Really Top Secret Projects (Ben Rich remark to Jim Goodall)

Was the mockup similar to the model and drawings seen from Northrop AF/X or were there significant changes (if available to say)?
This was the "Performance" design, for AX/AXF. It was the start of a follow-up design to replace the F111 and fold for the Navy. It went through several irradiation s before the company moved on after the Customers showed little interest since there was no room in the budgets. We had some pretty cool designs floating around about then. The ATA was a pure wing, posted by quellish. The wind tunnel photo was at Northrop Aircraft's 7x10 low speed tunnel. I worked there for a couple of years.
Correct me if I am wrong and as far as I know for ATA, we stayed with the side by side seating arrangement (because the USN wanted an LO A-6 replacement) at the time we bowed out and let GD/McAir have it. The USN also was jacking around with the spec too much as well. We had a very nice design. Plus I think GD/McAir low-balled their bid too.
Northrop's cost estimates were grounded in experience and hence more realistic. The Navy didn't like them and went with the team with little relevant experience, promising to do it all cheaper. Northrop wouldn't match their price and didn't bid.

It didn't work out well for anyone except Northrop.

“A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.”​

Yes, customer {Navy} wanted side by side. Both were studied in the tunnel though. Navy wanted a fixed price contract, Northrop said cost plus, which is real world, and yes, Navy change requirements almost daily. We did not bid a fixed price contract. GD wanted it bad and took the bait. We all see how that turned out. We {NG} got involved near the end, we were read into the GD A12 to try and solve all their problems. By then it was too far gone. Another said note in history.
 
Was the mockup similar to the model and drawings seen from Northrop AF/X or were there significant changes (if available to say)?
This was the "Performance" design, for AX/AXF. It was the start of a follow-up design to replace the F111 and fold for the Navy. It went through several irradiation s before the company moved on after the Customers showed little interest since there was no room in the budgets. We had some pretty cool designs floating around about then. The ATA was a pure wing, posted by quellish. The wind tunnel photo was at Northrop Aircraft's 7x10 low speed tunnel. I worked there for a couple of years.
Correct me if I am wrong and as far as I know for ATA, we stayed with the side by side seating arrangement (because the USN wanted an LO A-6 replacement) at the time we bowed out and let GD/McAir have it. The USN also was jacking around with the spec too much as well. We had a very nice design. Plus I think GD/McAir low-balled their bid too.
Northrop's cost estimates were grounded in experience and hence more realistic. The Navy didn't like them and went with the team with little relevant experience, promising to do it all cheaper. Northrop wouldn't match their price and didn't bid.

It didn't work out well for anyone except Northrop.

“A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.”​

Yes, customer {Navy} wanted side by side. Both were studied in the tunnel though. Navy wanted a fixed price contract, Northrop said cost plus, which is real world, and yes, Navy change requirements almost daily. We did not bid a fixed price contract. GD wanted it bad and took the bait. We all see how that turned out. We {NG} got involved near the end, we were read into the GD A12 to try and solve all their problems. By then it was too far gone. Another said note in history.
You definitely know a whole hell of a lot more on this than I do, but my vague understanding was that the GD A-12 (stupid designation recycling, I hear A-12 and my head goes to the Lockheed proto-Blackbird one) was pretty much ready to go when the program was canned. Massively over-budget, but almost production-ready, and a large number of people were very displeased with how it got cut so far into development.

Well, "cancelled", the actual Navy Avenger II was pretty definitively dropped. But uh, there was an unidentified Dorito-shaped something photographed over Wichita back in 2014 that bears an uncanny resemblance to an A-12.
 
It wasn't anywhere near a flying demonstrator, much less a flying prototype. "Production-ready" was still buried in the engineers' dreams.

GD told the Navy that they would need as much more as they had already spent (which was almost the entire development budget) to get to "production ready".
 
It wasn't anywhere near a flying demonstrator, much less a flying prototype. "Production-ready" was still buried in the engineers' dreams.

GD told the Navy that they would need as much more as they had already spent (which was almost the entire development budget) to get to "production ready".
We can talk about the issues effecting the A12 for days. There was a huge problem with it's weight. The carry through spars were in the wrong place and design, and in order to get it's required strength and load capability needed, they kept adding material, etc. NG came on board and did an analysis, not of just the RCS, antenna issues, but of structure, propulsion, intake, exhaust, etc. Our lead aerodynamics engineer, a well known figure, published his findings. He said so much was wrong that it couldn't be made to operate off a carrier with any payload. His recommend was to start over. He told them what to change to have a chance at an operation design. It wasn't pretty, but he was polite. Chaney stopped the program payments after the full review, maybe two months, after NG gave it's findings to the review board. We did offer to help. The Navy budget just would not allow this, they were running dry. We had done such a good job on ours, again we were pretty bummed.
 
Our lead aerodynamics engineer, a well known figure, published his findings. He said so much was wrong that it couldn't be made to operate off a carrier with any payload. His recommend was to start over. He told them what to change to have a chance at an operation design. It wasn't pretty, but he was polite.

I'm trying to recall, but wasn't that Barnaby Wainfain? I keep thinking he had a talk, or a paper, about what not to do when designing an aircraft and he brought up the chopped up load paths on the A-12.
 
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Our lead aerodynamics engineer, a well known figure, published his findings. He said so much was wrong that it couldn't be made to operate off a carrier with any payload. His recommend was to start over. He told them what to change to have a chance at an operation design. It wasn't pretty, but he was polite.

I'm trying to recall, but wasn't that Barnaby Wainfain? I keep thinking he had a talk, or a paper, about what not to do when designing an aircraft and he brought up the chopped load paths on the A-12.
 
of note
 

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Copy of Lockheed Point Paper Flateric addressed above on the 1995 Security Issue:

POINT PAPER
RESPONSE TO
COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION


13 September 1995



LOCKHEED MARTIN SKUNK WORKS
Division of Lockheed Martin Corporation
1011 Lockheed Way
Palmdale, CA 93599



1. BACKGROUND​

As requested, we are responding to the Commission's request for information on our thoughts and comments on the impact of preserving the secrecy of sensitive projects. We concur with the Commission's efforts to make comprehensive proposals for reform designed to reduce the volume of information classified and thereby strengthen the protection of legitimately classified information. The economic environment is such that every effort must be made to assure the adequacy of protection within the constraints of a security system that is simplified, more uniform and more cost-effective.
In the ever-changing environment in which we work, a lot has evolved since the Commission was formed. The current system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information is contained with Executive Order 12958, dated April 1995. This order prescribes all pertinent details concerning classification standards, levels, categories, and authority. This order further defines the duration of classification and declassification/ downgrading. The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) further promulgates these regulations, and flows derivative classification authority and guidance to the contractor community. In short, the Government Contracting Authority is the classification authority and issues classification guidance to the contractor in the form of classification specification and security guides. The contractor role is to classify, based on this guidance (derivative classification), and challenge what it believes to be improperly classified information. Implementation of these measures on a consistent basis will go a long ways to drive down the cost of security.



2. ISSUES IN PRESERVING SECRECY​

2.1 Extent of Classification/ Consequences of Overclassification
In original classification, the government has often relied on outdated perceptions concerning the value of the information, the whims of an overzealous classification official or, if all else fails, the status quo. Special access program managers have always had the power to independently set security policy within their program. This culture of secrecy often contributes to initially classifying more information than required, over- classification of information, and not downgrading or declassifying information in a timely manner. Often times this promotes empires and limits oversight. The consequence of this action directly relates to added cost affecting the bottom line of industry and inflating procurement costs to the government.

  • Overclassifying technology inhibits information exchange between programs and leads to "reinventing the wheel."

  • Classifying contractual and financial data within a corporation, which in today's environment should rarely be classified, inhibits accurate forecasting, limits oversight, and could eventually lead to an erosion in shareholder value based on unavailability of information for analysis.

  • From a legal standpoint, classifying unnecessary paperwork can put the company and the customer in jeopardy of union actions and lawsuits. Issues that we experience daily pit an overzealous need to limit access against the rights of a bargaining unit employee of employment based on seniority.

  • For larger programs, massive declassification would not only eliminate unneeded protection for older information but would also have the potential for decreasing the amount of classified areas that are dedicated to storage.
Most information is perishable. A rational government-wide standard of classification should serve as a guide for all classification decisions. It is the duty of the classification official and the program to do a uniform and realistic risk assessment that defines not only what information is classified, but how long it can be reasonably assumed to require that protection. If a declassification date cannot be established, a reasonable review date should be set up and adhered to. It is evident that any unnecessary restriction to information flow will create added cost and inefficiencies in an organization. One method of avoiding this is to address proper classification up front.

  • Our recent Tier III Minus program is a good example of cost avoidance in this area. Early in the program, Lockheed and ARPA worked diligently to establish realistic security guidance geared to the program goals-- a compressed schedule and roll out nine months later. The result was the ability to do a job without unnecessary restraints while protecting the technological capabilities. This was an acknowledged special access program.

  • Unfortunately, unacknowledged special access programs do not always work as well since they are at the mercy of the program managers and numerous security guides. These programs usually involve long lead technologies that are oftentimes classified on generalities and do not address review cycles for downgrading or declassification. This results in multiple customers applying multiple security requirements. A fallout of this is the fact that inspections are now comprised of multiple agencies, multiple programs within agencies, and a cast of inspectors continually inspecting the same items within the contractor facility. This repetition adds both time and money to the government and contractors. Eliminating this redundancy within inspections (e.g., every customer checking the alarm systems, plant protection response times, government security files, visitor control procedures, etc.) would create less intrusive inspections and save time all around. The bottom line is inspecting the common criteria only once.
To eliminate the added cost of secrecy requires cooperation of government and industry. We need to work together to establish the realistic classification guideline and properly identify exactly what information requires protection, while at the same time keeping program goals in mind. Also, proper oversight and management of a recognized and timely declassification review process is required to eliminate unnecessary security protection and allow effective flow of information.

2.2 Personnel Security

Personnel security, the cornerstone of the security system, is only as good as the trustworthiness of the people in possession of (or responsible for) classified information.

  • Personnel Security Clearance: The granting of a clearance means the individual has been screened and met the criteria for clearance in such areas as: financial stability, immoderate alcohol/ illegal drug use, foreign involvement/connections, arrest records, psychological/ mental counseling.

  • Periodic Re-evaluation: Each cleared employee needs to be periodically re-evaluated to assess his/her ability to continue to safeguard classified information and five- to seven-year periodic reviews should be continued.

  • Periodic reviews would be more effective if they consisted of a standard Counter Intelligence (CI) scope polygraph for contractor personnel.

  • A set of three to five questions dealing with trustworthiness (e.g. "Have you sold information to another country?"), rather than lifestyle questions, should be the standard for the polygraph.

  • Adverse Information Reporting: Adverse reporting is very important because it can trigger a new background investigation.

  • Every American convicted of espionage might have been stopped, if identifiable adverse information had been reported.

  • A strong security education program is required to motivate our employees to be responsible citizens and to report behavior that calls into question the integrity or trustworthiness of a cleared employee.

  • The greatest threat to a defense contractor does not come from outside sources. Historically, it has been someone from within that is most likely to commit espionage.
The personnel security system has recently become easier for contractors.

  • The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) agents and the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) have adopted a user-friendly and helpful perspective towards industry.

  • The advent of computers has enabled contractors to process Personnel Security Questionnaires (PSQs) in a timely manner. Modern technology has allowed us to process and store information with a great deal of efficiency.

  • On-line capabilities have alleviated the seven-day delay in waiting for mail deliveries for Letters of Consent. This permits employees on lay-off or in holding tanks to report to their work stations expeditiously.

  • The NISPOM relaxed the need for extensive paperwork for reinstatement/ revalidation/ transfer. It is now possible to utilize a one-page form for these purposes.

  • DIS has granted a waiver to transfer clearances within all Lockheed Martin companies, to easily merge and reorganize the new corporation.

  • DIS is transitioning into more of a partnership with industry. An example of this partnership is the amount of time needed to clear an individual from "hire" to "start date." The ISM [the old Industrial Security Manual] gave only 30 days. At the Skunk Works most employees must possess a final clearance before they can start work. A final clearance takes between 3 months to 6 months on an average-- and as long as one year in some instances. We requested a waiver from this 30-day requirement and asked instead for 120 days processing time. The waiver was granted, and the NISPOM, which replaced the Industrial Security Manual (ISM), changed the processing time to 180 days.

  • This partnership is a reality-- especially at the local level. DIS representatives visit the facility and know what is going on. They have adopted a "teamwork" approach (e.g. sharing information, solving problems, etc.) rather than behaving like a policing agency looking for problems.
The future offers a more timely and less expensive personnel security system.



  • Beginning late this year, a new standard form will be utilized for all clearance requests, i.e. Top Secret, Secret and Confidential clearances.

  • The Privacy Portion on the new form will be easier for employees to complete due to the fact that most of the questions will address only the last seven years.

  • Eventually, all forms will be on-line to DISCO, including the new PSQ, User Agency endorsement letters, and fingerprint cards. Contractors cannot accomplish transmission if any of the required data is missing from forms, which will eliminate time-consuming rejections.
    The personnel security system needs even more refinement.
    • The new personnel security Executive Order, requiring a financial disclosure, is poor "risk management"; it speaks more towards "risk avoidance." If someone makes the decision to commit espionage, he/she would not hesitate to lie on a financial disclosure statement. Financial disclosure would also have a negative effect on our industry by keeping good people from becoming involved in an industry that invades their privacy.

    • Contractors are required to complete a local file check-- which encompasses a review of personnel files, Government Security files, payroll (wage garnishments), etc., and a supervisor certification for a Top Secret clearance at the time a request for clearance has been initiated. When Defense Investigative Service (DIS) agents arrive to investigate, they perform exactly the same file checks. This is a time-consuming task and a duplication of effort.

    • Change the requirement to report traffic violators to a certain number with a certain time-span. Increase dollar amount on traffic citations to be reported as adverse information (not to include alcohol or drugs).

    • The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals needs to make more timely decisions of whether to grant or deny an employee a security clearance. In some cases, it takes six months to a year for a decision.

    • It is redundant to submit a complete PSQ package for adverse information (e.g. wage garnishments) which has already been reported and favorably adjudicated within the past 12 to 18 months.

    • Program access criteria should be standardized for SAP/SAR programs.
2.3 Information Systems Security
More attention must, by necessity, be focused on information systems security.


  • We are totally dependent upon computer systems to perform almost every aspect of our complex classified contracts. Threats to national security information disseminated across electronic information systems are very real. The increased value of US technical information necessitates balancing national policy objectives and the importance of sharing information with the need to protect our leading edge technologies.

  • The majority of incidents involving information systems are caused by authorized individuals doing unauthorized activities. Strong technical measures already exist to keep the outside out (encryption, firewalls, passwords, etc.). It appears there is more benefit to information systems security through an effective personnel security program than arbitrary, costly physical restrictions on the computer systems.

  • There is no doubt that increased connectivity creates greater vulnerabilities. However, the advent of the NISPOM has not really addressed implementing security requirements based on risk management factors, but, instead, appears to be aimed at risk avoidance.

  • The NISPOM, Chapter 8, "Automated Information Systems Security," above all other chapters in the manual, requires extensive changes in our automated information systems security program that are more restrictive and that have significant cost impact to industry. For example:
    • All procedures for our classified computer systems must be totally rewritten to accommodate new NISPOM requirements. This is an extensive investment of manpower for this contractor as we currently have over 150 Standard Practice Procedures for 1200 classified systems. There is a further concern with the implementation of the NISPOM Supplement used by our special access program customers, i.e. can the contractor come up with a single set of procedures that can be adapted to special programs and "white world" programs without each special access program retreating to its own format as they have done in the past.

    • A Certification Test Plan, which outlines the inspection and test procedures to demonstrate compliance with the security requirement associated with the mode of operation must be developed for each classified system. As a minimum for dedicated systems, the test plan must verify that system access controls and/or procedures are functional and provide test results that verify the need to know controls are implemented. This is a costly requirement. By definition, these tests mandate highly technical personnel perform these tests. We rely on our Information Services personnel to assist with security tests and evaluations, but their services are charged back to programs incurred with each test. Additionally, each contractor is conducting its own tests on similar equipment, meaning each contractor is "reinventing the wheel" rather than sharing test results for specific configurations.

    • Storage media used for Top Secret processing may not be used for Secret processing. It may not be declassified; destruction of the storage media is the only acceptable method. Up until a year ago, almost without exception, storage devices used for classified special access program processing (regardless of classification level) were required to be destroyed. In one instance the Skunk Work was required to destroy over $300,000 worth of storage devices used on one of its classified mainframe processors (we had upgraded from double-density storage devices to triple-density storage devices). Recently, we have been allowed to degauss or overwrite Confidential and Secret special access program storage devices for reallocation on other special access programs. However, Top Secret storage devices must still be destroyed.

    • A bigger issue with storage devices is with the prohibition against using Top Secret storage devices for multiple special access programs from different User Agencies (e.g., Air Force special access programs will not allow their devices to be used by Navy or Army special access programs). The main impact here is with our supercomputing efforts. Supercomputers and their storage devices are expensive; contractors cannot afford to purchase separate storage devices for each classification level, each program, and each agency. We appear to be spending more dollars "protecting us from us." Economies of scale demand that once a system is approved at the Top Secret level, it should be available to multiple programs and agencies (with "clearing" between processing sessions).

    • The contractor must validate the functionality of security-related software, requiring the similar technical expertise as that required for Certification Tests. In addition, and much more costly, is the requirement to verify all software is free of malicious code prior to installation. This is a prime example of implementing "risk avoidance" rather than "risk management." The expense of line code and virus checks of every standard off-the-shelf software package used on a classified system is not warranted. With over 1,200 classified systems in use by the Skunk Works, the manpower required to virus check each software revision on each system prior to installation would be untenable.
More and more, special access program customers are becoming involved in how the Skunk Works protects its unclassified systems as well as its classified systems.


  • The Joint Security Commission report, "Redefining Security," and the Information Infrastructure Task Force's report, "NII Security: The Federal Role," clearly shows this interest is warranted, not only by our customers, but by the Corporation itself. But as both of these reports point out, there is a need to better understand what will be needed to make our information secure enough to ensure information security and network reliability. Until we have a better understanding of the "what," the government should not implement arbitrary and costly security measures. Government contractors and computer vendors should expand the time sharing of information system vulnerabilities and countermeasures.

3. SUMMARY​

The past few years have seen great changes in the security programs in the United States. Foremost among these changes have been the approval of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) and Executive Order 12958. These are significant improvements in standardizing requirements for the contractor community. As we have pointed out, they can still be improved upon. The work of the Joint Security Commission and now the forming of your Commission are another positive step forward. Even with the current strides, we are still spending too much protecting us from ourselves. We need to be more conscious of utilizing risk management instead of risk avoidance methods in determining security requirements in this era of diminishing assets.
I do believe we need to concentrate a large part of our efforts on Information and Personnel Security programs. This is money well spent. In all other areas the risk management versus risk avoidance approach must be stringently and intelligently applied. Only continuous meaningful Government/ Industry participation in defining the rules, combined with the appropriate oversight will allow us to drive down the exorbitant costs of security. We look forward to providing you with any additional information that can be of assistance.
 
From page 25:

"Gellhorn warned that by placing scientific information in isolated compartments the government would be fragmenting knowledge, narrowing fields of inquiry, and encouraging the duplication of unsuccessful research. Such an approach prevents the exchange of scientific ideas and the stimulation that comes from a comparison of experience. In addition, it takes no account of the needs of scientists working outside the area of secrecy. Indeed, among the multitude of secrecy procedures introduced during World War II, none was more dubious than compartmentalization. Employed by the military on national security grounds, the imposition of this philosophy on scientific research was uniformly counterproductive. One government official admitted that 'more harm in arresting research and development was done by this compartmentalization of information than could ever have been done by the additional scrap of information that the enemy might have picked up by a more general dissemination of knowledge.'"

Secret Science - Federal Control of American Science and Technology by Herbert N. Foerstel. ISBN 0-275-94447-6. Published in 1993.
 
It wasn't anywhere near a flying demonstrator, much less a flying prototype. "Production-ready" was still buried in the engineers' dreams.

GD told the Navy that they would need as much more as they had already spent (which was almost the entire development budget) to get to "production ready".
We can talk about the issues effecting the A12 for days. There was a huge problem with it's weight. The carry through spars were in the wrong place and design, and in order to get it's required strength and load capability needed, they kept adding material, etc. NG came on board and did an analysis, not of just the RCS, antenna issues, but of structure, propulsion, intake, exhaust, etc. Our lead aerodynamics engineer, a well known figure, published his findings. He said so much was wrong that it couldn't be made to operate off a carrier with any payload. His recommend was to start over. He told them what to change to have a chance at an operation design. It wasn't pretty, but he was polite. Chaney stopped the program payments after the full review, maybe two months, after NG gave it's findings to the review board. We did offer to help. The Navy budget just would not allow this, they were running dry. We had done such a good job on ours, again we were pretty bummed.
That's incredibly interesting! Was the AX proposal from McAir/GD based on Northrop project review? Is the only artwork we have any realistic?
Thank You very much.
 

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And that belief I have seen challenged a number of times, and that there was indeed a sub scale B-2 demonstrator.
Prove it. I can tell you I was there at the start of the ATB/Senior CJ/AP-10/B2. worked there until the mid 90's. I also worked ATA, ATF, etc. There was no demonstrator of any kind. Just Tacit Blue, which was my first. So I don't know who is feeding you your misinformation, so present your evidence please.
Considering these projects are compartmentalised would anyone from one program know what was going on with another.

You have a point as visit to Skunk Works by my old colleague Steven Trimble when he ran DEW LIne section of Flightglobal, he went on visit (by invite only) in 2008 to see the USAF AFMC Advanced Composite Aircraft (based on Dornier 328). It was in an compartmentalised empty space in large hangar, with a dividing wall where Steven saw the top of the P-791 in the gap and asked if that was it to his hosts and escorts. They laughed and said they could tell but have to kill him afterwards in a joking manner.

He pointed out that there was wee white noise of buzzing in the corridors between project offices so that peeps in office could not eavesdrop or accidentally say loudly what they were working on.

Anyhow here is extract of a recent visit last year to new facilities, hes speaking to another former colleague Guy Norris in podcast.


cheers

That's something I can talk about and do have experience with. I work in a IT environment where they have a mechanical fan like system in place with ducting above our ceilings where talk nearby is drowned out by a large building-wide white noise system. It's also meant to not distract people from what they are working on. But I've often joked that it sounds like someone running a bath in an adjacent room. I later found out that the rheostat like control in my boss' office actually controlled the speed and pitch of the noise created by the fan. We initially thought it was just a thermostat.
 
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Tangential, excessive compartmentalisation is a well-known bane of other industries, sometimes due corporate stupidity / inertia eg 'Not Invented Here' and its converse, and sometimes because of a surfeit of specialisation...

Plus, yes, senior management who are too financially and legally oriented to adequately 'keep tabs' on the core business of engineering stuff that works reliably, on time and on budget: Yes, Boeing, I was thinking of you, too...
 
Relative to the A-12, folks I worked with at LM Aero-Ft. Worth, when it was still General Dynamics, tell tales that indicate the cancellation was merited as they have some real horror stories. FWIW, the building that was built for this effort has now been completely torn down and the fenced off land is for sale.
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
The SR-71 doesn't seem to have had too many problems ?
As for the F/A-22, its price limits its use and I think that its availability is low, it's a pity because it's a wonderful fighter. Better not to talk about the F-35...
 
SR-71 is not true stealth. It had a thermal IR signature the size of Mount Everest. Because of its speed, so what's the point in being stealth (or trying) ? Subsonic or low supersonic (Mach 1. 5 ) did better. But Mach 3.5 ? forget it.

D'oh, silly me, forgot the F-117: that one didn't went too badly, when you think about it. 59 build, not too expensive, stellar and impeccable service for nearly three decades, still flying in small number...

Something went wrong when Lockheed faceted style went out of the window for smooth curves.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast, one that flies Mach 6 and one much faster. According to the USAF General interested in obtaining help with the project, which was experiencing 'hardware' issues, he was willing to turn towards universities and private enterprise for the solution. This is what led some to believe that NASP was a cover for those efforts.
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
The SR-71 doesn't seem to have had too many problems ?
As for the F/A-22, its price limits its use and I think that its availability is low, it's a pity because it's a wonderful fighter. Better not to talk about the F-35...
Imagine 60 F-22s a year since and instead of cancellation. A lot of new [F-35/B-21] tech including coatings etc. could have been in different build increments.

The ones rolling off the lines today would be close to 6th Gen IMHO.
 
SR-71 is not true stealth. It had a thermal IR signature the size of Mount Everest. Because of its speed, so what's the point in being stealth (or trying) ? Subsonic or low supersonic (Mach 1. 5 ) did better. But Mach 3.5 ? forget it.

While often people use the term "SR-71" or "Blackbird" to refer to both the SR-71 and A-12, when it comes to survivability there are differences between the two aircraft that are important.

The A-12 (OXCART) was designed to have better survivability than its predecessor, the U-2. Speed, altitude, and anti radar / radar camouflage were engineered to make the A-12 more difficult to shoot down. It was not designed to be undetectable. The SR-71 did not have the same anti radar features that the A-12 did.

It's not clear what you mean by "true stealth". The A-12 was certainly designed with radar cross section reduction as a primary goal (along with speed and altitude) to reduce vulnerability to interception.
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
The B-2 was not capped because it was insanely expensive. It became insanely expensive because production was capped due to the end of the Cold War. All of the development costs were spread across only 21 airframes, instead of 132. Also, the production cost rose as fewer aircraft were produced as building fewer parts and assembling fewer airframes costs more since you don't get the large lot cost savings and and you cut off production before the full affects of the assembly learning curve can kick in. It still would have been expensive, but only about one quarter of what it ended up costing.

As for the F-22, there isn't any indication that 187 wasn't enough. We haven't needed all of them for any combat mission we've been engaged in since their development. We've had more than enough to accomplish anything that's been asked of them.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast, one that flies Mach 6 and one much faster. According to the USAF General interested in obtaining help with the project, which was experiencing 'hardware' issues, he was willing to turn towards universities and private enterprise for the solution. This is what led some to believe that NASP was a cover for those efforts.
Hi. Interesting, and thx. Do we have a traceable source for that?
A.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast, one that flies Mach 6 and one much faster. According to the USAF General interested in obtaining help with the project, which was experiencing 'hardware' issues, he was willing to turn towards universities and private enterprise for the solution. This is what led some to believe that NASP was a cover for those efforts.

In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast, one that flies Mach 6 and one much faster. According to the USAF General interested in obtaining help with the project, which was experiencing 'hardware' issues, he was willing to turn towards universities and private enterprise for the solution. This is what led some to believe that NASP was a cover for those efforts.
Hi. Interesting, and thx. Do we have a traceable source for that?
A.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast...

What he actually said in the interview was that Sandy McDonnell told him (Prof. Czysz) that he (Mr McDonnell) was told by an 'unknown' officer whilst at Offutt AFB that there were "five things you don't know about, Sandy" and that he needed to 'develop certain hardware capabilities' if it was 'to come about'

That's quite a distance from saying "there were five vehicles that were built..."

b.t.w. - if anybody has a copy of that interview with pg. 18 still present please post
 
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Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
The B-2 was not capped because it was insanely expensive. It became insanely expensive because production was capped due to the end of the Cold War. All of the development costs were spread across only 21 airframes, instead of 132. Also, the production cost rose as fewer aircraft were produced as building fewer parts and assembling fewer airframes costs more since you don't get the large lot cost savings and and you cut off production before the full affects of the assembly learning curve can kick in. It still would have been expensive, but only about one quarter of what it ended up costing.

As for the F-22, there isn't any indication that 187 wasn't enough. We haven't needed all of them for any combat mission we've been engaged in since their development. We've had more than enough to accomplish anything that's been asked of them.
As for the F-35 there isn’t any indication we need any of them for any combat mission……
 
SR-71 is not true stealth. It had a thermal IR signature the size of Mount Everest. Because of its speed, so what's the point in being stealth (or trying) ? Subsonic or low supersonic (Mach 1. 5 ) did better. But Mach 3.5 ? forget it.

While often people use the term "SR-71" or "Blackbird" to refer to both the SR-71 and A-12, when it comes to survivability there are differences between the two aircraft that are important.

The A-12 (OXCART) was designed to have better survivability than its predecessor, the U-2. Speed, altitude, and anti radar / radar camouflage were engineered to make the A-12 more difficult to shoot down. It was not designed to be undetectable. The SR-71 did not have the same anti radar features that the A-12 did.

It's not clear what you mean by "true stealth". The A-12 was certainly designed with radar cross section reduction as a primary goal (along with speed and altitude) to reduce vulnerability to interception.
It's competitor, the Convair Kingfish, looked even more reminiscent of a modern stealth aircraft.

kingfish4.jpg
 
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Did Ben Rich mention a weapons project where a rocket-propelled, "concrete" war head missile was launched from a SR-71 variant as a kinetic energy weapon?

I remember reading somewhere about a weapon of this sort, and Ben Rich was involved?
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
B-2A wasn't helped when management problems caused that year's delay - one incompetent first-level manager in the wrong place can create all sorts of headaches. The manager in question had been hired from Rockwell as the B-1 effort wound down and was not that competent (over 100% turnover in one year in his group) and was eventually forcibly retired. Then they went on a "Tiger team" approach to get things moving and a lot of us got drafted to assist. It was an "interesting" experience; once I showed I knew what I was doing, I got handed more responsibility and "got 'er done!"
 
Can't help thinking that, so far, no US stealth program ever went smoothly. B-2: capped to 21 insanely expensive; F-22, capped to 187 good aircraft in the end, but not enough of them, A-12: a complete carnage, nipped in the bud and F-35... oh well. It is doing better nowadays, but the 2010's were hard times...
B-2A wasn't helped when management problems caused that year's delay - one incompetent first-level manager in the wrong place can create all sorts of headaches. The manager in question had been hired from Rockwell as the B-1 effort wound down and was not that competent (over 100% turnover in one year in his group) and was eventually forcibly retired. Then they went on a "Tiger team" approach to get things moving and a lot of us got drafted to assist. It was an "interesting" experience; once I showed I knew what I was doing, I got handed more responsibility and "got 'er done!"
The B-2 was also delayed for the low altitude re-design requested by USAF, big, subsonic flying wing on the deck, not a good idea. Also, we took on a lot of incompetent people from the B-1B program (management, engineers, techs you name it) for ASD Pico, Palmdale and EAFB B-2 CTF which did not help us but we apparently needed people.
 
What worries me is that secrecy may lead to tribal knowledge being lost. Having a very limited in-house publishing company do ready made books to be housed in a vault like gold bars to be released one day sounds like a good idea.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast...

What he actually said in the interview was that Sandy McDonnell told him (Prof. Czysz) that he (Mr McDonnell) was told by an 'unknown' officer whilst at Offutt AFB that there were "five things you don't know about, Sandy" and that he needed to 'develop certain hardware capabilities' if it was 'to come about'

That's quite a distance from saying "there were five vehicles that were built..."

b.t.w. - if anybody has a copy of that interview with pg. 18 still present please post
 
Did Ben Rich mention a weapons project where a rocket-propelled, "concrete" war head missile was launched from a SR-71 variant as a kinetic energy weapon?

I remember reading somewhere about a weapon of this sort, and Ben Rich was involved?
Best source I can find on that is from Kelly Johnson's autobiography (and of all the places, cited on a 3D mockup model of the weapon uploaded to Shapeways).
“One of my favorite ideas for a number of years[…]if a 2500-pound highly steamlined shape made of tool steel[…]were to be launched from altitude by an SR-71 it would hit sea level at speeds well above Mach 3. Such a bomb could go through 300 feet of earth. It could, for example, plug the tunnels through the Ural mountains. It could penetrate 33 feet of reinforced concrete.
[…]
We could expect the bomb to hit well within a thirty-foot target area when dropped from 85,000 feet.”
Basic idea is actually valid if you've got a need for a non-explosive penetrator. During development of the GBU-28 - which is its own fun story - they built an inert model filled with concrete (I think it was inert and concrete-filled, at least) and dropped it from an F-111 at Tonopah Test Range.

The hole it left was over 100 feet deep. The Air Force didn't even bother to dig it up.
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast...

What he actually said in the interview was that Sandy McDonnell told him (Prof. Czysz) that he (Mr McDonnell) was told by an 'unknown' officer whilst at Offutt AFB that there were "five things you don't know about, Sandy" and that he needed to 'develop certain hardware capabilities' if it was 'to come about'

That's quite a distance from saying "there were five vehicles that were built..."

b.t.w. - if anybody has a copy of that interview with pg. 18 still present please post

I'm sorry, I'm not quite sure what you are inferring - the Isinglass study was cancelled roughly 20 years previous to the Czysz/McDonnell conversation. Could you be a bit more specific?
 
In the mid-1980s, according to Paul Czysz, McDonnell Douglas CEO Sandy McDonnell (CEO from 1980-1988) said there were five vehicles that were built for flight research in secret. Three that doesn't fly very fast...

What he actually said in the interview was that Sandy McDonnell told him (Prof. Czysz) that he (Mr McDonnell) was told by an 'unknown' officer whilst at Offutt AFB that there were "five things you don't know about, Sandy" and that he needed to 'develop certain hardware capabilities' if it was 'to come about'

That's quite a distance from saying "there were five vehicles that were built..."

b.t.w. - if anybody has a copy of that interview with pg. 18 still present please post

I'm sorry, I'm not quite sure what you are inferring - the Isinglass study was cancelled roughly 20 years previous to the Czysz/McDonnell conversation. Could you be a bit more specific?
The interview is covered in that thread.
 
Cancerman, I worked these programs as well and you are correct in your statements and info regarding B-2, ATA and ATF. I left NGC in the late -90's. I started NGC at ASD-Pico.

Man, you guys are just making me jealous. I would have loved to work at NGC ASD.
I second that! What illustrious company we keep! And I'm being serious. Too cool!
 
Regarding excessive compartmentalization, we found out near the end of the TSSAM program that a problem we'd solved had already been solved before, on two other programs, but we never knew about this due to compartmentalization. Somewhere they ought to have a secure repository of these techniques/technologies to prevent continuous reinvention of the wheel.
 
flateric said:
Stephane Cochin (Stratosphere Models) discusses here http://groups.yahoo.com/group/space-modelers/message/65311
if some information trails in Lockheed Horizons article on hypersonics tech may be a clue to Renй Francillon's 'manned Mach 6 vehicle'
mentioned in first edition 'Lockheed Aircrafts...'

Hi Flateric,

Since a couple years passed since my posting, i have updated my information (see below). First, there is no proof that René Francillon saw or found something indicating specifically a Mach 6 cruising aircraft test flown by Lockheed. When i started my research on hypersonic aircraft projects in 1999, the only known Mach 6 hypersonic project from Lockheed was the L-301 NHFRF. The X-24 C project was already publicly accessible to some degree if you knew where to look in 1981 (even AW&ST mentionned it along with photo of a desk model of Phase I, from what i remember) and he certainly saw the research that Lockheed did on Lockalloy. Still, althought it was the best candidate for what he states, the L-301 was only designed to cruise for a few seconds with its experimental scramjets. And we all know the project was never built. Although.. (and i will expand on this later as there is stuff i have never posted that is quite interesting).

However, it was quite interesting back then in the early years of 2000 when i was researching the X-24 C project as well as beryllium-aluminium (on which i accumulated quite a lot of material), there was some interesting and discreet disinformation going on about the use of Lockalloy by Lockheed. The official story on the web on Nasa historical webpages was that Lockalloy was developed to be tested on the lower central fin of the YF-12 aircraft as a way to counter vibrations in that fin.

I was finding all that very funny because meanwhile i had the Nasa CASI papers during the same time period and they stated cleary how the Lockalloy was to be used for the X-24C Phase III L-301 NHFRF from Lockheed. Furthermore, Lockalloy was developped by Lockheed in the 1960's for use on a spacecraft project. A very complete technical paper on safety procedures for milling and cutting beryllium-aluminium (whose dust is quite toxic and causes the berylliose illness (similiar to asbetos disease) was also published by Lockheed during the time period of the X-24 C project.

Also, you should have seen the kind of response i got when i tried to get my hands on old Lockheed Horizon magazines back in 2000. I called a branch of Lockheed located where i live which deals with reproduction technology. When i reached the lady there by phone, she had quite a happy and helpful voice. A few days later when i called back to know the result of her search to see if they had any of those magazines at their office, her tone had radically changed and was a lot less helpfull. She basically told me i had to call the Lockheed Skunk Works directly (in California). I later spotted a whole series of those magazines at a local library (the series was mostly complete, but not totally), made photocopies of what i found, came back for a 2nd series of photocopies. Then the weird thing is that on my third trip, all the magazines were removed from the library and moved into a depot.. On further trips when i checked, the books never returned on the shelves where i first found them.

I later found another source in Canada for some of the magazines that the first library didn`t have. The funny thing there too is that at first, they did pretend to me they did not have any copies of Lockheed Horizons. It is only when i specifically showed them the result of my internet search (with a special search engine we got here for academic use) along with the year and number of the documents i was looking for and which i knew they had, they finally admitted having them in stock..

During another search, when i was in contact with professor Paul Czysz, he gave me a librarian contact of his in the university where he worked where he said i would find copies of Lockheed Horizons. Well, when i contacted that lady by letter, she basically told me that NONE of ALL the university libraries in the US have ANY copy of Lockheed Horizons (!!!).

OK... and my name is Santa Claus..


So i guess Canadian libraries have better material than those in the US, since i found all i was looking for here..

When i first started my research on the FDL-5, 10 years ago, i found a technical paper that specifically said the FDL-5 A (unmanned) was built. It was actually the one version of the FDL-5 for which we know for sure there were components built, including some full-scale components. Another technical paper refered to the FDL-5 A having been built and tested in the HATS facility (a large oven chamber) at Wright Patterson. Since more information have now come out, and it turns out the information that was printed in the 2 tech papers was partly untrue.. Here`s why (and no one can blame someone for quoting what a tech paper was declaring as an accomplished fact): more detailled now declassified technical papers on the full-scale test items for the
FDL-5 A contradict what was said in the earlier papers, in fact, a full size fin and a full size front fuselage only were built and tested in the oven. Now an article even refers to the FDL-5 front fuselage as the 'HATS' (it was not, the HATS was the oven). That front fuselage i now found out was not a test flight article but was actually a simplified FDL-5 A front fuselage (its underside was flat, uncharacteristic of the all the FDL-5 series which have a slightly curved underside), a technical paper on the zirconia-diboride skirt and heat shield as well as an article link it clearly to the FDL-5 (although the article did not say so cleary, it showed it in conjonction with a photo of the FDL-5 mock-up nevertheless), and the heat shield technical paper shows a drawing of that FDL-5A front fuselage test article (to be tested in the oven) with a.. flat underside. End of the mystery.

Sub-scale components were also built to test the heat shield leading edges and nose tip material.

Now do we know everything about the FDL-5 series ? Not yet, by far. A lot of it is still classified, specifically on the later manned versions.

Now what else could Lockheed have built that was hypersonic.

Two things clearly:

FDL-6 SOMV (for which there is a rear fuselage half, and photographic evidence for it, in Lockheed Horizons).
(technical papers on it are still classified by the way, last time i checked, NTIC told me they don`t have any of them, even though i have specific titles and author names for them, as well as numbers).

And:

HGV (this is actually the only one which is confirmed by an FOIA as having been built. That project was a silver bullet weapon that was later on removed from the US arsenal following one of the missiles treaties with the Soviet Union. I have a copy of the document at home).

FDL-6 SOMV is as yet unconfirmed as having been flown. Now, they had to have had `something' hypersonic, based on what Ben Rich says in his autobiography and article. Obviously if you eliminate FDL-5 (which was a pretty much in depth study), and X-24 C (pretty pretty much detailled study too), that leaves only FDL-6 and HGV, one of which only is confirmed (an unmanned boost glide missile).

The other possibility is that there is something ulterior to those projects that we don`t know about yet, something manned, but older than 1981.
The craft you described with the skirt and flat underbelly. I seen that type of plane once.

it was summer 2005 and I was going into my junior year. We just got home from working the night shift security at the local complex for the elders. We would always stop by my bros step dad's house steal beers from his basement. He was a cop and he kept the beer he confiscated from some unlucky people who had booze. We have a dry rez so no alcohol is allowed on our reservation. My brother went out on a early morning bike ride. A minute later he was back telling me and my two other brothers to "come see this." He was insistent and just told us it's a plane hoovering, above the neighborhood that was up on a hill, shining a light down on it. We were teasing him but he was sincere and told me it was silent. We jumped off roof and biked out on the highway that's on the other side of the valley from where it was.

We're out in an open area the sun is still behind the hills to our backs and we noticed that there wasn't a sound at all. Whatever it was doing the birds and dogs kept quite. Oddly enough there wasn't any noise from the highway or any local vehicles we heard about 30 minutes prior (we live along one of the busiest trucking routes in the country). So me being me, I lit my joint and cracked a beer I stole from my Bros step dad and flipped off the plane. My brothers must have been scared because they told me to put it out and toss my beer. We watched it for about 5 minutes before the light shut off and it started moving towards us. But the beam of light was still visible, even though we could see the planet closing from it's point of origin, as it continued to appear physical but transparent. Like how a jet from a water gun looks like and it was gone once it got to ground.

It was a bit chilling because it felt like forever to get over head. The window outlines we're there but it looked like the same as the the hull. It was smooth looking and the rivets were visible, a dark matte greyish white. It made me think it's texture was like that of sharks skin. The cockpit was similar to the supersonic boomer or that airliner, like elongated and risen slightly higher than the cargo bay area. Wedged shaped wings more on the aft end of the hull and a bit higher than the flat bottom with a rectangular tale section. Just before the wings was the a darker patch of the air force circled star and rectangle stripes. No detail just the dark patch. And it was completely silent even though it was about 100" or less above us.

As it's passing we were all caught off guard seeing the exhaust vents emitting a color of blue I've never seen before, maybe the vividness of lightening is about as close as I can describe it but it didn't look like lightening. Then we heard a torch like sound but it was so faint, made us question if we heard anything at all. We followed it out on a dirt road east into the sunrise as it slowly climbed and accelerated. Me and the other middle brother kept following it rounding a hill before it was gone. The way back in town and home we were talking about the silence. A block away from the house it's like the world woke up, trucks Jake braking down the big hill into town and our friends loud rez bomb pulling up to the house coming from a party and rounding a bottle he stashed and made off with.

I've told plenty of people about this and most just dismissed us and said we made it up because of the hoovering, light we seen and it's propulsion exhaust. Our friend who pulled up believed us because he said an erie feeling came over them. He thought it was a bad spirit and went in the house he was at until that feeling left. I am native living on the rez, yes we do pick up on that stuf. Yes, I personally seen some bad spirits and it's not something that you want to encounter. But that's a other topic. But it was just funny how that happened after we got home after that whole twilight zone episode.
 
Although I'm skeptical, lets filter out what we know about the sighting:

Summer 2005
A dark grey aircraft hovered over a small neighborhood at dusk for at least 5 minutes.
An inconsistent beam of light shined down from the aircraft.
It made little sound, although sounded like a blow torch as it slowly passed overhead.
The shape was a 'wedge' shape with US roundel marking ahead of the wings.
The raised cockpit had windows and the 'hull' had blended windows.
Rivets in the skin were visible.
The aircraft accelerated slowly away.

My first guess would be that this is some type of airship that uses an embedded turbine. The semi-rigid airframe could be aluminum (hence the rivets) while the remaining airship envelope was of a lighter material like Goodyears' Tedlar airship material. The blended windows could enclose a troop carrier section that enables the aircraft to carry soldiers for an assault type of mission with windows sewn into the envelope. The light emitted from the craft could be a laser from a soldiers weapon shining down with dust being illuminated sporadically in the lasers beam. The blue color could be the engines exhaust glowing in the exhaust duct. The blue color in a jet engine's exhaust is given by the characteristic EM radiation of C-H bond breaking. C- and H- radicals will form and recombine with O- radicals to form CO2 and H2O. This is independent of temperature.

Another idea is that it could have been a UAV with similar design as mentioned above, but with sensor windows.

Interesting sighting. If it was over a neighborhood hopefully others were able to see it as well and reported it.

BTW, an unusual sighting in 2021 by 50 Marines near Twenty-Nine Palms was also documented with similar similar characteristics. They reported something about half the size of a football field (below).
 

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