including produced in series, working and drawn according to the mobilization plan, and also newly developed in Russia or other states - participants "agreements about the civil aviation and about the use of airspace" from 27.12.1991 g. and of "agreements about the guarantee of the radar identification of the air, above-water and ground-based units, equipped with the responders of system "Parol" from 26.06.1992 g.), independent of the forms of property must be equipped with the responders of the system indicated.

For the civilian vessels, developed in the states, which are not participants in the named agreements, the requirements about the equipment by their responders of system "Parol" must be established by the joint resolutions of the ministry of defense, the department of aerospace industry and shipbuilding of the ministry of the economy RF and federal aviation service RF according to the federal rules of the use of airspace RF the flights of airships without the equipment for the radar identification are forbidden, with exception of the aircraft, on which the installation of this equipment earlier was not provided for.

In the civil aviation of approximately 7,5 thousand aircraft, including of 1800 main, which according to the decision of government RF must be equipped with system "Parol". However, only 15% of them have this system, which substantially hampers control of the order of the use of airspace. Furthermore, operable on the conditions lizinga by domestic airlines the airships of foreign production also are not equipped with indentification equipment.

OAO "Aeroflot" proposes to generally remove the responders of the system of national recognition from the airships. But this is already dangerous precedent and will lead to the complication of solution of the problem, confronting the armed forces RF on the control of the order of the use of airspace and the intersection of the state border of Russia.

One should mention about the fact that there is the decision of government, which forces ekspluatantov of airships independent of the forms of property to ensure the equipment of the operable and newly made flight vehicles with the means of the system of state identification "Parol" in time, determined by present decision.

Finally, bezukosnitel'noye fulfillment by the appropriate ministries, by departments and with the organizations of the requirements of the decision of the government RF and other given above normative documents will make it possible to ensure the solution of the problem of the reliable determination of the state belonging of civil/civilian air objects with the use of contemporary technical equipment. In this case the possibility of the fire damage/defeat of our objects by its fire means will be lowered, the effectiveness of making decisions about the state belonging of objects will increase by the organs/controls of aircraft warning service.

"PASSWORD" I our NEIGHBORS

The disintegration of the Soviet Union little affected the functioning of the united system of state radar identification. Besides Moldavia and Azerbaijan and partly the Georgia, remaining states concluded "agreement about the guarantee of the radar identification of the air, above-water and ground-based units, equipped with the responders of the identification of system" password ", from 26.06.1992 g. and protocol to this agreement from 04.06.1999 g. (Minsk).

In the agreement of the governments of participating governments (Armenia, Belarus', Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine), being guided by the tendency to ensure the reliable identification of its objects for the purpose of the elimination of unpremeditated defeat by its their fire means, they agreed to preserve as the united system of national recognition radar system "Parol". In this case the sides were bound within the five-year period from the date of its entrance into the force (i.e. to 2004 g.) to equip with the means of system "Parol" the air and seagoing vessels of ministries, departments and organizations, which belong to their states.

Thus, not only in connection with Russian federation, but also at the intergovernmental level for the states - participants IN THE CIS is prepared the necessary normative base regarding the equipment of civil/civilian airships with the responders of identification system "Parol".

ON WHAT IS HELD THE "PASSWORD"

Any regular controls, which achieve any leading and guiding role in the region of the state system of the radar identification, in Russia no. Although, it seemed, "Parol" - state system however it is held in essence on the decency of performers, placed, by the way speaking, even in the Soviet times. The management of the country, in all likelihood, not to the end is aware in the fact that the "Parol" continues to be held on one enthusiasm.

Possibilities for this and spare parts to the "Parol", increasingly less and less. Each block, in particular, the making secret indentification equipment (but on it practically it is held entire "Parol") have its period of fitness, installed lifetime of work. With expendable materials the system will simply begin to collapse without the appropriate maintenance and the periodic repair, the makeup. If we are guided by its own rules and principles, then without the operational system of state identification aircraft cannot be let out in the flight, ship - in the sea. Thus, absence or malfunction of the system of national recognition can lead to paralysis in air and at sea.

By the way, none of the aircraft OF NATO in the recent events in Yugoslavia neither for the minute turned offnor identification system nor system RBS. therefore as in the developed countries of the West the life even of the separately undertaken pilot is very high. Furthermore, control of this mass of air objects was accomplished both from air (aircraft of the type "AWACS") and from the earth/ground (control elements of air traffic). "breeding" of this quantity of flight vehicles is very problematic without the flawlessly functioning system of national recognition.

PROGRAMMED CHAOS

One of the promising trends of the solution of the problem of the equipment of civil aviation the responders of national recognition is use in the content of onboard equipment of the complexed radio-electronic means of the dual purpose. In particular, at present is developed/processed responder 4280 MSGA for the airships of civil aviation, which must ensure work in the identification system "Parol", the domestic system of secondary radar UVD and the international system UVD ATS RBS Mode S (discrete-address regime/conditions of identification). The tentative period of completion of development (beginning of series output) - began of 2004.

In the same direction occurs the development of the aircraft responders of the system of national recognition in THE USA and the NATO alliance countries (Mark 12). In peacetime their commercial airplanes use only second responder RBS, while in the special period this onboard equipment works in the resistant to spoofing regime, which ensures the work of the system of national recognition.

At present are developed proposals on the equipment of aircraft with the modernized system "Parol" ("Strazh", Guard)) for guaranteeing the reliable aircraft warning service of Russia. However, there is no significant optimism in performing of this work.

Actually, during this financing it is possible to part with one additional sign of great power, and the arising situation in its indices and to characteristics is very close to this. If relation to the state system of the radar identification does not change, then will not possibilities not only pass to the new system "Strazh" (Guard), but also even modernize and support in the operational state "Parol". Is completely probable the possibility of return to "Kremniy-2". But "Kremniy" within the visible period will end existence, since it is based on the old element base, industry has not for a long time let out spare parts to it.

Realias are such. But without the reliable radar identification system in air chaos will begin, without any exaggeration. It is worthwhile for second to only visualize that confusion, which can arise in any military conflict, when in air, at sea and on the earth/ground will be located hundred and thousands of objects and within a few seconds will have to be selected - where friend, where the strangers - and to make the valid decision for the application of fire means.

It is published in the independent military review from 15.12.2000
 
http://www.wps.ru/ru/pp/military/2005/08/13.html

Found this. Quite interesting.

The countries OF THE CIS improve the air defense

System "Parol" will reliably protect the aircraft of the states of collaboration from the unpremeditated damage by its antiaircraft missile systems

In the period from 9 to 12 August of this year in the staff on the coordination of the military collaboration (SHKVS) of the participating governments OF THE CIS, took place the conference on the problems of use and improvement of the united system of the radar identification of air, above-water and ground-based objects.

To the conference were invited the representatives of ministries, departments, organizations and ministries of defense of the participating governments of agreement of 26 June, 1992, "about the guarantee of the radar identification of the air, above-water and ground-based units, equipped with the responders of identification".

As stated WPS the officer OF SHKVS Colonel Nikolai salakhov, conference is caused by the need of considering the questions, connected with the application of means of the united system of the radar identification, for the purpose of the elimination of the unpremeditated defeat of air, above-water and ground-based objects by its fire means.

According to him, the radar identification ensures the flight safety of the aviation of the participating governments of the agreement above the territory of the countries of collaboration and excludes the cases of a uncontrolled stay of object- disturbers in airspace, and also the unpremeditated defeat of its flight vehicles by its fire means. The urgency of problem is aggravated also by the existing cases of air terrorism.

The questions, which require the production/consumption of united views on fulfilling of intergovernmental agreements, were included in the plan of conducting conference. In this case it was disseminated other documents about the history of the development of system "Parol". We give their summary.

The first system of the radar identification "SCh-1" ("friend-foe") appeared in arsenal of the parts of the air defense forces in the 1940s. For the change by it arrived the system "SCh-2".

At the end of the Fifties was finished the development and was accepted for the armament fundamentally new in comparison with "SCh-2" system of the radar identification "Kremniy". However, this system of the radar identification had the low indices of reliability. It was not protected from the action of passive and active jamming, which decreased the authenticity of the determination of the state belonging of objects and the effectiveness of air defense as a whole.

American aviation in 1965 during the war in Vietnam with the aid of aircraft F -4 imitated signal "friendly aircraft" in the identification system "Kremniy". Therefore this system it required constant modifications and modernizations of equipment.

The means of this system and its modifications ("Kremniy-1,2,2M") began to enter into service of the armies of the participating governments of the Warsaw Pact, countries of socialist orientation, and also number of the participating countries of the nonalignment movement.

The first American identification system Mark X appeared in arsenal also in the fortieth years. Subsequently was developed the identification system Mark XII, which is used at present. Is conducted the development of qualitatively new identification system MK-15X.

Thus, the states of world were divided into two parts, each of which used either Soviet or American of identification system.

However, the rapid development of the means of electronic warfare, the appearance of new industrial technologies and so forth dictated the need for further improvement of means and entire identification system, high reliability and constant combat readiness of which became one of fundamental component of the combat readiness of the armed forces as a whole.

For these purposes, and also for guaranteeing the armed forces with more reliable radar identification, in parallel with the modernization of the means of system "Kremniy" in 1959 [it must be 1969- translator] was begun the development of the fundamentally new system of the radar identification.

From the moment of the beginning of the development of system and before its adoption for the armament VS OF THE USSR the samples of this system underwent several stages of modernization both in the part of the technical solutions and in the part of the application of a new element base (from the electric vacuum lamps to the application of microassemblies and multilayer printed-circuit boards). This made it possible to maximally decrease the mass-and-size characteristics of equipment, to considerably increase its reliability and radiation durability, to decrease the dependence of equipment on the climatic actions.

The troop tests of the means of identification system carried out in the period from 1978 through 1981 confirmed that they correspond to the assigned contemporary requirements practically according to all characteristics and are not inferior, but in a number of cases it exceeds foreign analogs from the basic parameters. For the same years falls the active re-equipping VS of the USSR.

The means of the system of the radar identification are the basic means of the determination of the state belonging of objects. As the basis of the technical solution of the radar identification is assumed the principle of active radar, i.e., the active demand of the object of identification and active response to it.

For the radar identification of the detected air, above-water or ground-based (coast) object the interrogator of the identifying object emits inquiring radio signals.

To these signals the responders of the identified objects emit the reciprocal coded radio signals, which contain information about the state belonging or the individual signs of these objects. Response signals are received by interrogator and in the case of the correspondence to their acting key (code) automatically are decoded and are mapped onto the indicator screens in the form, accepted for this type of radar (RLS) or antiaircraft missile system (ZRK).

Appearance on the screen of the indicator of the established marker (sign) next to the mark of the detected object attests to the fact that object answers the acting code. The markers (signs) of the identification of different regimes of the work of system differ from each other.

It is necessary to note that at present for purposes of the organization of reliable radar identification in the armed forces of the states of collaboration and coordination of their mutual actions in this region by the participating governments of the cooperation of the independent states the following basic documents are accepted:

1. Agreement of the governments of the participating governments of the cooperation of the independent states "about the guarantee of the radar identification of the air, above-water and ground-based units, equipped with the responders of the identification of system" password "of 26 June, 1992.

By agreement it is provided to preserve this system as the united system of the radar identification for determining the belonging of air, above-water and ground-based objects with the participating governments of this agreement.

Participants in this agreement became the republic of Armenia, republic Belarus', republic Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzskaya republic, republic Tadzhikistan, the republic of Uzbekistan, Russian federation, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine;

In the development of this agreement two protocols on 4 June, 1999, and on 30 May, 2002 are signed.

The special urgency of the organization of reliable radar identification and elimination of a uncontrolled stay of air objects in airspace of the states of collaboration they acquire in connection with the creation of the integral system PVO º - AIR DEFENSE» of the participating governments OF THE CIS and its intercession to standby alert on the protection of air terminations of the states of collaboration, and also fight with the air terrorism.

Information: why is necessary system "Parol"

The aircraft were beaten because of the absence (noninclusion) of aircraft responder:

In 1980 in the Far East (southern Korean aircraft);

In 2001. above the Black sea TU -154

During July 2005 had the same precedent with the aircraft of Vietnam.

In the course of combat operations in Iraq were revealed 17 cases of opening fire on its aircraft and troops:

22 March - the defeat of English tactical fighter "Tornado" because of the troubles in the system of the determination of state belonging "IFF";

On 24 March the defeat of American tactical fighter F -16. on the route pilot was deflected from the established route, detected from onboard indicator the moment of seizing his aircraft of ground RLS after accepting it for the Iraqi, immediately produced the launch of rocket, which struck antenna system ZRK "Patriot". Simultaneously ZRK in the automatic conditions also produced the launch of rocket, as a result of which the aircraft was beaten.

On 2 April as a result of troubles in the identification system ZRK "Patriot" was beaten the deck tactical fighter F/A-18 "Hornet" pilot camber.

By attack aircraft A -10 were attacked the subdivisions of the marines, as a result of which perished 10 soldiers.

Are fixed the skirmish between two subdivisions of the marines OF THE USA and four cases of the firing BMP of their combat technology.
 
Izdeliye 023M Kremniy-2M

The Parol system was supposedly tamper-proof, and designed to self-destruct when the "erasure" button was pressed by the pilot, or failing that explosion was automatically triggered by the ejection sequence, compared to the Kremniy system which was destroyed by contact with the ground.

http://www.avia.ru/cgi/discshow.cgi?id=5431191262665838785491126790079&page=8
 
I`ve found these two photos depicting the NRZ-12 "наземный радиолокационный запросчик",the secondary radiolocation system providing identification friend or foe in the Kremnij-2. The big one is the P-12 surveilance radar.

P.S. source, journal Letectvo&PVO in 1970s
 

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overscan said:
compared to the Kremniy system which was destroyed by contact with the ground.
That`s correct. The SRZO-2/SRO-2 had a impact sensor(switch) located behind the radar section. Once the impact G load 14.5 was exceeded the switch initiated the self destruction mechanism and the onboard decoder interface exploded.

Some stuff about the first soviet IFF interrogators the СЧ-1, СЧ-2 and the СЧ-3.
http://www.aeroreview.ru/?/pages/akk/akk_200502_019021/akk_200502_020.htm
 
Interesting again.

If I post the Russian text and English translation for the Su-27SK manual section on IFF, could you comment on it?
 
The Mig-15 cockpit SRO-1 panel, the above-left switch is the "OTVET-GOTOVNOST"(RESPOND-STAND BY) switch, the above-right switch is the "BEDSTVIE-VKL-VYKL" (EMERGENCY-ON-OFF) switch. The big knob could be the code selector with the code indicator nearby. The thing(switch??) on the most left side I do not have a clue what it might be.
 

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Ahmad Rushdi says there was an SRO-2M2.

He says that the Iraqi side were aware of "Combat Tree",

The Iraqi AF was aware of the combat tree from late September 1980, through the Iranian pilot POW. All Iraqi planes crossing the Iraqi-Iranian front line switched off their IFF devices.
 
overscan said:
Ahmad Rushdi says there was an SRO-2M2.

He says that the Iraqi side were aware of "Combat Tree",

The Iraqi AF was aware of the combat tree from late September 1980, through the Iranian pilot POW. All Iraqi planes crossing the Iraqi-Iranian front line switched off their IFF devices.
Isn`t that weird that all what is known about the "Combat tree" literally contradict, of what have been done to counter it? Hopefully someone can shed light on the exaggerated "combat tree" mystery. Anyway, I can tell you by seeing an Iraqi Mig cockpit(detail panel photo) if it was equipped with SRZO-2M(izdelie 023) or just by the SRZO-2(izdelie 020). There might be even more secured versions of the Kremnij-2M the "-2M2", but probably exported abroad to third world countries instead of the PAROL.
 
As I heard recently all PVO brirds in service have been brought up to Kremnij-2M(izd.023) in late seventies/early eighties. Some photos of the Kremnij-2(2M) IFF aerials.
 

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mrdetonator said:
Isn`t that weird that all what is known about the "Combat tree" literally contradict, of what have been done to counter it? Hopefully someone can shed light on the exaggerated "combat tree" mystery. Anyway, I can tell you by seeing an Iraqi Mig cockpit(detail panel photo) if it was equipped with SRZO-2M(izdelie 023) or just by the SRZO-2(izdelie 020). There might be even more secured versions of the Kremnij-2M the "-2M2", but probably exported abroad to third world countries instead of the PAROL.

I don't know if it's the best, but my favourite description of "Combat Tree" is in the book "Clashes" by Michel. He decribes how it was used operationally by F-4s in Vietnam. I'm surprised that there is so much "secrecy" regarding its use in the F-15, considering how little secrecy there seems to be for its use in the F-4. Maybe it would make a good starting point for research.
 
very interesting description of the Kremnij-1 IFF from one russian forum.

Наверное, первой отечественной системой государственного опознавания была система "Кремний-1". Система работала в метровом диапазоне волн (аппаратура могла настраиваться на несколько частот в диапазоне). В состав РЛС вводилась аппаратура, называемая "наземный радиолокационный запросчик" (аббревиатура - НРЗ), а на борту самолета устанавливалась аппаратура, называемая самолетный радиолокационный ответчик (СРО) или самолетный радиолокационныйзапросчик-ответчик на истребителях, имевших радиолокационный прицел (СРЗО).
Строго говоря, кодирования запросных и ответных сигналов в системе не было. Передатчик НРЗ по запуску синхронизировался с РЛС и при включенном запросе (включеном тумблере или нажатой педали) с каждым зондирующим сигналом передатчика РЛС в ту же сторону антенной НРЗ излучался импульс запросчика.
Самолетный приемник отвечика, приняв сигнал запросчика, включал на этой же частоте на излучение свой передатчик и через антенну в ответ посылал последовательность коротких и длинных импульсов. Набор этих посылок составлял код ответного сигнала. В качестве кода использовались некоторые буквы, передаваемые телеграфной азбукой Морзе. Код менялся по временнОму расписанию и устатнавливался переключателем.
Индикатор НРЗ представлял собой осциллограф с горизонтальной линейной разветкой; развертка синхронизировалась импульсом запуска РЛС. На усилитель вертикального отклонения луча подавался сигнал с амплитудного детектора приемника НРЗ через однокаскадный видеоусилитель. На дальности отвечающей цели появлялись пульсирующие амплитудные отметки-импульсы разной длительности (условно "короткие" и "длинные"). Если ответчик отвечал буквой "А", то это была последовательность "точка - тире", буква "Л" - "точка-тире-точка-точка". Набор букв для кодирования
был ограничен.
Наверное из-за этой "долбёжки" азбукой Морзе НРЗ-1 в войсках имел неофициальное прозвище "Дятел".

В качестве примера конкретного исполнения НРЗ-1 приводятся две фотографи.
На первой изображена развернутая на позиции РЛС П-3А. На переднем плане слева стоит мачта с антенно-поворотным устройством НРЗ-1.
На второй изображение шкафа приемо-передающей аппаратуры НРЗ-1.

Состав комплекта:
- шкаф запросчика с приемо-передающей аппаратурой;
- блок управления с ндикаторным устройством;
- антенно-мачтовое устройство.

Особенности построения.

В шкафу с приемо-передающей аппаратурой размещались три блока:
- блок Б-11 - передающее устройство;
- блок Б-15М - приемное устройство;
- блок Б-22 - блок питания.
Передающе устройство состояло из генератора и модулятора. Генератор собран по схеме двухтактного генератора с самовозбуждением на лампах ГУ-3 и колебательной системой в
виде длинной линии, изготовленной из латунных посеребреных трубок. В блоке передатчика размещался антенный коммутатор, подключающий антенну по очереди к генератору и приемнику.
Приемник собран по супергетеродинной схеме с одним преобразованием частоты на октальных (восьмиштырьковых) радиолампах. На переднюю панель приемника выведены шлицы настройки колебательных контуров преселектора, усилителя высокой частоты и гетеродина.
В качестве индикатора настройки использовалась радиолампа 6Е5С - оптический индикатор настройки. Его круглй зеленый "глазок" выведен на переднюю панель блока приемника.
Индикатор представлял собой специализированный осциллограф с линейной разверткой.
Его фотографии не нашел.
Антенна НРЗ представляла собой систему из двух антенн типа "волновой канал" с вертикальной поляризацией и общим плоским рефлектором из металлической сетки. Антенная система устанавливалась на выходной вал поворотного устройства,которое, в свою очередь устанавливалось на металлической мачте-трубе. Мачта удерживалась в вертикальном положении посредством двух ярусов оттяжек и металлических кольев, забиваемых в землю.
Поворотное устройство антенны смонтировано в литом силуминовом герметизированном прямоугольном корпусе. В нем размещен коллекторный электродвигатель постоянного тока на 110 В, сельсины, реле управления, высокочастотный токосъемник. В системе вращения антенны был еще один небольшой блок (номер и название восстановить не удалось),
в котором размещалась лампово-релейная схема, обеспечивающая синхронное и синфазное вращение антенны НРЗ-1 с антенной РЛС.
 
Probably, the first domestic system of state identification was system "Silicon". System worked in the meter wave band (equipment I could be tuned by several frequencies in the range). Into the composition RLS was introduced the equipment, called "ground based interrogator" (abbreviation - NRZ), and on board the aircraft it was installed the equipment, called airborne responder (SRO) or aircraft interrogator-responder on the destroyers, which had the radar sight (SRZO).
Strictly speaking, codings of inquiring and response signals in the system was not. Transmitter NRZ on the starting was synchronized with RLS and with the included demand (**vklyuchenom toggle switch or the harvested pedal) with each sounding signal of transmitter RLS in the same side of antenna NRZ was emitted the pulse/momentum of interrogator.
The aircraft receiver **of otvechika, after accepting the interrogating signal, included at the same frequency for the emission its transmitter and through the antenna in response sent the sequence of short and long pulses. The collection of these messages composed the code of response signal. Some letters, transferred by telegraphic Morse code, were used as the code.The code changed according to the temporary/time timetable and **ustatnavlivalsya by switch.
Indicator NRZ was oscillograph with the horizontal linear **razvetkoy; development/scan was synchronized by trigger pulse RLS on the vertical-deflection amplifier of ray/beam it was supplied signal from the amplitude detector of receiver NRZ through the one-stage video amplifier. At the distance of the corresponding target/purpose appeared the pulsatory amplitude mark- pulses/momenta of different duration (conditionally "short" and "long"). If responder answered letter "A", then this was sequence "point - dash", letter "L" - "point-dash-point- point". Collection of letters for the coding
it was limited.
Surely because of this "**dolbezhki" by Morse code NRZ -1 in the troops had unofficial nickname "woodpecker".

Are given two photo-rule as an example of the concrete/specific performance NRZ -1.
On the first it is depicted developed on the position RLS P-б. The mast with the antenna- rotary device/equipment NRZ, to the left stands in the foreground.
On the second the image of the cabinet of the receiving-transmitting equipment NRZ -1.

Composition of the complete set:
- the cabinet of interrogator with the receiving-transmitting equipment;
- the control unit with **the ndikatornym device/equipment;
- antenna- mast device/equipment.

Special features of construction.

In the cabinet with the receiving-transmitting equipment three blocks were placed:
- block B -11 - transmitting device;
- block B -15m - receiving device;
- block B -22 - power unit.
Transmitting device/equipment it consisted of generator and modulator. Generator is assembled according to the schematic of double measure self-excited oscillator on the lamps **Of gu-e and oscillatory system in
the form of the long line, prepared from the brass **poserebrenykh tubes. In the unit of transmitter the antenna switchboard, which connects antenna along the turn to the generator and the receiver, was placed.
Receiver is assembled according to superheterodyne circuit with one conversion of frequency on the octal (octal) radio tubes. The slits of tuning the oscillatory circuits of preselector, high-frequency amplifier and heterodyne are brought out to the front panel of receiver.
As the tuning meter was used the radio tube **'ESHCHS - optical tuning meter. Its **krugly green "eye" is brought out to the front panel of the unit of receiver.
Indicator was the specialized oscillograph with the linear development/scan.
Its photograph it did not find.
Antenna NRZ was system of two Yagi antennas with the vertical polarization and the general/common flat/plane reflector from the wire mesh. Antenna system was established/installed on output shaft of rotary device/equipment, which, in turn was established/installed on the metallic mast- pipe. Mast was retained in the vertical position by means of two tiers of guys and metallic stakes, clogged into the earth/ground.
The rotary device/equipment of antenna is installed in the cast Silumin sealed rectangular housing. In it is placed the commutator motor of direct current to 110 v, selsyns, relays of control, high-frequency slip rings. In the system of the rotation/revolution of antenna there was one additional small block (number and name restored/reduced could not be),
in which was placed lamp- relay circuit, which ensures the synchronous and cophasal rotation/revolution of antenna NRZ -1 with antenna RLS.

Fairly rubbish translation...
 
Time to start looking at Parol.

From Su-27SK Manual

6231R-9 interrogator
6202R-1 transponder
A-511 SIF

A) the general identification of aircraft according to the principle "its - stranger ";
b) the individual identification of aircraft according to the principles "where you?" and "who you?";
c) the delivery of emergency signals "calamity " and "anxiety ";
g) the output of flight information about the flight altitude of aircraft and the fuel remainder.
Aircraft responder A -511 is intended for the accomplishment of the following objectives:
A) increase in the range of ground-based radars and antijamming from the local objects and the weather factors;
b) the determination of the coordinates of aircraft;
c) the individual identification of aircraft on the radar indicators ;
g) transfer to the dispatcher radars of digital information about the flight altitude, the number of aircraft and the fuel remainder;
d) regime the "wireless silence ", with which the responder passes into the regime "it is finished ".
They are established on the front panel:
switches A 1, A 2, B 1, B 2, intended for install on the earth of the inquiring and reciprocal codes Sh of regime and for proverk of the fitness for work of interrogator;
 
The PU-S31-1 panel: switch ZAKHVAT-SVOY-CHUZHOY, the weapon system locks-on only FOE targets when the position "CHUZHOY" is selected. The pilot may cancel the lock-on with the button "ZBROS" on the control stick. When switched to "SVOY" the weapon system may lock-on a friend target too.
 

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The 9.12B vs 9.12A , differences in the IFF system equipment. The 9.12B lacks the PAROL control panel, it has the old style code switch selector 8BK, the control stick contains the "ZAPROS" button instead of "SBROS". The "SBROS" button is located on the PU-S31-1 panel. This is almost identical to Kremnij-2(2M) controls used on the Mig-21,23. In other words, pilot has to manually interrogate the target pushing the button "ZAPROS" after he locked-on one. The IFF process works automatically for the 9.12A, the information whether friend or foe is then put on the SEI(HuD) display.
 

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From Tom Cooper:

On the other side, I can add that Iranian pilots I asked about the functionality of the CT later during the war said (and all of them were taken completely by surprise to hear that I even know about the CT), that the number of "unknown" returns "increased". This wouldn't bother them all too much, however, as the only side flying in large formations was the Iraqi. Besides, their [Iranian] ROEs were such that "unknown" was sufficient for getting a "clear to fire" order. Such ROEs, BTW, are still in force there.... So, it's a trace with dead end here. They couldn't say if this came out of the fact that the Iraqis have got upgraded SROs, or some other reason.
 
overscan said:
From Tom Cooper:

On the other side, I can add that Iranian pilots I asked about the functionality of the CT later during the war said (and all of them were taken completely by surprise to hear that I even know about the CT), that the number of "unknown" returns "increased". This wouldn't bother them all too much, however, as the only side flying in large formations was the Iraqi. Besides, their [Iranian] ROEs were such that "unknown" was sufficient for getting a "clear to fire" order. Such ROEs, BTW, are still in force there.... So, it's a trace with dead end here. They couldn't say if this came out of the fact that the Iraqis have got upgraded SROs, or some other reason.
I wish at least this thread not to be spoiled by his fabulist stories. I`d rather stick with the technical aspects, thanks. I do not know what he is talking about anyway.
 
Well, what he appears to be saying that increasingly as the Iran-Iraq war went on, the "Combat Tree" equipment stopped being able to confirm (Soviet IFF equipped) contacts as hostile, but Iranian ROEs meant that an "unknown" response was adequate.

I know that some of his info is dodgy but he does have some good contacts and there's a nice "hidden forum" like this one on acig.org that I have access to where Iraqi/Iranian claims and counterclaims are being investigated pretty well.
 
overscan said:
Well, what he appears to be saying that increasingly as the Iran-Iraq war went on, the "Combat Tree" equipment stopped being able to confirm (Soviet IFF equipped) contacts as hostile, but Iranian ROEs meant that an "unknown" response was adequate.
Then what is the difference between "confirmed hostile contact" and an "unknown contact". Please explain.
 
overscan said:
I know that some of his info is dodgy but he does have some good contacts and there's a nice "hidden forum" like this one on acig.org that I have access to where Iraqi/Iranian claims and counterclaims are being investigated pretty well.
Not some, but most of his stuff CT related is meaningless because he doesn`t care about technical explanations. I can imagine that investigation group of Tom Cooper`s sensation-seekers.
P.S. Anyway, you shouldn`t say that to me about the secret forum. ;)
 
Well, this all depends on how exactly "Combat Tree" works, but my understanding is the difference is between "theres something out there in that direction emitting IFF type signals that I can't confirm to be friendly" and "its definitely a MiG".

"Combat Tree" could interrogate an SRO-2 equipped MiG and determine its identity. An Iraqi Mirage F1 could not be positively identified; so an Iranian pilot would not know if the contact was Iranian, but with malfunctioning IFF, or a Mirage.

If SRO-2M's antispoofing measures stopped "Combat Tree" identifying the MiGs, and Iraqi aircraft were progressively upgraded to SRO-2M, then you would expect that "Combat Tree" would be less and less able to positively identify Iraqi MiGs as hostiles. It seems that this may have been the case.

I'm not defending Tom at all; his knowledge of Soviet equipment is minimal at best. He thinks you can tell MiG-25RBSh from MiG-25RB by the presence or absence of SPO-15 antennas! Combat Tree was not some magic crystal ball of global situational awareness, but in Vietnam it was a very useful tool for obtaining BVR target identification of MiGs and also (this is perhaps more important) allowed lookdown detection of targets, which the APQ-120 radar was completely unable to do.
 
overscan said:
IFF panel from Moldovan (former Soviet) 9.13

Hey - any hints where those former Moldovan 9.13 are located? Now that I live in the U.S., maybe one is nearby.
 

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